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What explains the differences in the ways captor states choose to treat enemy 
prisoners during war? Why are the rights of some prisoners rigorously upheld, while 
in other cases they are viewed as expendable? I argue the abuse of captured 
combatants largely flows from the nature of the belligerents and bloodshed during 
war. According to the nature of the belligerents, I argue that democracies are less 
likely on average to abuse prisoners than their autocratic counterparts. However, I 
propose the reasons for this democratic distinctiveness are less a function of domestic 
norms of individual rights or nonviolence, but more due to the greater sensitivity of 
democracies to fears over retaliation as well as to the strategic benefits possible 
through good conduct. On the other hand, the bloodshed wrought by the aims states 
seek to attain through war, along with the severity of the fighting, strongly increase the 
chances that states will abuse their prisoners. In order to assess these arguments, I 
construct a new data set on the treatment of captured combatants during all interstate 
wars from 1898 to 2003. I then provide further support for the findings from the 
quantitative analysis using a series of in-depth case studies of several episodes of both 
the abuse and humane treatment of enemy prisoners. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The whole right which war can give over captives is to secure their 
person so that they can no longer do any harm.  
- Baron de Montesquieu 
 
Make no prisoners 
- Roman General Germanicus1 
These brief, yet telling, quotes succinctly embody two contrasting but 
ultimately enduring traditions regarding the treatment of combatants who become 
prisoners during war. One the one hand is the liberal tradition reflected in the writings 
of Montesquieu and others, which holds that prisoners are deserving of the utmost care 
and respect. By entering into captivity, prisoners are in effect engaging in a contract 
where in exchange for agreeing to lay down their arms and hand themselves over to 
the adversary, their captors in turn agree to treat them in a decent manner (Walzer 
2000:46). War is certainly hell, but according to the liberal tradition combatants who 
surrender have removed themselves from the heat of battle. Once they do so they are 
no longer considered instruments of warfare, but rather become individual human 
beings and should be accorded all of the fundamental rights guaranteeing their health 
and well-being throughout the entire time they are under their captor’s control. This 
perspective on the treatment of prisoners is a core tenet of just war theory and has 
been codified to an increasing extent in prevailing conventions on the laws of war. 
Against this benevolent side of prisoner care lies the darker but widely held 
view typified by Germanicus and others, which demands a harsher fate for those 
unlucky enough to fall into enemy hands. In this light, war is most certainly hell and 
the rigors of battle carry over to all aspects of the fighting whether on or off the 
                                                 
1 Both quotes are taken from a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on the Balkan 
wars from the early twentieth century (Carnegie Endowment 1993:215). 
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battlefield. Enemy combatants are not viewed as common human beings deserving of 
respect, but rather as objects to be dealt with or discarded as a captor see fit. In Roman 
antiquity, prisoners literally became a commodity where it was customary for captured 
soldiers to be sold as slaves or thrown into gladiator rings for the entertainment of the 
masses (Vance 2006:338-339). Although slavery became a less common fate, 
especially as it was eventually outlawed in the nineteenth century, the harsh 
punishment of prisoners has remained an all-too-common occurrence whether through 
torture, execution, hard labor, or a myriad of other forms of abuse. Facing such a dire 
future, it is not surprising that many soldiers preferred to continue fighting and face 
almost certain death rather than place themselves at the mercy of their captors, 
whether they were Soviet soldiers on the Eastern Front during the Second World War 
or U.S. troops in the jungles of Vietnam. 
Where do the prospects for an ordinary soldier facing the decision to surrender 
fall between these two extreme perspectives? In many ways we might expect the 
future for prisoners to be fairly bleak indeed, and thus much closer to Germanicus’s 
view on how they should and will be treated. After all, Winston Churchill provides 
probably the bluntest definition of a prisoner as a “man who tries to kill you and fails, 
and then asks you not to kill him” (Tsouras 2000:380).2 Given the harsh realities that 
often prevail during wartime, it is perhaps not surprising that captors may possess a 
variety of motives for harming enemy combatants who fall under their control.  
A perusal of the historical record suggests that states of all varieties are more 
than willing to abuse prisoners. For instance, it is difficult to discuss the subject of 
prisoner care without turning to recent U.S. policies toward detainees in the ongoing 
                                                 
2 More accurately, Churchill’s quote should refer to a man or a woman, though historically soldiers and 
consequently prisoners have overwhelmingly been male. For a discussion of the experience of women 
in captivity, see (Vance 2006:445-448). 
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War on Terror. Indefinite detention, torture, and other violations have garnered 
international condemnation as the United States continues to figure out how best to 
deal with suspected terrorists. Despite the purported tendency for democratic regimes 
to follow humane principles when waging war, recent U.S. conduct shows 
democracies can be just as susceptible as other regime types to combatant abuse given 
the right circumstances. Furthermore, Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and their ilk cannot 
be considered as isolated incidents or a singular departure from standard democratic 
principles, since there have been many past instances of democracies acting in a fairly 
harsh manner toward their prisoners. In the conflicts examined in this study, which 
focuses on all interstate wars from 1898 to 2003, I find in fact that about one-quarter 
of all warring democracies committed high levels of abuse against prisoners.3 
Democracy does not appear to be a panacea, in and of itself at least, to guarantee the 
safety of prisoners during war. 
The grim fate implied by Churchill’s quote must be balance against a long list 
of instances where prisoner treatment followed much more closely the humane tenets 
of just war theory and international law. The generous care accorded to prisoners 
across many conflicts has even led to contrasting views like the following: 
To-day the prisoner of war is a spoilt darling; he is treated with a 
solicitude for his wants and feelings which borders on 
sentimentalism. He is better treated than the modern criminal, who is 
infinitely better off, under the modern prison system, than a soldier on 
a campaign. Under present day conditions, captivity…is no sad 
sojourn by the waters of Babylon; it is usually a halcyon time, a 
pleasant experience to be nursed fondly in the memory, a kind of 
inexpensive rest-cure after the wearisome turmoil of the fighting. 
(Spaight 1911:265) 
                                                 
3 This is according to an index of combatant abuse that was developed for this project, which will be 
discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. 
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Given the purportedly sumptuous alternative of time spent in captivity rather 
than the risks of the battlefield, Spaight was amazed that soldiers would even choose 
to fight (Spaight 1911:265)! Spaight was an international legal scholar and his prim 
and proper account of the life of a surrendering soldier betokens more a Pride and 
Prejudice vision of prisoner care rather than the darker side more closely resembling 
Dante’s Inferno. The timing of Spaight’s comments is of course somewhat 
unfortunate, since it was just a few years before the First World War, which was not 
exactly known as a genteel or compassionate conflict in most respects. Despite his less 
than stellar predictive powers, Spaight’s perspective does point to another side of the 
treatment of combatants where prisoners have on the whole been handled quite well.  
What is also interesting about his comments is they were partly made in 
reference to the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, which at first blush might be 
considered a least-likely case for good prisoner treatment. First, the war involved two 
autocracies not exactly known to be very humane to their own citizens back home, and 
consequently might show little regard for enemy combatants. Second, Russia and 
Japan came from very different cultural backgrounds which could pose the danger of 
creating greater animosity. Third, at times during the conflict the fighting became 
quite pitched, which might be expected to lead both sides to vent their frustrations or 
punish prisoners from the adversary. Despite these dangers both of the warring parties 
generally treated surrendering enemy soldiers in a decent manner (Hata 1996:257; 
Vance 2006:346-347).  
Furthermore, looking more broadly and in a certain symmetry to the pattern for 
democracies, I find that across the interstate wars in this study around one-quarter of 
autocracies actually limit themselves to relatively low levels of abuse against their 
prisoners. Differences in the fate of surrendering soldiers across this brief selection of 
wars demonstrate that neither of the ideal type perspectives provides an adequate 
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account of the treatment of prisoners. Prisoners should not always be viewed as 
victims in dire straits where death is more than likely imminent, but nor should they 
always be considered pampered guests living in relative tranquility.  More generally, 
the historical record indicates some puzzling patterns in the conduct of captor states 
toward prisoners, which are deserving of a more systematic examination. 
The Question and Answer in Brief 
 This leads to the main research question of this study, what explains variation 
in the ways states choose to treat prisoners during war? Why are the rights of some 
prisoners rigorously upheld, while in other cases they are viewed as expendable? In 
simple terms, why are some prisoners horribly abused, while others are humanely 
treated? Despite the importance of these issues, there have been two main obstacles to 
adequately addressing this central research question. The first challenge is the lack of 
data on the treatment of combatants because no readily available indicator exists that 
is easy to measure. It is often difficult to obtain precise estimates for simply the total 
number of prisoners taken by each side during a give war, much less figures for those 
who lived or died. Even if death is certainly the most final and absolute outcome of 
captivity, many surviving prisoners still suffered greatly and may be maimed for the 
rest of their lives. Although many U.S. and British Commonwealth prisoners died 
under Japanese captivity, a great number continued to be in agony long after they were 
sent home due to the lasting effects of chronic hunger and disease (Vance 2006:464-
465). To overcome some of these issues in accounting for the great variety evident in 
the type and degree of prisoner violations, I develop a broad categorical measure of 
combatant abuse and spent a great deal of time and effort gathering the necessary data.  
The second and related obstacle is the lack of a clear theory of combatant 
abuse for developing and evaluating potential explanations for its causes. On this score 
as well I offer a framework for understanding under what conditions states are more 
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likely to treat prisoners humanely versus those circumstances in which they are more 
likely to treat them harshly manner. I argue that two key sets of factors are crucial for 
understanding patterns of combatant abuse, which I term the nature of the belligerents 
and the nature of the bloodshed.  
The nature of the belligerents looks to attributes of the warring states 
themselves and, in particular, focuses on the role of regime type. I find that 
democracy, despite some notable exceptions, acts on average to restrain the resort to 
combatant abuse. I also argue that the reason for this democratic distinctiveness is less 
a function of any inherent domestic norms, such as nonviolence or the sanctity of the 
individual rights of enemy combatants. Instead, democratic institutions create greater 
incentives for democracies to reject combatant abuse more out of practical fears of 
retaliation or escalation by the adversary, as well as greater sensitivity to possible 
strategic benefits that can somewhat paradoxically be gained through good conduct. 
Humane prisoner treatment can confer military advantages by making it more likely 
remaining enemy forces will prefer to surrender and accept the relative certainty of 
captivity rather than continue to risk death on the battlefield. In this way, good 
conduct during war can ironically weaken the ability of the adversary to resist by 
reducing its fighting forces on the battlefield through surrender. 
Other regime types may also be concerned with the risks of reciprocity of the 
advantages gained from humane conduct, but the argument I put forward is that the 
domestic institutions of democracies make them relatively more sensitive than their 
counterparts to these factors. Of course, if the incentives related to reciprocity or 
strategic advantages appear less forceful in a given war, then we may correspondingly 
expect democracies to act in a much more similar manner to their autocratic foes. 
The second component turns to the nature of the bloodshed itself created 
through war. I find two key traits of the bloodshed are especially important for 
 7 
 
understanding when higher levels of combatant abuse are more likely. The first trait is 
the severity of the fighting, especially conflicts that get bogged down into long and 
costly wars of attrition. Facing such dire circumstances resulting from all-out fighting, 
states are likely to become increasingly desperate to resort to combatant abuse as a 
tool of coercion to make the war more costly for their adversary, or to extract more 
from their prisoner population to facilitate the war effort. Worries over retaliation by 
the enemy are more likely to give way to the necessity of trying to find some way to 
coerce the adversary or extract more resources for warfighting.  
The second trait concerns instead the aims states seek to achieve through war 
and the ways in which these goals condition their incentives when deciding how to 
treat enemy combatants. I argue not all aims are created equal and only in those cases 
where a state strives to conquer territory from its adversary is the resort to combatant 
abuse most likely. When seeking territorial annexation, combatant abuse is a brutal 
though potentially effective strategy for eliminating those elements of the adversary 
most capable of mounting a rebellion to the conquering state’s continued hold on 
newly acquired lands. In this context concerns over retaliation or the possible benefits 
from good conduct are overshadowed by the longer-term advantages to be gained 
through combatant abuse. 
Taken together, the nature of the belligerents and the bloodshed contributes to 
our understanding of when states are most likely to turn to abusing enemy combatants. 
Looming large behind both elements is the shadow of reciprocity. Fears of retaliation 
and reactions to conduct by the adversary greatly condition whether and to what 
degree states will resort to combatant abuse. In order to more fully grasp patterns of 
abuse, I find that the conduct of the opposing side must ultimately be taken into 
account as well. On the other hand, other often cited factors influencing the conduct of 
states during war are found to have less of an impact. Cultural and racial animosities 
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are often argued to contribute to greater levels of violence of all sorts between warring 
parties, but I find that belligerents from different cultural backgrounds are no more 
likely to commit higher levels of combatant abuse than those from a similar 
background. Greater relative material capabilities also do not provide much insight 
into patterns of abuse, since the weak appear to be just as likely as the strong to 
commit violations against prisoners under their control. Finally and perhaps more 
regrettably, international law and international norms do not appear to offer significant 
restraints against combatant abuse. Neither ratifying prevailing international treaties 
nor growing humanitarian norms favoring prisoner rights substantially reduce the 
chance that states will choose to abuse enemy combatants. The international 
community thus unfortunately still appears to have a long way to go before effectively 
translating the principles of the laws of war into practice. 
Situating the Study 
The vast majority of research on war has tended to concentrate on its causes 
more than on any other stage of the conflict (Blainey 1988; Levy 1989). In many ways 
this focus is not without good reason, since identifying those factors most likely to 
cause wars can help to avoid later horrors by preventing future wars from breaking out 
in the first place (Van Evera 1999:1-3). A similar motivation is often also behind the 
smaller but still substantial literature examining how and why wars end (Wittman 
1979; Pillar 1983). By figuring out what factors make the termination of wars more 
likely, conflicts might be brought to a close in a quicker and potentially more 
agreeable manner to all parties involved. 
This study instead falls into the smaller but growing literature on the conduct 
of states in the midst of war (e.g. Legro 1995; Gartner 1997). Warfare of various sorts 
remains an unfortunate yet enduring phenomenon in the contemporary world (Sarkees 
et al. 2003:60-61). Research on what factors lead states to behave in different ways 
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during the course of conflict does not necessarily imply an unconditional acceptance 
of the brutality that often typifies many wars. Understanding what drives the conduct 
of states during war has the potential to ameliorate the fate of those participating or 
thrust into battle, even if war itself remains an enduring part of international relations 
for the foreseeable future. For instance, Reiter and Stam provide a seminal study of the 
role of democracy on the ability of belligerents to win the wars they fight (Reiter and 
Stam 2002). My study should best be viewed as complementary to Reiter and Stam, 
since by looking at the treatment of prisoners I seek to systematically examine the 
importance of regime type for one particular element of the broader conduct of states 
during war. Furthermore, if democracies are more likely to treat their captives well 
and this translates into certain military benefits, then prisoner treatment may provide a 
further mechanism explaining the propensity of democracies to win their wars. 
Looking at the treatment of combatants contributes to a growing body of work 
that examines the victims often created by war (Hartigan 1982; Grimsley and Rogers 
2002). Recent research in this vein by Benjamin Valentino, Alexander Downes, and 
others has tended to focus overwhelmingly on violence against civilians (Downes 
2006; Kalyvas 2006; Valentino et al. 2006; Downes 2007; 2008). As the unarmed and 
defenseless, civilians represent perhaps the most pitiful victims of warfare and are 
certainly deserving of current and future research. Other work has considered the 
treatment of combatants, but places prisoner issues within the broader context of 
compliance with the laws of war writ large (Morrow 2007). Turning to the abuse of 
combatants who have laid down their arms and surrendered departs from the existing 
civilian literature, but is in many ways complementary by bringing attention to another 
frequently forgotten casualty of war. This is thus the first study to date that specifically 
examines the causes of combatant abuse across a large number of conflicts. 
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In a similar manner to several studies on the targeting of civilians, I argue that 
the abuse of combatants largely follows a strategic logic.4 The nature of the 
belligerents and bloodshed framework emphasizes the role of particular incentives 
emanating either from the internal attributes of the warring parties themselves, or from 
the ensuing fighting, which influence their decisions on whether or not to resort to 
combatant abuse. This is in contrast to arguments emphasizing the importance of 
irrational hatreds as the primary driver of the conduct of states during war. Emotion 
and hatred may certainly play a role in certain cases, but do not provide much leverage 
for understanding broader patterns in the treatment of prisoners across wars. 
A few comments are also in order limiting the scope of this study and to 
specify what it does not purport to accomplish. First, I do not claim to offer a 
comprehensive account of the abuse of prisoners across all forms of warfare. This 
study is confined to examining the causes of combatant abuse during interstate wars. 
Violence against prisoners certainly occurs during civil wars, counterinsurgency 
operations, or other wars involving non-state actors, but a closer examination of these 
conflicts is beyond the purview of this study. Collecting adequate data just for one 
class of conflicts was a daunting task, which meant that from a feasibility standpoint I 
decided it was necessary to limit the study to wars between states.  
Nevertheless, it is instructive to keep in mind how my arguments for interstate 
wars would translate when applied to other types of conflict. For instance, the strategic 
gains from good conduct may be much smaller in such conflicts, especially if warring 
parties view the adversary as a stern foe unlikely to surrender in any event. If the 
                                                 
4 I use the term “strategic” in a similar sense to many other scholars studying the conduct of war to refer 
to decision making based on rational means-ends calculations rather than emotional or irrational hatreds 
(Valentino 2004:3; Downes 2006:170; 2008:10). This contrasts with another common usage drawn 
from game theory, which focuses on interactive decision making between multiple actors (Morrow 
1994:1). However, the latter usage is still relevant when discussing the importance of reciprocity and 
combatant abuse. 
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potential benefits of obtaining intelligence through torture or other forms of abuse 
seem especially attractive, then the strategic advantages from good conduct may be 
less alluring. Furthermore, expectations of reciprocity may be more problematic in 
conflicts against non-state actors who are not organized and do not fight in a similar 
manner to traditional national militaries. If these and other restraints operate with less 
force in other types of conflict, then it follows for instance that democratic belligerents 
might be just as ruthless as other regime types in such situations. The question of 
combatant abuse in forms of conflict other that interstate warfare is set aside for much 
of this study, but will be taken up in a more concerted manner in the concluding 
chapter. 
Second, I do not seek to provide a theory of every instance of combatant abuse 
committed by soldiers during interstate wars. War inevitably remains a dirty business. 
Even in conflicts that would be considered humane by most measures, atrocities can 
certainly still occur. The focus of this study is on the policy and practices of states 
toward enemy prisoners rather than isolated acts initiated by individual soldiers or 
small units of troops. The latter would require a theory of the conduct of individual 
soldiers, which is certainly an interesting topic, but deserving of an entire separate 
study on its own terms.5 Although more restricted, a study of the prisoner policies of 
warring states more closely matches existing research on the treatment of civilians. 
The best and worst cases of the treatment of prisoners more often than not involved 
active intervention by the government’s civilian and military leadership in all aspects 
of prisoner care, whether this concerned encouraging or restraining combatant abuse. 
                                                 
5 Examples in this vein include (Bourke 1999; Ferguson 2004). 
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Why Should We Care about Combatant Abuse? 
 Even though the historical record points to some intriguing differences in the 
treatment of prisoners across wars, why should we be concerned with understanding 
the causes of combatant abuse? From a humanitarian point of view the stakes are not 
small, since the number of prisoners captured during most wars is often quite large. 
Most studies of warfare disregard the treatment of prisoners and instead focus on the 
number of battle deaths inflicted during the course of fighting (Small and Singer 
1982:69-76; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). Battle deaths are certainly crucial for 
understanding various facets of the strategies belligerents employ and the ultimate 
course of the war, but discount the full costs of war. For instance, the Soviet Union 
admittedly suffered an astonishing 7.5 million battled deaths during the Second World 
War, but against this must also be included over 3.3 million Soviet prisoners who died 
in captivity. This means that almost one in every three deaths of Soviet soldiers during 
the war was inflicted against prisoners outside of battle.6 Investigating the causes of 
combatant abuse is thus relevant to developing a more general understanding of the 
suffering caused by warfare. 
 The study of combatant abuse also has broader policy implications as well. The 
War on Terror has brought difficult questions to the fore regarding the rights of 
captives and the responsibilities of their captors. Although my argument is concerned 
with interstate conflict, the paucity of research on combatant abuse across warfare in 
general means this study can also be viewed as a starting point for grasping the 
                                                 
6 Figures for Soviet battled deaths are based on the Correlates of War (COW) data set on Inter-State 
War Participants version 3.0 (Sarkees 2000). Figures for prisoner deaths are taken from (Forster 
1986:21). The number of prisoner deaths might even be an understatement, since prisoners who were 
summarily executed on the battlefield by German forces are likely included under the battle deaths 
total. It was common on the Eastern Front for the German Army to cooperate with so-called 
Einsatzgruppen (intervention groups), which were specially formed execution squads assigned to target 
Soviet prisoners and other undesired elements (Streit 1986:9). The relative ratio of prisoner-to-battle 
deaths should thus be viewed as a minimum estimate. 
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broader dynamics of prisoner treatment across other forms of armed conflict. 
Translating the logic underlying the nature of the belligerents and bloodshed 
framework, along with the many alternative explanations, to other types of conflicts 
remains an open though crucial question to address. 
The finding that democracies are more likely to treat their prisoners decently 
has implications for the larger literature on the value of promoting democracy 
worldwide. The democratic peace has established that democracies are less likely to 
fight one another, but added to this is the further potential benefit that democracies 
may conduct themselves more humanely during war. However, the argument I put 
forward should not be viewed as supporting a democratic triumphalist perspective. 
Democracies may on average be less prone to abusing prisoners, but given the right 
circumstances they can turn on their captives if they believe the benefits outweigh the 
costs. Recent U.S. treatment of prisoners from Afghanistan and Iraq thus follows a 
long tradition of combatant abuse committed by democracies. Democracies may 
certainly conduct themselves more humanely overall, but a darker side to democratic 
regimes often looms not far below the surface and should not be ignored. Determining 
the scope of the restraints under which democracies are most likely to follow 
humanitarian principles is necessary for understanding the overall role of regime type 
in the conduct of states during war. Identifying potential limits on democratic 
restraints is also especially useful when thinking about the future conduct of states 
under all forms of conflict. 
In a similar manner, although I find that international law and norms do not 
appear to greatly restrain combatant abuse, this does not imply they have no value 
whatsoever. Without norms or laws proscribing the use of violence against 
surrendering soldiers, studying violence against prisoners would be superfluous since 
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there would be nothing out of the ordinary in their suffering or death.7 In fact, the very 
measure of combatant abuse I construct draws directly from prevailing principles of 
international humanitarian law. Furthermore, international law also matters in the 
sense that states often feel they need to justify their policies toward prisoners during 
wartime in legal or moral terms. Other factors may ultimately play a greater role in 
determining the conduct of states toward enemy combatants, but international law and 
related norms remain an inescapable element of contemporary warfare. 
Finally, combatant abuse does not operate in isolation but can have wide-
ranging implications for the course of war, which can result in consequences that 
endure long afterwards. The treatment of prisoners of war and their eventual fate pose 
the danger of heightening animosities between already bitter rivals and thereby 
making wars even longer and bloodier than otherwise. For instance, the back and forth 
nature of the Korean War, where opposing armies marched up and down the Korean 
peninsula and the great powers of the United States and China clashed head on, 
certainly makes it count as one of the less renowned but brutal conflicts of the 
twentieth century.8 Despite many harsh realities to choose from, one prominent 
historian of the war, Max Hastings, found issues surrounding prisoners to be 
particularly deplorable: 
No aspect of the Korean War was more grotesque than the manner in 
which the struggle was allowed to continue for a further sixteen 
months after the last substantial territorial obstacle to an armistice had 
been removed by negotiation in February 1952. From that date until 
the end in July 1953, on-the-line men endured the miseries of summer 
heat and winter cold, were maimed by mines and killed by napalm, 
small arms, and high explosives, while at Panmunjom [the main site 
for negotiations] the combatants wrangled around one bitterly 
                                                 
7 For a similar argument on the role of norms against the killing of civilians, see (Downes 2004:36). 
8 Along with substantial U.S. and Chinese involvement, it should also be noted that the Korean conflict 
is interesting because it contained a certain civil war element in addition to its interstate character. Both 
the North and South Korean sides sought to become the legitimate authority over the entire peninsula. 
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contentious issue: the post-armistice exchange of prisoners (Hastings 
1987:305). 
As is evident from his remarks, the delay in ending the hostilities was not without 
consequences, since almost half of all U.S. casualties were suffered after the first 
armistice negotiations took place during which prisoner issues quickly became the 
central stumbling block (Hastings 1987:329). 
 The abuse of combatants also has the potential to spill over into other issue 
areas and cause further suffering both during and after war. Although far from 
conclusive, it has often been argued that one of the motivations behind the U.S. 
decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan during the Second World War was partly 
in response to the brutal Japanese policy toward U.S. prisoners in the Pacific (Speed 
1990:ix). In Europe during the same war, it is indicative that the first victims of the 
gas chambers at the Auschwitz concentration camp were not Jewish civilians but 
rather Soviet prisoners of war (Piper 1994:159; Ferguson 2004:185). In many ways the 
orders and policies that the German government formulated for the treatment of Soviet 
prisoners developed into the operational basis for carrying out the later Final Solution 
against the Jewish population (Streit 1986:2). Studying the treatment of enemy 
combatants thus has implications for understanding the broader conduct of states 
during war. 
Plan for the Remainder of the Study 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a more 
detailed definition of combatant abuse and puts forward the main theoretical 
framework for understanding its causes based on the nature of the belligerents and the 
bloodshed. Chapter 3 then introduces a new data set on combatant abuse during 
interstate wars from 1898 to 2003. I discuss some of the challenges in developing an 
operation measure for the treatment of prisoners and then present some preliminary 
patterns in combatant abuse across interstate warfare. Chapter 4 provides a 
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quantitative analysis of the causes of combatant abuse using this data set. The results 
offer strong support for the restraining effect of democracy, while as expected the 
severity of the fighting and territorial war aims greatly increase the likelihood a state 
will resort to higher levels of combatant abuse. Across all of these results, the role of 
reciprocity stands not far behind in the background. 
The next two chapters delve in greater detail to examine the logic underlying 
two elements drawn from the nature of the belligerents and bloodshed framework. 
Chapter 5 investigates what precisely seems to shape the conduct of democracies 
through a detailed examination of U.S. and British policy toward Axis prisoners 
during the Second World War. The evidence suggests democracies are driven less by 
normative commitments to domestic norms of nonviolence and individual rights, but 
rather institutional incentives related to concerns over retaliation by the Axis powers 
and the strategic benefits that could be gained through more humane conduct. 
However, I also argue that these restraints are fragile and that in many circumstances 
democracies can easily descend toward more brutal conduct. Chapter 6 then focuses 
on one trait of the nature of the bloodshed to determine why wars of territorial 
annexation are more likely to lead to higher levels of combatant abuse. Through a 
study of Soviet treatment of Polish prisoners during the Second World War, which 
culminated in the Katyn Forest massacre, I argue that the Soviet desire to conquer and 
hold on to Polish lands provides a better account for the timing and particular patterns 
of combatant abuse against Polish prisoners than alternative explanations. Chapter 7 
concludes by discussing implications of the results for understanding broader issues in 
the conduct of states during war and offers several avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CAUSES OF COMBATANT ABUSE: A CONCEPTUAL AND 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
What explains variation in the ways captor states choose to treat enemy 
prisoners during war? Why are the lives of some prisoners treated so cheaply, while in 
other instances captured combatants are diligently accorded the highest care and 
respect? Answers to these questions have implications not only for the immediate 
well-being of troops captured on the battlefield, but also for our more general 
understanding of the conduct of states during armed conflict. Even if they do not die in 
battle, the fortunes of soldiers once taken prisoner remain far from certain. Of the 
91,000 German prisoners who surrendered at the end of the battle of Stalingrad during 
World War II, merely 5,000 survived to eventually return home (Rayfield 2005:396). 
Yet the conditions for prisoners of war are not always so stark, and at times even 
approach a reasonable level of comfort. During the Falklands War between Britain and 
Argentina, prisoners on both sides were treated in a decent manner despite the enmity 
felt between the two adversaries (Beaumont 1996:287-288; Vance 2006:129-130).  
 Differences in the treatment of prisoners over time, but even within the same 
war, are startling and beg for a more systematic investigation. I begin this chapter by 
developing a more precise definition of the concept of combatant abuse. Combatant 
abuse is defined as a military strategy enacted by the political or military leadership to 
harm or kill through various means enemy combatants who have laid down their arms. 
I then assess the costs and benefits that often arise when states decide whether or not 
to abuse combatants.  
The third and fourth sections present a theory of combatant abuse, which 
centers on the nature of the belligerents and the bloodshed. The nature of the 
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belligerents concerns the warring states themselves and identifies particular national 
attributes that likely influence how they choose to treat enemy combatants who 
surrender. I argue that a state’s regime type, and democracy in particular, creates 
incentives for democratic belligerents to exert more restraint than their autocratic 
counterparts when deciding how to treat their prisoners. Normative and institutional 
approaches offer very different accounts to explain why democracies appear to act 
differently than other regime types. Democratic norms of respect for individual rights 
or restraints on the use of violence may make democracies more averse to inflicting 
abuses on prisoners. From an alternative institutional perspective, I propose that the 
restraining effect of democracy is a result of the higher sensitivity of democracies to 
the costs of retaliatory abuses as well as greater attention to some of the paradoxical 
benefits to be gained from good conduct. 
In the fourth section, I turn to the next theoretical component, which concerns 
the nature of the actual bloodshed wrought through war. I argue that two key attributes 
of the bloodshed are particularly salient and heighten the likelihood that states will 
resort to combatant abuse. The severity of the fighting on the battlefield increases 
incentives for states to use combatant abuse to coerce their opponent or extract more 
resources from the prisoner population. In addition, the objectives states seek to attain 
through war, in particular territorial annexation, makes combatant abuse an extremely 
attractive strategy for reducing future opposition in newly acquired lands. Fifth, I then 
discuss more briefly a frequently cited alternative explanation, cultural differences, 
which provides a different approach for understanding patterns of combatant abuse. 
Lastly, I summarize the main arguments put forward and briefly discuss how the 
hypotheses will be evaluated in the following chapters. 
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Defining Combatant Abuse 
For the purposes of this study, I define combatant abuse as a military strategy 
enacted by political and military authorities that involves the intentional killing or 
harming, either directly or indirectly, of enemy combatants who have laid down their 
arms and surrendered. The definition contains several elements that merit further 
elaboration, which are summarized in Table 1 below.  
Table 1: Summary of the concept of combatant abuse 
4 Components of combatant abuse
1) "Combatants"
▪"consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a 
command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates” 
(Additional Protocol I, Article 43).
▪broad concept of armed forces: uniformed military, guerrillas, etc.
▪excludes munitions workers.
2) State-sanctioned policy
▪excludes isolated acts by individual or small groups of soldiers.
3) Wide range of violations beyond execution possible
▪based on "Grave Breaches" logic of Geneva Conventions (1949 III, Article 130
▪main criteria: extreme physical and/or mental hardship.
4) Intentionality, including cases where negative harm to prisoners is foreseeable.  
First, both international legal scholars and just war theorists have spent a good 
deal of time and effort trying to precisely define the boundary separating combatants 
from noncombatants, or in other words civilians (Rogers 2007:103-108). Going back 
to the first conventions of the 19th century and even earlier to many of the legal 
scholars from the Enlightenment, one of the core elements of the laws of war has been 
to create a distinction between civilians and combatants (Best 1980:63-66). In 
practice, however, the line has not always been clear and some even argue any 
meaningful distinction is no longer tenable given the inherent links between the entire 
national economy and a country’s war making capability in the modern era, as well as 
the implicit consent of the public for the government’s decision to enter into armed 
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conflict (Dunlap 2000:10).9 Yet such a view masks substantial differences in the 
degree to which combatants and noncombatants participate and actively contribute 
toward the military activities of the state.  
For a baseline definition, I follow the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions and consider combatants to “consist of all organized armed forces, 
groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct 
of its subordinates” (Article 43).10 I interpret “armed forces” broadly to refer not only 
to individuals serving in the official uniformed military, but also to members of 
irregular forces, such as guerrilla insurgents. In either case civilians are distinguished 
from combatants in that they do not pose a direct threat of harm to enemy personnel or 
property. Civilians may give moral support to combatants through nonviolent 
demonstrations, or provide food and other nonlethal supplies, but these activities do 
not pose a direct physical threat to the adversary and thus do not make these civilians 
equivalent to combatants (Valentino 2004:13-14).  
One additional group that does not directly belong to the armed forces, but is 
sometimes still included under the combatant category, concerns munitions workers 
(Walzer 2000:145-146). I acknowledge this reasoning that individuals making the 
tools necessary for soldiers to fight should be considered differently from those 
making what soldiers need to live, but I exclude munitions workers from the scope of 
this study. Those who include munitions workers do so mainly to argue they are 
legitimate targets, unlike other civilians, during military operations such as aerial 
bombing campaigns (Downes 2008:14-15). However, my concern is not so much with 
the general targeting of combatants during the heat of battle, but rather with the 
                                                 
9 Best also points repeatedly to the gap between the legal distinction between soldiers and civilians on 
the one hand, and the actual thinking and conduct of many states during war (Best 1980:96-99, 200-
201). 
10 The full text of the Protocol is available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/470?OpenDocument.  
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treatment of combatants once they have laid down their arms and are considered hors 
de combat. If it can be said that munitions workers have “laid down” their tools, then 
historically they are more often than not treated in a similar manner to other civilians 
by occupying forces, though perhaps as a group with a particularly useful set of skills 
to be exploited (Vance 2006:232). The status of surrendering armed forces is usually 
very different and almost always involves some form of captivity. Civilians are also 
sometimes detained for a variety of reasons, but the more narrow definition of 
combatants used here, which focuses only on those who are part of the armed forces 
while counting civilians as everyone else, more closely follows current thinking in 
international law.11 
A final remark concerns the relationship between my definition of combatant 
and the legal concept of prisoner of war (POW). In order to be formally considered 
POWs, combatants must fulfill certain criteria, such as being commanded by a leader 
responsible for his or her subordinates, wearing a fixed and recognizable emblem, 
carrying their arms openly, and acting in accordance with the laws of war.12 Some 
combatants, especially guerilla fighters, might not be granted POW status because 
they fail to meet certain of these criteria, though even in this case the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I loosened these restrictions somewhat.13 On the other hand, international 
humanitarian law mandates that several types of persons accompanying the armed 
forces but who are not actual members, such as war correspondents, should also be 
given POW status. Thus not all combatants might be considered POWs, while at the 
same time most but not all POWs are combatants. Since this study is concerned with 
                                                 
11 See, for instance, Article 50 of Additional Protocol I, which defines civilians in a negative fashion as 
any individual that is not a member of the armed forces. 
12 See the 1949 Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Art.4 and the 
accompanying commentaries for further details. Available at 
http://icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/375?OpenDocument. 
13 See Additional Protocol I, Article 44. 
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the treatment of all captured combatants, irrespective of their official status once 
detained, I use the terms “combatants” or “prisoners” in the broader sense and reserve 
“POW” to refer to the narrower legal term where relevant. 
 Second, combatant abuse refers to government policy and practices rather than 
isolated acts by individual soldiers or small troop units. During war it is not 
uncommon for some soldiers to take matters into their own hands and release their 
frustrations on captured personnel. Given the stress and rigors of the battlefield, 
individual-level abuses are perhaps not all that surprising (Bourke 1999:170). In a 
study of several different areas of the laws of war, Morrow found that violations were 
more frequent in areas, such as the treatment of prisoners and civilians, where 
frontline soldiers had greater scope and opportunity to commit atrocities. In areas 
under more centralized control, such as the use of chemical and biological weapons or 
aerial bombing, compliance was consistently higher (Morrow 2007:569).  
Although I acknowledge the role of atrocities committed at the individual or 
small group levels for understanding the character and conduct of armed conflict, 
these types of violations are qualitatively different from state-directed policies. The 
historian Max Hastings remarked that to fully understand the nature and motivations 
of the behavior of U.S. and Communist forces during the Korean War, “It remains 
important and valid to make some distinction between the random acts of individual 
UN troops and the systematic brutality of the North Koreans” (1987:287). 
Furthermore, the best and worst historical cases of the treatment of prisoners involved 
government authorities playing a leading hand in directing their forces to refrain from 
or commit combatant abuse. It also cannot be assumed that the causes of combatant 
abuse instigated by small groups of troops on the ground will necessarily be the same 
as for abuses directed by the civilian and military leadership. Only forms of abuse 
flowing directly from government policy are, therefore, considered cases of combatant 
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abuse for the purposes of this study. Individual violations may be included, but only 
insofar as higher military or political authorities condone such actions and make little 
or no attempt to stop their reoccurrence. As Downes notes in the related area of 
civilian victimization, violations are not necessarily always initiated by government 
leaders. They may instead begin with the military on the battle front, but once they are 
explicitly sanctioned or implicitly supported by higher authorities, these practices 
become “de facto” government policy (Downes 2008:15). 
 Third, combatant abuse comprises a variety of actions beyond the immediate 
execution of prisoners. Over the course of the twentieth century, international treaties 
have provided a growing number of rights for prisoners ranging from protections 
against torture or execution to more minor provisions, such as providing postage 
services, recreational facilities, and respecting personal belongings. I focus on those 
abuses bearing most directly on the physical and mental well-being of prisoners, since 
these acts are more likely to affect their overall quality of life once they lay down their 
arms. The latter group of more minor violations is excluded from the definition of 
combatant abuse. Instead, the range of relevant abuses closely follows the concept of 
“grave breaches” as defined in Article 130 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention. 
These include execution, torture, inhumane living or working conditions, forcefully 
conscripting prisoners into the captor’s armed forces, and denying proper judicial 
rights.  
Examples of each form of abuse across a variety of time periods and types of 
war are provided in Table 2 below for illustrative purposes. Relying on the 1949 
Geneva Conventions might appear to pose a problem of applying one particular set of 
principles to earlier periods that may have been guided by different expectations. This 
would, in turn, unduly bias against the perceived behavior of states in earlier conflicts. 
However, elements of each of these grave forms of abuse are found in earlier treaties, 
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as well as customary norms going back at least to the nineteenth century.14 Rules and 
expectations proscribing the most serious abuses against the body and mind of 
prisoners do not represent a recent development in international humanitarian law, but 
have existed in one form or another for well over a century. 
Table 2: Varieties of combatant abuse with historical examples15 
Type of Abuse Violator War Date Policy/Event
Execution England Hundred 
Year's War
1415 Killing of French 
prisoners at Battle of 
Agincourt by the order of 
Torture France Algerian War 1954-1962 Harsh interrogation of 
Algerian fighters.
Living/workin
g conditions
Roman 
Empire
Various Early 
centuries 
B.C./A.D.
Use of prisoners as hard 
labor in salt mines.
Military 
conscription
Germay World War II 1941-1945 Soviet "Hiwis " pressed 
into the German armed 
fDenying 
judicial rights
United 
States
War on 
Terror
2001-
present
Indefinite detention 
without trial of Al Qaeda 
and other terrorist  
 Fourth, combatant abuse refers to practices that intentionally kill or harm 
prisoners. Abuses like execution or torture are fairly clear-cut in this regard, but others 
such as nutritional standards and living conditions may at times seem more 
ambiguous. Failing to provide adequate food, shelter, or medical care might not appear 
to be as reprehensible as the active decision to shoot captives. Denying these 
necessities can in fact cause similar suffering and often leads to the same result of the 
                                                 
14 This is evident in previous treaties, such as the 1929 Geneva Convention and the earlier 1899 and 
1907 Hague Conventions. The commentaries to the 1949 Geneva Conventions provide further support 
for this view, see http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/375-590156?OpenDocument. The customary basis 
for many of these principles is also evident in the 1863 Lieber Code, the 1874 Brussels Declaration, and 
the 1880 Oxford Manual of the Laws and Customs of War, all available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO?OpenView.  
15 Sources: (Keegan 1976:85-112; Bartov 1991:44-45; Andreopoulos 1994:205-206; Vance 2006:339, 
439-442). 
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deaths of huge numbers of prisoners (Weindling 2000:76-77, 357). For instance, at the 
notorious Totskoye camp in Czarist Russia more than 53 percent of Austro-Hungarian 
prisoners died during the winter of 1915-1916 from a typhus epidemic resulting from 
poor and neglectful sanitation and medical facilities (Rachamimov 2002:95). In a 
similar manner, it is estimated that far more Russian soldiers died from German 
policies of purposeful starvation at many prisoner camps on the Eastern Front during 
the Second World War rather than from outright execution (Streit 1986:9-10). 
The proper treatment of combatants involves both negative and positive 
requirements. Captors are supposed to refrain from certain practices like torture, but 
they are also expected to actively provide other services, such as adequate shelter and 
medical care. General living conditions can of course vary a great deal due to the local 
climate as well as the economic situation of the captor state, especially during 
wartime. Nevertheless, there is a general expectation that captor states will put forth a 
good faith effort to care for their prisoners across all of the key dimensions listed 
above. In sum, combatant abuse includes not only cases of intentionally harming 
captured combatants, but also those instances where the consequences of the captor 
state’s action, or inaction, would cause foreseeable and avoidable harm to prisoners.  
Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Combatant Abuse 
What might states have to gain from abusing prisoners? Conversely, what 
might be the advantages of treating prisoners well? Before considering the causes of 
combatant abuse, it is instructive to briefly examine some of the possible costs and 
benefits to captor states from different choices along the continuum from diligent care, 
in the case of U.S. treatment of Iraqi soldiers during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, to the 
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outright brutality wrought by Japanese forces in Southeast Asia and the Pacific during 
World War II (see Figure 1 below).16 
U.S. in Persian Gulf 
War 
U.K. in WWI 
(Western Front)
Japan in World War II 
(Pacific Theater)
Low Medium High
 
Figure 1: Continuum of brutality in combatant abuse 
On the benefits side, combatant abuse may represent a potentially effective 
coercive tool for manipulating the resolve and capabilities of the enemy. The leaders 
and citizenry of the adversary must take into account not only the deaths to 
combatants and civilians directly inflicted through fighting, but also the deaths of 
combatants off of the battlefield. Images of beaten and mutilated corpses of U.S. 
troops being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu are widely viewed as playing a 
pivotal role in the reduction of the U.S. military presence in Somalia in 1993 and their 
eventual full withdrawal (Mueller 1996:30-31).17 In the terminology of the coercion 
literature, combatant abuse is an example of a punishment strategy which targets the 
will of the enemy to continue fighting by raising the societal costs of the war beyond 
what the adversary can bear. Studies of punishment strategies tend to focus on civilian 
targeting, but the same logic applies to the treatment of combatants.18  
Combatant abuse can also conform to the logic of a denial strategy. Denial 
does not seek to target the enemy’s will to resist, but rather weaken the enemy’s 
military ability to achieve its objectives (Pape 1996:19). The effects of combatant 
                                                 
16 For a similar discussion, but more from the point of view of individual soldiers, see Ferguson 
(1999:371-373). 
17 Though for a more skeptical account, see (Larson 1996:49; Burk 1999:77). 
18 In one of the most widely read studies of coercion, Robert Pape notes that “Punishment is not limited 
to hitting civilians in population centers. It may take the form of killing military personnel in large 
numbers to exploit the casualty sensitivities of opponents” (Pape 1996:13). What is not explicit in 
Pape’s remarks is that the killing of combatants for punishment purposes can happen on or off the 
battlefield. 
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abuse on military capacity can take several forms. The capture of enemy troops 
already reduces the power of the adversary since these soldiers are removed from 
combat for the purposes of the current war. Whether prisoners are treated well or 
mistreated does not change this immediate effect on the manpower of the adversary. 
The decision to abuse those prisoners is likely to have several other side effects on the 
enemy’s power calculations. States are obviously most concerned with the current 
war, but they also need to remain wary of possible conflicts with third-party states 
(Blainey 1988:65-66; Reiter 2003:31). Normally, prisoners are repatriated at the end 
of the conflict and can contribute once again to the fighting force of their home state. 
If prisoners are instead killed, then the future military capacity of a state can be 
substantially weakened.19 Combatant abuse can also have a more direct impact on the 
current war. Demonstrating to the enemy’s soldiers and citizens their potential fate 
might undermine the fighting capacity of the adversary by leading more soldiers to 
desert, or more citizens to resist conscription into the armed forces. The desired 
audience of combatant abuse is therefore not only the adversary’s leadership but also 
its citizens. 
Beyond their use for coercing the adversary’s leadership and population, 
captured soldiers represent a potentially valuable source of information regarding the 
adversary’s armed forces. The use of torture and coercive interrogation techniques in 
general can be an attractive option for captors desperate for information regarding the 
plans and motives of their adversaries (Bellamy 2006:123; Slater 2006:193). The 
perceived value of torture is even evident in contemporary popular culture. Kiefer 
                                                 
19 Of course, there is no guarantee that prisoners will be returned in a timely manner if at all. States 
often recognize the strategic value of prisoners, which might help explain why negotiations over their 
repatriation are often long and arduous. For instance, one of the reasons Western Powers were reluctant 
to repatriate Russian soldiers still held by Germany at the end of World War I was the fear they would 
simply strengthen the Bolshevik side in the ongoing Russian civil war (Bugnion 2003:101-102). 
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Sutherland’s character “Jack Bauer” on the hit show 24 has brought into the 
mainstream the depiction of torture as not only an effective but also a normal practice 
for dealing with dangerous prisoners (Green 2005:34). The few empirical studies of 
torture indicate, in contrast, that coercive procedures are relatively ineffective in 
securing either reliable or useful intelligence from suspects (Biderman 1960:140-141; 
Bowden 2003:57).20 In interviews many retired  interrogators remarked that they 
found a combination of coaxing and deception to be more useful than outright 
violence (Lelyveld 2005:40).  
Even if torture has largely been found to be an ineffective tactic for extracting 
information from captives, the perception among military and civilian leaders of its 
utility remains prevalent (Arrigo 2004:564). Active coercion is not the only way 
captors can gain intelligence, since holding out the promise of better food and living 
conditions can also be useful. China used a combination of carrots in the form of extra 
rations and comforts, and sticks through a systematic policy of harsh interrogation to 
obtain information from U.S. prisoners during the Korean War (Garrett 1981:217-
218). The common Chinese aim to extract confessions from downed pilots admitting 
they had engaged in bacteriological warfare also demonstrates the possible 
propaganda value to be gained from torturing prisoners irrespective of the 
information’s veracity (Hastings 1987:301). What ultimately matters from the point of 
view of assessing the relative costs and benefits of torture is the continued perceived 
utility of this practice among many high-level decision makers. 
                                                 
20 The scarcity of publically available studies on the effectiveness of torture is not entirely surprising, 
since governments are likely reluctant to publically admit to torturing subjects. Furthermore, academic 
studies are equally unlikely, since “Federal guidelines governing the treatment of human subjects 
almost certainly would prevent the gathering of empirical research comparing whether torture was more 
effective than less brutal means of gathering information” (Bell 2008:356). 
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 Along with their value as human intelligence, prisoners also present a ready 
pool of physical labor that can augment the war making capabilities of the captor state. 
In a historical study of the economic impact of prisoners of war, Gerald Davis remarks 
that “As a worker who may legitimately play a positive role in the enemy's economy, 
his [i.e. the prisoner’s] greatest historical impact may indeed be to benefit the enemy” 
(Davis 1977:623).21 Various international humanitarian law conventions actually 
allow captor states to employ prisoners, but the types of work, conditions, and 
remuneration are strictly regulated. Even some of the harshest captors have eventually 
come to recognize that a minimum level of nutrition and work safety is necessary for 
prison laborers to be productive over the long run.  
Nevertheless, during times of crisis, of which war is one of the most obvious 
examples, it can often become expedient to exploit prisoners ruthlessly as a slave 
workforce. Japanese captors drove their prisoners relentlessly in the building of 
strategically important bridges and railways to cement control over newly conquered 
territories in Southeast Asia during World War II (Vance 2006:56-57). During the 
First World War, Russia pressed thousands of prisoners into a crash program to 
construct the Murman railway to circumvent the blockade imposed by the Central 
Powers on its Baltic and Black Sea harbors and maintain access to Allied shipments of 
necessary goods for the war effort (Vance 2006:112). Of around 70,000 prisoners 
employed on the railway, 25,000 were estimated to have died while 32,000 others 
suffered a variety of debilitating health ailments (Rachamimov 2002:111-112). 
Importantly from the Russian point of view, of course, the line was completed by 
                                                 
21 Though Davis is careful to point out that prisoners can become a net burden on captor economies 
because of the resources required for their proper care. This issue, among other costs, will be dealt with 
in further detail below. 
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December 1916, though this would not save it from military collapse and eventual 
revolution.  
Along with the gains from goods produced, the use of prisoners has the added 
advantage of freeing more of the domestic labor force to join the military (Lewis and 
Mewha 1955:199-200; Davis 1977:626). Belligerents can reallocate domestic labor to 
the war front, while substituting prisoner labor to make up for any shortfalls in 
production. Prisoners can also provide an even more direct contribution to military 
capacity through forcible conscription into the captor state’s armed forces. Germany 
enlisted approximately 300,000 Soviet prisoners, commonly known as Hiwis, against 
their will in order to bolster its forces for the continued campaign on the Eastern Front 
during World War II (Bartov 1991:44-45).22 In both direct and more indirect ways, the 
ruthless exploitation of prisoner labor can improve the fighting capacity of captor 
states on the battlefield. 
 A more psychologically-based logic tying combatant abuse to increased 
military capacity centers on the belief that perpetrating atrocities against the enemy 
can be a good way to build up the morale and courage of troops on the ground (Walzer 
2000:134).23 Of course, this needs to be balanced against likely psychological damage 
to individual perpetrators themselves, as well as a possible decline in military 
effectiveness due to the unraveling of discipline resulting from committing atrocities 
in the first place (Bartov 1991:82, 86-89; 2001:115). 
Even if a captor would in theory prefer to treat its prisoners well, properly 
caring for captives is no small logistical undertaking and can require the deployment 
                                                 
22 Other estimates of the total number of Soviet prisoners forcibly enlisted range from a minimum of 
250,000, which still represents a substantial number, to upwards of one million (Vance 2006:460). 
23 Walzer discusses this reasoning in the context of rape during World War II, and alludes to similar 
thinking by the legal scholar Vitoria with respect to plunder. However, the logic also appears to be 
consistent with combatant abuse. 
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of a significant amount of resources. Food, shelter, medical facilities, and the necessity 
of large numbers of guards mean not as many resources can be allocated to the war 
front, or the civilian home front for that matter.  For the 1916-1917 fiscal year during 
World War I, Austria-Hungary devoted more of its war expenditures to taking care of 
its 1.8 million mainly Russia prisoners than it did on explosives (Davis 1977:629)! 
Given the importance of artillery during the war, especially for its ongoing campaign 
against Italy at the time, the relative cost of dealing with prisoners was substantial. In 
light of these concerns, it is not surprising that some captors may choose to mistreat 
prisoners, through seemingly “benign” practices, such as neglecting to provide 
adequate living conditions, in order to devote scarce resources to the military 
campaign or assuage disgruntled domestic publics in the face of shortages at home. 
 Balanced against these benefits from combatant abuse are two primary costs. 
First, reciprocity always looms large when thinking about the side effects, unintended 
or otherwise, resulting from the conduct of states during war. Abusing prisoners 
almost certainly increases the likelihood the adversary will retaliate and abuse the 
original captor state’s soldiers in kind (Streit 1986:9). This may be motivated out of a 
desire for revenge, but also as a means to pressure the other side into ceasing its 
abusive behavior. In the broader historical context of war, however, retaliation can just 
as often lead to an escalating series of reprisals that in the end leaves the prisoners of 
both sides worse off.24 The tendency for behavior during the First World war to 
degenerate toward the lowest common denominator led one ICRC official to express 
                                                 
24 The feelings of many Scottish troops during World War I perhaps best sum up this view, “Fritz [a 
derogatory reference to German soldiers], they insisted, did not take any [prisoners], so why should 
we?” (quoted in Ferguson 1999:378). On the other hand, good behavior can create a self-reinforcing 
dynamic that can engender a relatively stable level of cooperation. Though not dealing specifically with 
prisoner treatment, a related example is the so-called “live and let live” system that developed on 
certain parts of the Western Front during the First World War (Ashworth 1980:46; Axelrod 1984:73-
74). 
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in exasperation, “Reciprocity, that implacable and unbending deity, [is] the only one to 
which, during this war, universal and vile homage has been paid” (Durand 1984:70). 
States must remain mindful of the response their actions are likely to engender. The 
degree to which a government is concerned with reciprocity will in large be part a 
function of how much they value the well-being of their own soldiers, which can vary 
a great deal. Although the dangers of reciprocity may always be present in the 
relations between warring parties during war, the relative sensitivity of states to the 
costs of reciprocity are not always equal. As will be discussed further below, the 
relative casualty sensitivity of belligerents, and hence their concerns over reciprocal 
abuses, is influenced a great deal by their regime type. 
 Second, along with the human costs to one’s own soldiers from reciprocity, 
abusing prisoners may also become militarily counterproductive. Knowing the 
gruesome fate awaiting them should they fall into the hands of an abusive captor, 
enemy soldiers may prefer to take their chances on the battlefield and fight on rather 
than surrender (Forster 1986:21; Rees 1999:67). Abusing prisoners, whatever the 
immediate advantages, may create a sterner foe and make the war more difficult and 
bloody in the long run. Properly treating the enemy’s combatants could actually be 
considered advantageous by making the remaining soldiers more likely to surrender 
and remove themselves from the frontlines (Ferguson 2004:149-152). 
This may help to account in part for the level of resources and attention 
devoted by some armies for publicizing to enemy soldiers that they will be well-
treated should they give themselves up (Shils and Janowitz 1948:312-313; Lerner 
1981:43). Taking steps toward increasing the surrender propensity of the enemy 
ultimately makes good sense strategically, since surrenders drain the adversary of both 
the physical manpower and morale necessary for effectively waging war (Clausewitz 
1984:231-232). 
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Good treatment also has potential benefits from the point of view of the captor 
state’s own soldiers. During part of the brutal war from 1979-1989 in Afghanistan, the 
Soviet Union recognized a military advantage stemming from an ICRC plan to 
transfer prisoners from both sides to a safe haven in a neutral third-party country. “[I]t 
is possible that the Soviet authorities accepted the ICRC proposal because it would 
enhance the morale of their troops in Afghanistan if they knew that capture by the 
mujaheddin need not mean a long period of deprivation or summary execution” (Carr-
Gregg 1989:103). Soviet motives in this instance also bring to the fore the other main 
benefit to one’s own soldiers from properly caring for enemy combatants. Reciprocity 
runs both ways and just as abuses can devolve into a downward spiral of more and 
more atrocious acts, positive treatment can cultivate a virtuous cycle of increasingly 
cooperative behavior between opponents. The latter more benevolent dynamic is 
expressed in the belief among officials responsible for administering the U.S. prisoner 
of war system in Europe during World War II that fair and proper care of German 
prisoners was the best way to ensure the good treatment of U.S. prisoners in German 
hands (Tollefson 1946:76-77). In a similar manner to reciprocity, certain attributes of 
the warring parties themselves or the conflict may make states value to a greater or 
lesser extent the possible benefits to be gained through humanely treating prisoners. 
 Strategic interaction with the adversary’s armed forces on the battlefield would 
seem to provide compelling reasons for states to avoid harming prisoners. However, 
abusing enemy combatants, along with the expectations and consequent behavior of 
the captor state’s own soldiers, may paradoxically present some further benefits for the 
perpetrator. Knowing the adversary is likely to retaliate against any previous abuses, 
soldiers from the captor state may be similarly emboldened to continue fighting rather 
than surrender (Beevor 1998:126). It has even been argued that part of Hitler’s 
reasoning for mistreating Soviet prisoners was to ensure the Soviets would respond in 
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kind, and thereby increase the likelihood that German troops would continue to fight 
on rather than surrender (MacKenzie 1994:508-509). The resulting equilibrium 
involved a much more brutal battlefront, but one with the benefit where the captor 
state’s own soldiers remained motivated to fight on rather than risk almost certain pain 
and death as captives. The flipside of the earlier benevolent logic is that combatant 
abuse can remain an indirect yet potentially useful instrument, along with more 
traditional tools like repression, to encourage one’s own forces to continue fighting on 
the battlefield (Ferguson 2004:171-188). 
Table 3: Summary of the potential costs and benefits of combatant abuse 
Benefits
▪instrument of coercion (punishment and/or denial strategy).
▪extract intelligence.
▪exploit as slave labor force.
▪violence against enemy to build morale and courage of own forces.
▪free up resources for fighting or homefront that would otherwise be 
devoted to prisoner care.
Costs
▪psychological costs to individual perpetrators.
▪decline in discipline.
▪reciprocity: increased likelihood enemy will retaliate in kind against 
prisoners it holds.
▪increase tenacity of enemy soldiers to continue fighting rather than 
surrender (though obverse may increase resolve of own soldiers to fight 
on out of fear over their own fate if they surrender).  
 In sum, there are several costs and benefits when deciding how to treat 
combatants from the opposing side. These advantages and disadvantages are 
summarized in Table 3 above. Not all of these factors are likely to be salient for all 
states, and some may be more consequential in certain cases or time periods than 
others. For instance, the rise of nationalism would suggest that the loyalties of soldiers 
to their home state have become even more enduring and would make successfully 
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coercing them into joining a captor state’s own military ranks even more difficult and 
dangerous than before.  
In spite of potential sources of variation in the costs and benefits of combatant 
abuse over time, the historical record suggests no dominant strategy appears to exist 
for the treatment of combatants. In some cases states seem to emphasize the benefits to 
be gained from combatant abuse, while in other instances they tend to focus on the 
costs and consequently refrain from committing violations. The accounting above 
suggests a fundamental tension between the costs and benefits of combatant abuse, 
since acting either virtuously or brutally comes with its own risks and rewards that 
may lead states in one direction or the other along a continuum of prisoner brutality. 
The following sections seek to build on this general discussion by offering a 
theoretical framework based on two key sets of factors – the nature of the belligerents 
and bloodshed during war. These factors are likely to influence how states assess the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of combatant abuse, which has implications for 
the eventual policy they adopt both on the battlefield in capturing enemy combatants 
as well as how they will treat these prisoners once they enter into captivity. 
The Nature of the Belligerents: Democracy and the (mis)Treatment of 
Combatants 
 Debates over the effect of regime type on armed conflict have focused 
overwhelmingly on the propensity of states to enter into militarized disputes up to and 
including war.25 The well-known democratic peace finding – that democracies are 
peaceful with each other, but just as conflict-prone as nondemocracies in general – 
remains a dyadic phenomenon. Given that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war each 
                                                 
25 The democratic peace literature is vast, but several works synthesizing the main arguments include 
(Maoz 1997; Ray 1998). 
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other, 26 deriving implications from the democratic peace literature for the actual 
conduct of states during war often focuses instead on possible monadic effects. In 
other words, do democracies somehow act differently than nondemocracies 
irrespective of the regime type of their opponent?27  
Existing research on the conduct of war largely follows the democratic peace 
tradition by distinguishing between normative and institutional explanations (Russett 
1993:30-42). While the normative and institutional approaches are sometimes viewed 
as complementary, recent scholars in the civilian victimization literature argue the two 
variants offer diverging predictions for the conduct of democracies during war 
(Valentino et al. 2006:345-346; Downes 2008:21). 
Normative Accounts 
Most of the scholars who argue that democracies fight their wars more 
humanely focus on the treatment of civilians. They generally emphasize particular 
liberal norms inculcated in the political culture of democratic regimes (Rummel 
1995:4; Merom 2003:15).28 In a comparative analysis of counterinsurgency strategies, 
Engelhardt argues democracies possess liberal norms propounding the virtues of 
nonviolence, which leads them to be unwilling to “play rough” (Engelhardt 1992:53). 
Examining the targeting of civilians by states during interstate, civil, and colonial 
wars, Valentino et al. argue, “If democratic values promote tolerance, nonviolence, 
                                                 
26 For a discussion of several alleged wars between democracies, see (Russett 1993:16-20). 
27 In the more established literature on the relative war-proneness of democracies, there is a growing 
though more controversial body of research arguing that democracies are in fact more pacific overall 
general (Schweller 1992:248-249; Rousseau et al. 1996:514; Lipson 2003:21). 
28 Rummel also offers an institutional explanation for the greater humaneness of democracies based on 
the number and scope of checks and balances that restrain democratic governments. However, he offers 
the qualification that institutional checks are reinforced by “the development of a democratic culture 
and norms that emphasizes rational debate, toleration, negotiation of differences, conciliation, and 
conflict resolution” (Rummel 1995:4-5). He hypothesizes these forces should be present but less 
restraining in foreign wars compared to domestic situations, but his results nevertheless find that 
democracies perform more humanely across all of these contexts (Rummel 1995:6, 25). 
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and respect for legal constraints, then democracies should wage their wars more 
humanely than other forms of government” (Valentino et al. 2004:382). Such norms 
are embedded not only in the civilian leaders and their publics, but are also thought to 
diffuse into the military’s thinking and practice, and provide a frontline defense 
against potential abuses on the battlefield (Gabriel 1984:8-9; Sarkesian 1989:44).29 
Along with the conduct of states during war, normative arguments gain further 
empirical support by studies finding democracies are less likely to commit human 
rights abuses against their own citizens up to and including more extreme forms of 
violence, such as genocide (Poe et al. 1999; Harff 2003; Davenport and Armstrong 
2004). 
Norms-based arguments have overwhelmingly focused on the treatment of 
civilians, but the same logic is consistent with the proper care for combatants. If 
principles of tolerance, nonviolence, and respect for individual rights provide 
protections for enemy civilians, then the same should be true for combatants. The 
normative argument with respect to the conduct of war centers on a broader process 
whereby states tend to translate their internal beliefs and practices externally when 
conducting foreign affairs (Dixon 1994:16-18). In democracies, domestic political 
culture centers on the fundamental equality of rights among individual citizens, which 
they are then prone to apply with equal vigor in their external relations (Weart 
1998:76-77, 90-92).30 More specifically with regards to the behavior of states during 
war, Doyle draws on Kant’s articles of perpetual peace to argue the tendency for 
                                                 
29 Though other scholars note that some militaries have insulated themselves from their surrounding 
domestic society, and are thus less influenced by broader societal norms (Rosen 1995:6). 
30 Weart argues that equal rights are not sufficient in themselves to define democratic political culture, 
which also requires in addition a tolerance of dissent over political differences. However, he 
acknowledges that in many ways toleration flows directly from equality: “The ideal of toleration is a 
corollary to equality, for if you truly regard me as your equal you will not try to prevent me from 
speaking my mind, nor force me to obey your arbitrary command” (Weart 1998:59-60). 
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democracies to externalize their domestic norms of respect for individual rights 
necessitates that they comply with all aspects of the laws of war, which includes 
respect for the enemy’s combatants (Doyle 1983:344). Locke follows a similar logic in 
his Second Treatise of Government and asserts that liberal principles of respect for 
individual rights mandate states to treat not only the adversary’s civilians justly, but 
also their soldiers (Locke 1980:93). This leads to the following hypothesis on the 
conduct of democracies during war, which is based on their distinct political culture of 
fostering a respect for individual rights and adherence to norms of tolerance and 
nonviolence: 
Hypothesis 1a (Democratic norms): Democracies are less likely to 
abuse captured combatants than nondemocracies. 
The normative approach appears to offer a compelling explanation for the 
conduct of democracies during war, but several concerns should be kept in mind. 
Returning to the dyadic version of the argument, democracies are only expected to 
externalize their norms of nonviolence with other democracies. When dealing with 
other regime types, a democratic state “may feel obliged to adapt to the harsher norms 
or international conduct of the latter, lest it be exploited or eliminated by the 
nondemocratic state that takes advantage of the inherent moderation of democracies” 
(Russett 1993:33). Since democracies only tend to fight nondemocracies, then by this 
reasoning they might be expected to act in a similar manner to their more brutal 
counterparts. However, this logic appears to hold more for the treatment of the 
adversary’s leadership rather than for ordinary soldiers.31 Russett is careful to 
distinguish between democracies’ perceptions of foreign leaders in contrast to their 
                                                 
31 Although arguing more from a structural than norms perspective, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 
posit that democracies are more likely to oust autocratic leaders following victory in war, though they 
remain largely silent on the subsequent treatment of the autocracy’s population (Bueno de Mesquita and 
Siverson 1997:193). 
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peoples. For instance, he notes “The essence of America's Cold War ideology was that 
it had no quarrel with the Russian people, but only with the atheistic communist elites 
who repressed them” (Russett 1993:32). Applied to the conduct of war, democracies 
might be expected to extend domestic norms of individual rights to enemy combatants, 
since the captured soldiers are in little way directly responsible for the policies of their 
autocratic leaders. The implications derived from the dyadic version of the democratic 
peace thus appear to converge a great deal toward monadic approaches, at least with 
respect to the treatment of enemy combatants during war.  
The monadic variant, which posits that democracies externalize their norms 
irrespective of the regime type of their adversary, is also not without problems. Critics 
point out that norms of nonviolence and respect for individual rights have not 
prevented democracies from waging wars of imperial conquest or engaging in covert 
actions to topple legitimately elected foreign governments (Forsythe 1992:393-394; 
Doyle 1997:292; Rosato 2003:588-589). In cases where democracies did not directly 
commit atrocities, they still frequently provided indirect support to the perpetrators, or 
stood by and allowed the violence to continue unchecked (McClintock 1992:139; 
Weart 1998:220-221). As Downes also notes, democratic publics do not always reflect 
the liberal norms attributed to them and can in fact be quite bellicose (Downes 
2008:23). Belying their supposedly pacific nature, democratic publics in many cases 
were quite supportive of both aggressive territorial expansion, as well as the use of 
brutal methods against civilians and combatants alike during the course of such wars 
(Reiter and Stam 2002:151-158). Reflecting this more ambivalent view, several recent 
empirical studies have found that democracy exerts little or no restraining effect on the 
treatment of civilians in various contexts of war and peace (Krain 1997:346; Valentino 
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2004:26-27, 237; Valentino et al. 2006:368-369).32 If the skeptics are correct and 
democracy does not significantly reduce the risks to the lives of innocent and unarmed 
civilians, then democratic norms are likely to exert even less of a restraint on the 
treatment of combatants who are directly engaged in battle against the democratic 
belligerent’s own soldiers. 
Institutional Accounts 
The second variant of democratic arguments centers on their institutional 
rather than normative characteristics. The logic focuses on the fact that democratic 
leaders tend to be held more accountable by their publics than leaders of other regime 
types. War remains one of the most salient measures of a government’s performance 
and recent research suggests that the tenure of democratic leaders  is more sensitive to 
the rising costs of war and the prospect of defeat than their nondemocratic 
counterparts (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995:852).33 Although governments 
may benefit from a rally effect resulting from the initial use of force, a large body of 
research finds that public support declines precipitously as the duration and casualties 
from war grow (Mueller 1973:60-65; Gartner and Segura 1998). The greater electoral 
vulnerability of democratic governments has led to the contention that democracies are 
both more selective in the wars they initiate and more likely to fight harder once war 
has begun.34 Fighting “hard” can, of course, refer to a wide range of behavior. For 
                                                 
32 Valentino acknowledges that democracy may on average reduce the likelihood of the mass killing of 
civilians, which he defines as at least 50,000 intentional deaths within a period of five years. However, 
he argues that democracy remains far from either a necessary or sufficient condition for preventing the 
resort to mass killing (Valentino 2004:28). 
33 In contrast to this office-holding approach, Goemans contends that the true cost of war is the 
probability the leadership will be punished in the form of death, imprisonment, or exile (2000:38-49). 
By this logic, he expects that mixed regimes will be more affected by the costs and likely outcome of 
war than either democracies or autocracies, since mixed regime leaders are the most likely to be 
subsequently punished. This argument will be evaluated in Chapter 4, which conducts a quantitative 
analysis of the causes of combatant abuse. 
34 These two components are commonly referred to as the selection and warfighting effects respectively 
(Reiter and Stam 2002:11). 
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instance, Bueno de Mesquita et al. find that democracies are willing to devote more 
resources to the war effort than their autocratic counterparts (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2004:374).35  
By extension, some argue the demands upon democracies not only to win, but 
also to minimize their own casualties, might actually make them more likely to fight in 
nastier ways than their nondemocratic counterparts (Valentino et al. 2006:348). 
Downes reasons that these institutional pressures largely account for his finding that 
democracies are often more prone to target foreign civilians during interstate wars, 
especially for conflicts that become particularly costly (Downes 2007:889; 2008:64).36 
This strategy may be part of an attempt to coerce the other side into giving up because 
of the greater human toll wrought by targeting noncombatants, or as a way to shift the 
risks and costs of war off of the democracy’s own soldiers and onto the civilians of the 
opposing side. It follows that a similar logic may operate with even greater force in the 
case of enemy combatants, since they pose a more direct threat to the belligerent’s 
own citizens and soldiers. Assuming the overall benefits of combatant abuse discussed 
earlier outweigh the costs, then the institutional pressures for democracies to win leads 
to the opposite expectation from the first hypothesis, which was concerned with 
democratic norms: 
Hypothesis 1b (Democratic institutions – first variant): Democracies 
are more likely to abuse captured combatants than nondemocracies. 
Based on the civilian literature, the normative and institutional perspectives 
appear to offer radically different expectations regarding the conduct of democracies 
                                                 
35 Though for a contrasting view, see (Reiter and Stam 2002:135-136). 
36 Though Downes also notes that if democracies tend to select relatively easier wars they are more 
likely to win, then democracies might also be less likely to target civilians, at least in wars they initiate 
(Downes 2008:22). 
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during war.37 Looking more closely at the treatment of combatants reveals that the 
institutional approach may not actually be at odds, but is in many ways 
complementary to normative arguments. Although democracies may be expected to 
“fight harder” to win the wars they fight, domestic institutional forces also require that 
they win quickly and cheaply in terms of casualties (Siverson 1995:481; Reiter and 
Stam 2002:164-165). This suggests that two complementary sets of factors may make 
democracies less likely to resort to combatant abuse. These are fears of reciprocity and 
the strategic benefits of good conduct. The logic of reciprocity can be tied to the role 
of regime type by pointing to the relative sensitivity of regimes with particular 
institutional configurations to retaliatory abuses. In a similar manner, certain regimes 
may also be more attracted to the benefits accrued through humanely treating enemy 
soldiers and thus be more likely to act in this way.  
First, if democracies are indeed more sensitive to the fate of their soldiers, then 
the looming prospect of reciprocity could lead them to be less, rather than more, likely 
to mistreat enemy prisoners. Even if abusing enemy combatants, or civilians for that 
matter, holds out the promise of substantial gains, democracies may be more 
susceptible to the resulting costs than autocracies and back away from relying on this 
strategy. 
Abusing the adversary’s combatants more often than not results in retaliation 
in kind. Pressured by the public’s demand to ensure the proper treatment of their 
soldiers under German captivity, the British government devoted sizable resources 
during World War I to sending aid packages and arranging visits by international 
                                                 
37 Another institutional variant focuses on the existence of audience costs in democracies, which 
suggests that threats made by democracies are more credible because leaders would suffer greater 
public sanctions if they subsequently backed down (Fearon 1994:582; Schultz 1998:830). Some 
scholars have extended this reasoning to argue that the behavior of democracies during war will be 
contingent on whether or not they have publically committed to an international treaty prohibiting the 
use of certain weapons or tactics (Morrow 2007:569-570). 
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monitors to prisoner camps in Germany (McCarthy 1918:3). In a similar manner, 
contrary to the perception of his generally hardnosed personality, Churchill intervened 
on many occasions throughout World War II to safeguard the treatment of German 
and Italian prisoners under Allied control out of fear the Axis powers would retaliate 
for any abuses against British prisoners in their hands (Moore 2000:183).38  
In a related study, Levi argues that democracies are generally constrained to 
adopt fairer military service policies, such as abolishing exemptions for elites, out of 
the need to obtain the contingent consent of their citizens. This consent in turn ensures 
citizens will provide the taxes and recruits necessary for an effective armed forces 
(Levi 1997:33-35, 205-208). Levi largely focuses on the domestic arena, but her 
insights have implications for the conduct of democracies toward combatants from 
other states.39 Government policy provides an important type of signal to citizens 
regarding its overall trustworthiness to act in their general interests (Levi 1997:21). If 
a democracy engages in the abuse of enemy prisoners, then this in itself might signal 
to citizens that their government is not trustworthy, which could subsequently reduce 
the capacity of governing authorities to formulate and implement other policies. 
Abusive behavior is also likely to have a more immediate effect. Aware of the 
consequent probability that the enemy will seek revenge should they be captured, 
soldiers are more likely to believe their government does not have their best interests 
at heart and respond accordingly through desertion or other measures. Although not 
directly involving prisoner issues, an indication of this general logic was evident with 
the large-scale mutinies within the French army in 1917, which were largely credited 
                                                 
38 This case is examined in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
39 Levi’s framework for contingent consent also requires that individuals expect their fellow citizens 
will also comply by engaging in what she terms “ethical reciprocity” (Levi 1997:19, 24). Nevertheless, 
extending her model to the treatment of combatants appears to rest to a greater degree on the first 
criteria that citizens perceive their government to be fair and just. 
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to the rising death toll on the Western Front from seemingly pointless frontal assaults 
by hundreds of thousands of ordinary French soldiers on prepared German positions 
(Gilbert 1994:333-334). 
Overall, the institutional incentives for democracies to win the wars they fight 
need to be counterbalanced by how their publics expect them to win. If combatant 
abuse is likely to result in abuse in kind against prisoners held by the adversary, then 
institutional incentives may in fact run in the same direction rather than counter to 
normative factors. Of course, nondemocracies are not oblivious to the potential loss of 
their own soldiers on the battlefield and in captivity. All states to a certain degree care 
about the fate of their troops, since this is likely to have domestic ramifications but 
also can affect their military capacity it large numbers of soldiers cannot be easily 
replaced. Nevertheless, the argument here is that domestic institutions of democracies 
make them relatively more sensitive than autocracies to the costs of reciprocity given 
the risks of public dissent and the greater accountability of democratic leaders to their 
publics. 
Second, facing these greater constraints from reciprocity democracies should 
also be expected to emphasize to a much greater extent the strategic benefits to be 
gained from treating enemy combatants in a humane manner. As was noted in the 
previous section on the costs and benefits of combatant abuse, acting “justly” is not 
always contrary to military effectiveness. All else being equal, treating enemy 
combatants in a humane manner should increase the propensity of those soldiers still 
on the battlefield to surrender. By treating enemy prisoners humanely, democracies 
can mitigate the risks of retaliation against their own soldiers, and at the same time 
potentially reduce the fighting force of their opponent by inducing a greater number of 
surrenders.  
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Past cases indeed show that democracies often devote a significant amount of 
resources not only to proper prisoner care, but also to publicizing their policies to the 
adversary’s soldiers. During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the United States dropped 
millions of leaflets on Iraqi forces in the field encouraging them to surrender with the 
promise they would be properly treated (Rowe 1993:197). U.S. policy expanded to 
educating their own soldiers regarding obligations with respect to prisoners under 
international law and the military advantages to be gained from complying with these 
rules. Through a widespread dissemination campaign, the Geneva Conventions 
became the “Book Choice of the Month” for U.S. forces during the war (Beaumont 
1996:288). 
Of course, democratic institutional restraints on combatant abuse may not 
always be enough to guarantee the proper treatment of enemy combatants. If the 
strategic benefits seem minimal, or if the incentives involving reciprocity break down 
because abuses by the adversary spiral out of control, then democracy by itself may be 
insufficient to prevent a belligerent from resort to combatant abuse. Nevertheless, on 
average both the fears of reciprocity and sensitivity to strategic advantages point to the 
third and final hypothesis connecting democracy to the conduct of war: 
Hypothesis 1c (Democratic institutions – second variant): Democracies 
are less likely to abuse captured combatants than nondemocracies. 
It should be noted that concerns over retaliation may be less present when 
targeting foreign civilians, which may help explain the divergence in expectations 
between Hypothesis 1c and the civilian literature regarding the impact of democratic 
institutions. Publics may be wary that a government willing to kill foreign civilians 
will one day turn on its own people, but this concern does not appear to be very strong. 
Past wars have shown that strategies of civilian victimization can actually be quite 
popular with the public, especially if they are seen as saving the lives of their own 
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soldiers (Downes 2008:23). Concerns over reciprocity should still exist, but recent 
research has shown that democracies often reduce the risks to their own civilians of 
becoming targets by finding ways to wage conflicts far away from their homeland 
(Valentino et al. 2008:21-22). All else being equal, democratic publics appear less 
likely to be the target of attack.40 Soldiers, in contrast, are much more vulnerable, 
since by necessity they have to fight on the ground and come into contact with enemy 
troops, irrespective of the location of the battle front. Democracies may perhaps be 
able to reduce this risk by relying to a greater extent on air or naval forces, but recent 
conflicts have shown that substantial ground forces are usually required for effectively 
prosecuting wars.41  
In sum, democracies are more likely to be sensitive to the reciprocal costs of 
combatant abuse by both their publics and the soldiers themselves, as well as the 
strategic benefits to be gained from good conduct. Along with the general role of 
norms of nonviolence and the protection of individual rights, democracies may also 
have institutional incentives for ensuring the proper care of combatants that fall into 
their hands. Some scholars have indeed argued that soldiers are more likely to 
surrender to a democratic adversary based on the belief they were more likely to be 
well-treated once in captivity (Reiter and Stam 2002:65-69). However, Reiter and 
Stam largely assume democratic captors act differently than other regime types based 
on a few historical examples rather than evaluating this claim in a more systematic 
                                                 
40 Of course, others have argued that democracies are particularly vulnerable to being targets of terrorist 
attacks, though the robustness of this finding is disputed (Pape 2003:349-350; Wade and Reiter 
2007:344). Although it would be interesting to assess the relatively vulnerability of democracies to all 
forms of political violence, it is beyond the scope of this study’s more limited initial focus on interstate 
wars. 
41 The Kosovo War is often credited as a shining example of how air power can do it alone in winning 
wars (Stigler 2002:125). Yet even in this instance, skeptics have argued that ground forces played a 
crucial role in bringing about Serbia’s surrender in the form of surrogate forces from the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA), as well as the importance of the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
(NATO) threat to initiate a ground invasion (Thomas 2006:17). 
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manner.42 The purpose of subsequent chapters is to begin to subject the hypotheses 
involving regime type and the treatment of enemy combatants to more rigorous 
empirical testing. 
The Nature of the Bloodshed: Aims and the Severity of Warfare 
 Regime type arguments place the emphasis on the domestic level and leave 
open the objectives a state brings to the war, or how the conflict progresses, as factors 
to be considered in their own right. The nature of the bloodshed manifested through 
the aims and severity of warfare are likely to influence how states weigh the costs and 
benefits of combatant abuse irrespective of their domestic characteristics.43 Each will 
be examined in turn. 
The Severity of Warfare 
A number of reinforcing factors may make wars of higher severity more likely 
to result in combatant abuse. As the fighting becomes bogged down into a war of 
attrition, or as the conflict lengthens and the number of battle deaths rises, states may 
be more apt to resort to abusing prisoners falling into their hands. In particular, states 
in the midst of a particularly hard-fought war are likely to appreciate the coercive 
potential of combatant abuse, which was briefly discussed earlier in the section on the 
costs and benefits of this practice. Coercion involves manipulating the costs and 
benefits of the adversary in the aim of changing its behavior (Pape 1996:12-13).  
                                                 
42 In a separate manuscript the authors assess their particular claim that democracies are likely to 
generate more surrenders from their opponents and find some support for this view (Reiter and Stam 
1997). However, in later work they acknowledge that this study on surrender propensity suffers from 
data problems and likely sources of statistical bias, which together caution against any conclusive 
findings (Reiter and Stam 2002:219-220 note.236). 
43 Along these lines, regime type may best be thought of as representing the intercept and the nature of 
conflict the slope of the relationship of both sets of factors to combatant abuse. I thank Christopher Way 
for this insight. Of course, regime type may also mediate the effects of the nature of the war, as well as 
broader issues such as reciprocity. 
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States may calculate that combatant abuse is an effective tool to impose further 
costs on a stubborn enemy and test its capability and resolve to continue fighting. 
Scholars examining a variety of conflicts have observed that wars rarely finish with 
one side utterly exhausted and completely defeated. Rather, wars are often terminated 
through some form of negotiated settlement despite the fact that both sides still have 
the capability to continue fighting (Wittman 1979:744-749; Blainey 1988:159-161; 
Goemans 2000:3-12). This insight is reflected in a growing body of work arguing that 
bargaining between states does not end with the outbreak of hostilities, but continues 
throughout the war.44 Fighting in this context is viewed as a way of revealing 
information about the relative capabilities and resolve of each belligerent (Reiter 
2003:30-31).45 Of particular concern here, the conduct of states during war also 
demonstrates their ability to inflict and bear painful costs relative to their opponent 
(Slantchev 2003a:127-128). According to this logic, a state may pull out not because it 
no longer has the capability to fight, but rather because it is unwilling to absorb the 
costs from continuing the war. Abusing combatants presents a stark, yet potentially 
effective means, for inflicting sufficient pain on an adversary. Incentives to resort to 
such abuses are likely to be even higher in wars that devolve into protracted 
stalemates. 
 The value of combatant abuse as a punishment strategy always needs to be 
balanced against its potential costs. Past research has shown that punishment strategies 
in general are not terribly effective in leading the adversary to back down (Horowitz 
and Reiter 2001:160). Modern nation states have shown themselves to be resilient to 
                                                 
44 Such a approach is largely consistent with Clausewitz’s classic dictum that war is merely a 
continuation of politics by other means(Clausewitz 1984:87). 
45 In contrast, earlier formal work often conceptualized war as a single costly lottery, where bargaining 
ends with the decision to go to war (e.g Fearon 1995:387). Research incorporating bargaining processes 
into the conduct and termination of war is a rapidly growing field, but notable examples include (Smith 
1998; Wagner 2000; Slantchev 2003b; Powell 2004; Smith and Stam 2004). 
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even extremely high levels of suffering. Punishment can also turn out to be 
counterproductive and actually harden the will of the enemy to resist (Pape 1996:21-
26). Similar problems are also evident in the effect of combatant abuse as a denial 
strategy in undermining the military capabilities of the opponent. Abuse may simply 
make the remaining soldiers even more determined to continue to fight rather than risk 
surrendering. Instead of weakening the adversary, abuse may end up creating a smaller 
but more resolute enemy fighting force. Nevertheless, abuse has proven effective in 
some circumstances and during an escalating and increasingly desperate conflict states 
may turn to any strategy that increases their chances for victory, however remote 
(Downes 2008:38-39). This leads to the following hypothesis linking the severity of 
the fighting to the level of combatant abuse: 
Hypothesis 2 (severity of warfare): Wars that are more severe (i.e. 
devolve into wars of attrition, or are longer and bloodier) are more 
likely to result in combatant abuse. 
Along with these potential coercive motives, combatant abuse can also yield 
certain benefits that may be highly attractive during a long and severe war through a 
logic of extraction. Properly caring for prisoners can be expensive in both money and 
personnel. Reallocating funds away from maintaining prisoners frees up resources that 
can serve more pressing military and civilian needs. The incentives to exploit prisoner 
labor to a harsher degree would also seem to be higher the more severe the war, either 
by releasing domestic workers for enlistment in the military or by directly conscripting 
prisoners into the captor’s own armed forces.  
Yet again, costs also need to be considered, in particular the prospect 
that such measures would be counterproductive. Ironically, more severe wars 
could lead states to the opposite conclusion that actually improving the 
treatment of enemy combatants may be in their ultimate self-interest. As noted 
earlier, good treatment might increase the propensity of soldiers to surrender, 
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which could be an appealing option for individuals caught in long and bloody 
battles on the front lines. While attractive in theory, the practicality of such a 
strategy is often daunting. The coddling of foreign killers is likely to be 
unpopular in many circumstances with the captor state’s own soldiers and 
citizens, especially if the public is being deprived of food and other necessities 
because of disruptions caused by the war. When finding themselves in a severe 
war, states may thus be more likely to calculate that the expected benefits of 
combatant abuse outweigh the costs that are likely to follow. 
War Aims 
 States go to war over a variety of issues and seek to achieve a wide range of 
objectives through the use of force (Holsti 1991:12-20). Expansive war aims are 
probably more likely to encourage combatant abuse than more limited ends. Even in 
the case of ambitious goals, incentives may be mixed. States seeking objectives like 
regime change, or demanding unconditional surrender, are likely to find themselves 
fighting a more resolute foe given the stakes of the conflict. The discussion above on 
the severity of war applies equally to these issues as well, and suggests several similar 
reasons why states may turn to combatant abuse. When seeking unconditional 
surrender, however, one promising alternative route might instead involve 
undermining the fighting capacity of the adversary so that they have little choice but to 
comply. Encouraging the enemy’s soldiers to surrender by guaranteeing their proper 
treatment presents a potentially attractive option for eroding that fighting capacity in 
high-stakes conflicts (Ferguson 2004:188-191).   
When pursuing an alternative strategy like regime change, a belligerent needs 
to be mindful of the effect of the current conduct of the war on the stability and quality 
of the subsequent peace (Walzer 2000:132; Buzan 2002:90). Soldiers and the military 
more generally can be useful allies in stabilizing the domestic situation once the 
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previous regime is overthrown. Properly caring for soldiers during the war thus 
reduces the likelihood of creating a more stubborn foe once hostilities have ceased.46 
To the extent that such wars are severe, or that states are desperate to end them quickly 
and cheaply, then the incentive for combatant abuse may be higher, but in both cases 
countervailing incentives may reduce the likelihood of relying on such practices. 
 In contrast, one specific objective that points much more heavily toward the 
probability of combatant abuse involves states seeking to annex territory from their 
adversary. When explaining the reasons why states often target civilians in wars of 
annexation, Downes argues they do so because civilians represent a potential “fifth 
column” that can threaten stability and foment rebellion against the occupying state 
(2008:35-36). Following this logic, combatants are likely to pose an even greater 
menace than civilians to occupying powers, since they already have the training and 
organization necessary to present a more tangible threat.  
The problem of what to do with prisoners at war’s end given their latent 
military power has vexed many captor states. Former prisoners have indeed played an 
often crucial role in the politics of both their captor and home states. After World War 
I the Czech Legion influenced the course of the Russian civil war by bolstering anti-
Bolshevik forces (Kalvoda 1983:231-233). Similarly, the Communist takeover of 
Hungary in 1919, which eventually led to Hungarian-Allies War that same year, was 
largely led by former prisoners who had absorbed radical Bolshevik ideology during 
their earlier captivity in Russia (Durand 1984:123-124) 
                                                 
46 Much attention has focused on the treatment of insurgents in the U.S. War on Terror, but in the case 
of Iraq prisoners were generally well cared for during the initial 2003 invasion to topple Saddam 
Hussein (Springer 2006:157; Vance 2006:210). Although the hasty disbandment of the Iraqi military 
after the war was over is often viewed as a rash decision, insurgent ranks would likely have swelled 
even more had the United States mistreated prisoners from the beginning and created further resentment 
among the Iraqi armed forces. 
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Of course, not all wars involving territorial prizes may be the same, and the 
corresponding incentives for states to resort to combatant abuse may not be equal. The 
desire to ruthlessly eliminate any future threat posed by enemy combatants is perhaps 
most salient in revisionist wars of territorial re-absorption. In such conflicts, the 
aggressor often seeks to directly take over lands that it considers should be part of its 
homeland. In this context combatants from the adversary are not only an unwanted 
element, but may directly challenge the state’s hold on these newly acquired lands. 
Despite the public pretext to protect minorities under the control of the Ottoman 
Empire, the brutalities meted out to captured Turkish soldiers is better accounted for 
by the territorial ambitions of the various Balkan allies to wipe out any source of likely 
resistance in their newly acquired neighboring lands as they sought to extend their 
national borders (Fried 1914:4). Bulgaria was subsequently turned on by its former 
allies, who coveted further territorial gains at its expense. During the Second Balkan 
War that followed, Bulgarian soldiers suffered a similar fate to the one experienced 
earlier by their Turkish adversary (Hall 2000:136).  
The German campaign against Soviet Russia during WWII is often described 
as an ideological war driven by ideals of racial superiority, but the territorial 
dimension of the conflict should not be overlooked. The living space (Lebensraum) 
sought by the Nazi regime was to come primarily at the expense of Soviet territory. 
The German leadership also realized that the threat posed by all Soviet prisoners was 
not equal. In the lead up to the invasion, German armed forces issued the Commissar 
Order (Kommissarbefehl), which mandated the immediate execution on site of all 
commissars found within captured Soviet armed forces. The preamble justified the 
order as follows, “To show consideration of these elements [i.e. principles of 
humanity] or to act in accordance with international rules of war is wrong and 
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endangers both our own security and the rapid pacification of conquered territory” 
(quoted in Browning 2007:220-221).  
Conversely, other territorial conflicts do not necessarily entail such radical 
objectives, but rather involve states seeking to conquer enemy lands and exert control 
over subjected populations and resources. In this alternative context, eliminating 
military cadres might not always be the most effective strategy. Several scholars in the 
related study of imperialism have in fact argued that civilian and military elites in the 
targeted territory may in fact be a valuable resource for acquiring and maintaining rule 
over the local population. Disgruntled or ambitious sections of the target’s elite may 
ironically view conquest by an outside power as the quickest and most effective means 
to increase their relative power and standing within their society (Robinson 1972:117-
118). Abusing enemy soldiers, or civilians for that matter, has the danger of becoming 
counterproductive to a conquering state’s interests if it is more likely to engender 
greater resistance to the occupier’s rule both by local elites and the wider population. 
Nevertheless, several wars of conquest indicate that the future threat posed by the 
adversary’s military forces continues to make combatant abuse an attractive strategy 
for aspiring conquerors despite any attendant risks. The systematic killing of 
defenseless Ethiopian troops by Italy during the 1935-1936 Italo-Ethiopian War only 
intensified afterward when Italian forces ruthlessly exterminated any remaining 
prisoners and later insurgents as it sought to cement its hold over Ethiopian territory 
(Sandford 1946:93; Barker 1968:304; Baudendistel 2006:223, 256). 
Although the strength of the motives to commit combatant abuse in wars of 
conquest may not be as pronounced compared to revisionist wars of re-absorption, in 
both cases the lust for territory can lead to a general policy of extreme forms of 
violence against enemy combatants. The pattern of combatant abuse involving states 
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seeking territorial aggrandizement in any of its particular incarnations leads to 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 (territorial annexation): States aiming to annex territory 
from their adversary are more likely to commit combatant abuse. 
In sum, belligerents aiming to annex territory from the enemy face strong 
incentives to use combatant abuse not only to gain the land in the first place, but also 
to improve their ability to maintain control long into the future. Taken together with 
the overall severity of the fighting, this suggests that the nature of the bloodshed 
wrought through war strongly conditions the ways states choose to treat enemy 
combatants. The main hypotheses relating to the nature of the belligerents and the 
bloodshed are summarized in Table 4 below. 
Table 4: Summary of hypotheses on combatant abuse 
Nature of the belligerent (regime type)
▪Hypothesis 1a (Democratic norms): Democracies are less likely to abuse 
captured combatants than nondemocracies.
▪Hypothesis 1b (Democratic institutions – first variant): Democracies are 
more likely to abuse captured combatants than nondemocracies.
▪Hypothesis 1c (Democratic institutions – second variant): Democracies 
are less likely to abuse captured combatants than nondemocracies.
Nature of the bloodshed (aims and severity of war)
▪Hypothesis 2 (severity of warfare): Wars that are more severe (i.e. 
devolve into wars of attrition, or are longer and bloodier) are more likely 
to result in combatant abuse.
▪Hypothesis 3 (territorial annexation): States aiming to annex territory 
from their adversary are more likely to commit combatant abuse.  
 
Cultural Differences as an Alternative Perspective 
Many alternative explanations to the nature of the belligerents and bloodshed 
framework sketched out above have been proposed and will be evaluated in greater 
detail later on in Chapter 4. However, another factor that stands out in the larger 
historical literature on war and merits further consideration concerns the role of 
cultural differences between belligerents for explaining relative levels of combatant 
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abuse (Hevia 2007:106). The sparse but overall decent conditions Napoleon provided 
for captured soldiers from other European powers during the French Revolutionary 
Wars stood in stark contrast to his order to execute all Muslim prisoners during the 
Battle of Acre against the Ottoman Empire during the same period (Bedjaoui 
1992:292). Similar contempt for soldiers from opposing cultures was evident in the 
remarks of an Italian officer during his country’s first war with Ethiopia from 1895 to 
1896: “A bit of Pizarro [referring to the Spanish conquistador] does not hurt; with 
some people terror works better than kindness” (Baudendistel 2006:221). 
The flipside suggests that similar cultural backgrounds should be credited for 
breeding a greater degree of understanding and compassion among fellow belligerents. 
Fighting during the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay from 1932 to 1935 was 
certainly at times quite pitched. Prisoners from both sides were nevertheless often 
viewed as unfortunate brethren caught up in a nasty war beyond their control, and as a 
result were generally treated in a decent manner (Zook 1960:101; Farcau 1996:61-63). 
Religious ties and a common sense of brotherhood are also cited as contributing to the 
lenient treatment Saudi Arabia accorded Yemeni prisoners during their war in 1934 
(Jarman 1998:242). 
The general logic underlying the role of cultural differences has recently 
gained a wider following through the so-called “clash of civilizations” thesis. As one 
of its foremost proponents, Huntington proclaims that civilizational differences, based 
primarily on religious values, has become the primary dividing line between states in 
the international system (Huntington 1996:47, 126). Social identity theorists posit that 
processes of in-grouping and out-grouping are ubiquitous and part of state’s project in 
defining its identity, but with the side effect that competition between states can often 
become quite intense (Mercer 1995:241-245). Civilizational variants argue that 
religious differences are a particularly salient cleavage that is likely to lead to violent 
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conflict between dissimilar states. Research in this vein has tended to focus on the 
onset of conflict, but Huntington also implies that cultural differences will have 
implications for the subsequent conduct of wars: “Over the centuries, however, 
differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most 
violent conflicts” (Huntington 1993b:25). Abuse against combatants is arguably one of 
the more vivid manifestations of violence during war. The role of cultural differences 
in shaping combatant abuse leads to the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4 (cultural differences): Wars involving states from 
different cultures are more likely to result in combatant abuse. 
Despite the compelling simplicity of the logic of the cultural argument, 
evidence that civilizational differences are a key determinant of the likelihood and 
bloodiness of war is mixed on both counts. Some scholars have indeed found that 
civilizational differences increase the probability of conflict between states 
(Henderson 1998:475-476).47 Other research has shown, in contrast, that civilization 
exerts little or no effect on conflict initiation (Russett et al. 2000:595; Henderson and 
Tucker 2001:328; Chiozza 2002:726). Studies on the conduct of states once war has 
begun reveal similar results. Belligerents from different civilizations are no more 
likely to target the civilians of their opponent than belligerents sharing the same 
civilizational background (Downes 2006:174; Valentino et al. 2006:369-370; Downes 
2007:891). Downes cautions that cultural factors may be more salient amongst 
soldiers on the battlefield and hence lead to greater atrocities in this area. Even here, 
he doubts this provides much insight into the behavior of higher authorities who are 
                                                 
47 The findings from Henderson are not completely clear. Studying war onset from 1820-1989, he finds 
that religious similarity dampened conflict, while ethnic or linguistic similarity actually heightened the 
likelihood of conflict. 
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not necessarily brutalized in a similar manner, which is a requirement for explaining 
more systematic levels of abuse (Downes 2008:26).48 
 Several historians taking a broader view of patterns in the treatment of 
combatants nevertheless continue to accord a great deal of importance to cultural 
factors. Beaumont examines a series of conflicts from World War II to the present and 
concludes that combatant abuse resulted in large part from “those persistent enemies 
of humanitarianism: mutual incomprehension of alien cultures, ideological fanaticism, 
and racial hatreds” (Beaumont 1996:280). Reflecting on an even longer timeframe 
involving the last two centuries of warfare, Best argues that “the circumstances most 
advantageous to observance of the law[s of war] were when armies of not dissimilar 
race, religion and general ethical notions (i.e. armies able to recognize in their foes 
‘people of their own kind’)…faced and fought each other” (Best 1980:217-218).  
 In response to Best’s broad sweeping conclusions, others argue that if cultural 
similarity acts as such a restraint against the resort to atrocities then civil wars should 
not be nearly so bitter or bloody (Roberts 1994:136).49 For all of the wars involving 
one country abusing prisoners from the opposing side, many other cases do not closely 
fit this pattern. In an exhaustive study of the Pacific Theater during World War II, 
Dower asserts that cultural differences and racial hatred accounted for the brutal 
nature of the fighting between Japanese and U.S. forces (Dower 1986:9, 35, 48-52). 
                                                 
48 Downes makes this point in reference to a more specific dynamic through which war can brutalize its 
participants and make them more likely to commit violations. An extension from the point of view of 
civilizational proponents, however, might suggest that this process of brutalization should be expected 
to be more severe in the case of belligerents from different cultures. 
49 The broader civil war literature is more mixed on this point. Some scholars find that civil wars based 
on ethnic or religious differences are longer, bloodier, and more difficult to settle than wars centering 
on socioeconomic or political issues, which would lend some support to civilizational arguments 
(Kaufman 1996:139-143; Roeder 2003:523). However, others find little support for ethno-religious 
factors (Fearon 2004:286). Others present a more nuanced position that religious differences are not in 
themselves a key factor, so much as whether a belligerent is pursuing religious-based objectives. 
However, this argument is so far limited to the narrower issue of the probability that a war will end 
through a negotiated settlement rather than outright victory by one side or the other (Svensson 
2007:941). 
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Yet Japanese treatment of peoples of Sinic origin, with whom they generally shared 
more similar cultural traits, was equally brutal, if not more so, than the treatment of 
U.S. and British combatants (Rees 2001:28). Furthermore, cultural differences did not 
prevent Japan from treating captured Russian and German soldiers in an exemplary 
fashion during earlier wars, such as the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War and World 
War I respectively (Hata 1996:257-262). 
 Others argue that it is not cultural differences per se that matter, but rather 
contrasting discourses of civilization and barbarism that are expressed by certain 
ideological groups within a given culture.50 For instance, Kinsella believes these 
discourses help to explain the relative restraint U.S. forces have shown Muslim 
civilians during the War on Terror compared to their extensive abuse of combatants 
coming out of these same societies. The protection of “innocent” civilians is justified 
by a civilizing principle of humanity, while the contrasting lack of regard for 
combatants is merited by the latter’s construction as a barbarian foe. As she explains: 
Specific rights of war are granted only to those so identified as already 
within the ambit of civilisation and, so it appears, humanity itself. By 
constructing a barbarous enemy, ‘akin to fascism, Nazism, and 
totalitarianism’ whose ‘murderous ideology’ may be different, but no 
less horrendous, as those of the early twentieth century, the rights and 
protections of war are rendered beyond their due (Kinsella 2005:183). 
Rhetoric concerning the barbarism and immorality of terrorists and other 
insurgents is certainly widespread in official U.S. pronouncements, but this is not 
                                                 
50 Another alternative, which still maintains the focus on cultural differences, suggests that differences 
on average might not be important, but that particularly hard-fought wars brutalize belligerents and 
make those differences in culture more salient. This appears largely consistent with Bartov’s view that 
ethnic difference can exacerbate already intense conditions on a battlefront and barbarize the frontline 
participants to an even greater degree (Bartov 2001:4, 155). However, a counter to this view might 
contend that processes of brutalization more often than not occur in particularly severe wars, meaning 
that any resulting behavior may be better accounted for by these underlying traits of the fighting rather 
than cultural attributes per se (Downes 2008:26). 
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necessarily equivalent to viewing these beliefs as the cause of U.S. behavior toward 
enemy combatants. Looking at Kinsella’s own statement, if Fascist Italy or Nazi 
Germany were viewed as similarly barbaric, then it is not clear why the United States 
treated Axis prisoners on the whole quite well (Beaumont 1996:279). Similarly, during 
the First Gulf War in 1991, President George H.W. Bush likened Saddam Hussein to 
Hitler and Iraqi troops to his Nazi henchmen, yet the United States scrupulously 
ensured that Iraqi soldiers seeking to surrender were protected and treated decently 
upon entering into captivity (U.S. News and World Report 1992:123, 143, 174; 
Roberts 1993-1994:161). The ICRC even went so far as to described U.S. conduct 
toward Iraqi prisoners during the war as “the best compliance with the Geneva 
Convention by any nation in any conflict in history” (U.S. Department of Defense 
1992:577). 
 Discourses of barbarism and the emphasis on the “otherness” of the enemy 
may sincerely reflect fundamental cultural differences between the belligerents. 
Barbaric rhetoric remains far more common, however, than the actual abuse of 
combatants during war. Cultural clashes appear to be associated just as often with 
respect for the rights of the enemy rather than their violation. A common alternative 
explanation for similar forms of rhetoric is that they can serve as an instrumental 
device to mobilize public support behind the government during trying times that 
often demand great sacrifices from the citizenry, of which crises and especially wars 
are some of the most noteworthy examples (Christensen 1996:17). 
 Although I have raised some concerns over the purported consequences of 
images of barbarism, untangling the precise role of these discourses would require a 
systematic study of their relative frequency, intensity, and specific content. Examining 
the many characteristics of wartime discourses and representations of the enemy 
involves an enormous endeavor in and of itself.  For instance, Dower’s impressive 
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study of Japanese and U.S. images of each other over the course of the Pacific War 
was based on an analysis of a wide range of official government statements, private 
correspondence, newspaper and magazine articles, and even political cartoons (Dower 
1986). Expanding Dower’s framework to a host of other states and conflicts, in 
addition to evaluating the nature of the belligerents and bloodshed framework 
developed in this chapter, is unfortunately beyond the scope of the present study. I 
limit the analysis to evaluating the more modest hypothesis (H4) outlined earlier 
regarding the impact of ex ante cultural differences on the probability of combatant 
abuse. A perspective focusing on cultural differences offers one of the most widely 
argued alternatives to the nature of the belligerents and bloodshed framework outlined 
earlier, and is certainly deserving of a more extensive evaluation.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I provided a detailed definition of the elements making up 
combatant abuse. In order to be considered combatant abuse, violations must be 
committed against combatants who have laid down their arms, be intentional, be 
sanctioned by the political or military leadership, but can also involve a variety of 
either direct or indirect forms of abuse. A subsequent analysis of the costs and benefits 
of combatant abuse reveals that states possess a wide range of incentives that could 
either lead them adopt or shy away from adopting this strategy. 
The next half of the chapter was then devoted to developing the core theory of 
the causes of combatant abuse, which focused on two key components – the nature of 
the belligerents and the bloodshed. The nature of the belligerents emphasized the 
importance of democracy for understanding how domestic attributes of the state can 
condition the likelihood that it will resort to combatant abuse. Separate normative and 
institutional variants were proposed for understanding what makes democracies 
distinct from other regime types when it comes to abusing prisoners. The second 
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component shifts emphasis away from domestic characteristics of the parties and 
focuses instead on the nature of the bloodshed during war. Two traits involving the 
nature of the bloodshed were proposed as being particularly salient and substantially 
increase the likelihood a state will resort to combatant abuse. These were the severity 
of the fighting on the battlefield and the type of objectives states seek to attain through 
war, in particular territorial annexation. The last part of the chapter discussed cultural 
differences as one other commonly cited alternative explanation for combatant abuse, 
though others will be put forward in subsequent chapters. 
The remaining chapters in the manuscript turn to evaluating in a more 
systematic manner the arguments put forward here and to assess the relative 
explanatory power of the nature of the belligerents and the bloodshed framework. The 
next two chapters assess the theory in a quantitative manner by first tracing trends in 
combatant abuse over the previous century of interstate warfare and then conducting a 
statistical analysis of the causes of combatant abuse. The following chapters then rely 
to a greater extent on qualitative evidence to assess whether the logic underlying the 
overall theoretical framework is supported across several different historical case 
studies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MEASURING AND IDENTIFYING TRENDS IN COMBATANT ABUSE 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to translate the general concept of combatant 
abuse introduced in the previous chapter into an operational measure that can be used 
to examine the treatment of prisoners across a large number of wars. The chapter 
proceeds in the following three sections. First, I discuss the cases forming the core of 
the overall data set, which concerns the treatment of prisoners during all interstate 
wars from 1898 to 2003. Second, I introduce a measure for the main dependent 
variable of combatant abuse. I also discuss some of the challenges that must be 
addressed when attempting to code the treatment of prisoners during war. In the third 
section I then use this measure of combatant abuse to examine some overall trends in 
the treatment of prisoners over more than one hundred years of interstate warfare. 
Data on Interstate Wars 
 The data set consists of all interstate wars from the end of the nineteenth 
century, which begins with the Spanish-American War in 1898, to the 2003 interstate 
portion of the Iraq War. I made the decision to restrict the type of war and time period 
considered for this study for a number of reasons. First, the time intensiveness and 
general challenges of coding prisoner treatment, which is discussed in greater detail 
below, meant I decided to limit the analysis to interstate wars instead of including 
other types of armed conflict, such as civil or colonial wars. Data was also generally of 
a higher quality for interstate wars compared to other conflict types, which allowed for 
greater accuracy in the coding of prisoner treatment. The analysis focuses on interstate 
wars, but extending the data collection effort to other types of warfare certainly 
remains a fruitful area for further research.  
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Second, earlier conflicts were excluded because of the lack of accessible and 
reliable data on the treatment of captured combatants. I chose to limit the analysis to a 
time period during which a wide range of scholarly and other primary sources were 
available to determine the level of combatant abuse for the various belligerents in a 
given war. One of the additional benefits of the time period chosen is that it matches 
quite closely to the development and codification of the laws of war, also known as 
international humanitarian law. Admittedly, the first most commonly accepted 
international treaty dealing specifically with the laws of war was negotiated much 
earlier with the 1864 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field. As the title of the convention makes clear, however, 
it was fairly narrow in scope and dealt only tangentially with issues related to 
prisoners of war.51 In contrast, the 1899 Hague Conventions are widely considered to 
represent the foundation of the modern laws of war. The Conventions provide the 
basic definition and principles for the treatment of prisoners of war, which have 
largely continued in a similar form up to the present day, though with some further 
inclusion and elaboration of certain rights and responsibilities (Vance 2006:171-172, 
200). The wars considered in this data set thus involve belligerents who at least had an 
understanding of the general prevailing international rights and obligations concerning 
the treatment of prisoners during war, whether or not they actually ascribed to and 
followed these principles themselves.52  
                                                 
51 For instance, Article 6 of the Convention discusses the treatment of wounded soldiers from the 
adversary, but allows for many of the details to be negotiated between the warring parties. See 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/120?OpenDocument. 
52 Although it should be noted this is distinct from estimating the actual effect of international laws and 
norms on the resort to combatant abuse by states during war, which is a separate empirical question 
taken up in the following chapter. 
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The list of wars is based primarily on the Correlates of War (COW) Inter-State 
War dataset (v3.0) with a few notable changes (Sarkees 2000).53 First, as has become 
increasingly common in the larger quantitative conflict literature, several long multi-
actor wars are divided into a series of separate military confrontations that more 
accurately capture the actual fighting between the relevant belligerents (Reiter and 
Stam 2002:39; Downes 2008:43). World War I was separated into four individual 
conflicts, World War II into nine separate conflicts, and the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf 
War into the Iraq-Kuwait and U.S. Coalition-Iraq conflicts.54 Second, a number of 
wars are included that, according to several criteria, qualify as interstate wars but for 
various reasons are not found in the COW data.55 The final data set contains 67 wars 
in total, which are summarized in a table found in the appendix.56 
The unit of analysis is the warring-directed-dyad. This means that in a war 
there are two observations for any pair of opponents, where each is a potential 
violator/victim in a given directed dyad. For instance, Falklands-Great Britain-
Argentina codes British treatment of Argentinean prisoners during the 1982 Falklands 
                                                 
53 Following COW, an interstate war is defined as a military conflict between two states, in other words 
two recognized members of the international system, which resulted in a minimum of 1,000 battle 
fatalities among the states involved. An individual state is counted as a participant in the war if it had a 
minimum of 1,000 armed personnel engaged in the hostilities, or sustained a minimum of 100 battle 
fatalities (Small and Singer 1982:55). 
54 Others also divide the Vietnam War into a U.S./South Vietnam-North Vietnam conflict from 1965 to 
either 1973 or 1975, and a subsequent South Vietnam-North Vietnam conflict from either 1973-1975 or 
for 1975 only (Reiter and Stam 2002:39; Downes 2008:43). For the purposes of combatant abuse, this 
distinction seems less relevant and is not adopted. Both North and South Vietnamese forces continued 
to hold prisoners from the 1965-1973 period after the U.S. withdrew its military forces from the 
conflict. Separating the treatment of these earlier prisoners from those captured later is thus 
problematic. Moreover, the general policies of both the North and South Vietnamese sides did not 
change substantially, which suggests that combining the two periods together still allows for a 
reasonable measure of each state’s overall treatment of enemy combatants. 
55 These conflicts are Chad-Libya (1987), the Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
(1992-1994), Ethiopia-Eritrea (1998-2000), Kosovo (1999), Kargil (1999), United States-Afghanistan 
(2001), and United States-Iraq (2003). Many of these conflicts update the most recent version of the 
COW data set, which ends in 1991 with the Persian Gulf War.  
56 The table in the appendix actually lists 69 wars for the time period 1898-2003, but two observations 
were unable to be coded due to insufficient information. These were WWIIf German-Yugoslav (1941) 
and the Second Sino-Vietnamese War (1987). 
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War, while Falklands-Argentina-Great Britain correspondingly measures Argentinean 
treatment of British prisoners during the same conflict. In wars involving more than 
two parties, there are two corresponding observations for each pair of states fighting 
on opposing sides. In theory, this suggests an enormous number of observations for 
large conflicts such as both world wars. In practice, however, most wars involve only 
a handful of states that can be considered relevant when assessing the treatment of 
prisoners.  
The data set is limited solely to those states deemed to be “capable captors.” A 
state is considered a capable captor if it meets both of the following two criteria. First, 
a state must have the capacity for an independent prisoner policy. This is not really a 
concern in wars between only two states, but in conflicts involving large coalitions 
subordinate alliance partners often have little leeway in adopting separate military 
practices from their more powerful patrons. For instance, during the Korean War 
allied forces were nominally under a unified United Nations command, but the United 
States dominated all aspects of the planning and prosecution of the war, especially 
with regards to prisoner policy (Springer 2006:212). As historian Max Hastings 
remarked, “Beneath a thin veneer of respect for the authority of the United Nations, 
Americans conducted the war as they saw fit.” (Hastings 1987:332). States in such a 
subordinate position should not be treated as separate observations, since their 
behavior is not independent but instead largely determined by their larger ally.57 
                                                 
57 There may be some concerns that selection effects may be operating regarding which types of states 
are found to be capable captors among coalition forces. Lead states in a coalition may choose which of 
its allies to delegate independent prisoner policies based on their expected behavior toward enemy 
combatants. For instance, if democracies are indeed more humane captors than nondemocracies, then 
democratic lead states may prevent potential allied transgressors from acquiring an autonomous 
prisoner capacity. According to this logic, the United States might have prevented Ethiopian or 
Colombian troops from developing their own prisoner policies during the Korean War because they 
feared these allies would commit greater levels of abuse. Even if this was the case, this selection effect 
likely presents an even tougher test of the democracy finding since several hypothetical “evil” 
autocratic captors would not be observed, which otherwise would have been if this dynamic were not 
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Coding subservient allies as separate independent observations thus in many ways 
engages in a form of double counting. 
Other scholars have dealt with the issue of subordinate allies in different ways. 
Morrow and Valentino et al. group allies together and weight all relevant independent 
variables by the individual contributions of each state to the alliance (Valentino et al. 
2006:358; Morrow 2007:571).58 If several members are truly subordinate, then it 
arguably may make more sense to focus on the characteristics of the lead state, since it 
is more likely that policy is being driven by its traits on relevant variables rather than 
an aggregation of allied values. On the other hand, if an alliance partner is deemed to 
have an independent policy, then it would be preferable to reflect this situation more 
directly by creating a separate observation for that state. I choose to follow this 
alternative procedure. States that fight on the same side but are found to have 
independent prisoner policies are given separate observations, while subordinate allies 
that lack an independent policy are excluded.  
Second, even if a state is deemed sufficiently autonomous to possess 
independent decision-making capacity, it must also have a sincere opportunity to 
either treat or mistreat enemy combatants whatever the case may be. In other words, in 
order to be considered a truly capable state for the purposes of this study the 
                                                 
operating. On the other hand, democracies might choose to transfer prisoners to their harsher autocratic 
allies to allow them to do the dirty work in dealing with captives. This possible phenomenon of 
rendition would in turn seem to count against the “good” democracy effect. Several charges along these 
lines have been made against the United States during the ongoing War on Terror with regards to the 
transfer of particular suspects to other countries where they were subsequently abused and tortured 
(Mayer 2005). However, I follow international legal principles whereby the original captor state 
ultimately remains responsible for the proper treatment of prisoners even after they have been 
transferred to a third party (e.g. 1949 Third Geneva Convention Art.12). Neither scenario appears to 
pose a serious source of bias and, if anything, provides an even stronger test against the benevolent 
democracy hypothesis. 
58 In their study on the targeting of civilians, Valentino et al. treat all coalitions in this manner, even 
those where individual allies might be deemed to possess an independent capacity for implementing the 
issue at hand. All wars in their data set, therefore, involve only two observations, one for each side. 
Along with greatly reducing the number of observations, this approach also implicitly aggregates 
potential differences in the behavior of allied members. 
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belligerent must have actually captured enemy combatants during hostilities. Most 
wars indeed involve both sides capturing substantial, though not necessary equal, 
numbers of soldiers from the opposing side. However, in cases of particularly one-
sided fighting it is not uncommon for the losing side to capture few if any prisoners 
from their superior adversary. During World War II Belgium was quickly overrun by 
Germany’s armed forces and records indicate no German prisoners were captured 
(Warmbrunn 1993:45-48). Similarly, Saudi forces easily pushed aside Yemeni 
defenses during their war in 1934, meaning Yemen had little if any opportunity to 
capture opposing combatants (de Gaury 1966:35; Wenner 1967:145).  
Coding such cases as countries that do not engage in combatant abuse would 
equate states that never had a meaningful chance to harm enemy combatants with 
those states that actually had an opportunity and chose to treat their captives in a 
decent manner. The latter are legitimate examples of negative cases of combatant 
abuse since the state in question committed few if any violations against their 
prisoners. In contrast, the former are better seen as irrelevant since the resort to 
combatant abuse is impossible because no prisoners were captured in the first place 
(Mahoney and Goertz 2004).59 The sample is thus limited to cases of states that had 
both an independent prisoner policy and an opportunity to harm enemy combatants.60 
                                                 
59 While Mahoney and Goertz discuss the issue of negative cases in the context of small-n research 
designs, they note their approach is equally relevant for large-n quantitative analysis as well (Mahoney 
and Goertz 2004:654). 
60 For a similar discussion in the study of civilian victimization, see Downes (2008:57-58). Given his 
subject matter, the criteria he uses for what constitutes a “capable” state are somewhat different. We 
share an emphasis on whether or not the state in question was a subordinate alliance partner, but he also 
includes whether the state’s forces invaded the territory of the adversary, or whether it possessed air, 
missile, or naval forces able to bomb or blockade the enemy. Both of these additional criteria make 
more sense for civilian victimization, since each provides a greater opportunity to harm civilians. 
However, neither is a necessary condition for combatant abuse as defined in this study. A defending 
country can take plenty of prisoners even when fighting on its own territory, as was evident with Soviet 
Russia throughout the German invasion of its territory during World War II. Similarly, combatant abuse 
does not depend on missiles or other capital-intensive weapons, since it often requires only a simple 
firearm for execution, or crude tools for other forms of abuse. The key defining feature of combatant 
abuse is that the belligerent must actually hold prisoners as a prior step before considering their 
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Examples of states that are considered participants in particular wars, but are not 
deemed to be capable captors for the purposes of this study, are provided in Table 5 
below. 
Table 5: Examples of non-capable captors during interstate wars, 1898-2003
Non-Capable 
Captor
Opponent Year(s) War Reason
Germany Japan 1914-1918 WWIa (Western Allies-
Central Powers)
No opportunity
South Africa Germany 1939-1950 World War II (Germany-
Western Allies)
Not independent
Ethiopia North Korea 1951-1953 Korean War Not independent
Egypt United Kingdom 1956 Sinai No opportunity
Kuwait Iraq 1990 Iraq-Kuwait No opportunity  
Measuring Combatant Abuse 
Combatant abuse is defined as a military strategy enacted by political and 
military authorities that involves the intentional killing or harming, either directly or 
indirectly, of enemy combatants who have laid down their arms and surrendered. War 
remains a brutal business and it is inevitable that all too many soldiers will die during 
the heat of battle. Soldiers who raise their hands to surrender have removed 
themselves, in theory, from the line of fire and it is their treatment that is the focus of 
this study. Mistreatment can take one or a combination of several forms, including 
torture, execution, and hard labor. Since my focus is on the conduct of states during 
war, violations that occur after hostilities have ended are excluded when coding 
combatant abuse for the purposes of the large-n research. This means that issues such 
as the exploitation of prisoner labor for postwar reconstruction, or the length of time 
                                                 
treatment. If a belligerent does not obtain any prisoners, then discussing their level of combatant abuse 
requires a hypothetical scenario considering what they would have done, which is beyond the scope of 
the current study. Downes notes that excluding non-capable states could introduce a selection bias, 
whereby states that are less likely to wish to harm civilians are also less likely to develop the necessary 
technological capabilities to be able to target civilians in the first place (2008:57). However, since high-
tech capabilities are not a prerequisite for combatant abuse, this concern is less relevant when dealing 
with issues related to prisoners. 
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until repatriation, are not considered in the quantitative analysis, but certainly remain 
relevant for grasping a fuller picture of the fate of prisoners resulting from war.61 
Implementing a measure for the concept of combatant abuse presents several 
challenges. First, violations may be state-sanctioned, but others may be committed by 
individual or small groups of soldiers without consent from higher-level authorities 
(Morrow 2001:974-978). As is evident from the definition for combatant abuse 
presented above, I choose to focus only on those acts that are either explicit state 
policy, or because of an established pattern of widespread practice are considered to 
be de facto state-sanctioned.  
Second, constructing an interval-level measure, such as the percentage of 
prisoners dying in captivity relative to the number of prisoners held, is inherently 
problematic because of limitations in the available data. The oft-quoted “fog of war” is 
quite literal when it comes to figures on the treatment of combatants and makes 
precise measures of combatant abuse extremely difficult to obtain. Moreover, 
prisoners do not have to die to suffer, since torture or lifelong ailments caused by poor 
nutrition should also be considered to be painful forms of abuse. Despite limitations in 
the feasibility of more fine-grained measures, a perusal of the historical record 
certainly reveals substantial variation in the treatment of combatants. I chose to 
construct an ordinal measure reflecting a broader set of distinctions in the treatment of 
combatants, which places each case of combatant abuse into one of three categories: 
high, moderate, or low. “No violation” is not included as a separate category, but is 
rather included under low-level combatant abuse, since during war it is almost 
unavoidable that belligerents will harm prisoners in some way.62 Low-level abuses are 
likely the best that can be reasonably achieved during wartime, at least for the period 
                                                 
61 Some of these postwar prisoner issues are indeed taken up in several of the later case study chapters. 
62 For similar reasoning from the study of targeting civilians during civil war, see Stanton (2005:18). 
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under study, and thus represent the minimum value chosen for the dependent variable. 
The overall strategy of employing a categorical measure is also in line with many 
other quantitative data sets studying the conduct of states or other warring parties 
during armed conflict, which reflects similar challenges in data collection.63 
 High-level cases involve state-sanctioned, widespread, and systematic abuse of 
prisoners. Although differences in the overall extent of violence may still certainly 
exist, cases included in this category generally involve captors who show little to no 
regard for the rights of prisoners who fall into their hands. Every single prisoner might 
not necessarily be killed or horribly violated, but a general policy and expectation 
exists that prisoners will likely be treated in a brutal manner. Examples include 
Japanese treatment of Allied prisoners during the Second World War, or British and 
French treatment of Chinese prisoners during the Boxer Rebellion.  
At the other extreme are low-level cases where prisoners are generally treated 
well and abuses are rare. In a corresponding manner to high-level cases, this does not 
necessarily mean abuses never occur during the course of the conflict. Warfare 
unfortunately, but almost inevitably, entails a harsh reality for most participants and 
the lot of prisoners is far from ideal even in the best of circumstances. Captivity causes 
a great deal of mental hardship and often exerts a lasting psychological toll on 
prisoners, which has become commonly known as “barbed-wire disease,” even when 
their physical safety is respected (Britt et al. 2006:95-96). What distinguishes low-
                                                 
63 Other examples of studies relying on categorical dependent variables include (Valentino et al. 2004; 
Stanton 2005; Downes 2006; Valentino et al. 2008). In one of the most systematic studies of the 
treatment of civilians during war, Downes uses a continuous measure for the targeting of civilians 
(number of civilians killed), but also includes a number of alternative categorical measures (Downes 
2008:44-47, 62-64). Examples of studies that rely solely on continuous measures include Valentino et 
al’s research on the determinants of the number of civilians killed during twentieth century interstate 
conflicts (Valentino et al. 2006). Humphreys and Weinstein also use a continuous dependent variable, 
in this case for the treatment of civilians during the civil war in Sierra Leone, but their measure is 
constructed by conducting factor analysis of a number of categorical variables drawn from survey 
responses (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006:435, 446). 
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level cases is that abuses are the rare exception rather than the rule. Low-level cases 
are perhaps better thought of as the best case scenario possible out of a range of poor 
options facing soldiers who surrender during war. Examples include U.S. treatment of 
Iraqi prisoners during the 1991 Gulf War. 
Between the two extreme points lie medium-level cases, where abuses 
certainly occur to a much greater extent than at low-level instances, but are overall less 
common or extensive compared to high-level abuse. This category may also include 
more frequent individual acts of abuse which are not explicitly supported by the state, 
but nor are firm steps taken by state authorities to prevent further acts from taking 
place. Examples include U.S. treatment of North Korean and Chinese prisoners during 
the Korean War. For illustrative purposes, a selection of historical cases from each of 
the high, medium, and low levels of combatant abuse is provided in Table 6 below. 
Table 6: Examples of combatant abuse in interstate wars
Level War Year(s) Violator Victim
High Boxer Rebellion 1900 China Russia
Second Balkan 1913 Serbia Bulgaria
WWII (Pacific Front) 1941-1945 Japan United States
Iran-Iraq 1980-1988 Iraq Iran
Medium Italo-Turkish 1911-1912 Italy Turkey
WWII (Eastern Front/ 
Continuation War)
1941-1944 Finland Russia
Six Day 1967 Israel Egypt
First Sino-Vietnamese 1979 China Vietnam
Low Russo-Japanese 1904-1905 Japan Russia
Chaco 1932-1935 Paraguay Bolivia
Second Kashmir 1965 India Pakistan
Falklands 1982 Argentina United Kingdom  
 Although each case is ultimately categorized as exhibiting either high, 
medium, or low levels of violations against prisoners, the overall coding of combatant 
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abuse for each warring-directed-dyad is initially drawn from separate measurements 
for the following six distinct forms of violations: execution, torture, denial of legal 
rights, compulsory military conscription, hard labor, and poor housing and nutrition. 
These violations were chosen because they correspond closely to the “grave breaches” 
outlined in the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, which are considered particularly 
heinous violations of prisoner rights under international law.  
Most of the individual violations were coded according to the same 
high/medium/low classification system, but a dichotomous coding was chosen as more 
appropriate for the forced conscription and legal rights components. In contrast to the 
greater degree of gradation in treatment across the other measures, in both of these 
cases prisoners were either forced to serve or not in the captor’s armed forces, or their 
legal rights were or were not infringed upon. Since forced conscription involves 
placing prisoners back into the line of fire and is widely viewed as a sui generis grave 
breach of the laws of war, violators for this variable were automatically coded as 
“high” overall.64 On the other hand, since denial of legal rights does not in and of itself 
cause direct physical harm to the prisoner, violators of this variable were coded as 
“medium,” provided they did not score any higher on the remaining components. Of 
course, if the denial of legal rights resulted in summary execution or other relevant 
abuses like torture, then this is also reflected under the other appropriate component 
variables. 
The six individual component violations are then used to construct the overall 
summary indicator of the level of combatant abuse based on the following decision 
                                                 
64 The official commentaries provided to the Geneva Conventions discuss in greater detail the unique 
problems and threat for prisoners posed by the crime of forcible conscription. See, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/375-590156?OpenDocument. For a more general discussion of the 
dangers inherent in compelling prisoners to perform military service, see (Gutman and Rieff 1999:100-
101). 
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rule. The highest level of abuse perpetrated by the violator state across the six 
components is used to code the overall summary indicator of abuse for a given 
warring-directed-dyad. For instance, if a state is found to have engage in high levels of 
abuse for execution against prisoners from an adversary, but low levels of abuse for 
labor conditions, it is still considered to have engaged in high levels of abuse overall. I 
chose this rule to hold states to a more stringent standard of expectations, since any of 
the individual violations on their own is considered a war crime and punishable under 
international law.65 However, it should also be noted that subsequent statistical results 
using this measure of combatant abuse do not change substantially when relying on 
different rules for aggregating the component variables, as will be discussed in further 
detail in the following chapter. 
I rely mainly on secondary historical resources supplemented by primary 
documents for coding the component variables for combatant abuse. Scholars have 
become increasingly aware of concerns over selection bias when studying particular 
historical episodes (Lustick 1996:606). Bias can occur because of tendencies by the 
original author of a historical account to favor certain actors or viewpoints over others. 
These biases can be compounded if the present-day researcher ends up systematically 
selecting certain historical works over others and thus forms an overly one-sided 
account of the subject (Thies 2002:362). Issues of this sort are particularly acute in the 
study of combatant treatment since perpetrators often have an incentive to conceal the 
extent of their violations. On the other hand, it is also common during war for 
opposing sides to hurl charges and counter-charges of alleged atrocities back and forth 
                                                 
65 On the desire to distinguish certain acts of violence during war as particularly egregious, see the 
Commentaries to Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/1a13044f3bbb5b8ec12563fb0066f226/ac8bb88157e3f8b4c12563cd004299a
8!OpenDocument. On the status of these grave breaches as official war crimes under international law, 
see Article 8 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/585?OpenDocument. 
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for propaganda purposes. Separating out reality from rhetoric during wartime can 
oftentimes be a daunting task. I attempt to minimize the extent of these biases by 
employing to the greatest degree possible multiple sources for each war. I also sought 
to rely on sources that were written well after the war, or by scholars not party to the 
conflict and who were thus less likely to weigh the evidence in favor of one side or the 
other.  
The final data set is based on a substantial amount of original research where 
the coding for each observation often draws on a large number of different sources. 
Using a variety of sources helps to produce a sort of “quasi-triangulation” that can 
increase our confidence about the likely patterns in the behavior of the actors being 
studied (Lustick 1996:616). The ordinal scale used for measuring combatant abuse 
also takes into account the uncertainty inherent in the historical record by specifying a 
broad, yet meaningful, range of variation in the level of violations committed by states 
against enemy combatants during war. 
A few comments are also in order regarding alternative measures of combatant 
abuse. Compared to research on civilian victimization, quantitative studies of 
combatant abuse remain relatively sparse. Most of the existing research on the 
treatment of prisoners comes out of the historical literature, which often focuses on 
one or a handful of cases in great detail.66 The approach taken in many historical 
works has the advantage of paying particular attention to the unique contextual factors 
that often distinguish individual episodes, but with the trade-off of demonstrating less 
ability to generalize across a wider range of cases and grasp broader patterns in the 
conduct states (Levy 2001:54). The measure of combatant abuse I develop is 
                                                 
66 Examples include Speed’s study of international diplomacy over prisoners during the First World 
War, and MacKenzie’s briefer but wide-ranging work on prisoner policies by the major powers during 
the Second World War (Speed 1990; MacKenzie 1994). 
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necessarily a crude reduction of an immense amount of information on each individual 
historical episode of combatant abuse. In this light, my measure and the resulting 
research strategy is perhaps best seen as complementary to existing studies in the 
historical literature. I seek to identify the causes of combatant abuse across a much 
larger set of cases, while remaining fully cognizant of the necessary compromise to 
sometimes disregard some of the unique details in each case at hand. 
In contrast to the historical literature, one of the only other examples of work 
involving quantitative data on the treatment of combatants is Morrow’s recent study of 
compliance with the laws of war more generally (Morrow and Jo 2006; Morrow 
2007). Morrow collects data on the treatment of prisoners during interstate wars, but 
also examines conduct of states across a number of other issue areas, including aerial 
bombing, respecting armistice/flag of truce, chemical and biological weapons, 
treatment of civilians, cultural property, conduct on the high seas, treatment of the 
wounded, and declarations of war (Morrow and Jo 2006:95-96). Examining the period 
from 1900 to 1991, the sheer scope of the study is impressive and it remains the most 
expansive and authoritative data set to date on compliance with the laws of war.  
Some important differences are evident between our two approaches. First, 
Morrow includes both individual and state-level abuses while I concentrate my 
analysis on the latter. As noted in the theory chapter, the causes of the two forms of 
abuse may in fact be quite distinct, so I choose to focus on the narrower phenomenon 
of state-level combatant abuse.  
Second, measurement for the dependent variable also differs somewhat. 
Morrow’s general indicator is based on multiplying two separate four-point measures 
for noncompliance with the laws of war – magnitude and frequency – to create a 16-
point scale (Morrow and Jo 2006:106-107). This scale is then condensed to create a 
four-level ordinal indicator for non-compliance (no violation, infrequent, common, 
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massive) rather than the three-level indicator I employ (low, medium, high). Morrow’s 
use of multiple composite indicators is an attractive approach, but the two measures of 
magnitude and frequency overlap to a certain extent and thus contain elements of each 
other when put into practice.67 We differ in that I focus instead on measuring different 
types of abuse to construct an overall indicator for the treatment of combatants. 
Third, there are several differences in coding decisions. The enormous breadth 
of the Morrow study, covering nine separate aspects of the laws of war, inevitably 
involves a trade-off in terms of depth when coding each observation and issue area. 
The result is a readily admitted problem of missing data for many issue areas and wars 
(Morrow 2007:562-563). In the case of prisoners of war, almost 37 percent of the 
observations are missing.68 Along with covering a shorter time period by ending in 
1991, this means that a large number of cases are absent from the data set. The 
solution adopted by Morrow is to substitute for missing values using a series of 
standardized codings, which in the case of prisoners of war assigns the categorical 
level of noncompliance as “infrequent,” or a 6 on the 16-point scale for 
noncompliance (Morrow and Jo 2006:98-99). Cases receiving such codings include 
such disparate observations as Guatamala in the 1906 Third Central American War, 
both belligerents in the 1929 Sino-Soviet War, and Egypt during the 1956 Sinai 
campaign.  
Assuming by default that all of these states must have exhibited the same 
relatively decent level of compliance seems problematic not least because according to 
                                                 
67 For instance, “magnitude” is also a four-level variable like the composite compliance indicator, but 
the top two levels refer to “some major violations” and “many major violations such that compliance 
does not matter” respectively, which explicitly incorporates the frequency of violations (Morrow and Jo 
2006:97). Similarly, the highest category for “frequency” refers to “massive violations to the point 
where the standard is ignored,” which incorporates a measure for magnitude. Therefore, it is not clear 
the degree to which the two components are capturing distinct elements of noncompliance. 
68 I thank James Morrow for making his replication files available.  
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Morrow’s own analysis compliance with laws protecting prisoners is amongst the 
lowest across all of the issue areas of war in his study (Morrow 2007:567). By 
focusing on a single issue I admittedly sacrifice the breadth evident in Morrow’s more 
far-reaching study, but at the potential advantage of being able to examine a wider 
range of sources for each case and coding a larger number of observations overall.69 
Moreover, several of the standardized codings are cases involving states I find to be 
“noncapable” captors. Treating these observations as exhibiting relatively low levels 
of abuse raises the problem noted earlier of conflating cases where the state actually 
treated prisoners well with those where the captor state never had the independent 
capacity or the opportunity to abuse prisoners in the first place.  
Despite some of these differences, and in a similar manner to the larger 
historical literature, my data and Morrow’s should ultimately be viewed as 
complementary. We use different measures and coding decisions for our main 
dependent variable and my study looks at only a small part of the broader behavior of 
states during war which is the focus of his much larger research agenda. 
Trends in Combatant Abuse 
How common is it for prisoners to be abused once they surrender, or are they 
actually cared for in a fairly decent manner more often than we might think? Although 
there have been several historical examples of both brutal and benevolent treatment of 
prisoners, identifying overall trends in the conduct of captor states has been difficult 
without developing a common measure of combatant abuse. With such a measure in 
                                                 
69 The implications are not insignificant. For instance, Italy during its 1935-1936 war against Ethiopia is 
given the standardized coding of “infrequent” prisoner violations in Morrow’s data set. My reading of 
the case indicates Italy in fact engaged in frequent and massive violations of Ethiopian prisoners, which 
suggests instead that the case should be coded as “massive” or at the very least as “common,” according 
to Morrow’s scale. Several scholars cover the Italian case in greater detail (Del Boca 1969; Durand 
1984; Bugnion 2003; Baudendistel 2006). Missing data still remains an unavoidable problem in both 
data sets. I was unable to obtain measures for 21 out of 262 total cases, or 8 percent of the observations.  
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place, in the following section I seek to outline some of the general patterns in the 
treatment of prisoners across interstate wars from 1898 to 2003. As will become 
evident, there is substantial variation in the treatment of prisoners by level of abuse, 
across time, and even by the specific type of violation. 
Tables 7 through 12 report the frequency and corresponding percentage of 
cases falling into each level of abuse for the six types of component violations 
respectively. The total number of cases included differs in many instances since some 
types of violations involved higher levels of missing data than others. For instance, 
data was generally much more readily available for execution, while obtaining reliable 
information on labor practices was more difficult.  Table 7 below deals with execution 
and indicates that while high levels of abuse are less common than either medium or 
low levels, which fare about equally well, in more than one in four cases captors 
possess a policy of systematically killing their prisoners. High levels of execution 
inflicted by Somalia against Ethiopian prisoners during the 1977-1978 Ogaden War 
might not be the norm, but the more benevolent conduct of India in safekeeping the 
lives of many Pakistani prisoners during the 1999 Kargil Conflict is far from the 
majority practice in warfare (de Waal 1991:311; Kargil Review Committee 2000:153). 
A similar pattern is evident in Table 8 for cases involving high levels of torture though 
in almost half the cases the use of torture is relatively low. This suggests captors may 
at least prefer to kill their prisoners outright rather than cause them to suffer greatly if 
they choose to abuse them. Chinese treatment of Russian prisoners during the 1900 
Sino-Russian War nevertheless shows that torture can be an ever-present fate for 
captured prisoners (Lensen 1967:19, 222-224). 
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Table 7: Relative frequency of execution across interstate wars 
Frequency Percentage
High 55 27.50
Medium 72 36.00
Low 73 36.50
Total 200 100  
Table 8: Relative frequency of torture across interstate wars 
Frequency Percentage
High 49 25.65
Medium 48 25.13
Low 94 49.21
Total 191 100  
The reality that the fortunes for most prisoners are more often than not difficult 
in summed up in Table 9. The table shows that almost two-thirds of all cases involve 
prisoners who have their rights denied in some meaningful sense. The results for the 
denial of legal rights are perhaps not completely surprising, since this is the broadest 
category in terms of type of abuse and cannot be completely divorced from many of 
the other types of violations.70 On the other hand, the relative rarity of forced military 
conscription displayed in Table 10, which involves only two confirmed cases in the 
data set, indicates that not all types of violations are resorted to in an equal manner.71 
The reluctance of captors to force enemy combatants to serve in their armed forces is 
not completely surprising, since this policy essentially puts weapons into the hands of 
erstwhile enemies, which is obviously not without grave risks. 
                                                 
70 For instance, if a captor engages in summary execution of prisoners, then this counts as a denial of 
legal rights, in this case of a fair trial before punishment, and is coded accordingly. 
71 The two cases of forced military conscription concern Russian treatment of Polish prisoners and 
German treatment of Soviet prisoners, both of which occurred during the Second World War. More 
common is the use of prisoner labor in war-related industries, but this is distinct from actual military 
conscription and is considered instead under the hazardous labor category where applicable. There have 
also been several instances where captors may seek to encourage certain prisoner groups to volunteer 
and join their side’s armed forces, but this is allowed under international law and thus not considered a 
crime alongside forced conscription. 
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Table 9: Relative frequency of denial of legal rights across interstate wars 
Frequency Percentage
Yes 133 66.50
No 67 33.50
Total 200 100  
Table 10: Relative frequency of forced military conscription across interstate wars 
Frequency Percentage
Yes 2 1.02
No 194 98.98
Total 196 100  
 Much more frequent, though still far from widespread, are abuses based on 
hazardous labor conditions, which are summarized in Table 11. More than one quarter 
of all observations involve instances where labor conditions reached medium or high 
levels of abuse. Although this violation involves more problems with missing data, the 
general conditions for prisoner labor at least appear better than for living conditions 
more generally. This pattern may be accounted for in part by the necessity to provide 
better care to laborers if a captor wishes to fully exploit their potential. Nevertheless, 
there are several instances where captors sought to exploit prisoner labor to the 
greatest extent possible with little care for the wellbeing of their captives, such as the 
horrible conditions existing for prisoners working on railways, bridges, and other 
installations when under Japanese custody.72 In contrast, Table 12 shows that in over 
half of the cases, prisoners must cope with below par housing, nutrition, and medical 
resources, which greatly heightens their risk of dying from injuries, hunger, or 
communicable diseases. While many Ottoman prisoners were summarily executed by 
Bulgarian captors and their allies during the First Balkan War beginning in 1912, a 
                                                 
72 It is instructive that even in the case of Japan there could sometimes be some variation in the 
treatment of prisoner depending on the type of labor they performed or the particular camp in which 
they found themselves (Flower 1996:227). Though in all cases it should not be overlooked that the 
treatment of prisoners was deplorable and differences were more a matter of degree rather than of kind 
in the horrors captured combatants faced. 
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great number of others suffered a far worse death through malnutrition and ultimately 
starvation as they languished in scantily-equipped prison camps.73 Although food and 
housing requirements are amongst the areas that receive the greatest attention under 
international humanitarian law, this has certainly not translated into more healthy and 
comfortable living conditions for the vast majority of prisoners. 
Table 11: Relative frequency of hazardous labor across interstate wars 
Frequency Percentage
High 9 7.50
Medium 25 20.83
Low 86 71.67
Total 120 100  
Table 12: Relative frequency of poor living conditions across interstate wars 
Frequency Percentage
High 29 16.29
Medium 64 35.96
Low 85 47.75
Total 178 100  
The tables above detail the different levels of abuse across each of the 
component types of prisoner violations. I use the data from each component variable 
to construct the main summary indicator of combatant abuse. Table 13 below reports 
the relative frequency of cases across each of the low, medium, and high levels of 
overall combatant abuse.74 Medium-level abuse is the modal category with 78 
occurrences (37 percent of all cases), though both high and low levels of abuse are 
also common with 69 (33 percent) and 64 (30 percent) occurrences respectively. 
                                                 
73 One of the more gruesome examples was the Bulgarian-controlled island of Toundja, where Turkish 
prisoners were reduced to stripping the bark off of trees for want of food. Not surprisingly, few survived 
their ordeal at the island prison (Carnegie Endowment 1993:112).  
74 There are also 26 cases of states deemed to be “not capable” and 21 cases for which data on 
combatant abuse could not yet be found. The totals for these two sets of cases are not included in the 
percentage figures reported in Table 13, but taken together “not capable” states and missing 
observations represent 10 percent and 8 percent of all cases respectively. 
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Almost one-third of the observations in the data set are thus associated with high 
levels of abuse, which shows that brutal treatment of captured prisoners is not an 
uncommon phenomenon when states choose to settle their differences by force. 
However, this can be contrasted by the almost equally common tendency for states to 
treat their captives in a decent manner. The distribution across the three categories 
indicates that no level of combatant abuse predominates. The relative frequency of 
each level demonstrates that substantial variation in the treatment of prisoners indeed 
exists across wars. The fate awaiting many soldiers who surrender themselves is 
oftentimes certainly harsh, but this must be considered alongside a large number of 
instances where the conduct of captor states toward their prisoners is much more 
encouraging. 
Table 13: Relative frequency of combatant abuse across interstate wars 
Frequency Percentage
High 69 32.70
Medium 78 36.97
Low 64 30.33
Total 211 100  
In a similar manner to the previous tables, Table 13 only reports the frequency 
of each level of abuse across the entire time period under study, which totals more 
than one hundred years of warfare. Figure 2 below provides a better sense of possible 
trends in the various levels of combatant abuse over time. The lines show the 
percentage of combatant abuse at each given level over the course of separate twenty-
year periods.75 The final period from 1978 to 2003 includes the last 26 years of 
observations in the data set, since the time periods do not divide neatly into equal 
intervals. The figure shows some interesting overall trends. Low-level abuses are at 
                                                 
75 If a war begins during one period, but continues into a subsequent period, observations for that war 
are reflected only in the earlier period during which the conflict began. This is to avoid double counting 
wars that happen to fall across two time periods. 
 83 
 
their smallest relative frequency (21 percent) in the first period, 1898-1918, while 
high-level abuses reach their zenith during the same period (43 percent). The period 
includes World War I and the marked gap between low and high-level abuses suggests 
some support for the notion that these were indeed the bad old days typified by high 
levels of brutality both on and off the battlefield (Liddell Hart 1946:60-61).76 
 
Figure 2: Relative frequency of levels of combatant abuse, 1898-2003 
During the subsequent interwar period low-level abuse remained fairly 
constant, while higher levels of abuse dropped precipitously (16 percent). Mid-level 
violations, such as during the 1919 Hungarian-Allies War, were by far the most 
common category making up 63 percent of all forms of abuse. This trend toward the 
mean perhaps reflects a degree of war-weariness from the lengthy trench warfare of 
                                                 
76 For a more moderate view on conduct during the Great War, see (Rachamimov 2002:67-69, 78-82). 
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the Great War, but also the relatively smaller scale of conflicts at this time compared 
to the adjoining periods. 
The next period, 1938-1957, is the only time where lower forms of abuse 
predominate (41 percent), which is somewhat surprising given this period includes 
both World War II and the Korean War. World War II was certainly characterized by 
almost unprecedented levels of brutality on the Eastern Front, but in contrast the 
treatment of prisoners by all sides was fairly decent in the Western Theater of the war. 
The following period shows a general pattern of convergence in the relative frequency 
of each of the levels of abuse. From 1958-1977, is each level is responsible for around 
one-third of all abuses respectively. The final period from 1977-2003 points to a 
slightly polarizing trend as mid-level abuses decline to 26 percent, while lower and 
higher forms both increase to 37 percent of all cases. This suggests that while humane 
standards of care are becoming more common in the most recent period, brutal 
treatment in other instances is rising at the same rate. 
Except for the interwar period, no level of abuse appears to overshadow the 
others. Focusing only on lower-level abuses shows some promise from a humanitarian 
point of view, since the relative frequency of these more benevolent cases of prisoner 
treatment increases, albeit haltingly, throughout the twentieth century. 
Counterbalancing this positive trend is a similar upward tendency for the highest 
forms of abuse, at least from 1918 onward. Taken together, the overall pattern 
suggests the conduct of warfare is unfortunately not becoming more humane over time 
as high levels of abuse persist and have actually continued to increase over the last 
half-century. This is sobering news for those policy makers and activists who hope 
states would have internalized prevailing international norms over time and 
correspondingly place a higher priority on respecting the health and wellbeing of those 
prisoners who fall into their hands. 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter introduced a new data set on combatant abuse, which covers the 
treatment of prisoners during interstate wars over the period from 1898 to 2003. I 
developed an operational measure for the key concept of combatant abuse, which 
relies on the treatment of prisoners across six different types of violations, which are 
aggregated to form an overall three-level categorical indicator dividing cases into 
either high, medium, or low levels of abuse. Investigating patterns within the 
component violations and summary indicator confirms many differences exist in the 
ways prisoners are treated across wars. The lives of captured combatants are not 
always condemned to a Hobbesian existence, but nor is their safety oftentimes 
guaranteed in any meaningful sense. The results indicate that there indeed exists 
substantial variation in the level of combatant abuse during interstate wars. Left 
untouched so far is what causes these differences in the treatment of prisoners. The 
next chapter takes up the issue of which factors lead prisoners to suffer more greatly 
under certain captors or wars than others. Returning to the main research question of 
this study, why are some prisoners horribly abused while others are treated relatively 
well? 
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CHAPTER 4 
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF COMBATANT ABUSE 
Introduction 
In this chapter I move beyond identifying overall trends in the treatment of 
prisoners in order to examine in a more systematic manner the causes of combatant 
abuse during interstate wars. In particular, I seek to test the explanatory power of the 
nature of the belligerents and bloodshed framework. The nature of the belligerents 
argues that normative and institutional traits of democracies make them more likely to 
properly care for enemy combatants than their autocratic counterparts, though certain 
countervailing democratic institutional incentives also need to be kept in mind. The 
nature of the bloodshed further emphasizes the role of particular goals states may 
pursue through war, especially territorial annexation, as well as the severity of the 
fighting once the war has begun, on the likelihood that states will resort to combatant 
abuse.    
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate hypotheses derived from these two 
sets of factors, as well as several alternative explanations. First, I briefly review the 
theoretical motivation behind each of the explanatory variables, but focus more on 
measurement issues for the purposes of a large-n research design. The second and 
third sections center on the data analysis. I begin with some summary statistics to 
illustrate the initial relationships between combatant abuse and several of the 
independent variables. This is followed by an examination of potential confounding 
variables for regime type and the nature of bloodshed arguments before moving on to 
evaluating more comprehensive models of combatant abuse. The overall results 
strongly support the role of the nature of the belligerents and the bloodshed for 
understanding the causes of combatant abuse. Democratic belligerents are indeed 
found to be more likely to exhibit restraint when dealing with enemy combatants. On 
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the other hand, even when taking into account regime type, the severity and aims of 
the conflict heighten the resort to abuse against combatants, though with some caveats. 
In contrast to much of the historical literature, cultural differences do not appear to be 
a consistent determinant of the fate of prisoners, while many of the other factors 
operate in the expected direction. Of course, the quantitative analysis only provides 
one test of these explanations and many alternative factors may be worthy of further 
research. The fourth section then subjects the models to a series of specification and 
robustness checks. The fifth and final section summarizes the main findings and 
discusses how several of the results will be further examined using other types of 
evidence in the remaining chapters. 
Independent Variables 
 The independent variables were selected to evaluate the main causes of 
combatant abuse proposed by the nature of the belligerents and bloodshed theoretical 
framework. The arguments underlying the hypotheses for the primary explanatory 
variables are only reviewed briefly, since they were covered in greater detail in 
Chapter 2. Variables for a number of other alternative explanations are also presented 
and discussed. The measures are drawn from a variety of sources and supplemented 
with original coding where appropriate. 
 Regime Type: Regime type may influence the treatment of combatants in a 
number of different ways. Democratic norms protecting individual rights or promoting 
nonviolence may make democracies more likely to treat enemy combatants in a 
humane manner. Normative pressures may be supplemented by institutional incentives 
which increase the sensitivity of democratic leaders to public concerns over retaliation 
and to the strategic benefits that can be gained through good conduct. On the other 
hand, pressures from the domestic public to win quickly may make democracies more 
likely to resort to any tactic that increases the chances to achieve victory, however 
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dirty. To evaluate these alternative views, “Democracy” codes whether or not a 
country has a democratic regime type at the beginning of the war. I follow the 
standard practice in many existing studies on regime type and conflict by using the 
Polity IV index (Marshall and Jaggers 2007). Polity’s autocracy index is subtracted 
from its democracy index to create a 21-point scale ranging from -10 for least 
democratic to +10 for most democratic. I then create a dummy variable that codes a 
state as a democracy if it receives a score of 7 or above on the Polity scale.  
 Several limitations in Polity have been noted by many scholars, such as coding 
issues in specific cases, inappropriate aggregation procedures, and the focus on 
particular institutional indicators when measuring the concept of democracy as a 
whole (Alvarez et al. 1996; Gleditsch and Ward 1997; Munck and Verkuilen 2002).77 
Oren, in particular, puts forward a challenging critique arguing in part that coding by 
Polity researchers, as well as many other scholars, is influenced by the foreign conduct 
of particular regimes, especially in relations with prominent democracies like the 
United States (Oren 1995:152-153). Oren’s charge of endogeneity in the coding of 
democracy has the potential to completely undermine the very validity of the Polity 
measure. If foreign policy shapes the democracy score assigned to a given country, 
then Polity is essentially already capturing and reflecting the very foreign conduct 
researchers are seeking to attribute to regime type. Several scholars have responded to 
                                                 
77 Beyond these particular issues, there may be the added concern that the component dimensions 
underlying Polity might not be the most appropriate for evaluating the specific democracy argument of 
this study with regards to the treatment of prisoners. The Polity score is a composite index of five 
different dimensions: competitiveness of political participation, regulation of political participation, 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the 
chief executive (Marshall and Jaggers 2007:12-16). In terms of capturing the relative sensitivity of 
democratic leaders to public concerns over retaliation and potentially longer and bloodier wars resulting 
from combatant abuse, the index provides a reasonable measure linking the accountability of leaders to 
their publics. The normative argument in favor of democracies is less evident in the case of Polity. 
However, Doyle’s measure, which is discussed further below, is included as an alternative and more 
explicitly incorporates a normative component.  
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Oren’s critique and challenged various aspects of the logic of his argument, as well as 
his use and interpretation of historical evidence (Maoz 1997:182-192; Ray 1998:31-
33).  
Even if Oren is indeed correct, his critique is more relevant for the democratic 
peace thesis rather than arguments here regarding the actual conduct of states during 
war. Oren basically asserts that researchers, in line with past historical figures like 
U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, tended to view enemies of the United States like 
Imperial Germany as autocratic, while allies or friendly states were more likely to be 
treated as democratic (Oren 1995:153-157). In this light, the democratic peace thesis, 
which posits that democracies do not fight one another but are just as likely to fight 
other regime types, is simply a function of coding real and likely enemies of the 
United States and other democracies as nondemocratic irrespective of their actual 
domestic regime traits. The potential danger that Polity is endogenous to the conflict 
propensity between different pairs of states does not appear to present similar 
problems when looking at the actual conduct of states during war. The quantitative 
study of the conduct war is a relatively recent research program compared to the 
democratic peace, so it is perhaps not surprising that Polity or other democracy 
researchers did not have concerns over war conduct in mind when constructing their 
indices. Polity is thus not likely to suffer from a similar worry of endogeneity, which 
in this case would suggest that states that treat their prisoners humanely are more 
likely to be viewed as democratic by researchers.  
Furthermore, while Oren was responding in part to the near consensus that has 
developed in favor of the democratic peace thesis, there is far from a similar scholarly 
agreement in the case of the conduct of democracies once war breaks out. For 
instance, in the area of civilian victimization, several scholars find that democracy 
either has no effect or actually increases the likelihood a state will target civilians 
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(Downes 2006:174-176; Valentino et al. 2006:368-369; Downes 2007:889). There 
should in turn be less concern that relying on Polity will inherently predispose toward 
finding that democracies are less likely to abuse enemy combatants. If anything, the 
most recent research from the civilian realm would suggest that Polity provides a 
relatively tough test for the notion that democracies behave more humanely during 
war.   
Despite the concerns of Oren and many other scholars, Polity still remains 
useful for a number of reasons. The wide time-span from 1800 to the near-present 
provides a source of cross-national time-series data necessary for the sample of wars 
and countries considered in this project. Polity has also been the main measure used in 
most studies of domestic politics and conflict (e.g. Goemans 2000; Schultz 2001; 
Reiter and Stam 2002). In the aim of providing as close a comparison as possible to 
existing research, Polity seems to be an appropriate measure to employ for the 
purposes of this study. 
 As a robustness check I follow the lead of other recent scholars and include 
Doyle’s coding scheme for liberal democracies as an alternative measure, as well as 
several other measures (Downes 2008:58-59). In contrast to Polity’s greater focus on 
institutional characteristics, Doyle more explicitly incorporates normative concerns 
into his definition. While Doyle’s criteria for democracy includes a representative 
government that is competitively elected, he also includes protections of political and 
civil rights of citizens, private property, and a free market economy (Doyle 1997:264 
fn.261). In practice, the two measures are closely related and reflect the view that 
institutions and norms are often complementary and mutually supportive.78 Despite 
                                                 
78 In the observations from the combatant abuse data set the two measures have a correlation of 0.87. 
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some of their similarities, using alternative measures for the same variables provides 
added confidence regarding any potential regime type findings. 
 The following set of variables attempt to capture various elements of the nature 
of the bloodshed during war. Wars where the fighting becomes more severe may be 
more likely to lead to abuses against enemy combatants in an effort to coerce the 
opponent or simply reduce a warring state’s own costs. While the effect of certain 
objectives such as regime change may be ambivalent, others like territorial annexation 
are more likely to lead to combatant abuse in an effort to remove any subsequent 
threat within the newly conquered areas. Several measures for the severity of the 
fighting and war aims have already been created by other scholars researching the 
conduct of states during war, especially in studies on the treatment of civilians. In 
order to provide a comparison to existing research, I primarily rely on measures from 
this literature below. 
 War of attrition: A war of attrition is defined as a conflict that becomes bogged 
down into static or protracted fighting with little movement, which in turn tends to 
become extremely costly. The trench warfare that typified much of the Western Front 
during World War I falls firmly into this category. Following Downes, 
counterinsurgency warfare is included as part of this measure given its slow, arduous, 
and extended nature (Downes 2008:60). A dummy variable is created that takes on a 
value of 1 for a war of attrition and 0 otherwise. There exists a potential problem of 
endogeneity, since high levels of combatant abuse may make enemy forces resist 
much more energetically rather than surrender and a war of attrition may in turn likely 
ensue. As I discuss further below in subsequent robustness checks to the main 
analysis, endogeneity does not appear to pose a serious problem for assessing the 
overall effect of attrition on combatant abuse. 
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 War duration: Duration is measured as the length of the war in days, which is 
then logged to reduce the skewness of the distribution in the variable. 
 Battle deaths: The number of deaths suffered in combat is often one of the 
starkest measures of a war’s severity. However, any measure of battle deaths must be 
careful not to include prisoner killings or deaths in camps as part of the figure, since 
this would effectively include the dependent variable of interest, combatant abuse, on 
the right-hand side of the equation. Widely used data sets, such as the Correlates of 
War (COW), are ambiguous on this issue, since it is not always clear which types of 
fatalities are counted as part of the total number of battle deaths (Sarkees 2000).79 As 
an alternative, I rely on battle deaths data from the Uppsala/PRIO armed conflict data 
set.80 While the measure also includes civilian deaths directly connected to military 
operations, it explicitly excludes one-sided violence such as prisoner killings (Lacina 
and Gleditsch 2005:150). The inclusion of civilian deaths incorporates an added 
dimension not found in the COW source, but the authors argue this offers “the best 
measure of the scale, scope, and nature of the military engagement that has taken 
place” (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005:148). Nevertheless, as a robustness check, I also 
use the COW data as an alternative measure. The variable “Battle deaths per 1,000 
population” divides the number of battle deaths by the belligerent’s prewar population 
in thousands.81 
                                                 
79 This was also confirmed in personal correspondence with the current hosts for the data set (Sarkees 
and Wayman 2008). 
80 The standard PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset only covers the period 1946-2005 (v2.0), but the 
investigators also compiled a separate version of the data set that includes COW interstate wars as well. 
I rely on both versions of the PRIO data for the values of battle deaths used in the final analysis. Full 
details of both versions of the PRIO data can be found here, 
http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/The-Battle-Deaths-Dataset-version-
20/. 
81 Population figures were taken from the COW National Military Capabilities data set v3.02 (Singer et 
al. 1972). Strictly speaking, “Battle death per 1,000 population” is a measure of a war’s “intensity” in 
the language of Small and Singer (1982:76). However, this seems a better indicator of the relative costs 
inflicted on a belligerent than Small and Singer’s “severity” measure, which simply takes the absolute 
number of battle deaths suffered by a belligerent during the war. All else being equal, 10,000 deaths 
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 Expansive war aims: A dummy variable is created where a belligerent is 
considered to have expansive war aims if it seeks either regime change or 
unconditional surrender from the opponent, and 0 otherwise (Downes 2008:60-61). 
Examples here include the U.S. aim to topple Saddam Hussein during the 2003 
Second Gulf War, or the U.S. demand for the unconditional surrender of Japanese 
armed forces on the Pacific Front during World War II. 
 Territorial annexation: Based on other research and supplemented by my own 
coding, a dummy variable is created that takes a value of 1 for states whose aims 
included conquering territory from the adversary, and 0 otherwise (Valentino et al. 
2006:362-363; Downes 2008:61). Examples include German ambitions in acquiring 
Soviet territory during World War II, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan’s 1992-1994 
war over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. This main variable for territorial 
annexation shares an advantage with several previous variables of providing a direct 
comparison to existing research on the conduct of states during war.  
As a robustness check, I also consider the possibility that different types of 
wars of territorial annexation may have varying effects on the likelihood states will 
resort to higher levels of abuse. To test for this possibility, I divide cases from the 
main territorial annexation measure into two separate dichotomous variables. The first 
concerns revisionist wars of territorial re-absorption, such as Soviet aspirations over 
Polish territory during the early stages of World War II. The second variable involves 
more traditional wars of conquest, such as French designs on parts of former lands of 
the Ottoman Empire during the 1919-1921 Franco-Turkish War. 
                                                 
would probably have a much larger impact on a country of 1 million people than on a country of 100 
million. Nevertheless, as a further robustness check I also included a variable for the absolute total of 
battle deaths a belligerent suffered in the given war for both the Uppsala/PRIO and COW data, which is 
then logged to correct for the skewness in the distribution. 
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 The next variable seeks to tap into the last main explanation examined in the 
earlier theory chapter, which concerns cultural differences and the treatment of 
combatants. 
 Cultural Differences: Historians have frequently cited cultural differences as a 
key component in the process of dehumanizing an opponent, which often culminates 
in the abuse of prisoners (Beaumont 1996:280). As Downes notes, an ideal measure 
would examine popular and elite perceptions of the enemy and any resulting effects on 
state conduct during war on a case-by-case basis (Downes 2008:59). Unfortunately, 
this approach is not feasible in a large-n setting and raises the risk of endogeneity, 
since rising fears or hatreds of the enemy may be more a function of the aims and 
progress of the war rather than any innate prejudices between the two societies. As a 
more modest measure, I consider ex ante religious differences in a similar manner to 
several other studies (Downes 2006:170-171; Valentino et al. 2006:361). Coding is 
based on Henderson and Tucker’s widely-used measure for Samuel Huntington’s 
concept of civilization (Huntington 1993a; Henderson and Tucker 2001).82 While 
somewhat crude, this framework captures key cleavages between different societies: 
Western, Latin American, Hindu, Orthodox, Islamic, Africa, Sinic, Buddhist, 
Japanese, and a residual Other category. Using these classifications, a dummy variable 
“Cultural differences” is created that equals 1 if belligerents are from different 
civilizations, or both are coded as Other, and 0 if they are from the same civilization. 
 The remainder of this section presents several other factors thought to 
influence the conduct of states during war. They are then incorporated at various 
stages into the overall analysis where appropriate.  
                                                 
82 As a robustness check, Russett et al.’s alternate coding scheme for Huntington’s framework was also 
used (Russett et al. 2000). The results are largely the same when using either measure of cultural 
differences. 
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 Reciprocity: As numerous historical episodes have demonstrated, states are 
often likely to retaliate and reply in kind to prisoner abuses committed by the other 
side (MacKenzie 1994). In an attempt to begin to capture this dynamic, a dummy 
variable is created that takes on a value of 1 if a state’s soldiers become victims of 
abuse by the opposing state, and 0 otherwise.83 Given the potential back-and-forth 
nature of reciprocal abuses, a particular concern is that the variable will bias the results 
by effectively including part of the dependent variable, combatant abuse, in the 
reciprocity measure. A state’s behavior toward a target’s soldiers may in turn 
influence the target’s treatment of the initial offender’s soldiers, which implies that the 
reciprocity variable may be measuring a given state’s behavior on both sides of the 
equation. While this danger of endogeneity should induce some caution when 
interpreting findings related to reciprocity, it does not appear to produce any 
significant bias as will be discussed further in the results section below. 
 This measure for reciprocity simply assesses whether abuses by one side 
increase the probability the other side will also commit abuse. In contrast, Morrow 
seeks to examine various types of reciprocity effects when conditioned by other 
variables through the use of a wide range of interaction effects.84 Including interaction 
effects to the same extent in the data set below unfortunately introduces a large 
amount of multicollinearity, which can bias coefficient estimates and artificially 
inflate standard errors. Also, introducing interaction effects can make it more difficult 
                                                 
83 This operationalization was chosen to provide the most straightforward measure of abuses by the 
adversary. Using a single categorical measure capturing all three levels of abuse by the opponent, or 
creating separate dichotomous measures for each level of opponent abuse, does not substantially change 
the results. 
84 The main models simultaneously estimate five separate interaction effects involving reciprocity 
(Morrow 2007:565, Table 561). 
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to interpret the meaning of lower-order terms.85 For the purposes of this chapter, I 
therefore limit the analysis to examining the more straightforward direct effect of 
reciprocity on state behavior. I leave the examination of some of the more nuanced 
dynamics of reciprocity to later chapters, in particular Chapter 5 which delves more 
deeply into the role of democracy. 
Deterrence: Whereas the reciprocity measure captures the effect of the 
opponent’s actual conduct toward prisoners, the deterrence variable assesses the prior 
set of expectations among belligerents given whether or not each side is holding 
enemy combatants. If both states are capable captors, then in theory each may be 
deterred from harming the adversary’s combatants out of fear their opponent will 
retaliate in kind. Prisoners in many ways become akin to the common usage of 
hostages during earlier periods of warfare in order to ensure each side would abide by 
agreed upon rules of war (Elliott 1995:243). “Deterrence” is a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of 1 if both states are deemed capable captors and 0 otherwise. 
Germany-Belgium dyads during World War II would be coded as 0, since Belgium 
was not considered a capable captor, while Germany-Britain dyads during the same 
war would be coded 1 since both held substantial numbers of prisoners from the 
opposing side. 
International Law: A large body of international humanitarian law began to be 
codified beginning with the 1899 Hague Conventions and was greatly extended 
thereafter. In order to test for the effects of unilateral ratification, the first variable 
“Treaty ratification” measures whether or not a state has ratified the relevant treaty 
respecting the rights of prisoners before the war commenced. The second variable 
                                                 
85 The overall interpretation of the model is even more problematic and dependent on tenuous 
assumptions when some of these lower-order terms are excluded. For a more detailed discussion of 
these issues, see Braumoeller (2004:809-811). 
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“Joint treaty ratification” measures whether or not both members of the directed-dyad 
were party to the treaty before the war began to test the effect of mutual treaty 
ratification. Since “Joint treaty ratification” is in essence an interaction effect between 
the state’s own ratification of the agreement and that of its opponent, a separate 
unilateral variable “Treaty ratification (opponent)” is also included. 
The relevant treaty is based on the most recent international agreement in force 
at the time the war began. The relevant treaty and time periods are defined as follows: 
from 1899-1907 the 1899 Hague Convention; from 1907-1929 either the 1899 or the 
1907 Hague Convention; from 1929-1949 the 1929 Geneva Convention; and from 
1949 to the present the 1949 Third Geneva Convention.86 The choice of treaty and 
time periods departs slightly from several previous studies, which use the most recent 
treaty starting in the year it was negotiated (Valentino et al. 2006:360-361; Morrow 
2007:564). In years in which a new treaty came into existence, I only code the new 
treaty as relevant if the war started after the date the treaty opened for ratification. For 
instance, the Fourth Central American War began in February of 1907, but the 1907 
Hague Convention did not open for ratification until October of the same year. Also, 
international law scholars generally agree that the 1907 Hague Convention was only a 
slight revision of Hague 1899 with little substantive changes in the obligations of 
states regarding the basic rights of prisoners (Roberts 1994:122). States that chose not 
to join Hague 1907 nevertheless remained formally bound by similar obligations under 
Hague 1899, so to code them as 0 for the unilateral ratification variable in wars after 
1907 overlooks real and existing treaty obligations on their part.87 
                                                 
86 An additional version of this variable includes the 1977 Additional Protocol I as the most relevant 
treaty from 1977 to the present rather than the 1949 Geneva Convention. Results remain substantially 
the same when using this alternate measure. 
87 Another version of this variable was generated using the coding strategy for the 1899 and 1907 
Hague Conventions employed by Morrow 2007 and Valentino et al 2006. Results remained 
substantially the same. 
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 My aims in examining international law are relatively modest compared to 
Morrow’s in depth study of various facets of treaty obligations. In a similar manner, 
Morrow relies on interaction effects between international treaties and a number of 
other variables, but the same caveats apply as discussed earlier for the case of the 
reciprocity measure.  
 International Norms: The principles embodied in legally codified treaties may 
still have a broader international normative effect beyond the formal state parties. 
Higher levels of support for the rules and principles embodied in existing international 
treaties may influence the preferences and behavior of all states, whether or not they 
actually ratified the relevant agreement (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:900-901). The 
1949 Geneva Conventions, in particular, are viewed as a watershed in the protection 
accorded to a wide range of victims from war, including prisoners (Best 1994:80).88 
To test for the existence of a post-Geneva norm, I create a variable that measures the 
number of states by year that had ratified the Geneva Conventions as a proportion of 
the total number of states in the international system. The variable necessarily takes on 
a value of 0 for all years prior to the creation of the Convention. Although the measure 
is somewhat crude, it follows conventional practice by other scholars examining the 
effect of norms on state behavior in related areas, such as monetary policy and human 
rights (e.g. Simmons 2000; Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006). The variable is also lagged 
by one year to avoid issues of endogeneity. The 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions widened the definition of legitimate types of combatants and 
further extended protections accorded to prisoners. The International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), as well as many scholars, contend that many of the rules embodied 
                                                 
88 Though Best is also careful to point out that a great deal was left out of the Conventions during their 
negotiation, which had subsequent implications for the strength and scope of protections for war victims 
(1994:99). 
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in the Protocol have garnered the status of customary international law (Henckaerts 
and Doswald-Beck 2005:384-395).89 In a similar manner to the 1949 measure, a 
variable is created according to the same procedures to reflect any emerging 1977 
Protocol-based norm.90 
 Relative material capabilities: States with larger material capabilities may 
have a greater ability to abuse enemy combatants. On the other hand, more powerful 
states may have less need to mistreat combatants given their military superiority. This 
variable is defined as the percentage of total capabilities of all belligerents controlled 
by the relevant state. Capabilities data is based on the COW’s composite index of 
national capability (CINC), which is a aggregate measure of a state’s energy 
consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditure, military personnel, total 
population, and urban population (Singer et al. 1972). Each state’s capabilities were 
also corrected for distance to the main theater of combat using Bueno de Mesquita’s 
loss function to reflect a decline in capabilities as distance from the home front 
increases (Bueno de Mesquita 1981:103-108).91 States may also calculate their 
prospective need for combatant abuse based on the capabilities contributed by allies 
fighting at their side during war. A separate measure is included for allied 
contributions, which is expressed as the percentage of total capabilities of a state’s 
allies in the war corrected for distance. Table 14 below summarizes some of the main 
statistics for the variables to be used in the quantitative analysis that follows.92 
                                                 
89 However, it should be noted that the findings of the ICRC, and consequently the customary nature of 
many of the laws of war, remain hotly contested. For instance, see (Nicholls 2006; Wilmshurst and 
Breau 2007). 
90 As an alternative, using a simple dummy variable, which refers to war occurring before and after 
either 1949 or 1977 respectively, does not substantially alter the results. 
91 Measures for distances to the battle front were based on the work of Reiter and Stam and 
supplemented by direct-line distance data from Fitzpatrick and Modlin (Fitzpatrick and Modlin 1986; 
Reiter and Stam 1998). 
92 Since the analysis focuses on capable captor states, only summary values for these observations are 
reported. 
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Table 14: Summary of variables to be used in the statistical analysis 
Variable Number of 
Observations
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Combatant abuse 211 1.024 0.795 0 2
Democracy (Polity) 211 0.261 0.440 0 1
Democracy (Doyle) 211 0.270 0.445 0 1
War of attrition 211 0.412 0.493 0 1
Duration (logged) 211 5.163 1.802 0.693 8.226
Battle deaths per 205 6.255 12.719 3.59x10-6 68.599
1,000 population
Expansive war aims 211 0.351 0.478 0 1
Territorial annexation 211 0.180 0.385 0 1
Cultural difference 211 0.711 0.454 0 1
State's combatants 210 0.648 0.479 0 1
abused by opponent
Deterrence 210 0.905 0.294 0 1
Treaty ratification 211 0.735 0.443 0 1
Treaty ratification 211 0.749 0.435 0 1
(opponent)
Joint treaty ratification 211 0.678 0.468 0 1
1949 norms 211 0.262 0.408 0 1
1977 norms 211 0.059 0.192 0 0.833
Relative capabilities 211 0.338 0.282 0.004 0.988
Allied contribution 211 0.175 0.262 0 0.978  
 
 Summary Statistics and Preliminary Findings 
 This section provides an initial investigation of the data on their own terms 
without immediately turning to multiple control variables. Combatant abuse is a three-
level ordinal measure and many of the main explanatory variables of interest are 
dichotomous. Because of the nature of both sets of variables, I first choose to evaluate 
hypothesized relationships through figures reporting a straightforward series cross-
tabulations, which has been recommended as “the way to start any analysis” (Achen 
2002:446).93 
                                                 
93 Achen also suggests using simple plots, but these are generally more useful for continuous variables. 
I choose to rely on cross-tabulations, since this practice can provide a decent initial idea of any 
relationships between variables of interest. 
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 The following figures describe the results from cross-tabulations between the 
outcome of interest, combatant abuse, and several key explanatory variables in turn: 
democracy, war of attrition, expansive war aims, territorial annexation, and cultural 
differences. The vertical axis represents the relative frequency of cases for both values 
of the given explanatory variable (e.g. democracy-nondemocracy). The horizontal axis 
arrays these frequencies for each level of combatant abuse. The distribution of cases 
across the three levels of combatant abuse should give a good initial sense of whether 
or not any bivariate association exists between the variables. Kendall’s Tau-b statistic 
and its significance level are also reported to provide a preliminary statistical test of 
the relationship between each set of variables.94 
Figure 3 below shows a strong negative relationship between democracy and 
combatant abuse. In absolute terms, there are more cases for nondemocracies than 
democracies at all levels of abuse, but some interesting patterns are evident when 
looking at their relative propensities to commit abuses. While there is no discernable 
difference between democracies and nondemocracies in the incidence of medium 
levels of combatant abuse, regime type has much more of an influence at lower and 
higher ends of abuse. 24 percent of democracies commit high levels of abuse during 
war compared to 36 for nondemocracies, whereas 40 percent of democracies commit 
little to no abuse compared to 27 percent for their counterparts. The difference in 
regime type is statistically significant at traditional statistical thresholds and indicates 
that democracy may have a pronounced dampening effect on combatant abuse. This 
initial finding is particularly intriguing since as noted earlier it departs from many 
                                                 
94 The Pearson Chi2 statistic is more commonly used for cross-tabulations but is less appropriate when 
one or more of the variables is ordinal, such as combatant abuse in this case, since it does not take into 
account the ordered nature of the data (Agresti 2007:41). 
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recent studies in the related area of civilian victimization, which find democracy either 
has no impact or actually increases the likelihood that civilians will be targeted. 
 
Figure 3: Relationship between democracy and combatant abuse 
The next three figures examine various elements of the nature of bloodshed 
during conflict. As expected, Figure 4 shows a strong relationship between wars of 
attrition and combatant abuse. More than half of all wars of attrition ended up with 
high levels of combatant abuse compared to only 20 percent for more definitive 
conflicts. At the other end of violence against prisoners, belligerents in a war of 
attrition were about a third less likely to limit themselves to lower forms of abuse 
against their adversaries than in other types of wars. The relationship is also 
statistically significant, which lends further support to the view that wars of attrition 
create powerful pressures for belligerents to mistreat enemy combatants. 
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Figure 4: Relationship between war of attrition and combatant abuse 
Shifting to the actual objectives states seek to achieve through war, Figure 5 
below indicates that wars involving expansionist aims also have a positive relationship 
to combatant abuse, but this relationship is much weaker than for wars of attrition (p = 
0.222). This could reflect competing incentives within belligerents pursuing objectives 
like regime change or unconditional surrender, since combatant abuse may have 
counteracting effects in attaining these goals as hypothesized in the theory section. 
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Figure 5: Relationship between expansive war aims and combatant abuse 
The results are not nearly so ambivalent in the case of territorial annexation 
reported in Figure 6 below. Of all the variables examined so far, annexation has the 
strongest impact on combatant abuse both substantively and statistically. More than 
two-thirds of all belligerents seeking to conquer territory from their adversary are 
likely to commit high levels of combatant abuse. In only one case in the data set is 
territorial annexation associated with low levels of abuse.95 The results also do not 
change substantially when disaggregating the annexation variable into revisionist wars 
of re-absorption versus more general wars of conquest.96 Overall, the preliminary 
results from Figures 4 through 6 seem to suggest the nature of the bloodshed has a 
strong impact on the level of abuse committed by warring states against enemy 
combatants. 
                                                 
95 This was Pakistan during the 1965 Second Kashmir War with India. 
96 The relationship with regards to combatant abuse is more pronounced in the case of wars of re-
absorption, but remains significant for both categories. 
 
22.97
3 4. 31
36.49 37.23
40.54
28.47
0
10
20
30
40
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Low Medium High
Level of Combatant Abuse
Kendall's Tau-b =   0.1328   Pr = 0.222
Yes No
Expansive War Aims
 105 
 
 
Figure 6: Relationship between territorial annexation and combatant abuse 
Finally, Figure 7 provides an initial investigation of the relationship between 
cultural differences and combatant abuse. The results are suggestive that cultural 
differences are associated with higher levels of abuse, though they fall somewhat short 
of standard levels of significance. Belligerents coming from different civilizations are 
about 60 percent more likely to commit high levels of abuse than those from the same 
cultural background. This result also appears at first to differ from the related civilian 
literature where cultural differences are found to have little to no effect on state 
conduct during war (Downes 2006:174; Valentino et al. 2006:369-370). The flipside 
to cultural differences acting as an enabler of abuse is that cultural similarity might 
ironically operate as a restraint with culturally similar belligerents taking the welfare 
of their adversary’s soldiers into greater account. This would seem to expand the 
boundaries of those arguing that during war states devolve toward a form of 
“nationalist utilitarianism,” where the welfare of the state’s own soldiers and citizens 
 
2.63
3 6. 42
28.95
38.73
68.42
24.86
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Low Medium High
Level of Combatant Abuse
Yes No
Territorial Annexation
 106 
 
is placed high above those from other states, irrespective of the cultural affinity to the 
belligerent in question (Thomas 2001:184-186; Downes 2004:61-63). 
 
Figure 7: Relationship between cultural difference and combatant abuse 
The figures above present in a fairly clear manner the relative frequency of 
cases across different values of several explanatory variables and combatant abuse. 
Taken together, they provide preliminary support for the effects of regime type, the 
nature of the bloodshed, and cultural differences. Several caveats should be noted 
before proceeding to the next section. The cross-tabulations assumed observations are 
independent, which is unlikely since the conduct of states is probably influenced in 
part by the behavior of their adversaries. In multi-actor wars many belligerents are 
also measured multiple times to reflect their conduct toward several opponents. 
Additionally, the preliminary analysis examined each explanatory variable in isolation, 
while the effects of certain variables could change once other factors are taken into 
account in more comprehensive statistical models of combatant abuse. 
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Regression Analysis and Results 
 The preliminary analysis above took the simple approach of focusing on one 
variable at a time, but going to the opposite extreme of throwing all variables together 
and seeing what results come out presents its own set of dangers. “Garbage can” or 
“kitchen sink” models are common metaphors for the widespread practice of including 
as many variables as possible in a single regression equation (Berk 2004:126; Achen 
2005:329). Recent scholarship has highlighted several problems with this approach. 
First, models with a host of independent variables are often difficult to interpret in any 
meaningful manner and are impossible to visualize given the resulting high-
dimensional explanatory spaces (Achen 2002:443-446). Second, such models often 
obscure key differences between independent variables that may have serious 
implications for the results.97 Third and perhaps of most immediate importance, 
estimates for coefficients and significance levels in models involving a large number 
of independent variables can be extremely fragile (Berk 2004:126). Slight alterations 
in which variables are included, or how they are defined, can lead to drastic changes in 
results across models. Adding more variables in an attempt to reduce omitted variable 
bias only makes sense under extremely restrictive conditions, and can just as often 
worsen rather than improve the problem (Clarke 2005:348). 
 In response to these and other concerns, several scholars have suggested 
various guidelines for dramatically reducing the number of independent variables in 
any single model. One of the most well-known is the “rule of three,” where a model 
should include no more than three independent variables (Achen 2002:446). Others 
have countered that such an austere approach would limit scholarly research to 
                                                 
97 For instance, Ray distinguishes between confounding, intervening, and competing variables, which 
each have different implications for model building, testing, and interpretation (2003:13). 
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“islands of theory” focusing on isolated handfuls of variables with little sense of their 
relative effects on outcomes of interest (Oneal and Russett 2005:295).98  
I propose taking a middle approach closer to those seeking to incorporate the 
general spirit of caution advocated by critics of garbage can models. Rather than 
report the “best” model that might happen to support the desired hypotheses, a form of 
sensitivity analysis can be conducted that evaluates the range of estimates for 
parameters of interest under different model specifications (Kadera and Mitchell 
2005:323).99 If estimates and their significance remain resilient across a variety of 
specifications, then this should provide greater confidence that an effect for a given 
variable indeed exists. In all cases the general rule remains that model selection should 
be guided by theory concerning the central outcome to be investigated. As one 
methodologist asserted, “all models are wrong,” but this does not mean that regression 
models cannot be useful if developed in a careful manner and with some humility to 
the challenges posed.100 It is to this endeavor that I now turn for the rest of this 
chapter. 
 Across all of the models reported below, the dependent variable “combatant 
abuse” is ordinal. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) would potentially bias the 
results, since OLS assumes intervals between neighboring categories in the ordinal 
variable are equal (Long 1997:115). A more modest assumption for the three levels of 
                                                 
98 For instance, Oneal and Russett agree that Ray’s rule to never to control for intervening variables in a 
model is useful for inducing greater care in variable selection (Ray 2003:4-6). However, they argue that 
rigid adherence to this rule would overlook the utility of including intervening variables as a way to 
clarify causal relationships between the key explanatory variable of interest, the intervening variable(s), 
and outcomes. For instance, while they accept that alliances may be an intervening variable between 
democracy and conflict, they argue that including both terms allowed them to show alliances were not 
driving the finding that democracy reduces the probability of conflict and in fact that alliances had little 
effect overall (Oneal and Russett 2005:294). 
99 As the authors remark, “Ray’s teaching is properly understood as an exhortation for scholars to more 
carefully consider the theoretical role of each control variable and its proper treatment in statistical 
models, not as an edict banning the use of control variables” (Kadera and Mitchell 2005:324). 
100 George E.P. Box, quoted in Berk (2004:126). 
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combatant abuse is that they can be ranked from lowest to highest, but the distance 
between successive categories of abuse may not necessarily be the same. A more 
appropriate model for dependent variables based on this type of structure is ordered 
logit. Standard errors for the coefficients are clustered by war to take into account that 
observations within a given war may not be independent. 
 Heeding the advice to carefully build models from the bottom up, Table 15 
reports a series of regressions including each of the main explanatory variables of 
interest, as well as whether the belligerent’s soldiers were abused by the adversary. 
Reciprocity is included as a baseline variable because past empirical studies on state 
conduct during war have found the opponent’s behavior is a necessary component for 
understanding a belligerent’s decision making calculus. (Morrow 2007:570; Downes 
2008:66). Formal work of varying rigor has also confirmed the need to consider 
reciprocity when investigating the conduct of war, which is one of Achen’s criteria for 
including additional variables in a statistical model (Achen 2002:437).101 As is evident 
from all of the models, reciprocity strongly influences a belligerent’s treatment of 
enemy combatants. Cases where the adversary commits combatant abuse are 
significantly more likely to be associated with abuse by the captor state.102 
                                                 
101 Examples include (Axelrod 1984:73-87; Ferguson 2004; Dollery and Parsons 2007). Reiter and Stam 
provide an exception to the logic of reciprocity in wartime when looking at the related issue of the 
individual soldier’s decision to surrender (Reiter and Stam 1997:7-14). However, their model is a 
single-shot game rather than the repeated games approach employed by the other authors cited, where 
the latter models probably more closely represent the general logic of combat. 
102 As an alternative measure for reciprocity, I included two dummy variables for medium and high-
level abuses by the adversary respectively. Results for the other explanatory variables generally remain 
the same. Not surprisingly, the coefficient for high levels of abuse by the adversary is somewhat larger 
than the medium-level coefficient. This follows intuitively that higher levels of abuse by the opponent 
are correspondingly more likely to be associated with higher levels of abuse by the belligerent. 
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Table 15: Ordered logit analysis of combatant abuse (main explanatory variables and 
reciprocity) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy -0.968*
(0.464)
War of attrition 0.958**
(0.335)
Expansive war aims 0.145
(0.387)
Territorial annexation 1.599**
(0.526)
Cultural difference 0.374
(0.327)
State's combatants 3.400** 3.114** 3.258** 3.100** 3.222**
   abused by opponent (0.601) (0.613) (0.628) (0.610) (0.613)
First cutpoint (τ1) 0.772* 1.207** 1.007** 1.043** 1.199**
(0.375) (0.359) (0.333) (0.335) (0.401)
Second cutpoint (τ2) 3.261** 3.711** 3.420** 3.581** 3.621**
(0.634) (0.655) (0.615) (0.623) (0.644)
Observations 210 210 210 210 210
Log likelihood -174.6 -173.6 -178.9 -170.4 -178.3
Wald Chi2 39.46 30.39 30.64 41.43 29.61
Pseudo-R2 0.240 0.245 0.222 0.259 0.224
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by war)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1  
 Turning to the main explanatory factors reveals some interesting findings. As 
in the simple cross-tabulation, democracy restrains the probability of harming 
combatants and is significant at conventional thresholds. Conflicts that turn into wars 
of attrition or involve the pursuit of territorial annexation, on the other hand, are much 
more likely to result in higher levels of harm against combatants.103 The findings for 
the remaining two variables are more mixed. Expansionist war aims are positively 
                                                 
103 The results generally continue to hold when the territorial annexation variable is disaggregated into 
separate wars of re-absorption versus wars of conquest categories. It should be noted that in some later 
specifications the statistical significance of the wars of conquest coefficient sometimes becomes 
attenuated, though in all cases both variables remain in the expected direction of heightening the resort 
to combatant abuse. 
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associated with combatant abuse, but the variable is far from significant (p = 0.707). 
This is consistent with the notion that states seeking regime change or unconditional 
surrender might perceive no overwhelming benefit from resorting to combatant abuse 
compared to belligerents pursuing other objectives, such as territorial annexation. 
While cultural differences were positively associated with combatant abuse in the 
simple cross-tabulation setting, they are no longer statistically significant once taking 
into account reciprocity and the clustered nature of the data (p = 0.253).104 Even in this 
relatively parsimonious model, cultural differences may not be a strong driver of state 
conduct during war compared to some of the other proposed factors once taking into 
account the role of reciprocity. 
 The findings from the baseline two-variable models are now subjected to 
further scrutiny. As Ray notes, including potential confounding variables, which are 
“antecedent third factor[s] that [bring] about a statistical association or correlation 
between two other variables (emphasis in original),” provides an especially strong test 
of any purported effect (Ray 2003:4; 2005:284). One of the most promising candidates 
as a confounding factor for democracy is economic development. Economic 
development is often cited as a cause of democratization, though the precise 
relationship continues to be debated (Lipset 1959; Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 
2006).105 In this light, the perceived relationship between democracy and the treatment 
of combatants might simply be due to the separate relationships of economic 
                                                 
104 When excluding reciprocity and instead running a series of bivariate regressions on each of the 
explanatory variables the results are generally the same though the statistical significance of cultural 
differences improves somewhat (p = 0.095). This suggests that culture should not be discarded 
immediately and will be investigated further in later models. Nevertheless, retaining reciprocity is 
justified both theoretically as mentioned earlier, but also statistically. For each model in Table 15, 
likelihood ratio tests strongly suggest that reciprocity should not be dropped from the analysis. 
105 For instance, Przeworski et al. argue that economic development is not related to the emergence of 
democracy, though it does influence the duration of democratic regimes once established (Przeworski et 
al. 1996). For a skeptical view on both counts, see (Robinson 2006). 
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development with democracy and combatant abuse respectively. Some research on 
conflict propensity has found that incorporating economic development conditions or 
even completely accounts for the purported effect of democracy (Mousseau et al. 
2003; Gartzke 2007).106 It may also be the case that economic development acts as a 
confounder with respect to regime type and the conduct of states during war. For 
instance, the culture of contracts generated through capitalistic economic development 
may influence the general conflict propensity of states (Mousseau 2003). Such a 
contract culture might also be expected to make it more likely that economically 
developed states will respect the laws of war and refrain from abusing enemy 
combatants. 
 Economic development may also influence the cost-benefit calculations of 
captors in more nuanced ways when deciding whether to harm or care for prisoners. 
Just as regime type appears to heighten the sensitivity of democracies to retaliatory 
abuses compared to their autocratic counterparts, economic development may function 
in similar ways. Countries with more developed economies tend to have citizens and 
soldiers possessing with higher levels of human capital and other valuable skills. 
Furthermore, as Rowe’s engaging study of pre-WWI Europe argued, wealth gained 
through rising trade greatly increased the relative cost of labor for many of the great 
powers, which had perverse consequences for their national security policies (Rowe 
1999:206). In countries like Great Britain, rising wages and the lure of opportunities in 
the civilian sector made it increasingly difficult for the British armed forces to recruit 
and retain soldiers (Rowe et al. 2002:552). Economic development can have similarly 
paradoxical effects by significantly increasing the price of each lost soldier. Engaging 
in combatant abuse substantially increases the likelihood those high-value prisoners 
                                                 
106 However, others have found no such relationship between economic development and conflict, while 
the democracy finding remains robust (Maoz and Russett 1992). 
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caught by the adversary will be abused and potentially killed. This suggests that more 
economically developed states may be more sensitive to the costs of combatant abuse 
and thus more likely to treat enemy combatants humanely in an attempt to protect their 
own soldiers under enemy captivity. 
 Economic development may also operate in more direct ways by reducing 
some of the particular benefits from combatant abuse, especially the exploitation of 
prison labor. The economies of highly developed states often involve a complex web 
of interrelated knowledge-intensive industries, which require highly educated and 
skilled workers in order to function properly. The coerced use of prisoner labor is 
unlikely to contribute much benefit in such circumstances compared to less developed 
economies where prisoners could be put to work in agriculture, construction, or other 
forms of hard labor. Brooks observed a similar dynamic in the declining benefits from 
conquering developed states, since it becomes increasingly difficult to extract 
resources from such targets because of the complex nature of their economies (Brooks 
2005:65-71). Just as the benefits of conquest may decline when attacking 
economically developed states, the benefits of combatant abuse for those same states 
may also diminish for similar reasons. Developed captors may be less likely to resort 
to combatant abuse simply because they are less likely to obtain substantial benefits 
from doing so. 
I examine the possibility of the confounding effect of economic development 
using several different measures.107 The consensus measure in studies of economic 
development and conflict remains gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Gartzke 
2007:175). Annual GDP/capita data are generally available from 1950 onwards for 
                                                 
107 Rowe’s argument suggests it is trade specifically rather than the resulting economic development, 
which is the main driver. In order to test for any trade effect, I also included a variable measuring a 
state’s trade openness, which is the ratio of its annual exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. I 
used trade data from (Gleditsch 2002). The coefficient was not statistically significant.    
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most countries, but missing data is more of a problem for earlier periods. In order to 
obtain wider coverage, I rely on research by Angus Maddison, supplemented by data 
from Kristian Gleditsch and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(Gleditsch 2002; Maddison 2006).108 The variable measures GDP/capita in constant 
1990 US$ and is lagged one year before the war started. The variable is also logged to 
reduce the skewed distribution of the data.  
Table 16: Ordered logit analysis of combatant abuse (democracy reconsidered) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy -0.968* -1.124* -1.492** -0.933*
(0.464) (0.510) (0.469) (0.458)
State's combatants 3.400** 3.168** 3.716** 3.175**
   abused by opponent (0.601) (0.681) (0.774) (0.604)
GDP/capita -0.223
(0.280)
Iron/steel production -0.0317
(0.0741)
Energy consumption -0.0634
(0.0509)
First cutpoint (τ1) 0.772* -1.020 0.673 -0.0452
(0.375) (2.127) (0.641) (0.553)
Second cutpoint (τ2) 3.261** 1.310 3.324** 2.454**
(0.634) (2.171) (0.956) (0.740)
Observations 210 152 138 199
Log likelihood -174.6 -127.9 -107.6 -168.1
Wald Chi2 39.46 29.41 27.90 37.38
Pseudo-R2 0.240 0.232 0.287 0.224
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by war)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1  
The first column in Table 16 reports the baseline democracy model including 
reciprocity already discussed, while Model 2 incorporates the GDP/capita measure. 
The results suggest that economic development is not a confounding variable for 
democracy despite its theoretical merits. The coefficient for democracy actually 
                                                 
108 The World Bank data is available at www.worldbank.org/data/onlinedatabases/onlinedatabases.html.  
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increases, but this appears to be a function of the reduced sample size from missing 
data for economic development.109 Like democracy, the coefficient for GDP/capita is 
also negative as expected, but the effect is fairly weak overall (p = 0.426). According 
to these results, economic development is perhaps viewed at best as a complementary 
cause of abuse alongside democracy rather than a confounding variable (Ray 2003:6-
10).  
Even when relying on Maddison’s extensive research, missing data remains an 
issue. The problem is evident in observations from earlier years and especially for 
smaller states, such as several Eastern European and Central American countries. As a 
robustness check, I also considered some commonly used proxies for economic 
development, which are based on components from the COW National Material 
Capabilities data set (Singer et al. 1972). Model 3 includes the log of annual steel 
production (thousands of tons), while Model 4 looks at the effect of logged annual 
energy consumption (thousands of coal-ton equivalents). Steel production actually 
suffers from even greater missing data problems than the initial GDP/capita measure, 
but still has some value as a different measure for economic development. The data on 
energy consumption are relatively more complete and contain only eleven missing 
observations across the sample under investigation. Irrespective of which measure is 
used, the results generally remain the same. Economic development does not appear to 
be a confounder for democracy. 
 A similar analysis is conducted for the war of attrition finding. The group of 
potential confounders considered is much larger. I include several of the other main 
explanatory factors (cultural differences, democracy, and territorial annexation), as 
                                                 
109 If Model 1 is rerun on the reduced 152-observation sample used in Model 2, then the coefficient for 
democracy in the first model actually grows to -1.329. Although the coefficient from this smaller-
sample model is then slightly reduced to -1.124 in Model 2 reported above, this still suggests that 
GDP/capita is not driving the democracy finding. 
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well as a few other variables (relative capabilities, unilateral treaty ratification, and 
joint treaty ratification). A plausible account could be developed for each of these 
factors to relate them to both attrition and combatant abuse in order to demonstrate the 
original attrition relationship to be spurious. For instance, the enmities resulting from 
cultural differences may be more likely to be associated with conflicts that involve 
pitched attritional warfare as well as the abuse of combatants. On the other hand, 
states that ratify treaties guaranteeing prisoner rights may be more likely to conduct 
the war in such a way to avoid attrition or settle before that point, but at the same time 
are also less likely to harm enemy combatants. 
 Table 17 below reports the baseline attrition model and then incorporates each 
of the candidate confounders into separate models. For Model 7, the unilateral 
ratification variables for both the main belligerent and the adversary are also included, 
since joint ratification is essentially an interaction effect of these two lower-order 
terms.110  Turning to the results, some of the added variables, such as democracy and 
territorial annexation, are significant, but in no case do any of the variables appear to 
pose problems as confounders for attrition. There is thus little evidence that the 
observed effect of attrition on combatant abuse is due to any antecedent factor lurking 
in the background. 
                                                 
110 For a more thorough discussion of the reasons for including all lower-order terms for interaction 
effects, see (Braumoeller 2004:811). 
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Table 17: Ordered logit analysis of combatant abuse (war of attrition reconsidered) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
War of attrition 0.958** 1.000** 1.045** 1.073** 0.957** 0.836** 0.877**
(0.335) (0.327) (0.326) (0.369) (0.335) (0.303) (0.308)
State's combatants 3.114** 3.028** 3.235** 2.922** 3.108** 3.167** 3.172**
   abused by opponent (0.613) (0.620) (0.607) (0.606) (0.614) (0.625) (0.624)
Cultural difference 0.478
(0.323)
Democracy -1.076*
(0.494)
Territorial annexation 1.724**
(0.479)
Relative capabilities -0.113
(0.554)
Treaty ratification -0.558 -0.560
(0.378) (0.677)
Treaty ratification 0.479
   (opponent) (0.719)
Joint treaty ratification -0.332
(0.925)
First cutpoint (τ1) 1.207** 1.502** 1.009** 1.318** 1.165** 0.772+ 0.923+
(0.359) (0.412) (0.390) (0.356) (0.393) (0.455) (0.518)
Second cutpoint (τ2) 3.711** 4.025** 3.606** 3.986** 3.669** 3.294** 3.448**
(0.655) (0.670) (0.667) (0.659) (0.661) (0.693) (0.730)
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Log likelihood -173.6 -172.5 -168.4 -164.1 -173.5 -172.1 -171.8
Wald Chi2 30.39 34.51 41.63 46.69 30.62 31.88 36.52
Pseudo-R2 0.245 0.250 0.268 0.286 0.245 0.251 0.253
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by war)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1  
 The robustness of the finding that territorial annexation is positively associated 
with higher levels of combatant abuse is subjected to the same procedure. A similar set 
of potential confounders is used as in the previous analysis on war of attrition. War of 
attrition is not included, since by definition a characteristic of the actual fighting once 
the war has begun cannot precede prewar objectives. The remaining variables are 
plausible antecedent factors that could be associated with territorial annexation and 
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account for the conduct of states towards enemy combatants. For instance, states with 
greater relative capabilities may be more likely to adopt ambitious objectives like 
annexing territory at the expense of their weaker foe, while at the same time be more 
likely to use their capabilities to harm enemy combatants. Table 18 below reports the 
results from incorporating each additional variable into the baseline annexation model. 
As with wars of attrition, territorial annexation remains robust even when potential 
confounders are taken into account. Most of the added variables are not significant, 
though democracy continues to have a restraining effect on combatant abuse as 
expected. 
I choose not to report a corresponding analysis for expansionist war aims or 
cultural differences. The motivation for including confounders is normally to test 
whether a purported effect of a given variable of interest is spurious. Since neither of 
these two variables turned out to be terribly significant in the earlier baseline models 
from Table 15, little would be gained from such an analysis. As a check, candidate 
confounders were added to expansionist war aims in a similar manner to war of 
attrition, but the results generally remained the same. The coefficient weakened 
somewhat after confounders were included, which only seems to confirm that 
expansionist war aims play little systematic role in combatant abuse. 
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Table 18: Ordered logit analysis of combatant abuse (territorial annexation 
reconsidered) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Territorial annexation 1.599** 1.577** 1.585** 1.602** 1.660** 1.661**
(0.526) (0.526) (0.601) (0.534) (0.473) (0.471)
State's combatants 3.100** 3.054** 3.246** 3.103** 3.154** 3.155**
   abused by opponent (0.610) (0.611) (0.604) (0.611) (0.632) (0.630)
Cultural difference 0.282
(0.362)
Democracy -0.935*
(0.405)
Relative capabilities 0.0574
(0.544)
Treaty ratification -0.845+ -0.707
(0.472) (0.724)
Treaty ratification 0.158
   (opponent) (0.829)
Joint treaty ratification -0.265
(1.016)
First cutpoint (τ1) 1.043** 1.211** 0.850* 1.065** 0.439 0.480
(0.335) (0.408) (0.367) (0.399) (0.472) (0.556)
Second cutpoint (τ2) 3.581** 3.753** 3.485** 3.604** 3.034** 3.075**
(0.623) (0.646) (0.642) (0.667) (0.702) (0.762)
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210
Log likelihood -170.4 -170.0 -166.5 -170.4 -167.0 -167.0
Wald Chi2 41.43 43.41 43.74 42.15 47.39 50.15
Pseudo-R2 0.259 0.260 0.276 0.259 0.273 0.274
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by war)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1  
 The reasoning for not examining cultural differences also reflects the lack of 
findings from the baseline model, but the overall logic is slightly different. As noted 
earlier, a confounder is an antecedent factor to the variable of interest, in other words a 
factor that precedes the explanatory variable under investigation. Given that culture is 
operationalized in this study on the basis of civilization which is rooted in religion, it 
is difficult to imagine a factor that both precedes and is related to a state’s 
 120 
 
civilizational affiliation. Furthermore, since the variable focuses on cultural 
differences, the confounder would somehow have to account not only for the state’s 
religion but also that of its adversary.111 In this instance, it makes little sense to discuss 
potential confounders with respect to cultural differences. 
The preceding series of models opened each of the baseline findings for the 
main explanatory variables to further scrutiny. The analysis focused on examining 
potential confounders that could potentially reveal the alleged relationship between 
each explanatory variable and combatant abuse to be spurious. While gaining some 
useful information regarding the robustness of some of the main findings, this 
approach is geared more toward evaluating the impact of one key factor of interest 
(Ray 2003:3). However, the theory of combatant abuse based on the nature of the 
belligerents and bloodshed proposed in Chapter 2 involves multiple factors. I am 
ultimately interested in assessing the effects of this set of explanatory variables 
together in the aim of building a more general model of combatant abuse. Several of 
the main variables were evaluated as potential confounders in the analyses above, but 
do not appear to play such a role. Factors like democracy, attrition, and annexation, 
therefore, might be better viewed as complementary causes of combatant abuse where 
each makes a distinct contribution to understanding the conduct of states during war. 
Combining these variables into a single model has the benefit of examining the effect 
of each factor on combatant abuse relative to each other rather than in isolation.112 
                                                 
111 Of course, this same factor would then also have to be related to combatant abuse in such a way as to 
account for the latter’s observed association with cultural differences. 
112 Although Ray provides several warnings regarding the choice of variables to include in a model, he 
acknowledges the potential value of examining competing variables together. After warning against 
haphazardly including control variables that are also associated with the outcome of interest, he notes, 
“This is not to say that a control for…a complementary cause…is uncalled for or undesirable” (Ray 
2003:10). 
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Toward this end, I include the main explanatory variables of interest in a 
baseline combined model of combatant abuse reported in Table 19 below. These are 
democracy, war of attrition, territorial annexation, cultural differences, and 
reciprocity. The results in Model 1 largely reinforce those from earlier more 
parsimonious specifications. Democracy continues to act as a restraint, while attrition, 
annexation, and reciprocity increase the probability of higher levels of combatant 
abuse. Cultural differences are also modestly associated with worse treatment of 
prisoners, but the coefficient continues to fail in meeting conventional levels of 
statistical significance.  
The remaining models introduce other measures for the war’s severity to 
evaluate alternatives for the war of attrition variable relied upon to this point. Since 
wars of attrition tend to be longer and costlier in terms of lives lost, then it may follow 
that battle deaths and war duration should be positively related to combatant abuse 
when substituted into the model.113 The results from Models 2 and 3 provide some 
modest support to this notion. Both battle deaths per 1,000 population and duration are 
positively related to combatant abuse in a similar manner to war of attrition, but the 
coefficients are weaker in statistical terms (p-values of 0.16 and 0.15 respectively).114 
                                                 
113 The alternative measures are run in separate models with attrition excluded in order to avoid 
problems of multicollinearity. 
114 The results for battle deaths differ little when using the logged absolute number of number of battle 
deaths instead. The results are also generally similar when using COW battle deaths data rather than 
PRIO for either the logged or deaths per 1,000 population measures. 
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Table 19: Ordered logit analysis of combatant abuse (combined model with 
alternative measures of war severity) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy -1.058* -0.925* -0.923* -0.965* -1.046*
(0.439) (0.424) (0.415) (0.406) (0.430)
War of attrition 1.198** 1.238**
(0.371) (0.446)
Territorial annexation 1.701** 1.434* 1.600** 1.547** 1.708**
(0.554) (0.615) (0.618) (0.584) (0.555)
Cultural difference 0.443 0.426 0.405 0.346 0.420
(0.333) (0.374) (0.343) (0.332) (0.305)
State's combatants 2.994** 3.138** 3.054** 3.156** 3.012**
   abused by opponent (0.615) (0.631) (0.601) (0.628) (0.639)
Battle deaths per 0.0263
   1,000 population (0.0189)
Duration of war 0.155
(0.107)
Expansive war aims 0.234 -0.140
(0.394) (0.439)
First cutpoint (τ1) 1.390** 1.232** 1.812** 1.101** 1.358**
(0.435) (0.452) (0.696) (0.410) (0.399)
Second cutpoint (τ2) 4.190** 3.793** 4.478** 3.747** 4.160**
(0.684) (0.706) (0.976) (0.640) (0.655)
Observations 210 204 210 210 210
Log likelihood -158.6 -159.2 -164.5 -165.8 -158.5
Wald Chi2 47.39 42.93 44.62 58.64 64.66
Pseudo-R2 0.310 0.289 0.285 0.279 0.311
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by war)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1  
In his analysis of civilian victimization, Downes uses expansionist war aims as 
another proxy in place of war of attrition for the severity of the war.115 Downes notes 
that wars with more ambitious aims may be more likely to induce greater resistance 
from the adversary, which in turn generally make them longer and bloodier (Downes 
2008:59-60). This is not necessarily the case, though it may be correct on average. For 
                                                 
115 The variable is used more specifically in terms of his “desperation logic” for civilian victimization 
(Downes 2008:29-35). 
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instance, the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War qualifies as an expansionist war for the United States 
since it sought to overthrow the Hussein regime. As is well known, the interstate 
portion of the war ended relatively quickly with few U.S. casualties, though it should 
be noted the same cannot be said for the insurgency that soon followed.  
On the whole, the expansive war aims variable may indeed be an alternative 
measure for war of attrition, or instead it could be viewed as a prior factor. I take into 
account the first possibility by substituting expansive war aims for war of attrition in 
Model 4, and address the second possibility by including both together in Model 5. 
The overall findings do not change significantly in either case. In Model 4, the 
coefficient for expansionist war aims continues earlier trends of being positive but 
with weak statistical significance. In Model 5, the coefficient actually becomes 
slightly negative but with a relatively large standard error (p = 0.552), while the 
positive effect of attrition remains consistent.116 The war of attrition indicator thus 
remains a more consistent factor for explaining combatant abuse than alternative 
measures. All in all, the results for the main explanatory variables from Table 19 
above appear robust across a variety of model specifications. 
 One other issue that has not yet been discussed in detail, but may influence the 
earlier findings, concerns possible simultaneity bias in the reciprocity variable, which 
measures whether the state’s own soldiers were abused by the adversary. Across all 
models this variable is consistently and positively associated with greater levels of 
combatant abuse, which follows the logic that retaliation is a potent force during war. 
However, the adversary’s behavior is likely influenced by the belligerent’s own 
                                                 
116 The two variables exhibit a moderate positive correlation (r = 0.37), but this does not appear to 
significantly alter the relationship of either variable with combatant abuse under various model 
specifications. 
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conduct, which creates a potential problem of endogeneity.117 This means the 
dependent variable measuring the belligerent’s conduct toward the adversary is in 
essence included on the right-hand side of the equation, which is supposed to only 
contain strictly independent variables.118 The presence of endogeneity means the 
coefficient for reciprocity will tend to be biased upwards. If the bias is strong enough 
this would negate the earlier findings regarding the positive relationship between 
reciprocity and combatant abuse, but could also have broader implications for the 
overall findings. 
 I attempt to address this issue using instrumental variables analysis for the 
potentially endogenous reciprocity measure to assess the degree to which previous 
results are biased. A good instrument should be uncorrelated with the error term in the 
regression model, but highly correlated with the endogenous variable (Baum 
2006:186). In practice it often extremely difficult to find a separate valid instrument, 
so I follow the common practice by constructing an instrument from other variables 
that are correlated with the adversary’s level of abuse using two-stage least squares. 
One of the costs of this approach is a loss in efficiency whereby the standard errors of 
the estimator will be larger, since the instrument tends to be not as precise a measure 
for the endogenous term compared to the original variable itself (Baum 2006:211-
212).  
The instrument is constructed using the independent variables from the earlier 
models that did not take into account endogeneity (e.g. cultural differences, war of 
                                                 
117 This is reflected in the corresponding warring-directed-dyad where the adversary is coded as the 
violator and the current state as the victim, and in which the current state’s behavior is then considered 
as an independent variable. 
118 For a similar discussion in terms of compliance with the laws of war more generally, see (Morrow 
2007:563). More specifically, if reciprocity is endogenous to the dependent variable, then this also 
means it is correlated with the error term (ε), which violates one of the key assumptions of the 
regression estimators used up to this point (Long 1997:119; Greene 2003:378-379). 
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attrition, etc.), as well as the corollary values for the adversary on other relevant 
variables (e.g. whether adversary is a democracy, aims for territorial annexation, etc). 
Unfortunately, no instrumental variable estimator exists for the special case of an 
ordered endogenous variable. I rely on the standard estimator, which assumes both the 
endogenous and dependent variables are continuous. This is far from ideal, but should 
still give a good indication of any possible sources of endogeneity. While not reported 
here for the sake of brevity, modeling the adversary’s conduct as endogenous in a 
corresponding manner across earlier models does not substantially alter the results. 
Some of the coefficients, in particular those for reciprocity, are attenuated somewhat 
but overall the results for the main variables of interest remain largely similar.119 
Moreover, a series of Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests indicate it is justifiable to rely on the 
standard estimation methods used earlier rather than employing an endogenous 
regressor.120 
 Even putting aside concerns over endogeneity, the existing measure for the 
adversary’s conduct is admittedly coarse. An ideal alternative would be to obtain 
annual or even more fine-grained temporal data with precise information on the dates 
and levels of all abusive acts committed by both sides during war. Many other scholars 
have unfortunately found such data extremely difficult to collect for the purposes of 
large-n analysis (Downes 2008:48). As Morrow remarked when discussing his 
decision to focus on the behavior of belligerents for each war as a whole: 
Finally, I would like to make clear what the data set is not. It is not a 
comprehensive listing of all violations for a given warring directed 
dyad-issue-area. A comprehensive listing would be fantastic for testing 
                                                 
119 As an alternative, I also ran the analysis using an instrumental variable probit estimator (Maddala 
1983:240-241). The dependent variable of combatant abuse is treated as dichotomous though the 
endogenous reciprocity variable must still be treated as continuous. To construct a dichotomous 
measure for the dependent variable, instances of high combatant abuse were coded 1, while medium 
case of abuse were coded 0 alongside lower levels. Results generally remained the same.  
120 All supplementary results are available from the author. 
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the dynamics of compliance, but it is a fantasy to believe that it could 
be collected for even a small set of the cases (2007:563). 
The reciprocal dynamics in the behavior of belligerents can perhaps be more 
effectively examined through in-depth case studies, and I will consider this question in 
greater detail in subsequent chapters. For the time being, the current measure for the 
adversary’s behavior, while far from perfect, at least has the benefit of beginning to 
capture some of the effects of the forces of reciprocity on the conduct of states during 
war. 
 The final set of models seeks to build on insights from the earlier specifications 
to create a more general model for understanding the causes of combatant abuse. 
Larger statistical models certainly have the risk of becoming unwieldy, but if 
constructed carefully they have the added benefit of more directly examining the 
effects of several variables of interest in relation to each other (Oneal and Russett 
2005:295).  
Table 20 below contains the main set of explanatory variables, including 
expansionist war aims, from the previous table as a baseline and then adds several 
other factors of interest. Model 2 includes the dummy variable for “Deterrence,” 
which takes on a value of 1 if both states are coded as capable of harming 
noncombatants and 0 otherwise. As noted earlier, when both states are capable captors 
each may be deterred from harming the adversary’s combatants out of fear the 
opponent will reciprocate against the prisoners under its control. The results from 
Model 2 appear to bear this logic out, since a situation of deterrence has a restraining 
effect on combatant abuse while the other coefficients are largely unchanged.121 
                                                 
121 The measure for deterrence was constructed in a similar manner to that in Downes (2008:61). 
Though surprisingly, in many cases he finds that deterrence actually increases the likelihood of abuse in 
the case of civilian victimization (Downes 2008:67). A positive coefficient suggests a state is more 
likely to commit violations against an adversary having the capacity to retaliate than against one that is 
incapable. This contrasts with the result I find in Table 20, where deterrence acts as a constraint on 
abuses, which seems more intuitively plausible. 
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Table 20: Ordered logit analysis of combatant abuse (combined model with other 
independent variables) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy -1.046* -1.145** -1.046* -0.998* -1.043*
(0.430) (0.439) (0.430) (0.415) (0.426)
War of attrition 1.238** 1.323** 1.238** 1.233** 1.085**
(0.446) (0.438) (0.444) (0.448) (0.411)
Expansive war aims -0.140 -0.352 -0.141 -0.0334 -0.0311
(0.439) (0.440) (0.438) (0.455) (0.417)
Territorial annexation 1.708** 1.745** 1.708** 1.599** 1.727**
(0.555) (0.548) (0.571) (0.567) (0.526)
Cultural difference 0.420 0.390 0.420 0.361 0.318
(0.305) (0.286) (0.322) (0.330) (0.316)
State's combatants 3.012** 3.994** 3.012** 3.105** 3.064**
   abused by opponent (0.639) (0.841) (0.639) (0.643) (0.648)
Deterrence -2.446**
(0.857)
Relative capabilities 0.00253 -0.401
(0.627) (0.777)
Allied contribution -1.017
(0.912)
Treaty ratification -0.527
(0.440)
Treaty ratification 
   (opponent)
Joint treaty ratification
1949 norms
1977 norms
First cutpoint (τ1) 1.358** -0.288 1.359** 1.079+ 0.897
(0.399) (0.535) (0.414) (0.553) (0.554)
Second cutpoint (τ2) 4.160** 2.635** 4.161** 3.904** 3.717**
(0.655) (0.687) (0.656) (0.729) (0.748)
Observations 210 210 210 210 210
Log likelihood -158.5 -150.6 -158.5 -157.2 -157.4
Wald Chi2 64.66 57.09 64.98 67.28 66.64
Pseudo-R2 0.311 0.345 0.311 0.316 0.315
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by war)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1  
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Table 20(continued) 
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Democracy -1.059* -1.136** -1.146** -1.211**
(0.421) (0.427) (0.426) (0.404)
War of attrition 1.171** 1.377** 1.287** 1.318**
(0.404) (0.451) (0.446) (0.401)
Expansive war aims -0.0628 -0.125 -0.104 -0.150
(0.415) (0.446) (0.449) (0.458)
Territorial annexation 1.734** 1.758** 1.716** 1.659**
(0.539) (0.559) (0.546) (0.525)
Cultural difference 0.369 0.349 0.339 0.171
(0.315) (0.318) (0.304) (0.308)
State's combatants 3.065** 3.034** 3.155** 4.430**
   abused by opponent (0.646) (0.638) (0.650) (0.926)
Deterrence -2.658**
(0.777)
Relative capabilities -0.369
(0.855)
Allied contribution -1.152
(1.023)
Treaty ratification -0.508 -0.440
(0.649) (0.719)
Treaty ratification 0.728 0.502
   (opponent) (0.818) (0.809)
Joint treaty ratification -0.528 -0.442
(0.997) (1.006)
1949 norms 0.643
(0.446)
1977 norms 1.989+ 2.488*
(1.208) (1.145)
First cutpoint (τ1) 1.147+ 1.520** 1.482** -0.835
(0.612) (0.413) (0.398) (0.794)
Second cutpoint (τ2) 3.974** 4.340** 4.303** 2.190*
(0.788) (0.657) (0.646) (0.895)
Observations 210 210 210 210
Log likelihood -156.9 -157.2 -156.3 -144.8
Wald Chi2 73.27 65.13 70.91 66.02
Pseudo-R2 0.318 0.316 0.320 0.370
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by war)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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As noted before, states with greater capabilities may be more able and willing 
to harm combatants. However, when a state’s own relative capabilities are included in 
Model 3 the variable has little effect. Adding the capabilities of the state’s allied 
belligerents in Model 4 also yields little insight, though the coefficient for both 
variables actually becomes slightly negative. These ambiguous results for capabilities 
may reflect the fact that although more powerful states may have a greater ability to 
abuse combatants, they may also have less incentive to do so, given the likely 
superiority they possess over their opponent. On the other hand, weaker states may 
have less ability, but a greater interest, in resorting to combatant abuse as part of their 
warfighting strategy. Even in this case the ambiguous results for material capabilities 
suggest that combatant abuse is far from simply a “weapon of the weak.”122 
The next models incorporate various measures for international law and norms. 
As expected, Model 5 finds that states that ratified the most recent convention on the 
laws of war were less likely to harm combatants, though the coefficient fails to meet 
standard levels of significance. In Model 6, joint treaty ratification has a similar 
restraining effect, though the coefficient is still relatively weak. Whether the adversary 
unilaterally ratified the treaty actually has a positive though modest effect, which 
perhaps suggests that belligerents may calculate they can harm enemy combatants in 
the expectation that the adversary is less likely to respond in kind. 
With respect to the international law variables, none of the three measures take 
into account the prior process that led states to ratify or reject the given treaty in the 
first place. A growing literature has tried to incorporate this selection effect in 
different ways when assessing the overall effectiveness of international law on state 
                                                 
122 This phrase was taken from Scott’s study of various forms of resistance employed by weak and 
marginalized groups against stronger actors (Scott 1985). 
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behavior (Simmons and Hopkins 2005; von Stein 2005).123 The same factors that may 
influence the conduct of states during war may also influence their tendency to 
commit to international treaties. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this project to 
develop a fully articulated model for state decision making concerning the ratification 
of international humanitarian law.124 For the current purposes of this study, I only 
report the existing treaty results, while making clear that they do not take into account 
possible issues regarding selection effects. 
Turning from legal to more broadly-based normative effects, Models 7 and 8 
include measures for the wider impact of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 
Additional Protocol I respectively. Somewhat surprisingly, both of the 1949 and 1977 
variables are positively associated with combatant abuse and attain modest levels 
statistical significance (p-values of 0.1 and 0.15 respectively)125. While several post-
WWII conflicts, such as the 1982 Falklands War and U.S. fighting in the Persian Gulf 
War were associated with low levels of abuse, the Iran-Iraq, Ethiopian-Eritrean, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh wars, among others, resulted in an enormous amount of suffering 
for captured combatants. This is a sobering trend, which suggests the conduct of war is 
not necessarily becoming more humane in the contemporary era. One historian’s 
ambivalent characterization of international norms and warfare in the latter half of the 
twentieth century is fitting: “the 1949 Convention and the Protocols of 1977 
                                                 
123 In her reanalysis of the effect of IMF Article VIII on monetary policy compliance, von Stein finds 
that treaty effects are overstated, or biased upward, when the selection process is not taken into account 
(2005:611-612). This seems to imply that we can be less concerned for role of treaty effects in the case 
of combatant abuse, since even if they are overstated they are already fairly weak. It follows that taking 
into account selection effects would only reduce the coefficients for international law even further. 
However, as she shows in her general statistical model, the direction of the bias cannot be determined a 
priori, but is rather contingent on several other factors that may not be automatically known by the 
researcher (von Stein 2005:617). We should, therefore, remain cautious in assigning any definitive 
value to the treaty effects reported above even if they suggest a weak overall effect on combatant abuse. 
124 Though a current working paper by the author attempts to develop and empirically evaluate a 
framework for understanding the ratification of the laws of war. 
125 The results are generally the same when using instead the post-1949 and post-1977 year dummy 
variables to capture normative effects. 
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succeeded in establishing international standards of treatment for POWs that have 
universal acceptance, at least formally (emphasis added)” (Beaumont 1996:288-289). 
Putting it all together, the final column in Table 20 reports the overall Model 9, 
which combines several factors from the preceding analyses.126 As in the case of all of 
the earlier models, the main variables of interest remain consistently significant and in 
the expected direction. Democracy has a restraining effect, while war of attrition, 
territorial annexation, and reciprocity all increase the probability of combatant abuse. 
Cultural difference continues to have a moderately positive effect, while expansive 
war aims actually has a slight negative though again insignificant effect as in several 
of the previous models from Table 20. The coefficients for the other variables remain 
in the same direction at similar levels of statistical significance. 
Table 21 provides a further indication of the stability of the coefficients across 
various model specifications. The table shows the highest and lowest coefficient 
estimates for each of the main explanatory variables based on the 31 separate models 
reported in the tables from the preceding analysis.127 The values vary somewhat for 
the main findings involving democracy, war of attrition, territorial annexation, and 
reciprocity, but in all cases the size and direction of the coefficient estimates remain 
fairly consistent. On the other hand, the maximum and minimum values for expansive 
war aims are positive and negative respectively, which reinforces the general lack of 
any findings for this factor. Both estimates for cultural differences remain positive, but 
the low estimate is the closest to 0/no effect of all the variables except expansive war 
aims. Table 21, therefore, provides further evidence that the results for the main 
                                                 
126 The 1977 norm variable is used instead of 1949 given the former was found to be more statistically 
significant from the prior two models. 
127 Subsequent robustness analysis involved scores of different models, but across all of these 
specifications the size of the coefficients for the same set of variables generally remained consistent. 
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explanatory variables were not due to one particular model, but are rather robust 
across a wide range of specifications. 
Table 21: Range of estimates for main explanatory variables 
Variable Low estimate High estimate
Democracy -0.923 -1.492
War of attrition 0.957 1.377
Expansive war aims -0.150 0.234
Territorial annexation 1.434 1.758
Cultural difference 0.171 0.478
State's combatants 2.922 4.430
   abused by opponent  
The values from Table 21 demonstrate the resilience of the statistical findings, 
but provide little indication of the substantive impact of each factor on the level of 
combatant abuse. The full specification from Model 9 in Table 20 above is used to 
estimate the substantive effects of each of the independent variables on the level of 
combatant abuse. Since ordinal regression models are nonlinear with respect to the 
probabilities of observing specific values on the dependent variable, the effects of the 
independent variables are not as easy to interpret compared to the case of OLS (Long 
1997:127-140).  
Table 22 reports predicted probabilities of combatant abuse with the 
independent values set to specific values of interest. For ease of presentation, only the 
predicted probability of observing a high level of combatant abuse is reported.128 
Predicted probabilities were simulated using the Clarify package (King et al. 2000; 
Tomz et al. 2003). The first column presents the initial probability of observing high 
combatant abuse when the relevant independent variable is set to a lower value with 
all other variables held constant at their means. The lower value is 0 for dichotomous 
variables, such as democracy, and the twentieth percentile value for continuous 
                                                 
128 Probabilities for middle and low levels of combatant abuse are available from the author. 
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variables, such as relative capabilities. The next column then gives the predicted 
probability once the independent variable is changed to a higher value, which equals 1 
for dichotomous variables and the eightieth percentile for continuous variables, while 
all other variables are again held constant at their means. The third column reports the 
absolute change in the predicted probability when moving from lower to higher 
values, and the final column calculates the percentage change between the two 
predicted probabilities.129  
Democracy has a fairly sizable impact and reduces by over 60 percent the 
probability that a state will commit high levels of combatant abuse. Wars of attrition 
make it almost three-times more likely that states will harm enemy combatants. The 
battle deaths and duration measures for war severity are also positively related to 
combatant abuse, though at more moderate levels in comparison to the general 
attrition variable.130 Expansive war aims have a slight negative effect when all other 
variables are held at their means, yet this factor also fails to be very significant. In 
contrast, states seeking territorial annexation were over three-times more likely to 
resort to combatant abuse. The results indicate that in a substantive sense the nature of 
the belligerents and the bloodshed exert strong effects on the resort to high levels of 
abuse. 
                                                 
129 Some scholars are wary of the use of percentage changes because of the difficulty of assessing the 
meaningful impact of the change in the independent variable on the outcome of interest (Ray 2003:10-
12). I choose to report both the absolute and percentage changes in the predicted values and leave it to 
the reader to decide which they find more useful. 
130 Probabilities for these variables were generated by rerunning the full model with each variable 
substituted for war of attrition. 
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Table 22: Substantive effects of independent variables on the probability of high levels 
of combatant abuse† 
Initial 
probability
Probability 
after increase 
in variable
Absolute 
change in 
probability
Percent 
change in 
probability
Democracy 0.23 0.09 -0.15 -63
War of attrition 0.12 0.32 0.21 181
Battle deaths per 0.17 0.21 0.04 24
   1,000 population‡
Duration of war‡ 0.15 0.23 0.08 52
Expansive war aims 0.19 0.17 -0.02 -10
Territorial annexation 0.14 0.45 0.31 218
Cultural difference 0.16 0.19 0.03 16
State's combatants          0.02 0.50 0.49 2773
   abused by opponent
Deterrence 0.69 0.15 -0.54 -78
Relative capabilities 0.20 0.17 -0.03 -15
Allied contribution 0.21 0.15 -0.07 -32
Treaty ratification 0.25 0.17 -0.08 -32
Treaty ratification            0.15 0.20 0.05 36
   (opponent)
Joint treaty ratification 0.25 0.17 -0.08 -32
1949 norms‡ 0.15 0.29 0.15 102
1977 norms 0.16 0.67 0.51 315
†Baseline probability of high combatant abuse equals 0.192 where all variables are held at their means. 
For the predicted probabilities reported above all independent variables are held constant at their 
means except for the variable of interest. Dichotomous variables are changed from 0 to 1, while 
continuous variables are changed from their 20th to 80th percentile values. All estimates were 
calculated using Clarify .
‡ Estimates for these variables were calculated by rerunning the full model but substituting the 
relevant variable for war of attrition in the case of battle deaths and duration, and for 1977 norms in 
the case of 1949 norms.  
As in the regression models, cultural difference has a modest effect of an 
increase in 16 percent for high levels of abuse. Reciprocity exerts the single largest 
relative effect. States whose soldiers are victims of combatant abuse are more than 
twenty-times more likely to mistreat enemy combatant in kind. This finding on its own 
mandates that reciprocity dynamics be examined in greater detail, as will be done in 
later chapters. However, the relatively large effect for reciprocity should be treated 
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with some caution. First and as noted earlier, this general model does not explicitly 
take into account likely endogeneity issues, which upwardly bias the effect of 
reciprocity. Second, the simulated values use the lower end of no abuses committed by 
the opponent rather than distinguishing between the different possible levels of abuse. 
If a three-level categorical measure for abuses by the opponent is substituted, then 
moving from medium to high levels of opponent abuse is estimated to result in a 
percent change increase in the likelihood of high levels of abuse of around 204 
percent, which is of a considerably lower order.131 The particular operationalization of 
reciprocity therefore affects the precise estimate of the effects of abuses by the 
opponent, but in all cases the size of the effect remains statistically and substantively 
positive. 
On the other hand, when a situation of deterrence exists between co-
belligerents, states are about 75-percent less likely to turn on their prisoners. This 
provides further indirect support for the role of reciprocity, since expectations of likely 
retaliation appear to make states think twice before committing abuses should their 
opponent have the capability to respond in kind. In contrast, the capabilities and law 
variables all continue to have fairly modest effects on the level of combatant abuse. 
Finally, the 1949 and 1977 norms variables show that the normative force of 
principles restraining the conduct of war still have some way to go. Both are positive 
and associated with a one-to-three times increase in the probability of high combatant 
abuse.132 Taken as a whole, the results reinforce the regression findings and illustrate 
                                                 
131 This is based on probabilities of 0.23 for medium and 0.71 for high, though the absolute probability 
change remains quite impressive. In a similar manner, shifting from high levels of abuse versus at any 
of the lower levels is associated with a similar percent change in the probability of high abuse in kind of 
around 202 percent, which is based on probabilities of 0.54 and 0.18 respectively. Whichever the 
particular measure of reciprocity used, the effects of the other variables of interest largely remain the 
same. 
132 In a similar manner to the war severity proxies, values for the 1949 norms variable were calculated 
by rerunning the full model and replacing the 1977 measure. The 1977 finding does not appear to be a 
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that factors related to the nature of the belligerents and bloodshed, in the form of 
democracy along with the aims and severity of war, play a large role alongside 
reciprocity in shaping the conduct of states during the course of the fighting. 
Robustness Checks 
Results from the main regression analysis were also subjected to a variety of 
additional specification and robustness tests. For the sake of brevity, the results are not 
reported here, but are available from the author. To ensure the results were not being 
driven by the particular measure of combatant abuse chosen, a number of alternative 
measures were also considered. Perhaps the three-level classification system of high, 
medium, and low levels of combatant abuse is in fact too fine-grained and what really 
matters is distinguishing high-level abuses from all other forms of abuse. A 
dichotomous variable was created “High-level Combatant Abuse” which codes cases 
of combatant abuse as high, while both medium and low cases are coded as 0. Using 
this dichotomous measure does not change the results substantially, since the effects 
for all of the main variables of interest continue to hold.  
In contrast, perhaps the main measure for the outcome of interest is not fine-
grained enough and in fact is masking important differences in the level of combatant 
abuse, which has crucial implications for understanding its causes. It is important to 
remember that the main measure for combatant abuse is a summary indicator of six 
different types of violations ranging from execution to housing conditions. The overall 
coding was then based on the highest value obtained across the individual measures, 
                                                 
statistical artifact of the particular model specification. For instance, 31 percent of the observations for 
belligerents in pre-1977 wars involved the highest level of combatant abuse, but this figure rose to 41 
percent for all post-1977 wars. While this should not be taken as meaning that greater normative 
support for the laws of war actually caused higher levels of combatant abuse, it does at least suggest 
that attempts to codify and embrace the laws of war are frequently motivated by an effort to curb 
persistent and growing excesses in the conduct of existing belligerents. International humanitarian 
norms may oftentimes be just as much a response to contemporary trends in abuses, instead of the more 
optimistic view that such principles act as a leading force in restraining state behavior. 
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since any of these violations on their own is considered a war crime under 
international law. Other decision rules could also be taken when aggregating these 
component measures. One problem confronted when trying to create other aggregate 
measures is that many observations have missing values for some of the component 
variables. In order to address this problem, I employed multiple imputation to 
substitute for any missing values on the component variables.133 I then used the newly 
completed data set to create two alternative measures for the overall combatant abuse 
indicator.134  
The first measure takes the average level of abuse across the six component 
variables, where “High” equals 2, “Medium” equals 1, and “Low” equals 0.135 The 
average is then reduced to a similar three-level ordinal ranking based on the following 
rules: “Low” if the average score is less than 0.5; “Medium” if the score is between 
0.5 and 1.5; “High” if the score is greater than 1.5. This coding rule actually provides 
a fairly tough test, since including such a wide range of values within the medium-
level category reduces the level of variation amongst the cases of combatant abuse. 
Nevertheless, the results remain substantially the same using this alternative 
trichotomous measure. The second measure simply sums the six component variables 
together to form an overall index for combatant abuse which varies between a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 11. In a similar manner, using this measure does not 
change the results in any meaningful way.136  
                                                 
133 Multiple imputation was implemented using the Amelia program (King et al. 2001). 
134 More precisely, Amelia created several versions of the data set, in this case five, with different values 
for each missing cell to reflect uncertainty over the nature of the missing data. 
135 For the two dichotomous components, instances of forced military conscription are coded as “High,” 
while instances of denial of legal rights are coded as “Medium.” 
136 Since this dependent variable has a larger range of values, all models were estimated using ordinary 
least squares (OLS). 
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I also used the individual components to investigate whether the causes of 
combatant abuse differed depending on the particular type of violation. Although there 
are some differences across types of violation, the effects are generally of a matter of 
size rather than statistical significance and thus do not undermine the overall results.137 
Finally, I also ran the models using the percentage of prisoners killed in captivity out 
of the total number of prisoners captured, where this information was available. In 
general the results were in the expected direction though the level of statistical 
significance was attenuated somewhat. However, these results are not completely 
surprising since precise values for this measure could only be obtained for 
approximately one quarter of the cases, which greatly reduced the degrees of freedom. 
In sum, across multiple alternative measures of combatant abuse, the results generally 
remain robust.  
In a similar manner, I tested to see if the democracy finding was being driven 
by the particular data source or coding rule chosen by relying on several alternative 
measures. I checked the results using cutoffs on the Polity score of 6 and 8 instead of 
the cutoff of 7 used in the main analysis, but the results remain largely unaltered. As a 
separate measure, I substituted Doyle’s coding for liberal states which includes both 
institutional and normative components. The results are not affected and, if anything, 
the effect of democracy is strengthened when using Doyle’s measure.138  
                                                 
137 For instance, the size of the democracy coefficient was highest for denial of legal rights and living 
conditions, though still substantively and statistically significant for the remaining categories of 
violations. 
138 Other commonly used measures for democracy were also considered, including those by ACLP and 
Vanhanen, but the results remain essentially the same (Alvarez et al. 1996; Vanhanen 2000). A related 
issue concerns the potential effects of different regimes beyond the democracy-autocracy dichotomy. A 
variable “anocracy” was created along similar lines as in other studies to capture mixed regimes 
between the democracy-autocracy extremes (Downes 2008:69-70). A state is considered an anocracy if 
it has a Polity score between -6 and 6. Including the anocracy measure does not substantially alter the 
results for the effect of democracy, while the effect of anocracy is similar to more extreme forms of 
autocracies. A different typology developed by Geddes categorizes authoritarian regimes as personalist 
dictatorships, single-party regimes, or military regimes (Geddes 1999b; 1999a). Again, including these 
variables does not substantially alter the effect of democracy, while the effects of the three authoritarian 
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Some might also argue the purported democracy finding may in actual fact be 
hiding a more particular United States effect given the latter’s prominence in twentieth 
century wars. Current behavior in the War on Terror notwithstanding, perhaps the 
United States has consistently acted in a more humane manner toward prisoners than 
other democracies. Studies in other areas, such as the imposition of economic 
sanctions, have indeed found that the purported effects of democracy are largely 
driven by U.S. behavior (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2008). I test for this 
possibility by including a U.S. dummy variable in the models alongside democracy. 
The democracy coefficients become slightly attenuated, which is not wholly surprising 
since the United States is also a democracy, and the U.S. dummy variable is in general 
negatively related to combatant abuse. However, the U.S. variable never comes close 
to attaining standard levels of statistical significance, while the significance of the 
democracy coefficient remains similar to its initial values. The results indicate the 
democracy finding is robust for alternative measures, but also that any particularities 
of the United States omitted from earlier models do not account for U.S. conduct 
toward enemy combatants during war. 
Although a U.S. effect does not exist, other country-specific effects may be 
operating behind the scenes. One of the most likely candidates involves Communist 
countries. Scholars studying mass killings more generally have argued that 
Communist regimes are especially prone to harming their populations as part of the 
larger goal to radically alter the entire basis of their societies (Valentino 2004:92-97). 
If such regimes could be so cruel to their own citizens, then there may be little reason 
                                                 
variables are indistinguishable. Although not significant, the effect for military regime is still positive 
(i.e. heightens the probability of abuse) but much less so than for the other two authoritarian categories, 
which is suggestive of some possible differences in the behavior of this type of regime. Considering the 
Geddes data only cover the post-WWII period and thus exclude a great number of observations in the 
data set, examining possible differences between nondemocracies in the conduct of war is an interesting 
avenue for further research. 
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to think they would not hesitate to act in similar ways to the populations of their 
foreign enemies. In the realm of prisoners of war, Communists states have taken 
certain notable steps that could be indicative of a greater likelihood to harm 
combatants. For instance, despite widespread participation in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, most Communist states entered a reservation to Article 85 of the Third 
Convention relating to prisoners, “which state[s] that prisoners prosecuted for acts 
committed prior to their being captured retained, even if convicted, the benefits of the 
Convention” (Beaumont 1996:286). Communist countries generally interpreted their 
reservation to this provision to mean that even soldiers suspected of alleged crimes 
could be denied POW status, which in turn allowed them to treat prisoners with 
greater latitude as they saw fit.  
Several cases certainly seem to reflect a Communist tendency toward abuse, 
since both North Korean and Vietnamese treatment of prisoners during their wars with 
the United States was far from humane (Miller 1975:114, 165). I test for this 
possibility by including a dummy variable for Communist belligerents in the main 
regression models. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, across various model 
specifications the Communist variable is actually slightly negative though never 
comes close to reaching standard thresholds of statistical significance, while none of 
the other findings are drastically changed. 
While particularly countries do not appear to be influencing the results in any 
meaningful sense, the same cannot be assumed for particular wars. I check whether or 
not the results are driven by either of the two world wars. Along with being probably 
the most distinctive events in the history of twentieth century warfare, both wars also 
involved a large number of capable belligerents compared to other conflicts. In order 
to examine if either war is affecting the results, I rerun the models with dummy 
variables for belligerents from World War I and World War II respectively. If either 
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war is truly distinctive in terms of the treatment of combatants, then the relevant 
coefficients should be significant and the findings for other factors may in turn be 
weakened. Again, none of the results for the main variables of interest are 
substantially affected.  
Attention to wars from particular times in the twentieth century raises the 
additional issue of whether particular period effects are operating that influence the 
size and direction of the coefficients over time. As a rough initial test of this 
possibility, I rerun the models but split the observations into pre and post-1950 
samples.139 While the significance of the coefficients is attenuated somewhat, which is 
to a certain degree is expected given the dramatically smaller sample size for each 
period, the directions of all the explanatory variables remain the same. The negative 
democracy finding, or the positive effects for war of attrition and annexation, appears 
to be fairly consistent over time.140 
Although differences over time may not be apparent, perhaps there are 
distinctive spatial logics. This would imply that the effects of particular factors may 
operate differently depending on the regional context. Geography may matter in 
shaping the likelihood and degree of combatant abuse in a number of different ways. 
Particular climates may make it more or less difficult to properly care for prisoners. 
Tropical climates in particular present several problems such as insects and 
communicable diseases, which make supplying adequate housing conditions much 
more problematic. Alongside these specific challenges for combatants in captivity, 
certain topographies may also increase the likelihood of capturing large numbers of 
                                                 
139 I chose 1950 as a dividing line, since it is the closest approximate midpoint for the entire time period 
under study from 1898 to 2003. This also reflects a general test of whether there were substantial 
differences between pre and post-Geneva periods, since the Geneva Conventions were negotiated in 
1949.  
140 The equality of coefficients was evaluated using Chow tests across each of the variables. 
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prisoners. For instance, island battlefields could make it much more difficult for 
soldiers to flee or desert since they literally have nowhere else to go. Geography may 
also operate in more subtle ways by interacting and influencing other factors found to 
affect combatant abuse. Mountainous or tropical areas likely make large-scale 
operations and troop movements more problematic and as a result conflicts in such 
locations may be more prone to devolving into wars of attrition. On the other hand, 
these same features, among others such as bordering oceans or large deserts, may 
make conquest more difficult and in turn reduce the likelihood an adversary would 
seek territorial annexation (Van Evera 1999:163) 
Geography presents several pathways that may influence the resort to 
combatant abuse. Most of these possibilities are unfortunately difficult to test in a 
large-n setting because many wars often take place across several different climates or 
topographies. In order to begin to test for the possible effects of geography, I rerun the 
models but split the data by region according to COW region identifiers (Western 
Hemisphere, Europe, Africa, Middle East, Asia, and Oceania).141 When employing 
either the primary location of the battlefront, or the home location for each given 
belligerent, as the basis for coding the regional affiliation of each observation the 
results again indicate that no significant differences exist for the main explanatory 
variables across different regions.142 
                                                 
141 Since there were no wars involving capable captors from Oceania during the time period, this region 
is excluded (for instance, Australia participated in the Korean War but is considered to have been a 
subservient ally under broader U.S. leadership). 
142 The tests must be considered as only suggestive of the absence of regional effects. In the case of 
battlefront location, it was difficult to obtain reliable estimates for Africa and the Western Hemisphere 
because of the relatively small number of observations for each region (9 and 16 respectively). In the 
case of home region, these two categories in addition to Asia were excluded for similar reasons. 
Nevertheless, for the regions that could be examined the results were robust across a variety of model 
specifications. The only exception was that the deterrence coefficient for Middle East took on a positive 
sign, though all other variables remained the same. 
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Taken together, the combined set of tests, while far from exhaustive, suggests 
that the main findings regarding regime type, the nature of the aims and severity of the 
conflict, alongside the role of reciprocity are consistent factors for understanding the 
abuse of combatants during war. 
Conclusion 
 In sum, both the regression analysis and substantive results indicate a great 
deal of support for several of the main hypotheses related to the nature of the 
belligerents and bloodshed framework put forward in the earlier theory chapter. 
Across a wide range of model specifications and measures, the nature of democratic 
belligerents was found to substantially improve their treatment of prisoners, which 
diverges sharply from findings in several recent studies on civilian victimization. The 
results leave open the relative role of structural versus normative factors in accounting 
for the effect of democracy on combatant abuse, but this is a question that is taken up 
in greater detail in the following chapter.  
Despite the restraining effects of regime type, the aims and nature of the 
fighting also greatly condition the conduct of states. Wars that get bogged down into 
costly battles of attrition, or conflicts where states aim to annex territory from the 
adversary, are much more likely to result in high levels of combatant abuse. 
Nevertheless, not all aims are equal. Wars where the aim is unconditional surrender or 
regime change just as often result in good treatment in place of abuse, once other 
factors are taken into account. Belligerents thus have contrasting incentives in certain 
cases that need to be taken into account when deciding how to treat captured 
combatants. Looming over their decisions is an ever-present concern for reciprocity, 
since violations committed by the adversary are more often than not associated with 
abuse in kind. Finally, cultural differences are an oft-cited determinant of combatant 
abuse, but prove to be inconsistent in explaining patterns of combatant abuse across 
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the full set of cases in the data set. However, it should be kept in mind the measure for 
culture necessarily only looks at preexisting religious differences amongst the warring 
parties, which leaves some of the more nuanced effects of culture open to further 
study.  
The quantitative analysis highlighted several notable patterns in the abuse of 
combatants across twentieth century warfare and beyond. The remaining chapters 
delve further into some of the key findings by investigating the logic connecting 
several components from the nature of the belligerents and the bloodshed to the degree 
to which combatants are treated or mistreated by their adversary once they are 
captured during the course of war. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE NATURE OF THE BELLIGERENTS: DEMOCRATIC 
NORMS, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMBATANT ABUSE 
Introduction 
One of the main findings from the preceding quantitative analysis was the 
tendency for democracies to be less likely to resort to higher levels of combatant 
abuse. Across a wide range of specifications and measures for regime type, democratic 
belligerents were less likely than their autocratic counterparts to abuse enemy 
combatants who fell into their hands. Despite the robustness of this overall finding, the 
quantitative analysis did not shed much light on precisely why democracies generally 
treat their prisoners more humanely. Separate normative and institutional approaches 
provide distinct logics to explain democratic restraint toward enemy combatants, but 
the aggregate data used for the quantitative analysis make it difficult to determine the 
merits of each account.  
The normative approach focuses on the political culture imbued in 
democracies, in particular principles such as respect for individual rights, tolerance, 
and limits on the use of violence. Externalizing such domestic norms to the foreign 
arena is expected to lead democracies to treat enemy prisoners in a more humane 
manner than nondemocracies, which do not tend to hold similar norms. In contrast, the 
institutional approach centers on the institutional attributes of democracies and their 
role in increasing the accountability of leaders to their public. Assuming that the 
public is concerned over the safety of their own troops both on the field and in 
captivity, and that leaders also in turn share these concerns, points to two main 
arguments for why democracies would be more likely to treat prisoners well. First, 
good treatment reduces the risks of retaliation by the adversary. If democracies are 
more sensitive to the costs of retaliation, then they should be more likely to take steps 
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to mitigate the downsides of reciprocity. Second, good treatment also provides certain 
strategic advantages that have the potential to end the war more quickly, with less 
carnage, and in the captor’s favor. Humane treatment makes it more likely that enemy 
soldiers will choose the relative comfort and safety of captivity by surrendering rather 
than keep fighting on the battlefield. Acting in a more humane manner is thus not only 
morally beneficial, but also results in military advantages that can undermine the 
enemy’s will to resist and continue waging war. Similarly, if democracies are more 
sensitive to the overall costs of war and face greater public scrutiny in its outcome, 
then they may correspondingly have a greater incentive to try and capture some of 
these strategic advantages. 
This is not to suggest that both the reciprocity and strategic advantages 
mechanisms do not operate to varying extents in the case of nondemocracies. All 
states likely place at least a minimum value on the safety and wellbeing of their 
troops, and would also prefer to exploit any possible military advantages available. 
My argument is that the institutions of democracies make them relatively more 
sensitive to both of these mechanisms, which accounts for the observed tendency of 
democracies to treat their prisoners more humanely. The flipside is that in situations 
where these mechanisms do not operate as forcefully, then democracies may be just as 
brutal as their nondemocratic counterparts. A full explanation for the role of regime 
type must ultimately account for both the virtuous and the vicious cases of prisoner 
treatment by democracies. 
The purpose of this chapter is to delve more deeply into the role of democracy 
by evaluating the relative strength of the normative and institutional approaches for 
understanding patterns of combatant abuse by democracies.143 Many other factors, 
                                                 
143 A separate institutional approach positing that democracies should actually be more likely to commit 
abuses was also presented in the theory chapter. However, since evidence for this expectation was 
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including cultural or racial differences, war aims, leadership personalities, among 
others, affect particular cases of democratic and nondemocratic belligerents alike, 
though perhaps to varying degrees. While accepting that a host of other factors help to 
shape prisoner policies, the narrower objective of this chapter is to assess the influence 
of normative versus institutional forces for understanding the role of democracy in 
limiting or contributing to the use of combatant abuse. 
In exploring the relationship between democracy and combatant abuse, the 
chapter proceeds in the following five sections. The first section returns to the main 
quantitative data set on combatant abuse, but derives additional observable 
implications in order to differentiate between the normative and institutional 
explanations. The second section builds on the aggregate findings from the additional 
quantitative analysis by examining in greater detail the specific case of U.S.-British 
treatment of prisoners on the Western Front during the Second World War. Although 
other factors influencing the decision making of the U.S. and British leaders are also 
touched upon, the main purpose of the case studies is to ascertain whether these 
democratic leaders thought and acted more according to normative or institutional 
expectations.  
In contrast to the relatively benevolent conduct toward prisoners over the 
course of the war, the third section turns to a darker side exhibited by the democratic 
belligerents during this period. I examine three additional areas of democratic abuse 
both during and after the Second World War, which have implications for 
understanding the motives underlying the conduct of democracies during armed 
conflict. These involve the treatment of Axis prisoners after the hostilities formally 
ended, the decision to forcibly repatriate Russian prisoners back to the Soviet Union, 
                                                 
generally lacking from the quantitative analysis of the causes of combatant abuse, this chapter focuses 
only on the two approaches that can account for the restraining effect of democracy. 
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and the targeting civilians. The fourth section questions the general restraining effect 
of democracy by examining several cases where democracies in fact committed high 
levels of combatant abuse. In particular, I argue that when the restraints of reciprocity 
break down, or the strategic benefits seem minimal, then democracies are much more 
likely to resort to combatant abuse. The fifth and final section then concludes by 
summarizing the main findings from the chapter and discusses some of the strengths, 
as well as limits, of democracy for improving the treatment of enemy combatants 
during times of war. 
Based on the weight of the evidence across each of these sections, both 
approaches offer some interesting insights, but I find that the institutional approach 
provides a more convincing explanation for the conduct of democracies toward enemy 
combatants. Concerns over reciprocity and attention to the strategic benefits from 
good conduct, rather than attachment to domestic norms, appear to provide a better 
account of both the benevolent and sometimes more nefarious actions of democratic 
belligerents toward their prisoners. 
Democracy, Norms, and Institutions: Some Further Quantitative Evidence 
Democracies are less likely to commit combatant abuse, but what role do 
normative or institutional factors play in accounting for this democratic 
distinctiveness? One of the challenges involves finding observable implications that 
distinguish normative from institutional explanations for the conduct of democracies. 
Amassing data detailing the series of specific violations committed by each side would 
be a promising approach. The thought processes and considerations of democratic 
leaders when deciding how they should treat prisoners, or react to abuses by their 
adversaries, would provide a rich collection of material for parsing out the motivations 
driving democracies and other regime types during the conduct of war. Unfortunately, 
the availability of the necessary data, along with the time-intensiveness involved in 
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this type of coding endeavor, means such an approach is not feasible across a large 
number of cases. This does not imply, however, that more fine-grained measures than 
simply the overall level of combatant abuse by each belligerent across a given war 
cannot be developed. In particular, identifying which side commits the first violation 
and the subsequent conduct by the initial victim has the dual benefit of providing a 
further test of the general democracy result as well as several opportunities to 
potentially distinguish between the normative and institutional explanations. 
The same data set is used as for the overall quantitative analysis, which 
involves combatant abuse across all interstate wars from 1898 to 2003. In a similar 
manner, the unit of analysis is the warring-directed-dyad, which means there are 
separate observations for each captor and captive state pairing. Data on the order of 
violations committed by each belligerent in a given war was collected alongside the 
main three-level categorical indicator for combatant abuse used in the earlier 
quantitative analysis. A dichotomous variable, “First violator,” was first created for 
each observation, which takes on a value of 1 if a state commits the first violation 
against an adversary, and 0 otherwise. Only violations that reach medium or high 
levels of combatant abuse are considered relevant when coding for first violator, since 
cases involving low levels of abuse either reflect no abuse at any point during the war, 
or relatively minor violations. The variable thus represents which state is the first to 
commit medium or high levels of abuse against enemy combatants.144 
In many cases determining the first violator is relatively straightforward. This 
is especially evident in instances where one side commits little or no combatant abuse 
at all. Since the United States treated Iraqi soldiers during the Persian Gulf War 
                                                 
144 As in the quantitative analysis, only capable captors are coded for “First violator,” as well as for 
other variables discussed below. States deemed to be incapable captors are coded as missing and 
excluded from the analysis. 
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extremely well, while in contrast Iraq was quite brutal toward the prisoners that fell 
into its hands, by definition Iraq is considered the first violator during this war (Rowe 
1993:196; Vance 2006:168). Wars where neither side moved beyond low levels of 
abuse, such as the 1969 Football War between Honduras and El Salvador, also mean 
by definition that neither can be the first violator since no significant violations took 
place (Anderson 1969:126-127). Even in cases where both sides resort to more serious 
levels of combatant abuse, it is often clear who committed the first violation. During 
the Second World War, German forces quickly overran French defenses during their 
initial blitzkrieg offensive. Records indicate the Germans were the first to mistreat 
prisoners and primarily at medium levels of abuse, although France later committed 
similar levels of violations against the more modest number of prisoners under their 
control (Durand 1987:25; de Zayas 1989:151). On the other hand, in some cases it is 
difficult to determine which state actually committed the first violation. In the 1911-
1912 Italo-Turkish War both sides captured combatants in early battles and committed 
abuses against their prisoners (McCullagh 1912:140; McClure 1913:79-80). In such 
instances both sides are coded as 0 given that no single first violator can be 
definitively identified.145 
 Both the normative and institutional explanations would expect democracies to 
be less likely to initiate the first violation. Democratic norms, such as nonviolence or 
respect for individual rights, suggest that democracies should be less likely to commit 
abuses and by extension instigate abuses in the first place. The greater institutionally-
driven sensitivity of democracies to the costs of retaliation similarly implies that 
democracies should be less likely to instigate combatant abuse out of greater fears of 
reciprocity. A negative relationship between democracy and first violators thus does 
                                                 
145 Coding both observations in these cases instead as 1 does not substantially change the results. 
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not distinguish between normative and institutional explanations, but is helpful in 
providing a further testable implication of the overall democracy finding. Figure 8 
below reports the results of a cross tabulation between regime type and whether or not 
a state is the first violator. 
 
Figure 8: Relationship between democracy and first violator 
The figure only includes cases where at least one side committed medium or 
high-level abuses. Cases where both sides limited themselves to low levels of abuse 
are excluded, since neither is considered as a first violator according to my 
definition.146 The figure clearly shows that democracies are less likely to commit the 
first violation and the measure of association is statistically significant.147 Only around 
                                                 
146 If all wars are instead included, then percentage values change somewhat, but the overall negative 
relationship between democracy and first violations still holds. 
147 Since both variables are dichotomous, all measures of statistical association discussed below use 
Pearson’s chi-squared test. This is instead of Kendall’s tau-b used for the ordinal combatant abuse 
measure in corresponding cross tabulations from the previous chapter. 
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one-third of democratic belligerents are likely to strike first at prisoners in their 
control, while more than half of all nondemocratic belligerents commit the first 
instance of combatant abuse. 
 Even if democracies do not commit the first violation, a further implication of 
the democracy finding is that they should also be less likely to retaliate against abuses 
committed by the opposing side. According to the logic of the normative argument, 
constraints on the conduct of democracies during war are generated by domestic 
norms, which in many ways should be independent of the behavior of the adversary. 
Whether or not the opponent initiates abuses should not in and of itself affect a 
democratic belligerent’s commitment to its domestic norms. In the case of the 
institutional explanation, democracies should still be less likely to reply in kind given 
that retaliation could lead to even worse abuses by the adversary, along with 
undermining the prospective strategic benefits to be gained from continued good 
behavior. Again, a lower likelihood of retaliation by democracies is consistent with 
both the normative and institutional explanations, but provides a further test of the 
general finding that democracies commit lower levels of combatant abuse.  
In order to evaluate this proposition, I develop a dichotomous indicator 
“Retaliate” for all states that do not commit the first violation in a given war, which 
takes on a value of 1 if the victimized state subsequently commits either medium or 
high levels of combatant abuse, and 0 otherwise.148 Figure 9 below shows a cross 
                                                 
148 First violators are excluded since by definition they cannot simultaneously be in a position to 
retaliate against an initial abuse. Although I use the term “retaliate,” this variable might also capture 
cases where both belligerents are responding to other incentives for combatant abuse, such as the 
severity of the fighting or war aims, but there is simply a lag between when each side begins to commit 
combatant abuse. This measure probably exhibits a greater level of noise, since it is likely picking up 
genuine cases where one side is retaliating against violations by the adversary, as well as those other 
instances where both sides might be acting independently but start to abuse prisoners at different points 
in time. The available data only makes it possible to determine the general time when each side began 
to commit violations rather than the specific motivation for doing so. The results for retaliation and later 
related variables thus must be considered with some caution. I thank Christopher Way for raising this 
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tabulation between regime type and retaliation. The results again indicate that 
democracies are less likely to retaliate against abuses committed by their opponent, 
and provide further support for the general constraining effect of democracy. Although 
significant in both statistical and substantive terms, the results point to a sobering 
finding, since even though democracies are less likely to retaliate they still do so in 
almost two-thirds of the cases. Nondemocracies of course retaliate at a much higher 
rate, but the figure points out that when one side commits combatant abuse it is not 
uncommon for the adversary to follow suit not long after irrespective of their 
particular regime type.  
 
Figure 9: Relationship between democracy and retaliation 
                                                 
issue. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the historical cases considered later in the chapter, as well as 
the record for many other wars suggest belligerents are very cognizant of the conduct of their opponents 
and thus the prospects for retaliation. 
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 Although a lower likelihood of retaliation is consistent with both the normative 
and institutional explanations, the level of the initial violation provides a potentially 
useful point for differentiating between the two approaches. Whether or not the 
adversary initiates medium or high levels of abuse, the normative approach still 
expects domestic norms to restrain democracies. Perhaps the force of these norms 
might weaken in the face of egregious acts of violence by the enemy, but on balance 
democratic norms should still limit the retaliatory impulses of democratic states. In 
contrast, one of the key elements of the institutional approach is that democracies shy 
away from combatant abuse out of fear this would lead to ever greater acts of abuse by 
the opposing side. If the other side is already committing the maximum levels of 
abuse, then this reciprocity incentive largely disappears. The material benefits from 
good conduct might still be present, but one of the main institutional restraints on 
democratic behavior is greatly weakened once the opponent starts committing high 
levels of abuse. 
Examining the rate of retaliation by states responding to high levels of abuse 
by the first violator provides a clearer test of the relative explanatory power of the 
normative as opposed to institutional explanations. While a normative approach would 
still presume that democracy will have a restraining effect on the likelihood of 
retaliation against high levels of abuse, an institutional approach would expect this 
relationship to be nonexistent or weak at best. “Retaliate (against high abuse)” is a 
dichotomous variable that takes on the value of 1 when a state retaliates against an 
adversary that initiates high levels of abuse and 0 if it does not. As Figure 10 below 
indicates, although democracies are still less likely to retaliate against high levels of 
abuse than nondemocracies, the effect is weaker than in the previous figures and no 
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longer statistically significant.149 The weak relationship between regime type and 
retaliation in this case appears to be more consistent with an institutional rather than 
normative explanation.  
 
Figure 10: Relationship between democracy and retaliation against high levels of 
combatant abuse 
 Beyond the question of retaliation there are other issues where the normative 
approach does not offer clear expectations compared to an institutional approach. In 
one sense the normative account views combatant abuse as fundamentally inconsistent 
with internal democratic norms of nonviolence, tolerance, and respect for individual 
rights. This leads to a general expectation that democracies will be extremely reluctant 
to engage in combatant abuse. On the other hand, translating the normative account 
                                                 
149 The cases of democracies not responding to high-level violations by the adversary are Great Britain 
against Turkey during the First World War and the United States against Iraq during the 1991 Persian 
Gulf War. The only case of a nondemocracy not responding to high-level violations also occurred 
during the Persian Gulf War, but involved Saudi Arabia against Iraq. 
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from the democratic peace to the conduct of war might instead suggest that domestic 
norms should have little effect on wars between democracies and autocracies, which 
concerns all conflicts involving democracies in the data set, since it is widely accepted 
that no two democracies have fought a war against each other. If autocracies cannot be 
trusted because of their own internal attributes, then this might in turn lead 
democracies to put aside their own liberal norms when facing these foes during war 
(Russett 1993:33).150 Taken together, this poses a problem for a normative approach to 
provide clear expectations regarding the patterns of abuse that democracies do end up 
committing. For instance, it is difficult for a norms-based argument to explain whether 
democracies would refrain from escalation in the sense of limiting themselves to equal 
or lower levels of abuse than their adversary, or whether they might in fact be more 
likely to escalate.  
In contrast, a non-escalatory dynamic is largely consistent with an institutional 
explanation. By limiting themselves to similar or lower levels of abuses compared to 
their opponent, democracies can increase the likelihood through reciprocity that the 
opponent would not choose to resort to even higher levels of abuse. On the other hand, 
retaliating at any level will likely reduce the total strategic advantages gained through 
good conduct, but those advantages remaining will still be greater if the democracy 
does not escalate.151 The relative propensity of states toward escalation based on 
                                                 
150 In his study of democratic foreign policy Doyle refers to Hume’s notion that democracies often 
exhibit “imprudent vehemence” when dealing with outside powers and that these tendencies are 
heightened when facing nondemocratic adversaries (Doyle 1983:323-325). Restraints on the use of 
violence against enemy combatants may in turn lose much of their force in such circumstances. Though 
Russett acknowledges that democracies may still differentiate between the leaders ruling autocratic 
regimes and their subjects (Russett 1993:33). However, even in this case it might be expected that 
normative restraints against combatant abuse may operate less strongly, since the subjects being held 
prisoner were also engaged in carrying out violations against democratic soldiers. 
151 The potential strategic advantages coming out of prisoner treatment are partly a function of the 
adversary’s conduct as well. This is based on the balance of soldiers from each side who would prefer 
to surrender rather than continue fighting. If a democracy chooses to engage in combatant abuse, but the 
adversary commits higher levels of abuse, then the democratic belligerent could still gain some 
advantages. These advantages would certainly be less than if it committed no abuses at all, since fewer 
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regime type is thus in many ways more consistent with an institutional explanation, 
but less evident from the point of view of a normative approach. 
An ideal test of whether or not democracies are less likely to escalate the level 
of combatant abuse would be to trace possible back-and-forth violations between 
belligerents across various wars. Again, this unfortunately is not feasible for a large 
number of cases. However, if democracies are less likely to commit escalatory levels 
of abuse, then this should be reflected in the main measure of combatant used in the 
preceding analysis. “Escalate” is a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if a 
state commits a higher level of abuse than its opponent, and 0 if it commits the same 
or lower level of abuse.152 Figure 11 below reports results from the corresponding 
cross tabulation. Democracies are indeed less likely to escalate overall than 
nondemocracies, though the level of statistical significance is more modest at around 
ten percent. 
                                                 
enemy soldiers would likely surrender, but the democracy would likely be assured that even fewer of its 
own soldiers would surrender because of the even higher level of abuse committed by the adversary. 
152 The results do not change substantially if the sample is limited only to those states that actually 
committed medium or high levels of abuse. 
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Figure 11: Relationship between democracy and escalation 
 According to the institutional logic democracies should also be less likely to 
escalate when retaliating against first violations due to similar reasons as outlined 
above for the general phenomenon of escalation. For instance, if an adversary first 
commits medium-level abuses, then retaliating with high-level abuses completely 
negates the possible benefits from good conduct and increases the risk that the 
adversary will also raise its abuses to higher levels in kind. Avoiding retaliatory 
escalation appears to be more consistent with the institutional approach, while is still 
more problematic for a normative perspective because of several possibly different 
expectations. In order to test this proposition, “Retaliatory escalation” is a 
dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if a state commits a higher level of 
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abuse in response to the level of abuse from an adversary who committed the first 
violation, and 0 otherwise.153  
 
Figure 12: Relationship between democracy and escalatory retaliation 
 As is evident from Figure 12 above, there are no cases in the data set of 
democracies engaging in escalatory forms of retaliation.154 Escalatory retaliation is in 
fact fairly rare in general, which suggests that those states that decide to initiate 
combatant abuse by committing the first violation are also likely to engage is 
                                                 
153 Since combatant abuse is a three-level ordered variable, “Retaliatory escalation” only takes on a 
value of 1 when the first violator commits medium levels of abuse and the state in question retaliates by 
committing high levels of abuse. 
154 In contrast, there are six cases of nondemocracies engaging in retaliatory escalation. These are: 
Yugoslavia against Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War, Turkey against Bulgaria in the Second Balkan 
War, Russia against Germany in the First World War, Romania against Austria-Hungary in the First 
World War, and Romania against Germany in the First World War. The lack of any cases of 
democracies engaging in escalatory retaliation is problematic for computing a measure of association, 
since one of the assumptions for Pearson’s chi-square is that there are no empty cells. Therefore, no 
Pearson’s chi-square statistic is reported in Figure 12. However, other measures, such as Fisher’s exact 
test (p = 0.07), suggest the relationship is significant at least at a level of ten percent or lower.   
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comparable or higher levels of abuse overall. However, it is indicative of the influence 
of regime type that the only states in the data set that have engaged in retaliatory 
escalation were nondemocracies. 
The results from the five tests for the normative and institutional approaches 
discussed above are summarized in Table 23 below. The first two tests point to the 
same expected behavior for democracies under either the normative or institutional 
explanation. Although the pair of tests cannot distinguish between the relative role 
played by either normative or institutional factors, they are helpful in providing further 
support for the validity of the overall democracy finding. The third test involving 
retaliation against higher levels of abuse provides a better opportunity to differentiate 
between the two approaches and is more consistent with an institutional perspective. 
The last two tests concerning escalation have less discernable implications from the 
normative explanation, but both follow expectations derived from the institutional 
approach.155 
Table 23: Summary of tests for normative and institutional explanations for the 
restraining effect of democracy on combatant abuse 
Outcome Actual effect
Normative 
approach
Institutional 
approach
First violator - - -
Retaliation - - -
Retaliation (against 
levels of abuse)
Escalation ? - -
Retaliatory escalation ? - -
Expected effect of democracy
- 0 0
 
                                                 
155 It should also be noted that all five of these bivariate relationships between regime type and state 
conduct toward prisoners generally continue to hold when subjected to more rigorous analysis which 
incorporates confounding factors and other control variables. The finding for escalation is the weakest 
statistically, but is still in the expected direction that democracies are less likely to escalate overall. 
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In sum, additional testable implications based on the quantitative data 
concerning the causes of combatant abuse during interstate wars provide further 
support not only for the general restraining effect of democracy, but in particular for 
the greater explanatory power of the institutional rather than normative approach. One 
of the limits of this data is its aggregate nature, which means that each test is more of 
an indirect evaluation of the normative and institutional forces underlying the conduct 
of democracies during war. The results from this supplementary quantitative analysis, 
therefore, should only be taken as suggestive of the relative role of institutional factors 
in explaining democratic treatment of enemy combatants. A complementary strategy is 
to examine in greater detail actual historical cases involving the conduct of 
democracies toward prisoners during war to determine what role norms or institutions 
played in explaining their behavior.  
The purpose of the case studies that follow is to examine in a more direct 
manner whether leaders in democracies thought and acted more according to the 
expectations of a normative or institutional explanation when deciding how to treat 
captured combatants. According to the normative side, it should be expected that 
political and military leaders would think and make their arguments for good prisoner 
treatment in terms of upholding traditional democratic principles of nonviolence and 
respect for the individual rights of their prisoners as persons inherently deserving to be 
protected. On the other hand, an institutional approach would expect democratic 
conduct to be guided more by concerns over retaliation by the adversary along with 
the strategic benefits that could be gained from good treatment. The two approaches 
are by no means mutually exclusive. A state could be primarily motivated by 
normative considerations, but still be more than happy to reap the strategic advantages 
from good conduct. However, by examining the available qualitative evidence in a 
more in-depth manner than is possible through aggregate quantitative data, the 
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objective of the case studies is to evaluate whether normative or institutional factors 
provide greater leverage for understanding the overall motives and patterns behind the 
conduct of democracies toward enemy combatants. 
The case studies that follow focus on the prisoner policies of the two main 
democratic belligerents, the United States and Great Britain during the Second World 
War across all fronts, but with a focus on the Western European Theater. These cases 
were selected for a number of reasons. The war was an all-out conflict of almost 
unparalleled severity lasting over five years and resulting in the deaths of millions of 
soldiers and civilians. Considering the importance of the second component of the 
theoretical framework regarding the nature of the bloodshed, the war in many ways is 
a tough test for the effect of regime type on the conduct of the democracies toward 
their prisoners. The cases also present a difficult test, since the democratic powers 
were facing notorious fascist adversaries during this war, whether in Europe or the 
Pacific, and expectations of reciprocity were likely already quite low. 
The cases also provide some interesting sources of variation in the treatment of 
prisoners both across different fronts as well as over time. This allows for a chance to 
assess the conditions under which the restraining effects of democracy are more or less 
likely to operate. Finally, from a more pragmatic point of view the historical record 
associated with these cases also provides a valuable opportunity for identifying the 
relative role of normative and institutional factors. Alongside the enormous secondary 
literature on prisoner policies during the Second World War, there is an impressive 
array of primary documents, personal memoirs, and other sources necessary for 
determining the precise motivations and logic which drove the decision making of the 
democratic leaders over how to treat enemy combatants during the war. 
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World War II in Europe: Britain, the United States, and the Treatment of Axis 
Prisoners 
The Second World War was unprecedented in its scope and brutality. Millions 
of troops from countries around the world were mobilized to fight on distant and often 
bloody battlefields. With so many soldiers on the frontlines, the most common fate 
was either dying in the heat of battle or surrendering and becoming a prisoner of war. 
Surrender often brought its own hardships, which ranged from the worst-case scenario 
of death during captivity to the best-case of imprisonment until the end of the war.156 
Table 24 below summarizes the number of prisoners taken and their relative death 
rates in captivity for several of the main belligerents from the war. 
Table 24: Examples of prisoners captured and death rates during World War II157 
Captor Victim Number of Prisoners
Death Rate in 
Captivity
Germany Soviet Union 5,700,000 58%
Soviet Union Germany 3,155,000 36%
Soviet Union Japan 600,000 10%
Japan U.S./U.K. 76,000 25-33%
U.S./U.K. Japan 50,000 < 1%
U.S./U.K. Germany 1,000,000 < 1%
Germany U.S./U.K. 240,000 4%  
All sides captured large though varying numbers of enemy combatants, but 
what is truly startling is the wide range of death rates across captor states. Even these 
numbers are an understatement of the true extent of combatant abuse, since they only 
                                                 
156 There were some exceptions involving the transfer of prisoners back to their home country before 
the war ended, but this was normally reserved for particularly ill or wounded soldiers. Although several 
thousand prisoners benefited from the handful of exchanges between the Western Allies and Germany, 
for the vast majority of prisoners during the war this possibility was nonexistent (Vance 2006:334-336). 
157 Figures in the third column represent estimates for the total number of enemy combatants captured 
during the war. Surrenders that occurred after the war ended were excluded when possible. Figures 
were based on the following sources (Forster 1986:21; Hata 1996:263; Overy 1997:355; Bartov 
2001:153; Morrow 2001:984; Ferguson 2004:163-186; Vance 2006:458-472). Italy was one of the other 
major belligerents during this war, but precise figures on prisoner death rates in Italian prison camps 
could not be located. 
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include deaths that resulted once a soldier reached the prison camps rather than those 
who were summarily executed on the battlefield. The fortunes for prisoners falling 
into the hands of an autocratic belligerent were quite dire. On average, around 46 
percent died in captivity with the worst being German treatment of Russian prisoners 
where 58 percent perished after surrendering, which totaled to more than three million 
individual soldiers (Forster 1986:21).158  There are also some impressive differences in 
conduct amongst the autocracies, in particular between German treatment of prisoners 
on the Eastern versus Western Fronts. Racial and ideological factors are evident in 
accounting for this difference, but a number of other factors contributed as well, 
including Germany’s different war aims on the two fronts, the relative severity of the 
fighting, and reciprocal dynamics. These differences are certainly worthy of further 
study, but the purpose of this chapter is not to adjudicate between a wide range of 
competing factors for explaining the conduct of belligerents in general, but rather to 
investigate the ways in which democratic norms and institutions shape the treatment of 
prisoners. 
Despite some of these differences on the autocratic side, those soldiers 
fortunate enough to surrender to the democratic powers fared much better with only 
around one percent unable to return home at war’s end. With hundreds of thousands of 
Axis troops falling into Allied hands as the war wore on, the sheer logistical 
difficulties of feeding and clothing the growing masses of prisoners mounted. In the 
week ending May 5, 1945, just three days before the official German surrender in 
Western Europe, the United States Army alone was distributing 1,751,513 food rations 
daily to enemy prisoners (Ross and Romanus 2004:530). The extent to which 
                                                 
158 The percentage of prisoner deaths across all autocracies was based on the average death rates from 
Table 24 for autocracies (i.e. excluding U.S./U.K. captor observations), which were then weighted by 
the total number of prisoners taken.  
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resources were allocated to prisoner care is reflected by the fact that rations destined 
for prisoners made up 30 percent of the total food rations the U.S. Armed Forces 
issued for other groups, such as their own troops and allies on the Continent.159 
Many Axis soldiers who first surrendered to U.S. or British forces were 
eventually transferred to camps in the United States proper. With greater space and 
resources, the comforts of prison life in these camps were in many ways better than 
those in the European theater. Taken as a whole, the conduct of the United States and 
its democratic allies has even been described as “the pinnacle of the historic 
development of prisoner protection” (Krammer 2008:40). It is not surprising that 
many Germans prisoners later described their time during captivity in the United 
States as “wonderful years” and “the experience of their lives” (Krammer 1979:xv). 
Praises of this magnitude should not overshadow the reality that U.S. and 
British abuses still occurred, especially on the Pacific Front against Japan (Dower 
1986:61). As Dower and others have argued, race certainly played a role in the 
treatment of enemy combatants during the war. As the relative death rates of German 
and Japanese prisoners at the hands of the United States reported in Table 24 above 
makes clear, however, there were ultimately as many similarities as differences in U.S. 
prisoner policies across both fronts. Abuses generally remained isolated and largely 
initiated by individual or small groups of soldiers rather than reflecting orders from the 
highest-level authorities.160 For instance, the worst incident in a prison camp on the 
                                                 
159 Calculations based on figures from Table 16 in (Ross and Romanus 2004:530).  Food resources for 
prisoners in fact dwarfed those for U.S. allies by a ratio of almost 5:1.  
160 The frequency and severity of violations does indeed appear to have been greater in the case of U.S. 
conduct on the Pacific Front in comparison to Western Europe. This was most likely in part a function 
of reciprocity, since much higher levels of abuse were committed by Japanese forces against U.S. 
prisoners compared to the German Wehrmacht. As the war continued U.S. practices in the Pacific 
generally trended toward the relatively better treatment of German prisoners, which cautions against 
ascribing U.S. policy purely to racial motives. Nevertheless, race and other issues of identity should not 
be disregarded in either case. For instance, later research has shown  how the level of identification the 
United States assigned to the European and Asian regions, of which Germany and Japan were 
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U.S. homeland occurred when a deranged guard opened fire with a machine gun on 
tents housing German prisoners in Utah with the result that nine were killed and 
another nineteen wounded (Powell 1989:223-225). Importantly, it should be noted that 
the guard was quickly punished, since U.S. authorities wanted to make sure such 
incidents were roundly condemned and not viewed as government policy. 
Incidents of this sort were certainly regrettable, but pale in comparison to some 
of the abuses committed by autocratic belligerents, where it was not uncommon for 
Germany to summarily execute hundreds of Russian prisoners on the spot (Bartov 
1991:83). Even in the case of the Western Front, Germany later issued the so-called 
Commando Order (Kommandobefehl), which mandated that Allied prisoners be 
summarily executed if they were engaged in missions German authorities deemed to 
be of an irregular or subversive nature, irrespective of the fact that these soldiers still 
qualified as prisoners deserving of all regular rights under international law.161 
What appears to have influenced the decisions of the United States and Great 
Britain to restrain themselves when dealing with enemy combatants? A normative 
approach would lead to the expectation that democratic leaders were influenced by 
prevailing domestic norms of tolerance, restraints on violence, and a general respect 
for individual rights. If this were the case, then the evidence should point to leaders 
frequently referring to these domestic principles when deciding what to do with 
prisoners under their control. On the other hand, an institutional approach would 
                                                 
respective members, greatly shaped U.S. foreign policy in both regions (Hemmer and Katzenstein 
2002:587-588).  
161 An excerpt from the order makes clear the tension between the legal rights of commando prisoners 
under international treaties versus the contempt for them held by the German leadership: “all enemies 
on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to 
all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in 
flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man…Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently 
be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted to them on principle.” Quoted in (Vance 
2006:92). 
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emphasize the importance of concerns over reciprocity and how good conduct could 
improve their side’s chances to win the war in a timelier and less costly fashion. In 
general, the historical record appears to offer greater support for the institutional rather 
than normative approach. The role of institutional incentives is evident by examining 
the sensitivity of the democratic belligerents to reciprocity and strategic benefits from 
good conduct, each of which will be discussed in turn. 
Reciprocity 
Once Germany had cemented its control over the European Continent by the 
end of June 1940, an uneasy yet mutually beneficial equilibrium in prisoner affairs 
developed on the Western Front between Germany and Italy on the one hand, and 
Britain on the other, which was later joined by the United States. Given the large-scale 
victories early on by the Axis powers, the Western Allies were particularly concerned 
over the risks of retaliation given they held many fewer prisoners than their adversary. 
Even as the tide of the war turned in the Allies’ favor, and with it growing numbers of 
Axis prisoners, the democratic powers remained extremely sensitive to the effects of 
their treatment of Axis prisoners on the corresponding fate of Allied soldiers in enemy 
hands.  
Worries within both the public and the military over the treatment of U.S. 
prisoners once behind enemy lines became a major issue for the government 
throughout the war. Putting forward one of the primary rationales for the U.S. practice 
of properly caring for German prisoners, Brigadier General R.W. Berry of the War 
Department General Staff stated plainly this policy meant “our boys over there [i.e. 
Germany] were better treated as prisoners than they otherwise would have been” 
(Committee on Military Affairs 1945:4). Major General Archibald Lerch, U.S. Provost 
Marshal General and the main military official in charge of the POW system in the 
United States, stressed the stakes involved in committing combatant abuse by 
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declaring that “Any non-adherence by this government [to the 1929 Geneva 
Convention]162 probably would result in instant retaliation against American prisoners 
held in Germany” (Porter 1945:4). Lerch continued that “The War Department has an 
abundance of evidence which leads it to believe that our treatment of German 
prisoners of war has had a direct effect in securing better treatment of American 
prisoners in Germany” (Porter 1945:4). 
U.S. officials were clearly aware of the twin role played by reciprocity in 
guiding their conduct toward German prisoners. In the first place, good treatment was 
more likely to be met in kind by German authorities. This was possible not only 
through direct actions taken by Germany to care for U.S. prisoners, but also by making 
it easier for relief agencies to gain access and be allowed to operate in German camps. 
The role of external agencies grew in importance, especially later on in the war as 
Germany’s infrastructure was devastated and supplies became increasingly scarce. 
One official from the American Red Cross noted that good U.S. conduct “has rendered 
a great service in enabling us to demand many things in hard-pressed, blockaded 
enemy countries which we might not otherwise have been able to obtain for our 
prisoners” (Committee on Military Affairs 1945:15). 
The second darker side of reciprocity was a discernable fear among policy 
makers that abuses committed in U.S. camps would result in swift retaliation against 
American prisoners held by the Axis powers. The result was that U.S. authorities often 
interpreted obligations under the 1929 Geneva Convention in as strict a manner as 
possible in order to ensure Axis prisoners would be treated according to the highest 
standards. The generous level of care even led to periodic outcries in the American 
                                                 
162 This refers to the Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva July 27, 1929, 
which was the main international treaty relating to prisoner issues in force during the Second World 
War. 
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media that enemy prisoners were receiving better treatment than regular U.S. soldiers 
in the field or citizens at home (Newsweek 1945b:58; Wittels 1945:18). Beyond the 
particular level of care, groups including labor unions protested against the use of 
prisoner labor, which they felt was crowding out legitimate work for U.S. civilians and 
depressing overall worker wages (Keefer 1992:69).163 Part of the government’s effort 
was thus devoted to convincing the public that U.S. prisoner policy was in line with 
the country’s international obligations and to promote the view that good conduct was 
necessary for the public’s broader concern over the safety of their own troops overseas 
(Committee on Military Affairs 1944:5-30). 
Although consistent across different government agencies as well as non-
governmental organizations, public pronouncements provide only indirect evidence of 
the importance of reciprocity in guiding U.S. conduct toward enemy combatants. 
Perhaps U.S. officials were in actuality primarily motivated by normative 
considerations, but chose to couch their policies in terms of reciprocity for public 
consumption. Even in this case, however, it is not clear why direct normative appeals 
would not be just as convincing, or even more so, if norms of nonviolence and 
individual rights embedded in democratic societies were the driving force behind U.S. 
conduct. 
Private discussions amongst government officials provide a clearer though by 
no means perfect window into the motivations underlying the conduct of democracies 
during war. One incident in particular that highlights the relative role of normative 
versus institutional factors involved internal British discussions on prisoner treatment 
                                                 
163 It should be noted that prisoner labor is entirely legal under international humanitarian law, so long 
as the work does not pose serious risks to the prisoner’s health and safety, is not directly related to the 
war effort, and the prisoner is adequately compensated for their labor. For specific labor provisions 
prevailing during the Second World War, see Articles 27 through 34 from the 1929 Geneva 
Convention. 
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during the early years of the war. With Germany’s quick defeat of France in six weeks 
from May to June 1940, Britain lost its foothold on the continent after the remnants of 
the British Expeditionary Force escaped at Dunkirk. While an air war continued to 
rage between the two sides, the main site for ground operations became North Africa 
where Britain used its colonial holdings as a launching point to challenge German and 
Italian dominance over the region. In the early period of the North African campaign, 
Britain was able to maintain its positions and frequently took modest numbers of Axis 
prisoners, whom it treated according to a decent standard of care. However, this policy 
quickly became tested. 
In early 1941, Britain began to receive reports that Italy was ordering its 
soldiers to execute all captured members of the Free French Forces (FFL)164 during 
battles in Libya and the surrounding area. The FFL were composed of remnants of the 
defeated French armed forces, which were not loyal to the German-backed French 
Vichy regime and thus nominally allied to Britain. When faced with this situation at a 
meeting with his Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee, the British Prime Minister, 
Winston Churchill, immediately proposed that Britain should send 1,000 Italian troops 
to the FFL as what he termed “working capital” (Moore 2000:183).165 The rationale 
was that by giving the French the capability to either threaten retaliation, or actually 
commit abuses in kind against Italian captives, Italy would be deterred from engaging 
in any future executions of captured FFL troops. 
Whatever the merits of this plan, it does not provide much support for the view 
espoused by the normative approach that democratic leaders should be expected to 
externalize domestic norms of nonviolence and respect for individual rights when 
dealing with foreign adversaries. Even the very words Churchill chose to use indicate 
                                                 
164 The acronym is based on the French term for these soldiers, the Forces Françaises Libres (FFL). 
165 It is unclear whether this proposal was ever initiated. 
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that Axis prisoners were perceived less as persons deserving of rights and respect, but 
rather as a commodity to be dealt with as Britain saw fit. 
This was in many ways consistent with earlier opinions expressed by Churchill 
regarding the status of enemy prisoners. Before becoming prime minister in May 
1940, Churchill served as First Lord of the Admiralty for the first months of the war. 
During his tenure he set forth the following policy to the Military Branch in an internal 
memorandum on October 15, 1939: 
...it is our policy to capture and hold as prisoner the largest number of 
able-bodied enemy aliens capable of military service whom we can 
catch upon the seas. We must accumulate a substantial stock of German 
prisoners in case we may need to inflict reprisals because of German 
barbarity to our own prisoners of war. This will probably not be 
necessary; but I took great pains in the last war [referring to the First 
World War] to catch as many as possible because the Germans always 
behave much better when you have more of their men in your hands 
than they have of your. And after all we want to help them to behave 
better (emphasis added).166 
Besides betraying a rather condescending view of the German leadership, Churchill 
consistently displayed a very instrumental approach to enemy prisoners as assets to be 
exploited rather than individuals inherently deserving of respect. In his time with the 
navy, he even planned on using German prisoners as de facto human shields to protect 
British hospital ships from attacks during earlier naval operations in Narvik, 
Norway.167 In this case Churchill appears to have been less worried about possible 
retaliation since the British navy had the upper hand at sea and his main concern was 
with British naval prisoners, which were few at the time. Once he became Prime 
Minister not long after, Churchill needed to take into account the impact of combatant 
                                                 
166 Churchill, quoted in (Gilbert 1993:242-243). 
167 Note from Churchill to General Ismay, May 2, 1940 (Gilbert 1993:1185). Using prisoners in such a 
manner is contrary to Article 9 of the 1929 Geneva Convention, which states in part that “No prisoner 
may at any time be sent to an area where he would be exposed to the fire of the fighting zone, or be 
employed to render by his presence certain points or areas immune from bombardment.” 
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abuse on the armed forces as a whole, and in particular public pressures over the 
safety of British prisoners. 
Despite personal views on the relative worth of enemy prisoners, it is 
important to note that proposals like the 1941 plan to transfer Axis prisoners for 
coercive or deterrence purposes in response to the earlier Italian abuses were quickly 
shelved. The reluctance of engaging in abuses either directly, or by proxy through 
allies, appears to have been driven less by norms-based convictions, but more for 
reasons of reciprocity, which is closer to an institutional approach. Although Churchill 
was tempted to exact some revenge against Italy over the FFL executions, there was a 
palpable fear amongst the members of the COS Committee that any violation could 
result in retaliation against more than 50,000 British prisoners held by the Axis powers 
at that time (Moore 2000:183). Continued good conduct by Britain toward prisoners in 
this case appears to have been more the result of instrumental considerations over the 
safety of British troops held behind enemy lines rather than any inherent concern for 
the rights of Axis prisoners as an end in itself. 
Over the course of the war Churchill in fact personally intervened on numerous 
occasions to ensure that the treatment of enemy prisoners remained at the highest 
standards (Ferguson 2004:153 fn.14). In personal correspondence, Churchill later 
revealed his interventions were primarily driven by fears of “a general counter-
massacre of prisoners,” which he felt could easily be sparked by any British abuses.168 
Concerns over initiating the first violation were thus a function of prospective fears of 
retaliation rather than from a desire to remain consistent with domestic democratic 
principles.169 
                                                 
168 Personal minute from Churchill to Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, July 30, 1944. Quoted 
in (Moore 2000:190). 
169 In general, far more information is available on the personal thinking of Churchill regarding prisoner 
issues compared to his fellow leader in the United States, Franklin Roosevelt. Part of this is simply 
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The pressures of reciprocity meant that both of the major democratic allies also 
preferred to maintain direct control over their prisoners rather than transfer them to 
third parties, who may not have had the same incentives to diligently care for the 
prisoners in their hands.170 A continuing source of friction throughout the war was 
cooperation between Britain and the United States on the one hand, and the residual 
French forces of the FFL. Since France was defeated and occupied early on, it ceased 
to be an officially recognized belligerent state for much of the war.171  
A complete explanation for the conduct of non-state actors like the FFL toward 
prisoners is beyond the scope of this study.172 Many elements nevertheless remain 
consistent with the overall logic of reciprocity presented above. As the case of the 
Italian-led executions makes clear, captured members of the FFL were systematically 
subjected to high levels of abuse by Axis captors. Levels of violence were exhibited 
on an even greater scale toward their fellow countrymen taking part in the French 
resistance in occupied and Vichy France (Durand 1984:540; Roberts 1994:132-133). 
Given that French fighters were already facing high levels of combatant abuse, there 
was little incentive to refrain from responding in kind against any Axis prisoners 
                                                 
because Churchill was a voluminous writer of the wars he witnessed and through his own memoirs. 
This was compounded by the sudden death of Roosevelt near the end of the war, meaning he never had 
a chance to produce any similar writings even if he had wanted to do so. Nevertheless, based on the 
available statements from other U.S. officials, as well as some of Roosevelt’s own personal 
correspondence discussed at various points in the chapter, it appears both leaders shared a similar 
concern over the effects of reciprocity on the formation of prisoner policy.  
170 Though it should be noted that many Axis prisoners were transferred to camps in Allied countries, 
such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. However, these countries were also democracies and had 
their own troops in combat. They were thus likely to exhibit a similar sensitivity to the risks of 
retaliation should they have chosen to abuse Axis prisoners. 
171 For instance, in the main quantitative data set introduced in Chapter 3, French conduct during the 
Second World War is only coded from France’s entry into the war in September, 1939 until its defeat 
against Germany and Italy in June 1940. 
172 The story of the FFL is also unusual, since French soldiers loyal to the Vichy regime were 
sometimes put in the awkward position of capturing and needing to guard fellow Frenchmen who were 
supporters of the opposing FFL. For a more complete discussion of the sometimes strange situation of 
intra-French prisoner diplomacy, see (Thomas 1996:87-88).  
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which fell into their grasp, which is consistent with the overall findings from Figure 10 
presented earlier in the chapter.173  
Whatever the precise reasons for their abuse, the prospect of transferring 
prisoners to French forces remained a constant worry for Britain and the United States. 
British and U.S. prisoners were treated much better on the whole, but both belligerents 
realized the safety of their troops would be in jeopardy if they were seen to be actively 
handing prisoners off to the FFL to treat as the latter saw fit. Prisoner transfers 
involved a trade-off between military expediency and the risk of retaliation. Whether it 
was in North Africa, or later in France proper after the Normandy invasions, 
transferring prisoners was seen as an attractive option to U.S. and British leaders 
because it would relieve the burden on already scarce resources for the war effort 
(Keefer 1992:17-18). Several proposed transfers of prisoners to FFL camps were 
dismissed during high-level U.S.-U.K. meetings because of fears of retaliation against 
Allied servicemen held by the Axis powers. Some later transfers eventually took 
place, especially when huge numbers of German prisoners fell into Allied hands after 
the D-Day and subsequent offensives, but U.S. and British leaders incorporated 
explicit guarantees for the laws of war and monitoring requirements by Allied and 
ICRC officials into the transfer agreements. Through collective pressure the two main 
democratic belligerents were able to improve the conduct of French captors, though 
both powers still showed an overall preference for controlling their own prisoners 
when possible (Moore 2000:187-194). 
Despite their best efforts, good conduct by the United States and Britain could 
not provide a surefire guarantee that their own troops would be treated accordingly. In 
                                                 
173 As a sign of the poor conditions in French-controlled camps, many Italian prisoners sought to escape 
not with the aim of returning to their own lines but rather to gain entry to U.S. facilities (Moore 
2000:186)! 
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part this was because Nazi Germany was less sensitive to the potential costs of 
retaliation since the government was not subject to the same degree of public pressures 
as its democratic counterparts.174 As the war gradually shifted in the Allies’ favor 
Germany became increasingly willing to abuse prisoners, especially those attempting 
to escape, as an example to other prisoners along with troops in the field, but also to 
deter millions of foreign workers from any thought of rebellion (Moore 2000:189).  
Although never coming close to approaching the horrific treatment of prisoners on the 
Eastern Front against the Soviet Union, German treatment of U.S. and British 
prisoners was punctuated by several episodes of violence. 
The ways in which the Western Allies chose to respond provides further 
support for the role of reciprocity and an institutional account of the conduct of 
democracies during war. Both the United States and Britain generally refrained from 
retaliating against German abuses, but the reasons for this restraint were more a 
function of the fear that any retaliation would simply result in an escalating cycle of 
violence by Germany. For instance, when a report surfaced that 50 prisoners were 
executed after escaping from the German camp Stalag Luft III in March 1944, Britain 
seriously considered reprisal executions, but rejected the idea as counterproductive to 
the safety of the remaining British soldiers in German custody (Bower 1981:82-83). In 
a similar manner, the United States decided to refrain from retaliating in kind against 
German abuses later in the war out of concern that this would only endanger those 
U.S. prisoners still in German captivity (Newsweek 1945a:21).  
                                                 
174 It should be noted that many scholars counter that Nazi Germany was actually more sensitive to 
general societal pressures compared to its democratic adversaries during the Second World. However, 
more recent research has argued that Germany was indeed able to call forth far greater sacrifices from 
its population and was less concerned about any possible public backlash. For a summary of this debate, 
see (Reiter and Stam 2002:121-124). 
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In personal correspondence between the two democratic leaders, Churchill and 
Roosevelt recognized that as the tide was turning against Germany, their adversary 
had a diminishing incentive to continue caring for Allied prisoners and could become 
desperate enough to inflict whatever damage it could on Allied troops, even if that 
meant combatant abuse.175 Both leaders preferred to issue direct warnings that German 
officials would be held personally responsible for war crimes should any abuses be 
committed against Allied prisoners. As they asserted in a joint statement publically 
released across Germany, “Any person guilty of maltreating or allowing any Allied 
prisoner of war to be maltreated, whether in the battle zone, on the lines of 
communication, in a camp, hospital, prison or elsewhere, will be ruthlessly pursued 
and brought to punishment.”176 Along with the continued role of reciprocity, this 
added danger of personal indictment in war crimes trials after the war is widely argued 
to have played a key role in deterring more extreme levels of German abuse against 
Allied prisoners (MacKenzie 1994:495-496). 
 Concerns over reciprocity thus appear to have greatly constrained the 
willingness of the democratic belligerents to initiate combatant abuse, or even to 
retaliate against abuses committed by their German adversary. Reciprocity-related 
motives were driven largely by the greater sensitivity of British and U.S. leaders to 
preserving in any way possible the safety of their own troops, which they believed 
centered on maintaining proper treatment of Axis prisoners in turn. In contrast, 
normative considerations were for the most part absent from the decision making 
process, or at best secondary to the attention devoted to the risks of retaliation. 
                                                 
175 Letter from Churchill to Roosevelt, March 22, 1945 (Loewenheim et al. 1975:681-682). 
176 Excerpt from original text of telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated March 22, 1945. Quoted in 
(Kimball 1984:582). 
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The Strategic Benefits of Good Conduct 
Beyond the risks of retaliation, one of the other reasons the democratic powers 
often refrained from retaliating against German abuses during the war was the belief 
that humane conduct provided additional strategic rewards on the battlefield. Properly 
treating prisoners could increase the propensity of those enemy combatants still on the 
battlefield to surrender. Facing these choices, soldiers would be more likely to 
calculate that they were better served by laying down their arms and going into 
captivity rather than risking death by continuing to fight (Ferguson 2004:149-152). 
The argument that democracies capitalize to a greater extent on the advantages of 
good prisoner treatment is also consistent with the more general finding that 
democracies are more likely to win the wars they fight, especially in a quicker and less 
bloody manner, than other regime types (Reiter and Stam 2002:165). If good treatment 
can induce enemy soldiers to surrender, then this would promise to shorten the war 
and reduce the overall number of casualties suffered by the democratic belligerent.  
Attention to the benefits of good conduct is also in part a function of the 
restraints imposed by reciprocity on democracies, since democratic belligerents are 
already predisposed toward more humane treatment of prisoners because of greater 
fears of retaliation as discussed in detail in the previous section. Although related, the 
precise logic underlying the strategic benefits from good conduct differs from that for 
the role of reciprocity. Since democracies have been found to be more likely to prefer 
to win their wars quickly and with fewer casualties, the strategic benefits derived from 
good treatment should be relatively more attractive to democracies than their 
adversaries (Reiter and Stam 2002:66, 164). Despite differences in the emphasis of the 
reciprocity and strategic benefits mechanisms, both view the predisposition of 
democracies towards the humane treatment of prisoners more as a means to achieving 
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broader ends, which is the assumption underlying an institutional approach, rather than 
as an end in and of itself as put forward by a normative account. 
From a strategic point of view, refraining from abuse involves certain trade-
offs. The coercive potential of combatant abuse is removed from the table, along with 
other benefits, such as an exploitable pool of slave labor or devoting less resources to 
properly care for prisoners. Against these potential drawbacks, the Western Allies 
consistently stressed the benefits to be gained from good treatment in undermining the 
morale and ability of the enemy soldiers to continue fighting rather than surrender. 
Even if good conduct in the end produces few tangible strategic advantages, what 
ultimately matters from the point of view of prisoner policy is that the democratic 
belligerents believed such conduct would be effective. Belief in the value of humane 
treatment is evident in the remarks of those officials most directly involved in 
implementing prisoner policies on the ground. One POW camp commander, 
Lieutenant Newton Margulies, remarked that it is “eminently more sensible, and really 
more clever, to win our war with butter and beefsteaks instead of bullets and bombs” 
(Margulies 1945:478). Along with encouraging Axis soldiers to surrender, Margulies 
noted further benefits to the United States from good treatment even after the prisoners 
were in custody. Despite a small segment of hardcore Nazi believers, prisoners on the 
whole were fairly content with their time in captivity. This meant that escapes and 
riots were less frequent, reducing the security needs for camps and allowing more 
troops to be allocated directly to the warfronts in Europe and the Pacific (Margulies 
1945:478-479).177 
                                                 
177 This is not to dispel the notion that escapes remained a concern at all camps, which both the Axis 
and Allied powers had to deal with on a constant basis. Furthermore, although compliant prisoners 
definitely could reduce the security needs at individual camps, the growing number of surrenders as the 
war progressed meant that additional guards were required. By the middle of 1945 there were 47,000 
troops assigned to guard duty at prisoner camps in the continental United States alone (Committee on 
Military Affairs 1945:10). 
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At the end of the war, the U.S. Congress convened a committee to investigate 
the overall Allied war effort.  One of the studies focused in particular on the nature, 
scope, and effects of the country’s policy toward enemy prisoners. After receiving 
testimony from all the branches of the Armed Forces, the Department of State, and a 
host of other agencies, the Committee offered the following conclusions regarding the 
the contribution of U.S. prisoner treatment to the overall war effort: 
Commanders abroad have stated that reports reaching German soldiers 
to the effect that we are treating prisoners fairly, in spite of what their 
officers told them, were a great factor in breaking down the morale of 
German troops and making them willing, even eager, to surrender. So 
pronounced was this effect that General Eisenhower had safe-conduct 
passes dropped by the millions over enemy lines, promising treatment 
in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention. Had these 
promises not been true, and believed, victory would have been slower 
and harder, and a far greater number of Americans killed (emphasis 
added). (Committee on Military Affairs 1945:19)  
It is also important to note that the Committee was well aware of both the strategic and 
reciprocal benefits gained through good conduct. Referring to the fewer number of 
U.S. soldiers killed as a result of humane treatment, they explicitly included not only 
those lives saved on the battlefield by shortening the war, but also those saved behind 
barbed wire by reducing the risks of retaliation by the adversary (Committee on 
Military Affairs 1945:3).  
 An interesting implication from the italicized portion of the above quotation 
was that the truthfulness of the promise to properly treat enemy prisoners was not 
sufficient in and of itself to encourage opposing combatants to surrender. In order to 
capture the strategic benefits from good conduct, democratic belligerents also had to 
make their commitments known to enemy soldiers and, even more importantly, those 
soldiers also needed to believe the democracies would indeed uphold their promises. 
 How the democracies chose to communicate and convince their preferences 
and practices to enemy soldiers became in many ways just as important for grasping 
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the strategic benefits from humane conduct as the policy itself. The use of propaganda 
to encourage enemy soldiers to surrender became an integral component of the 
Western Allies’ overall strategy for winning the war. The United States and Britain 
created a joint organization, the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) under the 
umbrella of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), for 
coordinating and conducting all propaganda campaigns against German troops in the 
Western European Theater during the war. While the mission of SHAEF was 
conceived primarily in military terms as “the destruction of Germany's armed forces,” 
PWD viewed its particular contribution to this overall mission as “to destroy the 
fighting morale of our enemy both at home and on the front” (Lerner 1981:43). 
 PWD’s emphasis on such a nebulous concept as “morale” left much to be 
determined, but by focusing on the war front as well as Germany’s home front it was 
clear that Allied propaganda was intended to target both German soldiers and 
civilians. Even when examining solely the combatant side of operations, undermining 
morale could involve a host of effects, including surrender, desertion, insubordination, 
or weakened fighting at the tactical level. Nevertheless, it is indicative that despite this 
broad mandate a post-war survey of officials associated with the Allied propaganda 
program found that a large number of respondents described PWD’s primary mission 
as, “To induce surrender”.178 Plans for encouraging enemy surrenders were not 
peripheral to military planners, but became a core instrument in the greater war effort. 
                                                 
178 The surrender response was the second most popular choice among a list of options offered to the 
question, “How would you describe the mission of Sykewar [i.e. PWD] in Europe during World War 
II.” The most popular option was “To weaken enemy will-to-resist (emphasis in original).” However, 
the choices were clearly not mutually exclusive since inducing surrender is in many ways a corollary to 
weakening enemy resistance. In light of the fact that a wide range of options were offered, such as 
controlling enemy civilian populations or presenting Allied war aims, the widespread support for the 
role of surrender at least suggests that it played a prominent role in PWD planning and operations.  
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 In order to achieve this aim, the Allies constructed an enormous organizational 
apparatus to develop, produce, and disseminate propaganda materials to the enemy 
population. Germany was a particularly difficult target because the Nazi regime 
maintained a monopoly over the main communication channels, including very close 
monitoring and censorship of the media.179 Given the German government had little 
incentive to inform their civilians and soldiers of Allied commitments, the democratic 
belligerents needed to devise ways to bypass official government channels and 
communicate directly to German soldiers. Means included radio broadcasts, audio 
messages over loudspeakers, and others, but by far the most popular tactic became the 
dropping of leaflets on German positions. Leaflets had the advantages of being able to 
be dispersed across a wide area, involved no technological requirements on the part of 
the target unlike the radio, and could be kept and read numerous times by the same 
individual soldier or easily passed on to others.180   
The resources devoted to the production and distribution of leaflets is a 
testament to their perceived utility by the Allies. In less than one year between D-Day 
with the landing at Normandy in June 1944 and Victory Day in May 1945, the United 
States and Britain dropped approximately six billion leaflets on German positions in 
Western Europe alone (Hollander 1945:159). As the war went on, the Allies were 
increasingly successful in finding their targets and disseminating information directly 
to German soldiers on the ground. Surveys of German POWs later on during the war 
found that over 80 percent had seen Allied leaflets (Lerner 1981:184). Of course, 
                                                 
179 Although by no means straightforward, in many ways the Wehrmacht was a softer target for 
propaganda than German civilians, since soldiers were generally in much more concentrated locations 
and closer to Allied positions (Lerner 1981:131-133). 
180 In fact, a black market soon developed among German soldiers for trading Allied propaganda, which 
only served to increase the overall audience for U.S.-British psychological warfare messages (Shils and 
Janowitz 1948:312). 
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surveys of captured German soldiers need to be considered with some skepticism, 
since respondents may simply want to give responses their captors would prefer.181  
Allied propagandists were thus successful is grasping the attention of German 
soldiers defending their positions against Allied advances, but what also mattered was 
the precise content of the messages. The themes relied on to encourage enemy soldiers 
to surrender point to the prominent role played by promises of good conduct. A 
content analysis of the “ZG” series of 84 PWD leaflets dropped on Wehrmacht 
positions found that “Good treatment of POW’s” was the fourth most common 
message (13 occurrences) across twelve main themes considered.182 More popular 
themes included “Inevitable German defeat” (16 occurrences), or the general but stark 
warning “Save yourself!” (14 occurrences). One problem with drawing firm 
conclusions from this series was that it was intended for the Wehrmacht across the 
entire Western front, which presumably included rear areas and reserve battalions. A 
clearer test of what the Allies viewed as the most effective message for inducing 
surrender would be a leaflet series intended primarily for German positions in heavily 
engaged battle zones. The CPH series of 39 leaflets distributed by the 9th U.S. Army to 
German units in its sector provides a better sense of the prominence of the “Good 
treatment of POW’s” theme for those individuals most likely to be in the position to 
surrender or continue fighting. In this series promises of good conduct became the 
                                                 
181 A further danger is that a sample limited solely to German POWs may provide a biased picture, 
since those most likely or amenable to picking up and reading an Allied leaflet may also be more likely 
to be influenced by the message and subsequently choose to surrender. 
182 Though it should be noted that this form of content analysis is not without limitations. The sample is 
not exhaustive, but is based on four main series of leaflets found at the Hoover Library archives. Only 
the single most prominent theme is selected for each individual leaflet even if multiple themes are 
included. If the leaflet was two-sided, and the second side included a different theme, then two separate 
observations were coded. Results also were not weighted by the number of a particular leaflet dropped, 
since this information is not always readily available for all leaflets. However, so-called “one-shots,” 
where a leaflet was only dropped in a single mission, were excluded. The use of maps, pictures, color, 
or other remarkable features were also not considered. The results thus focus on the frequency of 
themes across a given series of leaflets rather than the intensity (Lerner 1981:185). 
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most frequent theme employed with ten separate occurrences overall (Lerner 
1981:186-187).183 Assurances of humane treatment were thus most common in those 
areas where enemy soldiers would have the greatest opportunity to surrender. 
  Was all this effort in terms of the careful design of leaflets, but also the 
enormous scale of their distribution, actually successful in encouraging German troops 
to surrender in greater numbers than they otherwise would have? Figure 13 below 
shows the quarterly number of German troops surrendering to U.S. and British forces. 
As is evident, few prisoners were taken in the early years, while numbers reached into 
the hundreds of thousands by the third quarter of 1944 and spiked dramatically in 
1945.184  Although propaganda operations began in earnest from mid-1944 onward, it 
is clearly problematic to infer any direct association between psychological warfare 
and the number of observed surrenders, especially given the prominent role of Allied 
military advances during this period.  
A rigorous examination of the effectiveness of Allied propaganda during the 
war is not without problems. There has been no equivalent to the massive United 
States Strategic Bombing Survey conducted in the aftermath of the war to evaluate the 
effectiveness of airpower in achieving a wide range of objectives (United States 
Strategic Bombing Survey 1976).185 Little systematic data was compiled to estimate 
the direct effects of propaganda on the thinking and behavior of German targets, 
which has left military historians to make inferences based on what information they 
can find. 
                                                 
183 Another related theme that became increasingly common were leaflets providing specific 
instructions for how German soldiers willing to surrender could most safely do so. One of the most 
common tactics was to spell out in a phonetic manner two simple yet vital words for a soldiers to 
demonstrate their willingness to give themselves up, “Ei Ssörrender” (Lerner 1981:216). 
184 Figures based on (Overmans 1992:145). 
185 The survey included hundreds of reports totaling thousands of pages covering issues ranging from 
the destruction of particular German industries to undermining civilian morale. 
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Figure 13: Number of German prisoners by quarter, 1943-1945 
Even if such data exist, a compounding problem is that psychological warfare 
was not intended to be used as a technique completely separate from military force for 
influencing the beliefs and behavior of a target, but rather in a complementary and 
interactive manner (Smith et al. 1946:133). This problem is particularly pronounced 
for propaganda, since during the war Allied officials explicitly coordinated 
psychological warfare in conjunction with military operations. Successes during battle 
were expected to demoralize the enemy and as a consequence make them more 
susceptible to propaganda, which could then be translated into further military 
benefits. As one scholar notes, “it is difficult to discern where the demoralization 
induced by battlefield defeats left off and where the demoralization induced by 
propaganda in support of military operations began” (Gilmore 1998:148). The danger 
of circular reasoning becomes quite evident in this regard. Soldiers may surrender 
because of rising defeats on the battlefield, but propaganda taking advantage of this 
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and encouraging them to surrender makes the prospects of defeat loom even larger, 
which logically makes the prospects of defeat even larger. Although it is difficult to 
isolate the precise independent effect of propaganda given the importance of 
alternative factors and likely interaction effects, several signs point to psychological 
techniques playing at the very minimum a contributing role in encouraging enemy 
troops to surrender. 
 Attitudes of captured German soldiers indicate that promises of good treatment 
were highly salient. A series of surveys of German POWs over the course of several 
crucial months of fighting between December 1944 and February 1945 found that 
respondents remembered leaflets focusing on promises of good treatment more than 
any other theme (Shils and Janowitz 1948:302). Leaflets emphasizing the inevitability 
of the Allied victory, or appeals attacking Nazi ideology, in comparison appeared to 
have surprisingly little impact in undermining combat effectiveness.186 Again, care 
must be taken in assigning too much weight to these surveys given the context of the 
respondents and their potential desire to please their captors, whether out of fear or 
other motives. There is little reason to expect, however, that choosing the good 
treatment option was more likely to “please” their captors than the other available 
alternatives. After all, given the ideologically charged nature of the conflict, one might 
expect that attacks on Nazi ideology might be perceived as a far more popular answer 
from a Western point of view. Although only indicative, the surveys are at least 
suggestive of the motives and beliefs underlying German POWs at the time.  
                                                 
186 It is not that German soldiers were immune from attacks on Nazi doctrine, but rather ideology 
appears to have played less of a role in determining their likelihood to continue fighting, at least on the 
Western Front. As one soldier was quoted as saying, “Nazism begins ten miles behind the front line” 
(Shils and Janowitz 1948:303). For a contrary view on the role of ideology in motivating German 
soldiers on the Eastern Front against the Soviet Union, see (Bartov 2001:4, 104, 155). 
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 Beyond remembering the particular message, German prisoners were also 
likely to trust the Allied commitment that they would be properly treated as prisoners 
of war. SHAEF surveys between June and October 1944 show that between 82 and 90 
percent of German POWs believed they would be treated according to the 
requirements of the 1929 Geneva Conventions (Committee on Military Affairs 
1945:13). This is more than likely an upwardly biased estimate of the true belief of 
Allied promises within the broader German armed forces, since those soldiers who 
surrender were probably more likely to believe, or have been convinced by U.S. and 
British propaganda in the first place. Nevertheless, if soldiers had the opportunity to 
vote with their feet they appeared to have overwhelming preferred to surrender to U.S. 
and British forces rather than their more brutal Soviet ally. It has been estimated that 
in the closing months of the war approximately one million German soldiers fled West 
into the hands of the democratic powers rather than take their chances in Soviet 
captivity (Bischof and Ambrose 1992a:5). This might be indicative more of the fears 
of these soldiers of the Soviet Union rather than the benevolence of the Western 
Powers, but the point remains that their words were ultimately consistent with their 
actions. 
The overall level of trust exhibited by German soldiers in the promises of the 
Western powers is nonetheless impressive, since the German government went to 
considerable lengths to counter Allied propaganda. Officials from the Nazi Party were 
integrated into Wehrmacht units to indoctrinate soldiers, while S.S. and state police 
units were given increasing control over monitoring the movements of German troops 
in frontline areas (Shils and Janowitz 1948:307-308). Desertion was viewed as a 
“subversion of the war effort” (Wehrkraftzersetzung), and an official order was issued 
that threatened to execute any soldier attempting to desert, which eventually led the 
Wehrmacht to kill between 15,000 and 20,000 of its own troops (Bartov 1991:71; 
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Ferguson 2004:172). Through conducting a systematic campaign to misinform their 
own soldiers regarding the practices of the Western adversaries, it is perhaps 
surprising that Allied prisoner policies and propaganda were so successful at 
encouraging surrenders. 
One interesting component of this account is that while an institutional 
approach may provide a more convincing explanation for the causes of democratic 
policy making toward prisoners, a normative perspective may still shed some light on 
understanding why appeals of good conduct were effective in convincing individual 
troops from the Wehrmacht to surrender in the first place. It appears the ways in which 
German soldiers chose to evaluate Allied propaganda were consistent in many respects 
with expectations from a normative approach. Soldiers often reasoned that because the 
United States and Britain treated their own citizens in a lawful and humane manner, 
they were likely to do the same even with enemy soldiers. Beliefs of Allied promises 
of good conduct were largely successful because many German soldiers shared “the 
attitude that the British and the Americans were respectable law-abiding soldiers who 
would treat their captives according to international law” (Shils and Janowitz 
1948:313). As one soldier noted, “Nobody exactly wants to get captured, but I and my 
comrades all expected humane treatment from the Americans” (Committee on 
Military Affairs 1945:13).187 
                                                 
187 Although German soldiers may have been more likely to believe the promises of good conduct 
offered by the democratic belligerents, it is far from conclusive that broader democratic norms had any 
lasting impact on Wehrmacht prisoners during their time in captivity. The U.S. Provost Marshall 
General developed an ambitious reeducation program in an attempt to inculcate German prisoners with 
traditional democratic principles and beliefs. Exit surveys of prisoners found that an overwhelming 
majority professed support for democracy as Germany’s future form of government. Between 71 and 83 
percent of respondents were also reluctant to fight the same conflict even if Germany would win and 
they would personally live through the war. However, on other questions preexisting attitudes remained 
fairly entrenched. Asked whether Jews were to blame for Germany’s problems 57 percent at least 
partially agreed (Robin 1995:162). Such attitudes remained even for prisoners seen as fervently anti-
Nazi and selected for a special education program at Fort Eustis, Virginia. 10 percent of these prisoners 
still agreed with the anti-Jewish statement (Gansberg 1977:165). One explanation for these seemingly 
contrary findings was that German prisoners exhibited enduring totalitarian beliefs, which led them to 
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This poses a similar danger of circularity as in other issues regarding the 
effectiveness of propaganda. Expectations of good treatment by enemy soldiers may 
increase the incentives for democracies to treat prisoners well, which should 
correspondingly feedback and improve soldiers’ expectations of captivity. In a similar 
manner, autocracies may have a harder time convincing enemy combatants to 
surrender, and thus autocrats may have less incentive to treat prisoners humanely in an 
attempt to encourage further surrenders (Reiter and Stam 2002:67). In reality the 
connection between the prior expectations of prisoners and the conduct of captors is 
not always so deterministic. A group of soldier’s may be predisposed toward certain 
expectations regarding their prospects in captivity, but captor states irrespective of 
regime type may take certain steps to make it more or less likely that soldiers will 
choose to surrender. As will be discussed in further detail below, unlike on the 
Western Front Japanese soldiers were much less willing to trust they would be well-
treated by U.S. forces. Nevertheless, over the course of the war the United States to 
not simply resort to high levels of abuse, but rather used propaganda and other tools to 
influence these beliefs and subsequent decisions of Japanese soldiers to surrender. 
Beliefs of combatants are not necessarily predetermined and constant, but can be 
shaped at least to a certain extent by the conduct and overall practices of captor states. 
Given the importance of expectations over treatment, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the Safe Conduct Pass, or Passierschein, is widely viewed as the most 
successful propaganda leaflet from the entire war, since it capitalized more than any 
other on the promise of humane conduct toward surrendering soldiers.188 The leaflet 
                                                 
choose the “correct” answer that would please their new U.S. authorities, but fall back on Nazi beliefs 
when faced with questions where the answer was more uncertain (McGranahan and Janowitz 1946:5, 
12). Interpreting the meaning of survey responses must always proceed with caution. 
188 In a survey of psychological warfare experts associated with the Allied program, the Safe Conduct 
Pass was cited as the most successful leaflet from the war (Lerner 1981:306-307). 
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did not focus on any other issue, such as the strategic situation on the ground or the 
moral depravity of the Nazi regime. Instead, the pass concentrated on a simple 
promise of good treatment. The text of the leaflet reads as follows: 
SAFE CONDUCT 
The German soldier who carries this safe conduct is using it as a sign of 
his genuine wish to give himself up. He is to be disarmed, to be well 
looked after, to receive food and medical attention as required, and to 
be removed from the danger zone as soon as possible. 
Signed – Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme 
Commander Allied Expeditionary Force189 
The final design went through five different revisions based on information 
gleaned from interrogated German prisoners regarding what aspects of the leaflet were 
more or less attractive and convincing.190 In addition to the personal signature of 
General Eisenhower, the overall design of the pass was intended to look very official 
not only to demonstrate the seriousness of the commitment, but also to give German 
soldiers the sense that it gave them authority to surrender. The leaflet contained the 
government seals of both the United States and Great Britain, was usually printed on 
high quality paper using nice ink and in color. As one historian remarked, “From a 
rather crude beginning, the Allied surrender leaflet ended the war looking like a cross 
between gilt-edge bonds and a college diploma” (Margolin 1946:50). The leaflet was 
viewed as doubly effective because it enunciated in clear terms the Allied promise of 
humane conduct, but also provided a concrete means for Germans to actually 
surrender. Government reports from the war show that German soldiers would carry 
the pass with them, oftentimes waving it over their heads, to demonstrate their good 
faith as they surrendered (Committee on Military Affairs 1945:13). 
                                                 
189 The text was based on leaflets found at <http://www.psywarrior.com/GermanSCP.html>. 
190 Interestingly, the original design was based on Soviet combat leaflets (Lerner 1981:213). Given the 
brutality of Russian treatment of enemy prisoners during the Second World War, the Russian message 
was much less effective, though Russian propaganda did become more sophisticated over the course of 
the war (Ferguson 2004:191 fn.193). 
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 It bears reemphasizing that irrespective of the actual effectiveness of promises 
of humane treatment, what ultimately matters from the point of view of an institutional 
explanation for democratic conduct was that democratic leaders believed there were 
strategic benefits to be gained. As one U.S. General asserted, “German prisoners in 
America write thousands of letters to their families in Germany telling of the treatment 
that they are accorded. This is America's greatest propaganda and is having a decided 
influence on the course of the war” (Committee on Military Affairs 1945:3). The fact 
that the German government also believed in the power of these messages by 
attempting to counter such propaganda, even going so far in some instances as to 
censor or prevent mail from German POWs from being delivered back home, points to 
the role that concerns over strategic benefits played in shaping the incentives of the 
democratic belligerents (Speer 1970:250). 
 The potential for accruing strategic advantages from good conduct was even 
evident in the much harsher battle environment that prevailed on the Pacific front 
during the campaigns between the United States and Japan. There is little doubt that 
U.S. treatment of Japanese prisoners, especially in the early portions of the war, was 
below the standards afforded to Axis prisoners in the European Theater. Part of the 
reason for this conduct is actually in many ways consistent with an institutional 
explanation. Japanese treatment of U.S., British, and Commonwealth prisoners was 
extremely brutal.191 Prisoners were made to perform hard labor in unsanitary 
conditions and often on meager food rations (Vance 2006:464). Along with frequent 
executions, it follows that on average close to 30 percent of Allied prisoners did not 
make it home at war’s end, as was illustrated earlier in Table 24.  
                                                 
191 The war in the Pacific was also notable in an even more grotesque sense, since it was not uncommon 
for Allied prisoners to be vivisected and used for scientific experiments (Roland 1996:152, 169). 
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In light of the fact that Japan was already committing high levels of abuse, 
constraints relating to fears of retaliation were weaker in the case of the Allies in the 
Pacific. The forces resulting from reciprocity thus make the Pacific War a relatively 
hard case for arguing that strategic advantages played a role in prisoner policy making. 
The United States and Britain did indeed engage in significant levels of abuse against 
Japanese prisoners, though the abuse was not nearly as systematic or extreme as their 
Japanese adversary (MacKenzie 1994:516; Vance 2006:462). The response of the 
democratic powers in the Pacific War is in many ways consistent with the aggregate 
finding that democracies are often just as likely as autocracies to retaliate against high 
levels of abuse by their opponent, which was first reported in Figure 10 above. 
Nevertheless, Allied conduct remained more humane than that of their 
adversary and, if anything, gradually improved as the war continued. One of the 
reasons for this was that the strategic benefits from good conduct toward Japanese 
troops were in many ways greater than for any other group of enemy soldiers during 
the war. Japan’s Bushido tradition, which demanded soldiers fight to the death and 
viewed surrender as the ultimate dishonor, is often credited with making Japanese 
troops extremely reluctant to surrender (Benedict 1946:38). Soldiers facing the 
prospect of surrender would often instead prefer death in battle or even suicide. As the 
Japanese Armed Forces’ Field Service Code plainly stated, “Never live to experience 
shame as a prisoner.”192 The number of prisoners in the Pacific Theater was, therefore, 
much lower than in Europe. Figure 14 below provides the estimated annual number of 
Japanese prisoners taken by U.S. forces over the course of the war.193 
                                                 
192 Quoted in (Carr-Gregg 1978:25). 
193 Numbers taken from (Gilmore 1998:155). 
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Figure 14: Annual number of Japanese prisoners taken by the United States, 1942-
1945 
The Japanese culture of no-surrender made the use of Allied propaganda much 
more difficult than in the German case. However, this culture ironically provided 
some immense benefits to the Allies for those Japanese troops that did fall into their 
hands. First, Japanese prisoners had received no training on how to conduct 
themselves once captured, since surrender was never even discussed as an option by 
the military leadership. They were thus much less “security-conscious” than German 
or other prisoners, and often willingly shared valuable military intelligence (Hata 
1996:269). Second, the feelings of dishonor brought on by surrender often made many 
Japanese prisoners feel in essence dead and separated from their home country. 
Several prisoners in turn felt “reborn” under Allied captivity and even actively 
collaborated with their captors by writing and designing propaganda leaflets to 
encourage others to surrender, or even accompanying pilots to guide them to their 
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targets on combat missions over Japan (Gilmore 1995:200; Hata 1996:269)! While the 
strategic benefits from conduct good in the case of Germany often manifested more in 
the form of growing numbers of surrenders, in the Pacific Theater prisoner intelligence 
became a prized commodity. 
General indifference in the early years of the war toward abuses committed by 
individual soldiers or field commanders on the ground was gradually replaced by a 
growing recognition among the U.S. leadership of the value of properly treating 
Japanese soldiers. In personal correspondence even General Douglas MacArthur, 
Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), 
recognized that combatant abuse was counterproductive to the overall war effort and 
in particular harmed the propaganda efforts of the Allies to induce Japanese 
surrenders, which meant a loss of potentially valuable intelligence.194 The U.S. Army 
developed a concerted campaign to overcome the tendencies of U.S. soldiers to 
retaliate against Japanese abuses by making their troops more “surrender-conscious” 
(Gilmore 1995:198-199). This education program stressed not only the intelligence 
value of Japanese prisoners, but also pointed out that committing atrocities would only 
strengthen the resolve of enemy soldiers to continue fighting, which would simply 
result in further U.S. casualties.195 
 The sincere attempt by U.S. authorities to instill more humane practices on the 
battlefield and encourage surrenders in some ways begins to call into question the 
more common view that the conflict in the Pacific was a race war where both sides 
relied on unheard of levels of brutality in an attempt to exterminate the enemy (Dower 
                                                 
194 Based on personal correspondence from MacArthur to the Commanding General of Alamo Force, 
May 14, 1944 (Gilmore 1995:198). 
195 More direct incentives to encourage U.S. soldiers to capture rather than kill Japanese soldiers were 
also considered and even included the promise of ice cream and three days’ leave if a soldier brought in 
a prisoner alive (Bourke 1999:184). 
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1986:11; Weingartner 1992:55).196 There is little doubt that military force took pride 
of place in the Allied strategy for defeating Japan, but the fact that propaganda and 
other persuasive tools were also heavily employed at least suggests the United States 
was not purely driven by racial motives to rely solely on violence to destroy their foe 
(Gilmore 1998:147). The role of propaganda for encouraging surrender also counters 
the argument that U.S. leaders, citizens, and soldiers almost uniformly held negative 
stereotypes of the enemy as subhuman savages (Dower 1986:77-78). Officials from 
the U.S. War Office did not conceive of a monolithic Japanese soldier, but rather 
through an extensive analysis based on interrogations, personal diaries, and other 
captured documents, developed a five-fold categorization of distinct personality types 
and the influence of various forms of Allied information on each type of Japanese 
soldier.197 
 Although implemented on a smaller scale, Allied promises of human conduct 
appeared to have had some similar positive effects on Japanese soldiers as in the case 
of Germans in the European Theater. U.S. operations were successful in distributing 
leaflets to a relatively large number of Japanese soldiers. In a search of 1,000 Japanese 
casualties after one battle, it was found that over 90 percent possessed at least one 
Allied leaflet, despite orders from Japanese superiors that carrying Allied propaganda 
was an offense punishable by death (Walker 1974:53). U.S. plans to use propaganda 
for the purposes of actually changing Japanese beliefs faced an uphill battle given the 
baseline expectation of most soldiers was that they would be tortured or killed by U.S. 
forces. A study by the U.S. Office of War Information found as late as June 1945 that 
                                                 
196 Although Dower focuses primarily on the racism that imbued both sides and resulting atrocities, 
even he acknowledges that in many instance U.S. soldiers were willing to accept Japanese surrenders 
(Dower 1986:67). 
197 This categorization was based on a study by the Foreign Morale Analysis Division (FMAD), which 
is discussed more extensively in (Gilmore 1998:164). 
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84 percent of Japanese prisoners had expected to be killed after capture (Ferguson 
2004:181). On the other hand, the benefits from convincing even a few Japanese 
soldiers of U.S. promises of good conduct were highly promising, since a similar 
study also found that four in every five prisoners demonstrated “remarkable 
cooperation” in providing intelligence, but also in offering to encourage other soldiers 
to surrender (Dower 1986:77). 
 Facing an enemy that exhibited a lower propensity to surrender in the first 
place meant the degree of success of propaganda would likely be lower than in 
Germany. On top of the personal reluctance of many Japanese soldiers to surrender, 
the United States also had to deal with the fact that abuses by U.S. forces, especially 
on the battlefield, continued to occur and were more pronounced than the conduct of 
its forces in Europe. Furthermore, the steadfastness of many Japanese troops during 
battle is perhaps most apparent by the fact that Japan’s ratio of prisoners to battle 
deaths was far lower than for any other belligerent of the war (Vance 2006:462). 
Nevertheless, during one of the largest propaganda operations of the war over the 
course of the battle for the Philippines, the prisoner-to-dead ratio dropped from 1:100 
in late 1944 to 1:7 by July 1945.198 It is not unreasonable to assume that a substantial 
portion of this decline was a result of the greater trust many Japanese soldiers placed 
in the commitment of U.S. forces to humanely treat them if they surrendered. As one 
soldier remarked, “only half of [the men in his unit] believed the ‘good treatment’ 
promises” of leaflets.199 However, in light of the predisposition of many Japanese 
soldiers to fear capture at the hands of U.S. forces, as well as active steps taken by 
                                                 
198 Figures drawn from Table 1 in (Gilmore 1998:154). The increase in the number of prisoners was 
also argued to directly save U.S. lives, since removing these Japanese soldiers from the frontlines meant 
there were fewer that needed to be subdued by U.S. forces. Given the average number of U.S. casualties 
for every Japanese soldier killed, one study of the Philippines campaign estimated that the growing 
number of Japanese who surrendered meant 2,300 fewer U.S. soldiers died as a result (Fellers 1946:11). 
199 Quoted in (Gilmore 1998:150). 
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Japan’s government to convince their troops this would indeed be the case, the utility 
of Allied practices and commitments to good conduct for the overall war effort should 
not be understated. 
 In sum, evidence from the Second World War suggests that the conduct of 
main democratic belligerents was primarily driven by institutional incentives. The 
strategic benefits from humanely treating enemy combatants, whether in the form of 
greater numbers of surrenders or acquiring valuable intelligence, provided the promise 
to shorten the war and reduce U.S. and British casualties at the same time. 
Furthermore, as the earlier section on reciprocity made clear, humane treatment also 
reduced the likelihood of retaliation and could help provide further safeguards for 
those Allied troops who had fallen into the hands of the adversary. In both instances, 
the role of normative principles protecting prisoner rights appeared to be minimal. 
Additional Implications from WWII for the Role of Norms vs. Institutions 
 The theory of combatant abuse presented in this study is limited to the 
treatment of prisoners during the actual course of the conflict. The analysis of U.S. and 
British conduct during the Second World War up to this point has focused primarily 
on the motivations underlying their practices during the period of actual armed 
hostilities. The previous section argued that an institutional account emphasizing the 
greater sensitivity of the democratic belligerents to fears of retaliation, along with 
attention to the strategic benefits of humanely treating prisoners, provides a better 
explanation of their conduct than one based on domestic norms of nonviolence and 
respect for individual rights. Although far from perfect, the conduct of the democratic 
belligerents during the Second World War has been painted in a fairly positive light. 
Yet during the war and not long afterwards, both the United States and Britain 
committed various levels of abuse, which call into question any claim that 
democracies are always benevolent. Other elements from the Second World War point 
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to this darker side of democracy and provide a further opportunity to examine the 
relative role of normative and institutional factors for understanding the ways in which 
democracies sometimes act more brutally during war.  
 Toward this end, three other issues are examined below. These are the 
treatment of Axis prisoners in Europe after the end of war, the forced repatriation of 
Russian prisoners by the United States and Britain, and the targeting of German 
civilians by the democratic powers during aerial bombing operations. Each issue 
provides an additional observable implication for assessing the importance of 
democratic norms or institutions for understanding the outcome in each case. The aim 
of the earlier cases looking at U.S. and British treatment of prisoners during the war 
was to examine the precise motivations underlying Allied conduct, since both 
normative and institutional approaches expected the observed outcome of relative 
humanely conduct. In contrast, each issue below provides an added advantage by 
examining circumstances where the normative and institutional approaches each 
expect somewhat different outcomes. This also has the further benefit of evaluating 
the usefulness of each approach for understanding the more general behavior of 
democracies during both times of war and peace. 
The Treatment of Axis Prisoners in Europe after the War Ended 
 In many ways an examination of any changes in Allied treatment of Axis 
prisoners after Victory Day in Europe provides an even clearer test of normative 
versus institutional explanations, since each offers different expectations about post-
war Allied conduct. A normative approach would expect the democracies would 
continue to treat enemy prisoners in a humane manner. If anything, treatment might 
even be expected to improve. Security concerns during the war, along with fears over 
what defeat might mean for the survival of democratic societies, is one way in which 
democracies might rationalize less than ideal treatment of prisoners in the course of 
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battle for the greater good of defending their core values. However, once the war ends 
the enemy no longer poses the same level of threat, and one would expect democracies 
to hew even more closely to their principles and in turn improve their treatment of the 
prisoners they continue to hold.  
In contrast, from an institutional point of view one of the primary motives 
restraining combatant abuse – the fear of retaliation – largely disappears once the war 
is over. This is especially the case when one side has achieved total against their 
opponent. Although this does not immediately imply that previous benevolent captors 
will turn brutal, it does at least suggest democracies have fewer incentives to uphold 
rigorous standards of care for prisoners in their custody. The normative and 
institutional approaches, therefore, point to very different predictions regarding the 
conduct of the democratic belligerents at the end of the Second World War. 
After the defeat of Germany, the Allies were in complete command of German 
territory and quickly liberated their own prisoners, while rounding up hundreds of 
thousands of German troops as part of the terms of Germany’s acceptance of 
unconditional surrender.200 One prominent scholar has noted that with concerns over 
reciprocity gone, and a desire for retribution against German crimes committed during 
the war, the Western Allies engaged in a systematic campaign of genocidal 
proportions to exterminate German prisoners of war. While only a few thousand 
German prisoners were thought to have died in U.S. and British custody during the 
war, James Bacque argues that General Eisenhower personally orchestrated the deaths 
                                                 
200 Of course, the largest exception was areas under Soviet control, which included prisoners of war 
camps holding U.S. and British troops. However, this issue will be discussed further in the following 
section. 
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of between 800,000 and one million German soldiers after the Second World War 
ended (Bacque 1990:2).201 
 Bacque’s research has been roundly challenged on a number of fronts from 
both Anglo-American and German scholars. He has been criticized for his selection of 
historical sources and, in particular, his interpretation of the available evidence and the 
dramatic conclusions he then draws.202 The general scholarly consensus is that no 
methodical plan was put in place by the democratic powers to rid the world of German 
soldiers. The upper estimate puts the deaths of German prisoners in captivity after the 
war ended at around 56,000, which is almost one-twentieth the number alleged by 
Bacque (Cowdrey 1992:92). This figure implies a death rate of just over one percent 
and is certainly higher but not very far off from the estimated death rates under Allied 
captivity during the war of under or around one percent (Ferguson 2004:186). 
 What is relevant here is not so much the claim that the democratic powers 
engaged in a massive campaign of combatant abuse, but rather whether or not their 
conduct changed at the margin during the war compared to after hostilities ceased. The 
change in death rates, while still modest compared to those on the Eastern Front or in 
the Pacific, is at least suggestive that the Allies expended somewhat less effort to 
ensure the housing and nutritional needs of German soldiers in the aftermath of 
Victory Day.  
                                                 
201 Bacque saw the crimes as so ghastly that in a later interview he said Americans “should take down 
every status of Eisenhower and every photograph of him and annul his memory from American history 
as best they can, except to say, ‘Here was a man who did very evil things that we’re ashamed of.’” 
Quoted in (Bischof and Ambrose 1992a:20). 
202 Because of the implications of Bacque’s argument, a conference of historians was convened to 
evaluate his claims. The general consensus among the scholars gathered was that almost every single 
one of his arguments was overstated or simply false. The proceedings of the conference were published 
in an extensive study (Bischof and Ambrose 1992b). Nevertheless, Bacque’s research continues to 
garner a fair amount of attention in debates over the conduct of the democratic powers in the immediate 
post-war period. 
 200 
 
There are several complicating factors that make such a direct inference from 
the rise in deaths rate problematic. First, the Allies faced enormous logistical 
difficulties with the sudden influx of millions of additional surrendering German 
soldiers, with some estimates putting the total in the hands of the Western Allies at 
around 9 million Axis prisoners in Europe in the early months following the war 
(Bischof and Ambrose 1992a:5; Overmans 1992:145). One of the main problems was 
simply finding and distributing sufficient resources to provide the masses of the 
defeated German Army with a minimal level of care. This was made worse by the 
devastated nature of a defeated Germany as well as surrounding countries after years 
of blockade and aerial bombardment.  
Second, as the war went on a growing toll was wrought on German society at 
large, which meant that soldiers surrendering later in the war often entered into 
captivity sick and exhausted from the growing scarcity of food and supplies during 
their time fighting on the front (Ross and Romanus 2004:533-534). Because of their 
already weakened state those troops surrendering near or after Victory Day were thus 
less likely to be able to cope with any difficulties that arise in even the best of camps. 
Increases in the rate of prisoner deaths in captivity might be better explained by these 
contextual difficulties despite the best intentions of the democratic belligerents. 
 Although the post-war state of Europe presented greater obstacles for the 
treatment of German prisoners, there is little doubt the Allies took several steps to 
make the prospects for surrendering soldiers even more arduous. Taking advantage of 
the disappearance of the Third Reich as a functioning government, the Allies argued 
the 1929 Geneva Convention no longer applied. Subverting the letter and spirit of the 
existing laws of war, the democratic powers refused to grant official prisoner of war 
status to German soldiers surrendering after May 5, 1945, and stripped this status from 
German prisoners who were already being held in Europe up to that point. 
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Surrendering German soldiers were instead designated as “Disarmed Enemy Forces” 
by the United States, or “Surrendered Enemy Personnel” by Britain, and explicitly told 
they were not protected by the Geneva provisions. If democratic norms of respect for 
individual rights, or more broadly the sanctity of the law, had any impact on the 
conduct of Western Allies during the war, their strength appears to have greatly 
diminished at war’s end. 
 The disappearance of any fears of reciprocity appears to provide a more 
convincing explanation for the sudden change in Allied practices. Referring partly to 
Bacque’s charges, one historian comments more generally that: 
…while there is no real evidence to suggest that a deliberate “death 
camp” policy was being pursued by SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, 
Allied Expeditionary Force), the absence of possible retaliation meant 
that less effort was put into finding ways of procuring scarce food and 
shelter than would otherwise have been the case, and that consequently 
tens of thousands of prisoners died of hunger and disease who might 
have been saved (MacKenzie 1994:503). 
Across a number of dimensions the treatment afforded German soldiers in the post-
war period was inferior to that provided during the course of hostilities. The ICRC was 
given significantly less access to monitoring the conditions of prisoners and recording 
complaints compared to the much more open policy that had prevailed during wartime 
(ICRC 1948:539-540).  
One of the biggest problems was the refusal to promptly repatriate prisoners at 
the end of the war to their home country as mandated under Article 75 of the 1929 
Geneva Convention. Some have contended that Allied reluctance to send enemy 
troops home was partly driven by normative concerns over the latter’s health and 
safety upon returning to societies devastated by the war (Beaumont 1996:282). Yet the 
Western Allies had strong practical reasons for delaying the repatriation of enemy 
combatants, especially given their value as a source of labor for much needed 
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reconstruction. The newly reconstituted French Republic was particularly demanding 
that German soldiers help rebuild destroyed infrastructure across France. French 
policy also had a punitive motive to exact a certain amount of vengeance on their 
erstwhile occupiers. The United States and Britain were more than willing to meet 
these needs with some of their existing stocks of prisoners, and made several formal 
agreements to transfer Axis prisoners to France before their final repatriation home 
(Gansberg 1977:136).203 The willingness of U.S. and British authorities to transfer 
prisoners to the French with little regards for their treatment stands in sharp contrast to 
their attitude during the war when they were especially fearful of Axis reprisals in 
response to possible French abuses.  
Laborers were also sometimes forced to perform extremely dangerous work, 
which was in complete contradiction to existing international agreements. One of the 
most hazardous duties was mine clearing, and an ICRC report found that by the fall of 
1945 around 2,000 Germans were dying per month from this work (ICRC1948:334). 
When needs were present and no threat of retaliation against their own soldiers was 
apparent, the democratic norms of Western Allies appeared to have little restraining 
effect. The final repatriation of Axis prisoners originating in the West did not conclude 
until the end of 1948, more than three after the end of the war. Though it should be 
                                                 
203 Though neither the United States nor Great Britain should be viewed as simple bystanders who 
acquiesced to the demands of their vindictive French ally. One of the most shocking events from this 
period, which only fully came to light years later, was perpetrated directly by British authorities. 
Britain’s War Office created the so-called Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC), 
which administered a secret prison in the spa resort town of Bad Nenndorft, which was located in the 
British zone of occupied Germany. The center operated from not long after the end of the war until July 
1947. During this period, interrogators rounded up former members of the Nazi party and the SS, in 
order to prevent the rise of any Nazi-inspired insurgency (Cobain 2005:8). However, later prisoners also 
included suspected Soviet agents. Prisoners were regularly tortured and lived in horrid conditions with 
little food. Several guards were eventually court-martialed behind closed doors, but most charges were 
dismissed and few of the accused faced any significant punishment. The secrecy of the prison, along 
with the fact that Britain faced no real possibility of retaliation since Germany had been completely 
defeated, further points to the potential for democracies to resort to combatant abuse when the risks 
resulting from reciprocity are low. I thank Matthew Evangelista for bringing this episode to my 
attention. 
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conceded that the Western Allies’ effort was at least better than that of the Soviet 
Union, where the last German prisoners did not return home until 1956.204 
The willingness of the United States and Britain to eschew previous 
commitments to international law even led to some rather paradoxical situations, such 
as the holding as prisoners soldiers who were formally allied to both democratic 
powers. When the war began fascist Italy was one of the main partners of the Axis 
powers waging war against the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Throughout the 
summer of 1943, the Western Allies made steady advances across Sicily and were 
starting initial operations against the Italian mainland including heavy aerial 
bombardment of key cities. By September of that year, Italy was defeated and the new 
Prime Minister, Pietro Badoglio, who had taken over after Benito Mussolini had been 
deposed earlier that July, signed an armistice with the Allies. One of the main 
stipulations of the armistice was that Italian forces would switch over to fight for the 
Allied cause. Upon receiving word of the armistice, German forces quickly occupied 
much of the Italian peninsula, but Italy at least became a nominal partner in the U.S. 
and British coalition against Germany and Japan. 
One key problem, however, was between them the two democratic belligerents 
had captured approximately 450,000 Italian soldiers during earlier campaigns in North 
Africa and the Mediterranean (Moore 1996:32). In negotiations leading up to the 
armistice, the Allies promised the Badoglio government that all Italian prisoners 
would be repatriated so long as Allied prisoners under Italian control were promptly 
returned as well. This proposal reflects the common concerns of reciprocity expressed 
                                                 
204 In the case of German prisoners in the Soviet Union, many were initially sentenced to 25 years of 
hard labor for even relatively minor offenses. Their fate in Soviet hands would have likely lasted even 
longer. The Soviet Union only consented to repatriate the last batches of prisoners after West Germany 
eventually agreed to establish formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. Prisoners thus 
became victims of the larger diplomatic dispute between the two former wartime adversaries (Vance 
2006:461). 
 204 
 
by the U.S. and British leaders throughout the war. Unfortunately, it turned out the 
Italian government would be unable to uphold its end of the agreement. As part of its 
occupation of the Italian mainland, Germany quickly took control of all prisoner of 
war camps and quickly shipped most Allied prisoners out of Italy (MacKenzie 
1994:502). 
German control of thousands of Allied prisoners was far from a welcomed 
development for the democratic powers, but one side effect was that it provided much 
more flexibility over how to deal with Italian prisoners in their hands. The 1929 
Geneva Convention had never envisioned a scenario of one state switching sides 
midway through a war, which meant no explicit provisions existed for how Italian 
prisoners should be treated. By that point many of these prisoners had been 
transported to the United States, the United Kingdom, as well as various British 
colonies, and became important contributors to their war economies. There were thus 
strong incentives to put aside arguments that these prisoners should be liberated and 
instead keep them in a similar prisoner status. As one U.S. military official 
commented, “We felt it absolutely necessary from the military standpoint to keep 
these people [i.e. Italian prisoners] and get useful labor out of them” (Committee on 
Military Affairs 1945:3).  By the end of 1944 Italian prisoners on U.S. soil has 
provided over ten million worker-days of labor in tasks that freed up U.S. soldiers for 
deployment overseas (Lewis and Mewha 1955:100). Stated plainly, the 50,000 Italian 
prisoners in the continental United States, along with hundreds of thousands in North 
Africa and the British Dominions, allowed the democratic belligerents to substitute an 
equivalent number of their own troops, minus those needed for guard duty, directly to 
the war effort.205  
                                                 
205 Specific numbers of prisoners in the United States proper are based on statistics from (Krammer 
1979:271-272). It is indicative that the numbers of Italian prisoners based in the United States only 
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To be fair, in comparison to the fate their German compatriots later met, the 
actual conditions and restrictions for Italian prisoners improved somewhat after 1943, 
since they were viewed as less of a threat to national security (Porter 1945:4; Keefer 
1992:103). Nevertheless, it still was not lost on Italian troops that they remained 
confined to camps despite the fact that some of their brethren who had been lucky 
enough not to be captured were now fighting alongside their captors in Europe. Taken 
together, the evidence of Allied treatment of both defeated Germany and their 
newfound Italian allies provides further support for an institutional approach, which 
suggests the democratic powers were more willing to bend legal norms and exploit 
their captives once the threat of reciprocity disappeared. In the post-war environment, 
they also recognized the advantages to be gained from mistreating their prisoners, or at 
least not fully caring for their needs, and were more than willing to reap those benefits. 
Moral considerations for protecting the rights of prisoners, who had already suffered 
tremendously from the burdens of the war itself, appeared to have unfortunately 
played little role in shaping their conduct. 
The Forcible Repatriation of Soviet Prisoners at the End of the War 
 The Second World War generated enormous movements in populations as the 
result of civilians fleeing from conflict zones, workers coerced into enemy fields and 
factories, and of course huge numbers of prisoners. Between 1939 and 1945 it is 
estimated that around 30 million persons became displaced across Europe. Around 7.5 
million alone were non-Germans living in Germany and Austria (Proudfoot 
1957:169). Formerly captured Russian combatants formed a large part of this overall 
number. Many had already endured a harsh experience during their time in captivity. 
Although over 5 million Russian soldiers were captured on the Eastern Front during 
                                                 
began to decline once the wider war ended in September 1945, almost two years after Italy itself was 
defeated. 
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the war, only 2,000,735 eventually returned to the Soviet Union (Sword 1995:323). 
Although these two million persons might be considered the lucky ones, later 
developments after the war ended suggested this was not always the case. 
 Many of these prisoners, along with millions of displaced Russian civilians, 
did not want to return to their country of origin. While the exact number is unknown, 
between 250,000 and 1 million prisoners either volunteered or were coerced into 
joining the German armed forces, and feared they would be punished as fascist 
collaborators upon returning to the Soviet Union (Bartov 1991:44-45; Vance 
2006:460). Only four months after the invasion of Normandy in June 1944, the 
Western Allies already held 28,000 Russian soldiers caught fighting in German 
uniform (Proudfoot 1957:152). The final number ending up in Allied captivity is not 
known for certain, but was likely substantially higher. 
Even regular prisoners worried about their safety. Under Soviet military law, it 
was a punishable offense for a soldier to surrender without having first been wounded, 
or receiving an order allowing to do so from their superior (Ginsburgs 1957:360). To 
reinforce this point, in 1942 Stalin issued Order No.270 decreeing that any soldiers 
allowing themselves to be captured alive by German forces would automatically be 
considered traitors (Dallin and Nicolaevsky 1947:282). The fate of many Russian 
prisoners was thus well known should they eventually return to their homeland. 
 With prisoners of all nationalities scattered across the Third Reich and 
formerly occupied territories, the Western powers were faced with the choice of how 
to handle millions of Russian soldiers and civilians who fell into their hands as the war 
neared its end. According to a normative approach, an expectation would be that those 
not wanting to return to the Soviet Union would not be forced to do so. Returning 
individuals to a country where they were at grave risk of execution, or likely to be 
subjected to extreme forms of violence and deprivation, was in complete contradiction 
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to longstanding U.S. and British principles of asylum (Epstein 1973:21, 30). 
Furthermore, the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War contains no explicit 
provision outlawing forced repatriation, since this was not a scenario envisioned by 
negotiators at the time. However, compelling prisoners to return against their wishes 
appears to contradict the core principle of the convention as outlined in Article 2, that 
prisoners “shall at all times be humanely treated and protected, particularly against 
acts of violence,” and “measures of reprisal against them are forbidden.”206 In terms of 
precedents, bilateral treaties negotiated in the aftermath of the First World War, 
several signed even by the Soviet Union itself, explicitly stated that prisoners could 
only be returned to their home country on a voluntary basis (Epstein 1973:15).  
 The policy of the democratic powers went against these normative 
expectations, since the United States and Britain demonstrated little reluctance to 
forcibly repatriate Russian prisoners back to the Soviet Union. The policy was 
formalized in a specific repatriation agreement negotiated at the Yalta Conference in 
February 1945.207 The agreement was not made public until March 1946 after which 
time the bulk of the relevant repatriations had already been carried out. Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn described these orders, and later Western attempts to downplay the 
extent of their role, as the “last secret” of the war (Solzhenitsyn 1974:85 fn.45). 
Article 1 of the Yalta Repatriation Agreement stated, “All Soviet citizens liberated by 
the forces operating under United States command… will, without delay after their 
liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained 
                                                 
206 Reprisals generally referred to acts committed by the adversary power rather than by a state against 
its own prisoners. Nevertheless, the general spirit of the convention would provide for the protection of 
prisoners irrespective of the identity of the captor state. 
207 The full title was Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by Forces Under 
Soviet Command and Forces Operating Under United States of America Command; February 11, 1945. 
The text of the agreement can be found at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/sov007.asp.  
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separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed 
over…” 
 The agreement did not contain any explicit provision authorizing forced 
repatriation, but there was also no reference to the 1929 Geneva Convention, and there 
was little doubt that prisoners would be returned irrespective of their wishes and by 
any means necessary (Elliott 1973:262). The agreement was in many ways a 
continuation of existing policy, since both Western powers had already committed to 
forced repatriation well before the conference and interpreted the Yalta Agreement 
along similar lines. Britain had begun returning captured Russian prisoners as early as 
the summer of 1944 (Tolstoy 1977:51-52). Future British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan, and at the time resident minister at SHAEF, gave an official order as early 
as November 1944 stating in blunt terms that “All Soviet citizens, irrespective of the 
situation in which they are found or of their past history, should be turned over as soon 
as possible to the Soviet authorities for the latter to dispose of as they wish.”208 The 
United States took similar steps not long after their British counterparts (Epstein 
1973:33-34). 
 The policy of forced repatriation was also targeted specifically at Russian 
prisoners rather than those of other nationalities. Differences in the rights of prisoners 
were even made official policy. In the SHAEF Handbook of July 7, 1945, Amended 
through 20 September 1945, the section dealing with prisoners and displaced persons 
reads as follows:  
No United Nations national, stateless person, national of a neutral 
state or persons persecuted because of race, religion, or activity in 
favor of the United Nations will be compelled to return to his 
domicile except for a criminal offence. Liberal Soviet citizens 
                                                 
208 Quoted in (Sanders et al. 1992:34). 
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uncovered after 11 February 1945 [date of Yalta Agreement] are 
excluded from this policy (emphasis added)... (Epstein 1973:38) 
Unlike the slow return of German prisoners who were being used for 
reconstruction purposes across Europe, from May to September 1945 the United 
States alone transferred over 2 million Russian soldiers and civilians back to the 
Soviet Union, which was 89 percent of the total number of Russians it would end up 
repatriating (Elliott 1973:269). At the height of repatriation operations in late 1945, 
more than 50,000 Russians were being shipped daily from Western-controlled zones 
of Germany to Soviet authorities (Proudfoot 1957:211).  
 The Western powers even needed to resort to brute force on many occasions to 
compel Russian prisoners to enter into Soviet custody (Sanders et al. 1992:34). Many 
Russian prisoners thus died at the hands of their erstwhile liberators-turned-captors. 
Learning from these experiences, many Western officials turned to duplicity to 
convince prisoners to be shipped to a given destination. For instance, Britain 
controlled a prisoner camp in Lienz, Austria, which held thousands of anti-Bolshevik 
Cossack troops who had defected from the Red Army and joined German forces. In 
late May 1945, British officials announced to the 2,201 Cossack officers in the camp, 
as well as several hundred other Cossack elites, that they would be attending a 
conference. This raised some suspicion amongst the prisoners, but a British lieutenant 
gave his “word of honor as a British officer” they would be safe. The prisoners were 
then herded into trucks and transported directly to awaiting Russian forces. As one 
Cossack officer later remarked, “The NKVD209 or the Gestapo would have slain us 
with truncheons, the British did it with their word of honor” (Epstein 1973:78).  
Facing the specter of a return to the Soviet Union, many prisoners chose to 
commit suicide instead. Of the remaining prisoners at the Lienz camp in Austria, 134 
                                                 
209 Refers to the commonly used acronym for the Soviet secret police. 
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killed themselves between June 1 and 2, 1945 (Elliott 1973:253). Both Western 
powers later amended their policy to only “facilitate” repatriations so that certain 
categories of prisoners could not be coerced into returning home, but in practice the 
narrow criteria of this policy meant that forced repatriation continued unabated 
(Epstein 1973:272-273).210 
 The fate of many repatriated soldiers was of little doubt. Less than two years 
later in January, 1947, the Soviet government publicly pronounced that the Cossack 
leaders from the Lienz camp were found guilty of treason among other crimes and 
executed (Epstein 1973:81). The most notorious case probably involved the Russian 
General Andrey Vlasov, who was captured by Germany and later created an anti-
Bolshevik Russian Liberation Army under Nazi control. He and his forces were 
perfunctorily turned over to Soviet control in May 1945, and he was executed along 
with his highest commanders on August 1, 1946 (Elliott 1981:199-200). For regular 
troops execution was also a fear, especially if they had been caught in German 
uniform. However, even for many Russian soldiers whose sole crime was to have 
found themselves in German captivity, it was not uncommon to be sentenced to 
between 15 and 25 years in Soviet labor camps (Elliott 1981:193). Table 25 below 
provides estimates of the different sorts of punishment awaiting Russian soldiers and 
civilians returning to their homeland. 
                                                 
210 For instance, revised U.S. guidelines argued that only Russians caught in German uniforms, Red 
Army deserters, and those who “voluntarily rendered aid and comfort to the enemy” would be forced to 
return to the Soviet Union. However, the last category was so broad that it provided little restraint 
against further repatriations (Elliott 1981:110-111). 
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Table 25: The fate of returning Russian prisoners and civilians after World War II211 
Death sentence or 25 years in 
labor camp* 20%
Sentence of 5-10 years in labor 
camp 15-20%
Exile to frontier regions of Siberia 
for not less than 6 years 10%
Sent as laborers to devastated 
areas and not allowed to return 15%
Allowed to return home, but 
difficult to find work 15-20%
"Wastage" (escaped, died in 
transit, etc.)** 15-25%
*Life was considered so arduous in labor camps that 25 
years was effectively a death sentence.
**Final category is residual for those whose fate is not 
completely known. Range is provided since the previous 
set of figures do not add up to 100%.  
 The prospects for those Russian soldiers returning to the Soviet Union were 
thus daunting at best. Although the risks facing repatriated Russian soldiers and 
civilians may have been on the extreme end, persons not wanting to return to their 
country of origin often have good reasons to fear for their personal safety. 
Recognizing the general threat facing many individuals who had escaped or otherwise 
found themselves outside of their homeland, U.S. Secretary of State George C. 
Marshall stated unequivocally in Congressional hearings after the war on May 20, 
1947 that “It is the fixed policy of the United States Government to oppose any forced 
repatriation of displaced persons” (Epstein 1973:1). However, during the war Marshall 
was the U.S. Army’s Chief of Staff and thus instrumental in coordinating the 
repatriation of Russian soldiers to the Soviet Union. Why then did the democratic 
powers act completely at odds with their own humanitarian principles and contribute, 
albeit indirectly, to the deaths of so many Russian prisoners? 
                                                 
211 Based on estimates provided in (Tolstoy 1977:408-409). 
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 Some of the motivation appears to have been an unwillingness on the part of 
the democratic powers to upset their Soviet allies and make upcoming postwar 
negotiations over other issues, such as the future of a defeated Germany, or the nature 
of regimes in the Eastern European countries, even more difficult (Epstein 1973:26; 
Sword 1995:325).212 For the Soviet Union, the return of all prisoners served several 
ends beyond enforcing military laws which equated surrender with treason. Four years 
of war with Germany, much of it fought on Soviet soil, exacted an enormous toll. 
There was thus an enormous need for labor for reconstruction projects, and Soviet 
prisoners represented a valuable pool of workers (Elliott 1973:264). Perhaps even 
more important was the potential loss in both international and domestic prestige if 
hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens were seen to actively reject the Soviet system 
and prefer to remain in the West. This even led Soviet Union to send a barrage of 
accusations that the Western powers were mistreating Russian prisoners in their 
custody and were not allowing them to return home as all Russian citizens would 
obviously want (Epstein 1973:91).213 For these reasons, as early as August 23, 1944, 
the Soviet government issued a formal request to its Western allies that all Russian 
prisoners were to be returned “at the earliest opportunity” (Sword 1995:323). 
 A more pressing factor had less to do with Soviet demands for Russian 
prisoners, and more with concerns of the Western powers over the fate of their own 
soldiers who had fallen into Soviet hands. Because many German camps were located 
                                                 
212 The Western powers exhibited similar caution throughout the war concerning prisoner issues when 
dealing with Russia. When attempting to assemble a Polish armed forces in exile, Churchill was 
reluctant to press Stalin on the fate of thousands of missing Polish officers and other troops, which had 
been under Russian control. As Churchill noted, “No good could come of antagonizing the Russians.” 
Quoted from conversation between Churchill and Polish General Wladyslaw Anders, August 22, 1942 
(General Sikorski Historical Institute 1961:422). 
213 This led to some strange charges, such as that the Western Allies were trying to poison Russian 
prisoners by dosing their food with methyl alcohol. The truth in this instance was that a group of 
Russians had broken into a tanker of methyl alcohol on a U.S. camp, consumed fatal levels of the 
substance, and died despite the best efforts of U.S. medical personnel (Elliott 1973:264-265). 
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in eastern parts of Germany and occupied territories of Eastern Europe, Britain 
estimated in September 1944 that upwards of two-thirds of British and 
Commonwealth prisoners would likely be liberated by the Red Army (Sword 
1995:325). As the war neared its end around 60,000 U.S. prisoners alone fell under the 
control of Soviet forces (Elliott 1973:266). Both Churchill and Roosevelt were 
anxious even before hostilities ceased that Stalin was holding back the return of 
Western prisoners as a potential bargaining chip for gaining leverage on other 
matters.214 Despite some frustration with the conduct of their Soviet ally, Roosevelt in 
particular expressed his concern over the pressures emanating from “the intense 
interest of the American public in the welfare of our ex-prisoners of war…”215 Similar 
pressures on the part of the British public even led Churchill to write directly to Stalin 
pleading with the Soviet leader to personally intervene to ensure all British prisoners 
were returned as quickly as possible.216 
 In light of the intense desire for the return of their own soldiers under Soviet 
custody, concerns over the fate of prisoners to be repatriated to the Soviet Union were 
given little weight (Gilbert 1986:1159, 1204-1205; MacKenzie 1994:512 fn.98). Some 
officials, such as Joseph Grew, U.S. Under-Secretary of State, were extremely worried 
about the humanitarian implications of forcibly repatriating millions of Russian 
prisoners and civilians. Grew’s position ended up being a minority view within the 
higher echelons of both democratic governments. The Secretary of State, Edward 
Stettinius, refused to entertain Grew’s concerns because he feared raising any 
                                                 
214 Personal correspondence from Churchill to Roosevelt, March 16, 1945 (Loewenheim et al. 
1975:675-676). 
215 Personal correspondence from Roosevelt to Churchill, March 3, 1945 (Kimball 1984:542). 
216 Churchill emphasized the importance of this issue from the beginning, “There is no subject on which 
the British nation is more sensitive than on the fate or our prisoners in German hands and their speedy 
deliverance from captivity and restoration to their own country.” Quote from secret telegram from 
Churchill to Stalin, March 21, 1945 (Gilbert 1986:1259). 
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humanitarian issues regarding Russian prisoners would cause “serious delays in the 
release of our prisoners of war unless we reach prompt agreement on this question [i.e. 
repatriation of Russian prisoners].”217 
 The United States and Great Britain were thus quick to transfer Russian 
prisoners back to the Soviet Union once the war ended. The timing of the Western 
powers’ decision also reflects the change from Germany to the Soviet Union as the 
main threat of retaliation. Many Russian prisoners were captured well before the end 
of the war and remained in Western-controlled camps for months before they were 
eventually repatriated. Although some U.S. and British and prisoners were falling into 
Soviet custody, up until the very end of the war the bulk of these prisoners were still 
under German control. Both democratic powers feared that transferring anti-Bolshevik 
Russian prisoners or those that had fought in the Wehrmacht would result in swift 
German retaliation against Western prisoners.218 As General John R. Deane, the U.S. 
Military Attaché in Moscow and the main U.S. official who had co-signed the Yalta 
Repatriation Agreement, commented:  
To avoid reprisals by Germany against our own men held as prisoners 
of war by the Germans we took the position that we would have to hold 
those Russians found in German uniform until the end of the war, when 
the danger of reprisals had been removed by victory (Deane 1947:187). 
 Concerns over reciprocity, first by Germany and then by Soviet Russia, 
appeared to have played a large role in shaping the decision of the Western Allies to 
forcibly repatriate Russian prisoners to their homeland. The democratic powers were 
also fully aware of the implications their policy would hold for the safety of millions 
of Russian prisoners. They seemed to have been more than willing to directly trade the 
                                                 
217 Quoted from secret telegram from Stettinius to Grew, February 9, 1945 (Epstein 1973:45). 
218 There was a fear of reprisals against Allied prisoners in general, but both the United States and 
Britain realized that some citizens from Germany and other non-Allied countries had fought in Allied 
uniforms. Those prisoners were thus liable to be repatriated to their country of origin in a similar 
manner to any Russian who were to be sent to the Soviet Union for fighting in the Axis military ranks. 
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lives of millions of Soviet soldiers and civilians in order to ensure the safety of several 
thousand Western prisoners. In a somewhat morbid reference, U.S. Army historians 
gave the top secret documentary record of their country’s repatriation of Soviet 
citizens the codename “Operation Keelhaul.” Keelhaul refers to an old method of 
naval punishment, which involved dragging a bound individual from the bow to stern 
underneath a ship (Vance 2006:223). As one historian concluded, “The West’s 
humanitarian concern appears, in retrospect, to have been restricted to Westerners” 
(Elliott 1973:265). It cannot be expected that democracies always uphold norms 
preached at home, since exceptions necessary occur. What seems more difficult from a 
normative perspective is the relative ease with which the democratic powers were 
willing to abandon the Soviet prisoners and civilians in their care. 
From Soldiers to Civilians: Allied Bombing during the Second World War 
 As was remarked upon in previous chapters, studies on the treatment of 
civilians inside and outside of wars of all types dwarf the relatively small literature on 
prisoner issues. The purpose of this section is not to evaluate this impressive body of 
knowledge, but rather to consider more briefly any insight that might be gained from 
studying the treatment of civilians for understanding the normative and institutional 
approaches initially put forward for combatant abuse. Unlike the generally humane 
treatment accorded to German soldiers, civilians of the Third Reich were not nearly so 
fortunate. As the war progressed the Western Allies conducted an increasingly intense 
series of aerial bombing campaigns against German cities. Allied bombing during the 
war was estimated to have killed 305,000 civilians, wounded 780,000 more, and made 
7.5 million homeless (Pape 1996:271-272). The fate or German soldiers and civilians, 
therefore, followed two very different paths during the war. 
 Why were civilians brutally targeted by the democratic powers, while prisoners 
on the whole avoided the worst excesses of violence? A complete explanation of 
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civilian victimization is beyond the scope of this study, since there is already a large 
and growing research agenda grappling with this question alone. However, assessing 
the treatment of civilians by the democratic powers in light of the normative and 
institutional approaches provides some indications for why civilians were more likely 
to become victims than was the case for prisoners. 
 The motives underlying the conduct of the United States and Britain toward 
German, and later Japanese civilians, suggests that democratic norms had little 
restraining effect.219 This did not seem to be the case before the war, or in its early 
stages, when the democratic powers often spoke of civilian bombing in moral terms. 
After news broke in September 1937 that Japan was systematically bombing Chinese 
cities during the Sino-Japanese War, the Western Powers were quick to lead a League 
of Nations resolution condemning Japanese actions. In his famous “quarantine speech” 
of October 5, 1937, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt also publically spoke against 
Japanese atrocities on moral grounds, saying: 
…without warning or justification of any kind, civilians, including vast 
numbers of women and children, are being ruthlessly murdered with 
bombs from the air…Innocent peoples, innocent nations, are being 
cruelly sacrificed to a greed for power and supremacy which is devoid 
of all sense of justice and humane considerations (Roosevelt 1937). 
Referring to both the bombings in China and the Spanish Civil War, the U.S. State 
Department issued a formal statement, which included that “Such acts are in violation 
of the most elementary principles of those standards of humane conduct which have 
been developed as an essential part of modern civilization.”220 Nevertheless, when the 
                                                 
219 Some civilian and military officials did express moral reservations about the Allied bombing of 
civilians, but this was a minority view and far from the mainstream consensus that developed at upper 
levels of the democratic leadership (Downes 2008:137-139). 
220 Quoted in (Dower 1986:38). 
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democratic powers were faced with similar situations once they were at war, the moral 
condemnations they reserved for others exerted little impact on their own behavior. 
 The conduct of the democratic allies toward civilians largely goes against the 
prescriptions of a normative approach, but what of institutional expectations? When 
examined in a closer light, both of the two main institutional restraints in the case of 
prisoners were much weaker or largely absent for the treatment of civilians.  
The demands of reciprocity provided few incentives for either British or 
American forces to avoid targeting civilians.221 First, in case of Britain it was initially 
a victim of a concerted German air campaign commonly known as the “Blitz” to 
destroy British industrial capacity, but also terrorize its civilians into submission 
(Downes 2008:142-143). In a corollary to the retaliation of victimized democracies to 
high levels of combatant abuse, Britain had little to lose by responding in kind since 
the enemy was already targeting its civilians systematically. Of course, the United 
States did not face similar bombings, since its homeland was far beyond the range of 
the German Luftwaffe. However, after Germany lost the “Battle of Britain” air war 
over the skies of England by May 1941, it lacked a real capability to target British 
civilians from that point forward. The Luftwaffe became even more thinly spread as 
many squadrons were shifted to the Eastern Front after June of the same year in order 
to support the invasion of the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa. After the entry of 
the United States into the war and the gains achieved through the clear material 
superiority of the Western Allies, Germany eventually lost the ability to even protect 
its own airspace by the end of 1943. The democratic belligerents thus did not have to 
                                                 
221 In his work on civilian victimization, Downes makes an institutional argument that democracies are 
actually more likely to resort to abuse when they become increasingly desperate to shorten the war and 
reduce their costs (Downes 2007:876-877). However, Morrow has countered that in this case 
reciprocity provides just as good an explanation for instances of civilian victimization by democracies 
in Downes’s data set as does the latter’s desperation logic (Morrow 2007:570). 
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consider the risks of retaliation against their own civilians when planning bombing 
campaigns against German cities, which increased the likelihood that such campaigns 
would become more frequent and intense.222  
 Second, there was a much greater perception among the democratic powers 
that strategic benefits in the case of civilians were better gained by attacking rather 
than protecting them. Drawing on the visions of air power theorists from the interwar 
period, both the U.S. and British armed forces developed elaborate notions of the 
potential for bombers to revolutionize warfare by taking the fight directly to the most 
vital targets of the enemy’s society (Biddle 2002:107). One of the most famous 
proponents of air power, General Giulio Douhet, viewed the bomber as the ultimate 
offensive weapon and explicitly recommended targeting civilian populations as one of 
the surest ways to achieve victory in war (Douhet 1983:9-10). 
 The U.S. and British air services developed different doctrines during the 
interwar period, though each still professed the superiority of air power over other 
forms of military force. The British Royal Air Forces (RAF) espoused a doctrine of 
area bombing entire cities to destroy industrial capacity, but also directly target the 
lives and morale of the enemy populace (Biddle 2002:76). In contrast, the critical node 
                                                 
222 One interesting issue is why a greater degree of interdependence did not develop between civilian 
and combatant abuses. For instance, although German civilians became increasingly victimized, and the 
Third Reich lacked the capacity to respond in kind, it’s not clear why they did not retaliate against the 
Allied soldiers in their custody. There is evidence that some steps were taken along these lines. Camps 
holding Allied prisoners were sometimes placed near cities or key industrial installations in an attempt 
to deter attacks (Vance 2006:186). Similarly, there was some discussion of rescinding orders that the 
Wehrmacht should protect downed airmen from civilian mobs on the ground, but these were never fully 
implemented (MacKenzie 1994:494-495). On top of risking retaliation against German pilots in Allied 
hands, Allied airmen often possessed more valuable intelligence than regular prisoners, which meant 
there was also a practical tradeoff by allowing the population to vent their frustrations. However, Japan 
made a clear distinction between Allied pilots and regular soldiers given the particular threat aerial 
operations posed to the Japanese homeland. While the treatment of regular prisoners was already brutal, 
Japan classified downed pilots as “captured enemy flyers” rather than prisoners of war and their abuses 
were usually even more unbearable (Roland 1996:157). Questions of linkages across issues related to 
the conduct of war, or in this case the absence of such linkages, provide interesting avenues for further 
research but are beyond the scope of this study. 
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theory espoused by the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) stressed precision bombing of 
key industrial targets, which would lead to the collapse of fragile economies of 
modern enemies (Biddle 2002:160). Although different in emphasis, a scholarly 
consensus has developed that by late 1943 the two air forces gradually converged 
toward a common doctrine of indiscriminate civilian bombing (Parks 1995:153; 
Downes 2008:139). Between weather difficulties and increasing losses of planes 
resulting from attempts at precision bombing, the USAAF switched to so-called radar 
bombing whose precision was suspect and which was de facto the same as British 
nighttime raids against entire German cities. For the most part, the United States stated 
that it targeted military objectives, such as German rail yards. The fact that they relied 
on incendiary munitions during radar bombing, which were not effective against 
industrial targets, but extremely destructive of civilian dwellings, indicates their true 
intentions (Searle 2002:108-109).  
 The incentives and resulting conduct of the democratic belligerents was quite 
similar in the case of U.S. bombing of Japanese cities in the Pacific Theater. Many 
scholars have argued that the large-scale use of incendiary bombs to target Japanese 
cities, such as the notorious Tokyo firebombing which resulted in the deaths of 
between 80,000 and 100,000 civilians in a single night, were driven by racial 
demonization of Japan by U.S. forces, while “civilized” German civilians were spared 
the worst horrors (Dower 1986:40-41). However, many German cities were attacked 
using similar tactics, such as the bombing of Dresden which killed an estimated 
40,000 civilians. This suggests Allied air strategy was more similar than different in 
both theaters and cannot be explained primarily as a function of racial differences 
between the two enemies of the Western powers (Searle 2002:104; Downes 2008:139-
140).  
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Beliefs about the strategic benefits of indiscriminate bombing to undermine the 
economic capacity and morale of the enemy to continue fighting, whether in Germany 
or Japan, can therefore be seen at the very least as a permissive cause of civilian 
targeting. Attention to these benefits made it much more likely the democratic powers 
would turn to targeting civilians in contrast to their incentives with regards to 
protecting enemy combatants. Contradicting the expectations of the interwar air power 
theorists, later scholarly research has shown that strategies aiming to punish the 
adversary’s citizens are actually that not as effective as using aerial bombing to 
directly target military forces on the ground (Pape 1996:10; Horowitz and Reiter 
2001:160).  
These findings have not stopped later reincarnations of classic air power 
proponents, which put various levels of emphasis on the targeting of civilian 
populations (Warden 1997-1998:174; Dunlap 2000:10). The continued popularity of 
relying on air power despite evidence to the contrary does not bode well for the safety 
of civilian populations in future conflicts.223 Both democratic institutional incentives 
involving concerns over reciprocity and the strategic benefits from good conduct were 
largely absent in the case of civilians, which goes some way to accounting for the 
difference in the treatment of combatants in comparison to civilians during the Second 
World War. In contrast, normative principles might be expected to operate even more 
strongly in the case of protecting innocent civilians compared to soldiers on the 
ground. These normative expectations were not met during the war, since the conduct 
of democratic belligerents was in fact more humane overall toward enemy combatants 
that with regards to civilians. 
                                                 
223 For instance this debate continues to play out in the popularity among many government officials to 
widen the use of unmanned aerial drones in fighting al Qaeda versus those arguing the resulting civilian 
casualties are counterproductive to broader U.S. aims (Drew 2009:A1; Kilcullen and McDonald Exum 
2009:WK13). 
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When Democracies Go Bad: Considering Instances of High Combatant Abuse 
 The discussion in the previous section offers some more sober evidence of the 
seeming virtues of democratic belligerents regarding the treatment of enemy 
combatants. The postwar treatment of Axis prisoners in Europe showed the Western 
Allies were far from angelic, while the treatment of Soviet prisoners upon returning to 
their homeland suggested that democracies could tolerate higher levels of combatant 
abuse, at least when it was not being directly committed by them. Alongside the bright 
picture of the United States and Britain ensuring that German prisoners were accorded 
the highest standards during the Second World War looms a darker side to democratic 
captors. Although only reaching mid-levels of abuse in comparison to the brutalities 
meted out by Japanese captors, U.S. treatment of prisoners was far from ideal in the 
Pacific Theater during the war. The United States was at least encouraged to avoid the 
highest levels of abuse in this case in part because of the potential gains from 
interrogating Japanese prisoners that were captured alive. 
 As the overall quantitative analysis demonstrated, democracies on average are 
likely to limit themselves to lower levels of violence against enemy combatants than 
nondemocracies. However, as Table 26 below illustrates, there have been several 
cases where democracies resorted to the highest levels of combatant abuse and 
appeared to act more like many of their autocratic counterparts. 
Table 26: Examples of high levels of combatant abuse committed by democracies 
Democratic 
Captor Victim War Year(s)
France China Boxer Rebellion 1900-1901
Greece Bulgaria Second Balkan War 1913
United States North Vietnam Vietnam War 1965-1973  
 Some cases remain consistent with an institutional approach, where democratic 
violators were fighting enemies committing high levels of abuse and faced few 
incentives not to respond in kind. During the 1900-1901 Boxer Rebellion the United 
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States, Britain, and France all sent troops as part of a relief expedition to save Western 
missionaries and other civilians threatened by rising violence in China. Boxer fighters 
resorted to horrible levels of abuse against Western civilians and soldiers alike. 
Torture was a common fate for soldiers from the Relief Expedition, which usually 
ended in their execution (Keown-Boyd 1991:116). Decapitation and mutilation were 
also frequently committed by Chinese soldiers and in several instances commanders 
actually offered rewards to their troops if they brought back the severed heads of 
foreign soldiers (Martin 1968:72). Facing the prospect of surrender, many Western 
soldiers preferred committing suicide rather than face the trials of Chinese captivity, 
an unusual choice given their cultural background (Cohen 1997:189). 
 Encountering such high levels of combatant abuse, the Western powers more 
often than not responded in kind. Facing an ideologically-driven foe whose movement 
was based around anti-Western principles, there was little strategic benefit to be 
gained from good conduct. For instance, the Western Legation, which was under siege 
in the Legation Quarter of Beijing, preferred to bayonet captured Chinese prisoners to 
save bullets for the defense of their embattled position (Keown-Boyd 1991:115-116). 
British and U.S. forces sometimes sought to keep Chinese prisoners for labor 
purposes, nevertheless historical records indicate that U.S. commanders issued orders 
to give no quarter in many battles (Martin 1968:145; Vance 2006:51). As the war wore 
on and the Relief Expedition gained the upper hand, U.S. soldiers developed a 
colloquial term of “Boxer-hunting” for scouting mission seeking to find remnants of 
the Chinese forces (Cohen 1997:192).  
Reciprocity defined the conduct of the Western powers, since it was viewed 
that there was little incentive to hold back given the violence committed by their 
Chinese adversary. As one historian noted, when direct evidence was found of 
atrocities committed by Chinese troops, such as the possession of severed heads, 
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Western captors often “responded by  killing every enemy without mercy” (Martin 
1968:72). With reciprocity ruling the day, another scholar remarked that “As both 
Chinese and foreign observers noted, there was little to choose between Chinese and 
foreign brutality in the summer of 1900” (Cohen 1997:182). 
 In other cases democratic constraints on abuse against enemy combatants can 
be overcome by competing incentives. As the overall theory of combatant abuse put 
forward in Chapter 2 made clear, the second component involving the nature of the 
bloodshed can also matter a great deal in the conduct of states during war. In the 
Second Balkan War beginning June 1913, Bulgaria became the victim of aggression 
by its previous allies, Serbia and Greece, over the territorial spoils of their war earlier 
that year against the Ottoman Empire. By the end of the war, Montenegro, Romania, 
and even the Ottoman Empire itself joined the Greco-Serb side to conquer land at 
Bulgaria’s expense. Atrocities were common on the battlefield with few prisoners 
taken (Hall 2000:136-137). Democratic Greece conducted itself in just as extreme a 
manner as its nondemocratic partners. A variety of factors certainly contributed to the 
horrors inflicted during the war, but the desire to annex territory from the adversary 
was a key cause of the high levels of combatant abuse. The patterns of abuse mirrored 
those of the First Balkan War lasting from October 1912 to June 1913, where the only 
difference was the primary victim was Turkey rather than Bulgaria in the subsequent 
conflict.  
In both wars, aggressors sought to kill enemy troops in order to clear their way 
for a more assured occupation of newly conquered territory. Greece was just as 
influenced by this territorial incentive as its allies and issued explicit orders to its 
soldiers to this effect. A letter from one Greek soldier makes clear both the official 
sanction of combatant abuse by the Greek leadership and the motives underlying the 
order: “We have taken a small number of prisoners and them we have killed, such 
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being the orders received…in order that the dirty Bulgarian race may not spring up 
again” (Carnegie Endowment 1993:148). 
Even when territorial motives are not present, the severity of the conflict can 
heighten incentives for combatant abuse. The U.S. intervention in Vietnam from 1965 
to 1973 gradually devolved into a long drawn-out counter-insurgency war, which took 
on many attributes of attritional warfare (Downes 2008:60). U.S. treatment of North 
Vietnamese and Vietcong prisoners became increasingly brutal as the war went on. A 
general culture of brutality and torture developed within the U.S. armed forces on the 
ground in Vietnam, which was implicitly sanctioned and sometimes actively 
encouraged by high-ranking military officials (Bourke 1999:167; Forsythe 2005:76). 
Vietcong prisoners were viewed as particularly stubborn and “During interrogation 
they [i.e. prisoners] were threatened, abused and tortured in what appears to have been 
an officially condoned policy of extracting intelligence by violence” (Beaumont 
1996:285). In an attempt to disrupt the Vietcong’s vast command, control, and 
communication network, the U.S. government instituted Operation Phoenix in 1967 to 
target civilian leaders of the network by infiltration, interrogation, or often execution 
(Asprey 2002:910-911). While primarily focused on the civilian leadership, the 
program played a role in combatant abuse by identifying Vietcong suspects who were 
then captured and often tortured or killed by South Vietnamese forces (Moyar 
1997:87-107; Vance 2006:422). Counter-insurgency operations in Vietnam were thus 
typified by high levels of combatant abuse. 
This brief review of cases involving democracies committing high levels of 
combatant abuse demonstrates that neither democratic normative nor institutional 
forces can completely prevent the resort to violence against enemy combatants. 
Although the role of reciprocity as always looms large, the cases suggest the nature of 
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the bloodshed wrought by war also needs to be examined in greater detail to develop a 
fuller understanding of the motives leading states to abuse enemy combatants. 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to determine the precise logic underlying the general 
propensity for democracies to treat enemy combatants in a more humane manner than 
their autocratic adversaries. Separate normative and institutional approaches were 
offered for the observed distinctiveness of democracies concerning prisoner issues, 
which were then evaluated using multiple methods and sources of evidence. 
Additional quantitative analysis demonstrated that in situations where each approach 
diverged in terms of the expected behavior of democracies, the institutional account 
performed better than the normative alternative. Case studies looking at the conduct of 
the United States and Britain during the Second World War provided further support 
for the role of institutional factors in shaping their treatment of Axis prisoners. For 
both countries, institutional incentives relating to fears of reciprocity and sensitivity to 
the strategic benefits of good conduct appear to have played a key role in prisoner 
policy, while normative commitments to nonviolence and the sanctity of individual 
rights for enemy combatants were found to carry little weight.  
The conduct of democracies is by no means always so benevolent, which was 
evident in other ways during the Second World War as well as other conflicts. Several 
additional implications based on more nefarious behavior by both democratic 
belligerents during and after the Second World War were examined and found to be 
more consistent with an institutional approach. In the case of postwar treatment of 
Axis prisoners, the forced repatriation of Russian soldiers, and the targeting of 
civilians, when institutional restraints based concerns over reciprocity or strategic 
advantages were weak or absent then U.S. and British conduct toward prisoners 
correspondingly worsened. A review of several cases of high levels of combatant 
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abuse committed by democracies also shows that during these episodes institutional 
restraints were weak or were overridden by competing concerns related to war aims or 
the severity of the fighting. A full explanation for the role of regime type in explaining 
combatant abuse needs to consider not only when institutional restraints are more or 
less likely to operate, but also must take into account additional factors such as the 
nature of the bloodshed during war. 
Although this chapter sought to examine the motivations underlying the 
conduct of democracies during war, there are several ways in which this analysis can 
be extended. The case studies focused overwhelmingly on U.S. and British behavior 
during a single war in addition to some attention to French actions, but it remains 
unclear how these arguments would hold when looking at other democracies. Israel is 
perhaps the most readily available example, especially since it has fought several wars 
against Arab neighbors beginning with its independence in 1948. Israeli treatment of 
prisoners has differed greatly across wars and provides an interesting source of 
variation to be examined in greater detail (Gutman and Rieff 1999:29-32). War has not 
been confined to states, since one of Israel’s most enduring conflicts has been with 
various Palestinian and Lebanese non-state belligerents. To what degree is the conduct 
of Israel or other democracies guided by normative constraints versus institutional 
incentives related to reciprocity and strategic advantages? This question remains open, 
but is certainly worthy of further analysis for understanding the conduct of Israel in its 
own right, but also for evaluating the general effects of democracy of the conduct of 
states during war. Considering other democratic belligerents, but also the conduct of 
democracies in conflicts other than those between states, provide further opportunities 
for understanding the role of regime type and the abuse of prisoners. 
I also explicitly limited this chapter to the narrower issue of democracy, but the 
conduct of autocracies also deserves greater attention. As recent research has shown, 
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there are potentially important differences in the behavior of different sorts of 
autocracies when it comes to armed conflict (Peceny and Beer 2002:17). Some 
scholars even find that particular institutional characteristics make some autocracies 
behave quite similarly to democracies in certain contexts (Weeks 2008:37). Although 
democracies may be more than likely on average to treat prisoners well, several cases 
demonstrate that not all autocracies are brutal captors. As noted earlier, World War II 
already provides one of the starkest cases where German conduct on the Eastern Front 
was extremely harsh compared to its treatment of Western prisoners. Examining the 
conduct of autocracies on their own terms, and in particular searching for possible 
sources of variation between different autocracies, is a useful extension of this 
chapter’s focus on democratic belligerents.  
The institutional constraints related to the concerns of democracies over 
reciprocity and strategic advantages might not operate in similar ways in the case of 
autocracies, but are still likely present is some form. Similarly, autocracies might not 
share similar norms of individual rights and other democratic principles, but this does 
not mean that autocracies are deaf to normative appeals. For instance, historical work 
on Tsarist Russia has shown how the military and civilian leadership was strongly 
influenced by humanitarian ideals of the 19th century, which guided its approach to 
formulating and complying with the laws of war (Myles 2002:16-19). Just as not all 
democracies are alike, the historical record indicates that autocratic belligerents often 
differ greatly in their treatment of enemy combatants. Delving more deeply into the 
prisoner policies of autocracies promises to provide a better understanding of the 
overall role of regime type in the conduct of states during war. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE NATURE OF THE BLOODSHED:  
TERRITORIAL ANNEXATION, COMBATANT ABUSE, AND THE KATYN 
MASSACRE  
Introduction 
 The nature of the belligerent component of the theoretical framework 
discussed in the previous chapter focused on the internal characteristics of the war 
participants, especially the role of democracy. The second main component involving 
the nature of the bloodshed shifts gears by emphasizing the importance of key 
attributes of the conflict itself, rather than those of the belligerents, for understanding 
broader patterns of combatant abuse. This chapter takes up one of those attributes of 
the nature of the bloodshed, which concerns the specific aims states seek to achieve 
through the resort to war, in particular the objective of territorial annexation. States 
pursue a variety of aims through warfare, but in many ways the quest for territory 
represents one of the highest possible goals. By looking to annex territory from their 
adversary, states are literally attempting to redraw the map of the world.  The 
outcomes of wars of territorial annexation ultimately have consequences for large 
portions of the population in the areas under contestation, and in particular for the 
troops fighting on the ground who become prisoners. 
 States seeking to annex lands from their adversary usually do not wish to do so 
for only a short period of time, but rather want to consolidate their gains permanently, 
or at least for as long as possible. Enemy soldiers represent a particularly salient threat 
to the long-run tenure over newly conquered lands, given their military training and 
likely ability to form a resistance movement even after the initial war has ended. 
Looking into the future, states desiring to annex territory have strong incentives to kill 
as many enemy combatants as possible to prevent the rise of later threats to their rule. 
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The relative incentives to abuse prisoners as a preventative measure is likely 
influenced in part by the particular territorial objectives of would-be conquerors. 
States seeking to fully absorb neighboring lands as part of a larger revisionist project 
are likely to perceive enemy combatants as an even greater threat and eliminate them 
accordingly. On the other hand, states seeking more limited aims of occupation or 
indirect rule may have less need or reason to abuse enemy combatants to a similar 
extent. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the validity of the territorial logic in 
a more systematic manner. The chapter will proceed as follows. First, the logic of 
territorial annexation, and of revisionist re-absorption in particular, as a factor in the 
resort to combatant abuse in general is discussed in greater detail. I pay special 
attention to additional implications of the territorial motive for understanding patterns 
in abuse that are not easily captured in the earlier large-n analysis. For instance, 
territorial annexation leads to expectations over the use of varying levels of violence 
against different groups of enemy combatants as a function of their relative threat to 
the occupier. Those prisoners that present the greatest threat, such as the officer corps 
given their training and leadership skills, are often targeted the most fiercely. 
Second, I evaluate the role of territorial motives through a comparative 
analysis of Soviet conduct toward prisoners during the interwar period and World War 
II. At first glance, the Soviet Union might appear to be an easy case for finding 
instances of combatant abuse given the regime’s penchant for resorting to extreme 
forms of violence against its own citizens, especially during the Stalinist period. 
Soviet captors certainly exhibited horribly levels of cruelty at times, but they were not 
always so brutal toward their prisoners. What accounts for this variation? One of the 
other interesting elements of Soviet conduct during this period is that substantial 
variation is evident in Soviet war aims as well as its treatment of prisoners during 
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other conflicts. I begin by considering cases of Soviet territorial re-absorption, such as 
during the Second World War in Poland, the Baltic countries, as well as the Romanian 
regions of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Soviet territorial aims in these countries 
were quite similar, and combatant abuse correspondingly followed similar patterns. I 
then turn to several cases where the Soviet territorial motive was much weaker, such 
as the Winter War against Finland and several conflicts during the interwar period 
against Asian adversaries. In accordance with expectations from a territorial 
perspective, I find that the resort to abuse was much less apparent except when dealing 
with countervailing forces.  
The comparative analysis points to an association between territorial motives 
and combatant abuse, but does not uncover the precise logic underlying this 
relationship. In the third section I seek to uncover the territorial motive through an in-
depth examination of the case of Soviet treatment of Polish prisoners during the early 
stages of the Second World War, which culminated in the Katyn massacre of 
thousands of Polish officers. As noted above, this case might appear to be an easily-
explained instance of combatant abuse given the Soviet Union was led by a 
bloodthirsty tyrant, Stalin, who was not averse to wreaking terror against any group 
opposing him. The Polish prisoners of 1939-1940 might then simply be viewed as the 
latest in a long list of victims from the Stalinist era.  
Even accepting that Stalin was one of the most extreme leaders of the 20th 
century, this does not mean there was not a discernable logic in the Soviet use of 
violence against enemy prisoners. Combatant abuse was by no means constant, as 
certain groups of Polish prisoners were treated much more brutally than others. 
Patterns in the timing, method, and targeted nature of combatant abuse against the 
Polish prisoners reveals the Soviet Union was guided more by a brutal yet 
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instrumental strategy to secure newly annexed Polish territories rather than by an 
instinctual lust for violence.  
The fourth section then considers several alternative explanations for the Katyn 
massacres. I find that the territorial explanation generally performs better in 
accounting not only for the overall level of combatant abuse, but also for the particular 
patterns of violence during this episode. The final section then summarizes the main 
arguments and discusses some of the implications of the role of territory in explaining 
combatant abuse. 
Taken together, these cases illustrate that just because the Soviet Union was an 
autocratic state – and a highly brutal one at that – even dictators respond to the wider 
context of the war in which they find themselves and adjust their policies toward 
enemy combatants accordingly. The Katyn case involves an autocracy committing 
horrible atrocities as expected in many ways by the nature of the belligerents 
component of the theoretical framework. However, patterns of abuse within the Polish 
massacre, as well as differences in Soviet conduct in other conflicts, indicate that 
autocracies can be influenced by the nature of the bloodshed when deciding whether 
and how to resort to combatant abuse. A full theory of combatant abuse must, 
therefore, consider not only the attributes of the states themselves, but also elements of 
the wider war they are fighting. 
The Logic of Territorial Annexation and Combatant Abuse 
 The incentives linking territorial conquest to combatant abuse have just as 
much to do with what happens after the war as events taking place during the conflict 
itself. This stands in contrast to incentives involving regime type or the severity of the 
fighting, which often focus on more immediate concerns of fears over retaliation in the 
near term, or the likelihood of winning the current war on the ground. In the case of 
territorial annexation, states seeking to grab land from their adversary also need to 
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consider how they will occupy and hold on to their newfound spoils well into the 
future. Existing populations in these areas represent a potentially valuable resource to 
be exploited, but also a point of opposition that may ultimately frustrate a conquering 
power’s ambitions (Liberman 1995:4-5, 13-14). Civilians have been described as a 
potential “fifth column,” which could threaten an occupier by creating a resistance 
movement to its rule (Downes 2008:178). The threat posed by civilians in turn might 
explain why they are so often victimized during wars involving territorial annexation. 
 If civilians are viewed as “fifth columns,” then captured enemy combatants 
might be more appropriately considered as sixth, seventh, and eight columns 
combined. In comparison to the wider civilian population, combatants are often of 
prime fighting age and possess training in military operations and the use of weapons. 
These skills and attributes make captured combatants an especially salient threat to the 
occupying power, since they have the potential not only to fight, but more importantly 
to lead domestic opposition groups. Wars involving territorial annexation are thus 
much more likely to be associated with high levels of combatant abuse. Would-be 
occupiers should seek to target enemy combatants in their custody, as well as any 
others they may later be able to round up, since these actors present the greatest threat 
to their plans of consolidating control over annexed territories. When looking at wars 
involving different objectives, one would expect that the prospects for prisoners 
caught in those involving territorial annexation should be particularly poor. 
Not all wars of territorial annexation may be created equal, however, and the 
relative incentives for resorting to high levels of combatant abuse may differ 
depending on the particular territorial aims of the aspiring state. The preventive 
rationale underlying combatant abuse is likely highest in revisionist wars of territorial 
re-absorption. In such conflicts occupiers are seeking to completely subsume the 
territory under question. The very presence of enemy combatants is often viewed as a 
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direct threat to the occupier’s plans for extending its existing national boundaries. The 
Katyn massacre, where the Soviet Union sought to regain previously lost territory in 
Eastern Poland, represents a clear case of territorial re-absorption. In a similar manner 
after the fall of the Soviet regime in the early 1990s, the newly independent states of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a fierce war to claim the disputed region of Nagorno-
Karabakh for themselves. Both sides committed horrible atrocities against each other’s 
prisoners in pursuit of this territorial objective (Croissant 1998:87). 
The preventive elimination of future resistance through combatant abuse is not 
a strategy without risks. It may engender opposition from surviving elements of the 
enemy population, which may only fuel further grievances against the occupier. High 
levels of combatant abuse also risk international condemnation, which may thwart the 
occupying power’s broader strategic interests. As information surfaced regarding the 
Soviet role in the Katyn massacre, the Soviet Union needed to fight a constant 
rearguard action in the wider international community (Cienciala et al. 2007:232). 
States with more modest territorial ambitions may thus be less likely to assume 
the risks and expend the resources necessary to conduct a widespread program of 
combatant abuse. Enemy combatants likely do not pose a similar degree of threat 
when seeking more limited forms of occupation, as in French plans over parts of the 
former Ottoman Empire during 1919-1921 Franco-Turkish War. Although far from 
ideal, French abuses of Turkish prisoners certainly occurred but were not as extensive 
or widespread (Zeidner 2005:108). Of course, even in less ambitious instances of 
territorial annexation enemy combatants may represent a threat. The preventive 
incentives for combatant abuse thus are always present in one form or another across 
all instances of territorial annexation, though the relative strength of these incentives 
may vary a great deal. 
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The general territorial logic also provides several additional observable 
implications beyond the overall level of combatant abuse inflicted by captor states. 
First, the threat posed by different segments of the prisoner population is not 
necessarily equal. Although all combatants may possess a minimum level of military 
skills, enemy officers likely pose a much more severe threat. Officers have not only 
likely received more extensive military training and have greater combat experience, 
but they also possess valuable leadership talents necessary to coordinate resistance 
operations. It follows that those segments perceived as most threatening to the 
conquering state would most likely be abused to the greatest extent. All prisoners 
might suffer severely, but the worst levels of abuse are expected to be reserved for 
groups like officers given their skills and consequent threat. One further implication is 
that those prisoners from the targeted groups deemed to be most capable are likely the 
first to be eliminated. 
The territorial logic also provides expectations regarding the timing that abuse 
is most likely to occur. If control over the annexed territory seems assured, then the 
abuse of combatants should follow in relatively short order. Since part of the 
motivation is to destroy any possible future threats, then conquering captors have 
every incentive to enact any overall plans of combatant abuse as soon as possible. On 
the other hand, if the conqueror’s tenure over the newly gained territory seems 
precarious because of possible threats from outside challengers, then they ironically 
may have less incentive to engage in abuse. As the course of the Second World War 
duly illustrates, belligerents can often quickly change sides and previous enemies may 
become valuable allies. Outside threats may lead occupiers to hold remaining enemy 
combatants in reserve as a potentially useful ally in later conflicts with mutual 
enemies. 
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Territorial annexation provides several testable implications not only for the 
overall level of combatant abuse, but also for particular patterns in how and when the 
abuse is enacted. In the next section, I assess the general relationship between 
territorial motives and the overall level of combatant abuse through a comparative 
case study of several wars involving the Soviet Union.  
Territorial War Aims and Combatant Abuse in Comparative Perspective: The 
Case of the Soviet Union 
 The Soviet Union might seem like a strange case to consider for placing 
combatant abuse in a broader comparative perspective. At first thought, there might 
appear to be little to compare other than a series of unending depravities and suffering 
for those prisoners unlucky enough to fall into Soviet hands. Even though the Soviet 
Union was certainly quite brutal at home, there is little evidence its behavior 
inherently translated into the highest levels of combatant abuse on the battlefield 
during war. When examining cases of Soviet conduct during its many wars of the 
interwar period and the Second World War, the Communist regime actually 
demonstrated a remarkable range of behavior toward prisoners. While there are 
certainly cases of very high brutality, such as in Poland and the Baltic Republics, the 
Soviet Union also exhibited impressive restraint during wars against such disparate 
adversaries as China and Finland.  
I argue the key for understanding differences in Soviet conduct lies in the 
particular aims the Soviet Union was seeking through war rather than any particular 
attributes of the Communist regime itself. I divide Soviet wars during this period into 
those with clear aims of territorial re-absorption versus other types of conflicts. By 
examining these wars, I then argue that in those conflicts with territorial aims, the 
Soviet Union was remarkably more willing to resort to combatant abuse. 
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Soviet Conduct toward Prisoners during Wars of Territorial Re-absorption 
 After Tsarist Russia’s defeat and collapse during the First World War, large 
sections of the former Russian Empire broke away to gain independence or were taken 
over by other states. Throughout the interwar period, the new Soviet regime continued 
to harbor revisionist aims to regain lost tracts of land in Eastern Europe as part of its 
larger grand strategy. Table 27 below lists several of the more notable examples of 
Soviet territorial ambitions during this period and the subsequent treatment of enemy 
combatants caught in these regions once the Soviet Union fulfilled its aims. 
Table 27: Examples of Soviet aims of territorial re-absorption during the Second 
World War 
Victim Level of Combatant Abuse
Poland High
Estonia High
Latvia High
Lithuania High
Bessarabia and 
Northern Bukovina 
High
 
 The Polish case will be examined in greater detail in subsequent sections, but 
was typified by extreme levels of brutality against Polish prisoners as the Soviet Union 
sought to establish control over Eastern parts of Poland during its partition of the 
country with Nazi Germany (Malcher 1993:9-23). The remaining episodes did not 
take place in the context of an interstate war and were therefore not included in the 
quantitative data set, but are still relevant for assessing the role of territorial motives. 
The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania realized they stood no chance of 
defeating their larger Soviet foe and offered little resistance to the eventual Russian 
advance. Similarly, Romania felt it had little choice but to acquiesce to Soviet 
demands over Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in an effort to prevent the 
annexation of their entire country. Soviet incursions into the territory of its Balkan 
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neighbor eventually created a revisionist Romania of its own that later allied with Nazi 
Germany in part to regain lost territory. 
 Even though these additional cases do not strictly represent instances of 
interstate war combatant abuse, they are useful for putting the analysis of the Katyn 
massacre that follows in a broader perspective. Each represents an additional episode 
of Soviet territorial re-absorption and provides an opportunity to examine whether 
territorial motives had a similar effect on Soviet conduct toward enemy combatants. 
Stalin and the Soviet leadership perceived their aims in all of these territories in a 
similar manner (Weeks 2002:53). All were explicitly included in the Secret German-
Soviet Protocol of August 23, 1939, which outlined each member’s respective spheres 
of territorial interest in Eastern Europe.224  
 In the case of the Baltic states, Soviet policy was initially more restrained 
compared to what was happening in Poland. At the same time as Soviet forces were 
occupying Eastern Poland, governments from the Baltic countries were instead forced 
into signing trade and mutual assistance pacts with the Soviet Union during the fall of 
1939. The agreements included provisions for Soviet garrisons on Baltic territory. The 
expressed purpose of the troop presence was to protect each country from outside 
threats, but they also proved beneficial from the Soviet point of view in facilitating a 
full occupation force at a later date (Roberts 2006:43-44; Wettig 2008:20). 
 This precarious arrangement would last less than a year. The Soviet Union 
took advantage of the diversion of the world’s attention to the German victories in 
Western Europe to invade the Baltic states in June 1940. Soviet actions indicated that 
“Moscow’s principal aim was now the reinforcement of the Soviet ‘security system’ 
                                                 
224 For the text of these additional articles, see (Cienciala et al. 2007:41). Finland is also included in the 
list of the Balkan states, but as will be discussed in greater detail below Soviet aims in this state would 
ultimately be much more moderate. In the protocol, Lithuania is initially listed as falling under the 
German sphere, but the Soviet Union would eventually annex this country as well. 
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following the pattern of territorial annexation” (Pons 2002:201). The administrative 
and coercive apparatus of each of the Baltic states were replaced with Soviet officials. 
Elections were held later the next month in July, but voters were only allowed to 
choose from a list of candidates who were all from the Communist Party and 
specifically selected by Soviet authorities (Roberts 2006:56). The new “People’s 
Parliaments” then voted unanimously to incorporate their countries into the Soviet 
Union. 
 Soviet annexation in the Baltic states took place with little armed resistance 
compared to Poland, but patterns in the treatment of combatants and civilians were 
remarkably similar. From July through July 1940 alone, around 25,000 “undesirables” 
were deported from the three countries to labor camps in the Soviet Union (Roberts 
2006:45). All told, approximately 35,000 Latvians, 60,000 Estonians, and 75,000 
Lithuanians were executed or deported during the Soviet annexation of the Baltic 
states (Montefiore 2004:334).225 Many of these victims were members of the various 
Baltic armed forces, who were viewed as particularly undesirable given their potential 
threat to Soviet rule. 
 The officer corps in the Baltic states suffered a similarly brutal fate to that of 
their Polish counterparts. After the formal incorporation of the Baltic states into the 
Soviet Union, each of the national armed forces was subsumed under the Red Army. 
Command of the new Soviet constituent forces, however, was taken over by Soviet 
commissars to ensure that most Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian military officers 
                                                 
225 As with many Stalinist atrocities, the exact number of victims will probably never be known. There 
are also disagreements in the case of the Baltic states. Others find similar figures for Latvia and Estonia, 
but much smaller numbers for Lithuania. For instance, when also including those who were forcibly 
conscripted into the Red Army along with persons who were murdered or deported, one historian gives 
the following figures for the number of victims: 59,732 in Estonia, 34,250 in Latvia, and 30,485 in 
Lithuania (Dunsdorfs 1975:22). Even with these differences, there is little doubt that thousands suffered 
during the Soviet occupation. 
 239 
 
retained no significant leadership role. Native officers were then deported to the Soviet 
Union under the pretense that they were to receive “additional training.” The vast 
majority received no such instruction, but were rather summarily executed or sent to 
labor camps for eventual liquidation (Wettig 2008:21). The Baltic deportations 
paralleled closely the Katyn massacre as both pointed to a common policy of 
decapitating potential future leaders of resistance in the indigenous population 
(Conquest 1986:219). Just as in Poland, Baltic officers were viewed as a particular 
salient threat to Soviet control over the newly gained territories, and consequently 
these groups were targeted using particularly brutal tactics. 
 Less evidence is available regarding Soviet treatment of enemy combatants in 
the Romanian lands of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The Soviet Union 
demonstrated similar claims that Bessarabia had been “stolen” by Romania in the 
aftermath of Russia’s defeat during the First World War. Demands for Northern 
Bukovina were more of a surprise, since similar claims were not evident from 
previous Russian regimes.226 Nevertheless, both were absorbed by the Soviet Union in 
June 1940 in a similar manner to events in the Baltic countries (Weeks 2002:71). 
Soviet policies toward all segments of society in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, 
including the armed forces, were correspondingly as brutal as those enacted in Polish 
territories (Roberts 2006:56). It should be noted that while supportive for the overall 
territorial argument, the outcome of the Bessarabian and Northern Bukovinian cases is 
more problematic from a cultural perspective. Unlike the Baltic states, which were 
indeed quite culturally distinct from the Soviet leadership, the annexed Romanian 
lands shared many cultural similarities to their Soviet conquerors. The fact that 
                                                 
226 The area possessed greater historical ties to the earlier Austro-Hungarian Empire rather than Tsarist 
Russia. 
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combatants in both areas were abused suggests that cultural affinities did not play a 
determining role in these instances. 
In sum, when the Soviet Union possessed territorial aims in other countries 
during this period, then prisoners in these lands suffered more often than not horrific 
levels of violence. The reasons for this abuse appear to have been rooted in an 
underlying motive of eliminating potential future threats to the Soviet Union’s 
continued hold on newly incorporated territories. 
Combatant Abuse during Soviet Wars without Clear Territorial Aims 
The cases discussed up until this point all involve extremely high levels of 
combatant abuse and suggest the Stalinist Russia does indeed live up to its notoriety as 
one of the most ruthless regimes of the 20th century. When turning to conflicts where 
the Soviet Union did not demonstrate objectives of territorial re-absorption, the record 
regarding Soviet conduct becomes more mixed. Table 28 below lists several examples 
of wars where the Soviet Union did not demonstrate similar territorial war aims. 
Except for the war against Nazi Germany, in all of the other cases the level of 
combatant abuse inflicted by the Soviet Union was much more modest compared to 
the cases of territorial re-absorption. These cases also pose an additional problem for a 
cultural argument, since in general the levels of combatant abuse inflicted were quite 
low despite cultural differences between the Soviet Union and each of these 
adversaries. Other factors thus appear to be necessary in explaining the outcomes in 
these conflicts with the relative role of territorial objectives figuring most prominently. 
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Table 28: Examples of wars involving the Soviet Union without aims of territorial re-
absorption 
Victim War Level of Combatant Year(s)
China Sino-Soviet War Low 1929
Japan Changkufeng Mid 1938
Japan Nomonhan Low 1939
Finland Winter War Low 1939-1940
Germany World War II 
(Eastern Front)
High 1941-1945
 
The Winter War against Finland is particularly useful for assessing the general 
role of territorial motives in combatant abuse.  Territory certainly played a role in the 
conflict, but it was more a function of Soviet concerns over the proximity of the 
Finnish border to Leningrad, which was around 20 miles away from one of the Soviet 
Union’s largest and most important cities.227 The Soviet Union feared Finland could 
be used as a launching point for an attack against Leningrad by Germany, Britain, or 
France, with or without the consent of the Finnish government (Calvocoressi et al. 
1989:115).  The Soviets in fact offered to exchange a much larger parcel of Russian 
territory for the Finnish land adjacent to Leningrad. Soviet aims in this war were more 
modest and sought to occupy an adjacent slice of land as a buffer zone rather than seek 
complete territorial annexation. As Stalin personally remarked in private meeting with 
other Soviet officials, “we have no desire for Finland’s territory. But Finland should 
be a state that is friendly to the Soviet Union” (Roberts 2006:48).  
The two sides were unable to come to an agreement and war ensued. 
Nevertheless, the disputed land was sparsely populated and those groups living there 
were for the most part not of Finnish origin, but rather from the Karelia people who 
were ethnically distinct from both Russians and Finns. The motive to abuse 
combatants to ensure territorial conquest was thus less present in this case, and was 
                                                 
227 On top of being a main population center, Leningrad and its surroundings accounted for between 30 
and 35 percent of the entire Soviet defense industry (Roberts 2006:52). 
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reflected in the lower levels of violence against prisoners during the war. With the 
absence of strong territorial objectives, Finnish prisoners were on the whole treated 
fairly well (Hannikainen et al. 1992:85-87).  
As in the Winter War, the Soviet conflict with Nazi Germany from 1941 to 
1945 also involved culturally different foes, but was instead associated with extremely 
high levels of combatant abuse by all parties involved (Overy 1997:76; Vance 
2006:460). The Soviet Union was on the defensive for much of the war and did not 
seek to aggrandize itself at Germany’s expense unlike in the Polish, Baltic, and 
Romanian cases. Despite a similar level of territorial ambition, reciprocity appears to 
have been a determining factor in this conflict. The ferocity of Soviet treatment of 
German prisoners once the war turned in its favor was partially motivated out of 
revenge for earlier abuses committed by Germany when it had previously held the 
upper hand (Bartov 2001:124). The German case thus does not necessarily undermine 
the role of territory in explaining combatant abuse, but rather demonstrates that other 
factors can sometimes play a much greater role in shaping a captor state’s prisoner 
policies. 
Soviet Russia was also involved in several conflicts during the earlier interwar 
period against various Asian adversaries. None of these conflicts involved similar 
territorial aims and, as expected, the levels of combatant abuse were minimal by 
comparison to later Soviet policies in Poland and other annexed territories during the 
Second World War. These conflicts also further question the merits of racial or 
cultural factors, since in all cases Russian troops were pitted against a culturally 
distinct enemy, but did not resort to high levels of combatant abuse. In the Sino-Soviet 
War of 1929, Russian forces limited themselves to relatively low levels of abuse 
against Chinese soldiers (Clubb 1971:263). During this war the Soviet Union sought 
the more modest aim of ensuring its continued stake in the Manchurian Chinese 
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Eastern Railway rather than taking over the entire surrounding area and beyond. 
Wanting to maintain good relations with the Chinese populace in the region, the 
Soviet strategically calculated that good conduct toward enemy combatants would 
reduce the threat of escalation and make a stable post-war environment more likely 
(Patrikeeff 2002:85-87).  
Along similar lines, two wars against Japan at Changkufeng in 1938 and 
Nomonhan in 1939 were essentially border skirmishes that escalated into war, yet 
large swaths of territory were not an objective in either instance. In both cases the 
Soviets refrained from instigating abuses that came anywhere near to those committed 
against Polish prisoners not long afterward (Coox 1977:345-346; 1985:403). When 
territorial annexation did not appear to be a primary wartime objective, Soviet 
incentives to commit high levels of combatant abuse appeared to have been greatly 
weakened.  
Far from exhibiting an instinctual propensity for cruelty, the Soviet Union 
demonstrated significant variation in its treatment of enemy combatants. As the 
preceding discussion has sought to illustrate, the reasons for differences in Soviet 
conduct were driven in no small part by the particular territorial aims it sought to 
achieve through the use of force. Although this section has gone some way to 
illustrating a relationship between combatant abuse and territorial objectives, I have 
only provided some suggestive evidence as to why territorial motives are such a strong 
driver for victimizing prisoners. I now turn to the specific case of the Katyn massacre 
to assess in a more systematic manner how Soviet motives over Polish territory guided 
the decision to abuse the Polish prisoner population. The Katyn case also provides an 
opportunity to evaluate some of the additional implications developed in the 
theoretical sections concerning the timing of abuse and the relative targeting of 
different groups. I argue that the territorial motive provides the best explanation for 
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not only why Polish officers were targeted in particular, but also for when Soviet 
authorities decide to execute them. 
Russia, Poland, and the 1940 Katyn Forest Massacre 
 The Second World War was in many ways harder on the Polish people than 
almost any other nationality. Caught between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, 
Poland was occupied by the two great powers and became a key battleground on the 
Eastern Front. It has been estimated that Poland lost upwards of 20 percent of its 
prewar population by the end of the conflict (Piotrowski 1998:305). Despite the 
extreme hardships felt by most Poles, certain groups suffered to a much greater extent 
than others. Polish combatants who were captured during the course of hostilities were 
a particularly vulnerable group, but even in this case not all prisoners were treated 
equally. 
This section examines in greater detail the systematic execution of around 
22,000 Polish officers and related elites by Soviet forces, which has become 
collectively known as the Katyn Forest massacre. Officers had initially been 
sequestered in several “special” prison camps at Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov, 
as well as a number of smaller prisons, for more concerted interrogation. The 
imprisonment of the Polish officers would eventually culminate in the execution of 
nearly every single inmate except for a lucky few. The massacre is named after the 
Katyn Forest, though this site only contained mass graves for the Kozelsk prisoners. It 
became a common reference for the entire Soviet massacre because Katyn was the 
only site to be exhumed during the Second World War and was thus the most 
infamous mass grave of the conflict. The Katyn massacre presents a useful opportunity 
for understanding the ways in which the Soviet Union’s drive to occupy and annex 
Polish territory influenced its treatment of key sections of the Polish armed forces.  
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Much has already been written about the purges and mass killings of civilians 
and other groups endemic to the Stalinist period in Soviet Russia, but also Communist 
regimes in general (Valentino 2004:149-150). The Katyn massacre, however, should 
not be viewed as yet another instance of inherent Stalinist brutality, since there were 
many other cases of relatively benign Soviet treatment of prisoners during wars from 
this period. As the quantitative analysis from Chapter 4 demonstrated, there does not 
appear to be any intrinsic drive by Communist countries to engage in combatant 
abuse. Although they do not exhibit a similar overall degree of restraint exhibited by 
democracies, Communist countries were found to be no different from their other 
nondemocratic counterparts in the treatment of prisoners. Communist ideology may 
have certainly played a contributing role in the Katyn deaths, but does not appear to 
provide a full explanation for the course of events leading up to the executions. 
Beyond the variation evident in Soviet conduct across different wars, the 
Katyn case also provides interesting within-case variation in the degree to which 
different prisoner groups were abused. The explicit targeting of the Polish officer 
corps by the Soviet Union also provides an interesting episode which contradicts the 
usual thinking about the relative treatment of different ranks of prisoners. The laws of 
war set up an explicit hierarchy governing the rights and privileges of prisoners of war 
based on rank, which has been reaffirmed in later treaties up to the present day. Unlike 
regular soldiers, officers were not required to do any physical labor even though they 
were still allowed to collect their regular higher pay.228 These legal privileges have 
                                                 
228 See in particular Articles 23 and 27 of the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, which was 
the relevant agreement during the Second World War. Throughout the treaty there are numerous other 
references to special provisions for officers vis-à-vis regular troops. Importantly, it should be noted the 
Soviet Union was not a party to the 1929 Convention. One of the justifications Soviet negotiators gave 
for rejecting the agreement was precisely because rights it accorded greater privileges to officers 
(Morrow 2001:978). This suggests, however, that the Soviet Union would treat officers and other ranks 
similarly rather than targeting the former as occurred in the case of Poland during the Second World 
War. Furthermore, Soviet Russia was still a party to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions which 
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historically translated into superior treatment for officers while in captivity (Beaumont 
1983:74-75).229 During the First World War, Tsarist Russia ensured that captured 
German and Austro-Hungarian officers lived in relative comfort, while the masses of 
other-ranks were often deprived of even many of the necessities to survive 
(Rachamimov 2002:55, 98). Regular Polish soldiers certainly did not fare very well 
under Soviet custody, but the explicit targeting of officers stands in contrast to 
traditional principles of international law as well as historical precedent more 
generally. The Katyn Forest massacre represents an intriguing case where it was 
probably better to be a lowly infantryman rather than a highly decorated officer. As 
will be shown in greater detail below, the targeting of the officer corps was intimately 
tied to the Soviet Union’s designs for conquered Polish territory.  
Background to the War: Soviet Territorial Motives  
Poland and Russia have been far from intimate friends during much of their 
history. Since the late 17th century up to 1989, Poland has been dominated by its larger 
and more powerful eastern neighbor except for a few brief exceptions (Davies 
1982a:408-411). During the 18th century Russia, alongside Prussia and Austria-
Hungary, profited from three successive partitions of Polish territory. The Russian 
state, whether in its Tsarist or later Communist form, thus had a longstanding interest 
in Polish territory. 
One of the exceptions to Russian dominance occurred following the First 
World War when Poland regained sovereign statehood. Taking advantage of internal 
weakness after the Bolshevik Revolution and ongoing Russian civil war, a newly 
                                                 
required the proper treatment of prisoners irrespective of rank and certainly disallowed the type of 
actions that constituted the Katyn massacre. 
229 Beaumont notes this is not always the case and that some categories of officers have not been viewed 
as privileged elites by their captors. In the case of World War II, this includes Red Army commissars, 
German SS officers on the Eastern Front, and downed Allied pilots in the Pacific Front (Beaumont 
1983:76). However, she provides no discussion of the Polish officers who died at Katyn. 
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independent Poland turned the tables and successfully fought a war against its larger 
Eastern neighbor from 1919 to 1920. After Polish forces drove back a Russian 
advance that was halted at the outskirts of the capital of Warsaw, the Russians sued for 
peace. A formal peace treaty, the Peace of Riga, was signed in April 1921 where 
Poland gained large tracts of Russian territory in what is now Western Belarus and 
Ukraine. The gains were later ratified in 1923 by the Allied Conference of 
Ambassadors, which was established after the Versailles Treaty ending the First 
World War (Sanford 2005:7). The further loss of territory became a great source of 
grievance for Soviet Russia and contributed to the famous derisive yet faulty 
description of Poland by Vyacheslav Molotov, who would later become Stalin’s 
foreign minister, as “the monstrous bastard of the Peace of Versailles.”230 
During the interwar period, the Soviet Union harbored strong desires to re-
absorb these lost territories now found within the Eastern regions of a much larger 
Poland. The early stages of the Second World War provided the Soviet Union with a 
prime opportunity to retake territory from Poland, while at the same time ensuring a 
more permanent solution to the their Polish problem. In concert with Nazi Germany, 
the foreign ministers of the two countries, Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop, 
signed a Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, 1939. Article 2 of the agreement 
stipulated that should either country enter into war against a third party, the other 
country would not come to the aid of the latter country.231 It has largely been accepted 
that this agreement sealed the fate for a German attack against Poland. In the military 
                                                 
230 Molotov’s characterization is inaccurate because Poland was not an expressed creation of the 
victorious powers of the First World War m. In contrast, the Peace of Versailles simply confirmed the 
existence of a Polish state which had already developed de facto out of the vacuum of the defeated 
powers of Central and Eastern Europe (Davies 1982b:393-394). 
231 Article 2 read as follows: “Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of 
belligerent action by a third Power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support 
to this third Power.” Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union, 23 August 
1939, Moscow (Cienciala et al. 2007:39-40). 
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historian John Keegan’s straightforward prose, “Poland was now doomed” (Keegan 
1990:43).  
The publically disseminated Nonaggression Pact contained no provisions 
regarding German or Soviet interests in Poland. This was saved for a secret additional 
protocol, which divided Eastern Europe into separate German and Soviet spheres of 
influence. Article 2 of the protocol explicitly outlined each country’s share of Polish 
territory, though it left to a later date the final decision of whether to maintain a rump 
Polish state.232 The Soviet Union thus entered into collusion with Nazi Germany to 
gain territorial spoils at the expense of a defeated Poland. 
The war officially began with Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 
1939 despite warnings from the Western Powers. The attack in fact sparked the 
beginning of the entire Second World War. Britain and France quickly responded by 
declaring war on Germany though they provided few material resources to the Polish 
defenders. Stalin waited until Polish forces were sufficiently ground down by the 
German advance before invading Poland’s eastern border just over two weeks later on 
September 17.  
In one of the many peculiarities that would occur throughout the wider war, 
neither Poland nor the Soviet Union formally declared war on one another. The 
Soviets used a humanitarian pretext by arguing that it was merely intervening to 
protect Ukrainian and Belarusian minorities from the dangers of the collapsing Polish 
state (Zaslavsky 2008:10-11). For its part, the Polish government was already under 
siege from German forces and saw the Soviet occupation as a foregone conclusion. 
Wanting to avoid any further bloodshed, Polish military and political leaders did not 
                                                 
232 Secret Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet 
Union, 23 August 23 1939, Moscow (Cienciala et al. 2007:41). The Secret Protocol also contained 
Soviet claims over the Baltic states and Bessarabia, which will be discussed in greater detail below 
when considering Soviet conduct in other cases where it sought territorial re-absorption. 
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develop any concerted plans for defending the eastern regions of their country against 
the Soviet advance (Sanford 2005:21). Pockets of resistance by Polish forces 
continued on both fronts, but the war was essentially over by September 27. The 
Soviet Union suffered just 737 battle deaths, while Polish forces in the East were dealt 
a higher number of around 3,000 lives lost.  
The day after the war ended Germany and the Soviet Union reaffirmed their 
entente and consolidated their territorial gains with the September 28 Treaty on 
Friendship. The agreement included a few revisions of the initial division of land from 
the August 23 Secret Protocol, but the general partition of Poland into a German-
controlled western region and Soviet-controlled eastern region remained essentially 
unaltered.233 With the conclusion of the treaty the Soviets gained 52 percent of 
interwar Poland, which was made up around 126,000 square miles of land, and 38 
percent of its population, which totaled more than 13 million persons (Piotrowski 
1998:9). Despite Soviet claims to the contrary that the conquered lands were inhabited 
by few if any Poles, demographic estimates based on Polish records suggest almost 40 
percent of residents in these areas were ethnic Poles (Siemaszko 1991:230). 
In a similar manner to the August agreement Molotov and Ribbentrop 
negotiated an additional secrete protocol to the Friendship Treaty, which stated in part:  
Neither party will allow on its territory any Polish agitation that affects 
the territory of the other country. Both shall liquidate such agitation on 
their territories in embryo and shall inform each other about expedient 
measures to accomplish this (emphasis added).234 
The scope and extent of active German-Soviet collaboration in the suppression of 
Polish resistance remains an extremely contested issue (Sanford 2005:29-31). 
                                                 
233 German-Soviet Treaty on Friendship and the Border between the USSR and Germany, 28 September 
1939, Moscow (Cienciala et al. 2007:59-60). 
234 Secret Supplementary Protocol to the German-Soviet Treaty on Friendship and the Border between 
the USSR and Germany [Establishing Cooperation against Polish Resistance], 28 September 1939, 
Moscow. Excerpt quoted in (Cienciala et al. 2007:61-62). 
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Nevertheless, the protocol indicates both countries were acutely aware of the threat 
posed to their rule by Polish resistance and had already devised a strategy for dealing 
with this menace. How then did the territorial motives of the Soviet Union influence 
the decision over how to treat captured Polish combatants? The Soviets would 
eventually identify Polish prisoners of war, and in particular officers, as dangerous 
groups deserving of a brutal, yet extremely efficient, solution. 
The General Treatment of Polish Prisoners 
 From their first advances across the border into Polish territory, Soviet forces 
were far from humane in the treatment of enemy combatants. The high levels of 
combatant abuse that resulted are largely consistent with expectations of the Soviet 
Union’s territorial motives in Eastern Poland. Polish armed forces were identified as a 
general threat and abuses like torture or execution of prisoners, whether or not they 
had initially put up any resistance, became a common phenomenon during the combat 
phase of the conflict (Gross 1991:45-46; Szawlowski 1991:30). During the few brief 
weeks of the war, it is estimated that between 1,000 and 2,500 Polish prisoners were 
summarily executed on the battlefield (Sanford 2005:23). In one of the more gruesome 
cases, General Olszyna-Wilczynski, Polish commander of the Grodno military district, 
ordered his men to stand down to avoid needless bloodshed. He then rode forward to 
extend a courtesy to what he thought would be a friendly officer counterpart. Instead, 
he was immediately pulled from his car, thrown against a barn door, and shot on the 
spot (Zawodny 1962:131; Piesakowski 1990:38-39). 
 Many prisoners were able to avoid immediate execution and fell into some 
form of Soviet custody. While the precise number will likely never be known, it is 
generally accepted that around 250,000 Polish soldiers became prisoners of war of the 
Soviet Union (Piesakowski 1990:39; Vance 2006:222). Since the bulk of the Polish 
forces had been deployed to meet the earlier German attack, it is not surprising a far 
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greater number of close to 700,000 others became prisoners under German control 
(Rossino 2003:179). Not all Polish combatants fell into the hands of German or Soviet 
invaders and many were able to escape to various neighboring countries. Around 
40,000 soldiers were able to cross over to Hungary, while another 30,000 did the same 
in Romania. 15,000 others escaped to Latvia and Lithuania, though they were later 
captured when the Soviet Union eventually annexed the Baltic states in June 1940. 
Finally, 47,000 Polish soldiers, which included 9,200 officers, took various routes in 
secret to end up Allied-controlled territories like France and the Middle East (Sanford 
2005:22). Many of these officers and soldiers formed the core of Polish units which 
later fought under the command of the Western Allies throughout the rest of the war. 
The contributions of these escapees to the Western Powers would indirectly help the 
Soviet Union later on in the conflict once it had allied with the United States and 
Britain. However, at the time in the fall of 1939 the Soviet leadership was more 
concerned with the capability of Polish troops to undermine its control over Eastern 
Poland. 
 For the quarter-million soldiers who were unable to escape the fighting was 
over, but their deprivations had just begun. Some were fortunate enough to be sent 
home in the early stages of captivity, though this was primarily reserved for soldiers of 
Ukrainian or Belorussian origin (Zaslavsky 2008:13). The decision to do so was taken 
at the highest level of the Soviet government in a Politburo meeting on October 2, 
1939.235 These groups were largely viewed as less threatening to Soviet control over 
newly gained territories compared to the much more nationalistic ethnic Poles. The 
vast majority of prisoners of Polish ethnicity were thus far less lucky. As was the case 
throughout the war on the Eastern Front, the Soviet Union refused to allow the ICRC 
                                                 
235 The text of the minutes from the meeting can be found in (Cienciala et al. 2007:62-63). 
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access to Polish soldiers or holding sites, which meant prisoners could not benefit in 
any way under the organization’s auspices (ICRC 1948:407-408). 
Not long after capture, most prisoners were led on forced marches over vast 
distances to reach large temporary stations, such as the Szepietowka transit camp, only 
to continue another arduous journey to their final destination (Gross 1991:46). With 
the war ending in late September, the weather became increasingly severe. The further 
lack of adequate food and shelter meant countless numbers died before even arriving 
at their intended prison camp. 
 Although conditions often improved once prisoners ended up in a more 
permanent location, the level of treatment for most Polish prisoners was far below 
generally accepted standards. After formally incorporating all conquered parts of 
Poland into the Soviet Union, the Communist government passed a decree on 
November 29, 1939 that all soldiers and civilians in these areas were now Soviet 
citizens (Malcher 1993:7).236 This was then used as a pretext to forcibly conscript over 
210,000 persons into the Red Army, many of whom were former Polish combatants 
but also a number of civilians (Malcher 1993:7-9).237  
A large number of those not facing induction into the military were conscripted 
into vast labor camps located in remote regions of the Soviet interior. Together with 
Polish civilians, it is estimated that between one and one-and-a-half million Poles were 
deported to various camps in the Soviet Union to face grueling labor in often harsh 
conditions (Cienciala et al. 2007:138-139). The Soviet Union did not develop anything 
similar to the German concentration camps, where the expressed purpose was the 
                                                 
236 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR concerning the acquisition of 
citizenship of the USSR by the inhabitants of the Western districts of the Ukraine and Byelorussia 
(General Sikorski Historical Institute 1961:92). 
237 Conscripts largely served in construction battalions rather than being trusted with weapons. 
Nevertheless, the fact of conscription, alongside the direct military nature of their work, was in 
complete contradiction to prevailing principles of international law.  
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rapid and efficient killing of large numbers of persons. Nevertheless, the grueling 
work, harsh conditions, and paucity of appropriate food and shelter, made many of the 
labor camps de facto death sentences for Polish prisoners. The death rates in these 
camps varied greatly with some of the most extreme cases being those in the Far North 
Eastern Kolyma and Komi regions in the Arctic, where around 75 percent of Polish 
prisoners died between 1940-1941 (Conquest 1978:218-219). In general, it is 
estimated that the death rate for Polish prisoners across the various labor camps was 
between 25 and 60 percent per annum during the 1940-1941 period (Sanford 2005:55). 
The use of mass deportations and labor camps demonstrates that large swaths 
of Polish society were victimized as part of the broader Soviet policy of territorial 
annexation. The upper estimates suggest that over 10 percent of the Polish citizenry 
was deported or punished in some way by their Soviet occupiers. Territorial motives 
clearly played a major role in the overall use of violence by Soviet authorities in 
Poland. However, the general level of brutality hides important variation in the extent 
to which different groups were abused. As horrific as the 10 percent death rate for the 
entire population may seem, it still pales in comparison to the execution of over 95 
percent for the Polish officers in the Katyn massacre.238 The Polish civilian population 
certainly represented a potential threat to continued Soviet rule, since the possibility 
always existed that certain groups could coalesce and rebel against Soviet authority. 
The key question was rather the degree of threat posed by different segments of Polish 
society. Even the deportation of upwards of 1.5 million citizens was an enormous 
endeavor which expended huge amounts of resources for the Soviet Union. Ridding 
                                                 
238 The estimate for the civilian population is based on the widely cited upper figure of 1.5 million 
persons deported to the Soviet Union out of a total prewar population in Soviet-held Poland of around 
13.4 million (Sanford 2005:23; Cienciala et al. 2007:138-139). The estimate for death rate of the officer 
corps is based on (Sanford 2005:94). 
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annexed Eastern Poland of its entire indigenous population was consequently a nearly 
impossible task.  
The decision for the leadership essentially came down to how best to allocate 
the scarce resources of the Soviet coercion machinery. Polish officers, who possessed 
a high level of both military and leadership skills, posed the most palpable threat. The 
Katyn massacre was thus a shortcut toward suppressing the overall likelihood of a 
widespread rebellion in Soviet-held Poland. As one scholar remarked, “Short of 
destroying the entire population, a well-nigh impossible task, the next best method of 
reducing Poland for good was to remove all those in a position of leadership, military 
or intellectual” (FitzGibbon 1971:179). 
Territorial Annexation Taken to the Extreme: The Fate of Polish Officers in the 
“Special” Camps at Katyn 
The precise motives guiding the decision of Stalin and his inner circle to 
commit the Katyn massacre may unfortunately never be resolved with absolute 
certainty. No documents survive detailing the inner thinking of Stalin, or the private 
discussions among the top Soviet leadership which culminated in the final order to 
commit the Katyn massacre (Cienciala et al. 2007:141). Nevertheless, the available 
evidence strongly suggests the massacre was intimately connected to the territorial 
ambitions of the Soviet Union in Eastern Poland. Although Soviet authorities 
victimized nearly every segment of Polish society, the most brutal tactics were 
reserved for those groups viewed as most threatening to their hold on Polish territory. 
Officers were to find themselves unwittingly at the top of this list. As one prominent 
historian of the war concludes, “The death of Poland’s military cadres was part of a 
calculated strategy to rid the occupied areas of any elements capable of raising the flag 
of national resurgence against the Soviet invader” (Overy 1997:77). 
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 Even though direct proof of Stalin’s motives may be lacking, several pieces of 
evidence point to the crucial role played by territorial motives. Unlike in other wars, 
the Soviet Union entrusted the running of the prisoner program to the NKVD, or 
People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, rather than the armed forces.239 This 
decision went against usual Soviet custom and was in further contradiction to 
prevailing principles of international humanitarian law.240 As the Soviet secret police, 
the NKVD represented the main arm of domestic political repression. It already 
possessed a good deal of experience in extrajudicial killings and administered the 
notorious gulag labor camps for political prisoners and other individuals unfortunate 
enough to meet the wrath of the Communist government (Applebaum 2003:94). It is 
perhaps not surprising that the deportation of Polish soldiers and civilians to labor 
camps became a common form of punishment under NKVD rule. Delegating authority 
to the NKVD suggests the treatment of Polish prisoners was viewed more as a 
problem of internal security to the stability of a now enlarged Soviet Union rather than 
simply a matter of interstate warfare. Reliance on the NKVD in many ways flows 
from the objectives of territorial re-absorption, since the organization did not tend to 
be used for prisoner of war issues in most other Soviet wars  
 Lavrenty Beria, head of the NKVD and later a key player in the Katyn 
massacre, quickly formed a specific department within the secret police called the 
Administration for Prisoner-of-War Affairs to deal with the Polish camps.241 With the 
                                                 
239 Politburo Decision on Placing POW Reception Points under NKVD Protection (Excerpt) 18 
September 1939, Moscow (Cienciala et al. 2007:48-49). 
240 Prisoners of war are supposed to be under the control of the captor’s government and subject to the 
regulations of the captor’s armed forces. See, for example, Articles 4 and 8 of the 1899 Hague 
Convention, and Articles 2, 43, 45 of the 1929 Geneva Convention. 
241 See Secret Order of the USSR People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs, 19 September 1939, No. 
0309, Moscow (Cienciala et al. 2007:49). The acronym UPV is commonly used to refer to the 
department in many scholarly writings and refers to the Russian name, Upravlenie po Delam 
Voennoplennykh. 
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NKVD structure in place, the objectives of these facilities went beyond the simple 
custody and care of prisoners, which was the traditional purpose of most prisoner of 
war camps. NKVD captors also formulated an intense program of interrogation and 
indoctrination to identify individuals that might be amenable to the Communist cause 
on the one hand, and weed out and eliminate threatening elements on the other hand. 
Polish officers became a key target of this program across several special camps that 
were set up expressly for the purpose of interrogation and eventual elimination. 
 The chaos resulting from the war as hundreds of thousands of Polish soldiers 
surrendered in a haphazard fashion meant that most of the early camps contained 
prisoners across a wide range of ranks. From the beginning, however, Polish officers 
were treated differently from lower-ranked prisoners. The NKVD gave explicit 
instructions early on that officers should be identified and distinguished from the 
general prisoner population (Gross 1991:46). Red Army commanders were forbidden 
from releasing any officer prisoners under their care and were further instructed to 
specifically seek out Polish officers attempting to evade Soviet capture (Sanford 
2005:44; Cienciala et al. 2007:28). The special status accorded to Polish officers was 
formalized in a directive on November 19, 1939 that over 20,000 officers and other 
relevant officials would be separated from the main transit centers and transported to 
three specifically designed prison camps (Malcher 1993:24).  
These camps were Kozelsk, which was located 150 miles southeast from the 
town of Smolensk; Starobelsk, which was 160 miles southeast from Kharkov; and 
Ostashkov, which was on an island 9 miles northwest from the town of Kalinin (now 
Tver) (Sanford 2005:48). Kozelsk and Starobelsk were designated as camps primarily 
for officers, while Ostashkov became in many ways a residual for remaining 
categories of prisoners, which included officers from the police, border and prison 
guards, as well as a number of civil and judicial officials (Cienciala et al. 2007:29-30). 
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The emphasis on police and related officials at the Ostashkov camp may have 
illustrated a certain amount of Soviet projection and overestimation of the role of these 
individuals in the running of the former Polish state (Sanford 2005:54). A number of 
additional officers and officials were also held in a variety of smaller NKVD prisons 
in western portions of Belarus and Ukraine. The decision by the Soviets to isolate 
officers was thus made early on and reflects the special attention devoted to this 
particular group of enemy combatants. 
Unlike the sparse conditions that prevailed in the 26 regular prisoner camps 
and hundreds of other labor camps, the special camps for officers were relatively more 
comfortable though far from sumptuous (Vance 2006:221). Labor was still expected, 
but in general was less arduous and often limited to building and maintaining camp 
facilities. The main purpose of segregating the officers from the rest of the prisoner 
population was to conduct a concerted screening process to identify officers who 
might be sympathetic to the Soviet Union (Malcher 1993:24). Irrespective of the initial 
feelings of the officers toward the Soviet Union, all prisoners were also subject to an 
intensive indoctrination campaign to convince them to join the Communist cause 
(Roberts 2006:170). 
Reflecting the paranoia that had already enveloped the Soviet Union during 
earlier domestic purges from the 1930s, camp officials were extremely sensitive to any 
hint of opposition to Soviet authority by the prisoners. For instance, in late November 
1939 a special NKVD team was sent to Starobelsk to deal with a secret “anti-Soviet 
organization,” which merely turned out to be a request by a group of prisoners to 
contact the local American Consulate regarding the possibility of joining the Polish 
Army-in-Exile that had by then formed in France (Malcher 1993:25). The Soviet 
Union was ultimately justified in expressing concern over the beliefs of the prisoner 
population in the special camps. Compared to most other countries which were 
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annexed or became occupied during the Second World War, nothing that approached 
large-scale collaboration developed in Poland (Stachura 2004:131). Polish officers in 
general turned out to be fiercely nationalistic and derided what they considered to be 
the crude Soviet attempts at indoctrination. A later survey in March 1940 of 
Starobelsk officers asking where they would prefer to be sent should they be released. 
Answers to the survey revealed around half wished to return to Poland even though it 
was under German and Russian military control, while most of the rest wanted to be 
transported to a neutral country. Only 64 of the approximately 5,000 respondents 
indicated a desire to remain in the Soviet Union (Piesakowski 1990:142). 
The refusal by the vast majority of Polish officers to toe the Communist line 
and the outright rejection of the Soviet Union became a sore point for NKVD officials 
and the Soviet leadership more generally. The officers at the three special camps and 
other prisons were aware the interrogations were related to some form of selection 
criteria, though none knew these interviews would ultimately be a matter of life and 
death. Interrogations revealed that the vast majority of Polish officers had little 
sympathy for the Communist cause and would likely oppose Soviet rule if given the 
chance. By their words and deeds, the Polish officers demonstrated to Soviet 
authorities that they represented a long-term threat to continued Soviet control over 
Eastern Poland. While other Polish civilians and prisoners certainly suffered under 
Soviet rule, the threat posed by Polish officers meant that they would almost be 
completely eradicated. 
The internal discussions and exact steps leading up to the final order to 
liquidate the special camps have either been destroyed or are still hidden in Soviet 
archives (Cienciala et al. 2007:141). On December 3, 1939 the NKVD made the 
decision to formally arrest all Polish officers in the three special camps as suspected 
counter-revolutionaries, which put them under the Soviet penal system rather than the 
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convention laws of war (Sanford 2005:64). Later on March 5, 1940 based on the 
recommendations of the NKVD chief Beria, the Politburo issued the ultimate order to 
empty the special camps and dispose of almost every single Polish prisoner.242 The 
process involved the highest level of secrecy at all stages. Only Stalin, Beria, and a 
small circle of other officials were privy to the discussions proposing the execution 
order in the first place. Even after the order had been authorized, just a dozen officials 
took part in the planning, while it is estimated that those implementing the actual 
killing of more than 20,000 Polish prisoners involved only around 200 individuals 
(Sanford 2005:76).  
There have been various estimates of the exact number of prisoners killed 
across all of the sites. Part of the problem is that even many NKVD records tabulating 
the total number of victims contain numerous inaccuracies and contradictions. Table 
29 below provides the best figures for the number of prisoners who were killed 
compared to those who were spared for each of the three special prison camps.243 
Across these camps alone almost 15,000 officers and other high officials were killed. 
Because of the paucity of records, the fate for those housed in the Ukrainian and 
Belorusian prisons of the NKVD is less certain. It is now broadly believed that 7,305 
out of 18,632 individuals in these prisons were executed in a similar manner to 
prisoners from the three special camps (Sanford 2005:109). The outcome was 
unfortunately not much better for the remaining prisoners, since it appears that most 
were sent to labor camps or met a similarly nasty ending.  
                                                 
242 Indicative of how the business of the Politburo could move from the exceptional to the mundane, 
minutes from the meeting that day indicate that the next item taken up on the agenda concerned 
preparations for a new sarcophagus at the Kremlin mausoleum for Lenin’s body (Sanford 2005:81). 
243 Figures are based on (Sanford 2005:94, 115). 
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Table 29: Death and survival statistics at the three special camps for Polish prisoners, 
April-May 1940 
POW Camp Mass Graves Number Executed
Number 
Spared
Percent 
Executed
Kozelsk Katyn 4,410 205 95.4
Starobelsk Kharkov 3,739 78 97.9
Ostashkov Kalinin 6,314 112 98.2
Total 14,463 395 97.3  
Taken together, the most widely accepted figures suggest at least 21,768 Polish 
prisoners were systematically executed by the NKVD under Stalin’s authority from 
April through May, 1940. Those killed included 10 generals, 300 colonels and 
lieutenant-colonels, 500 majors, 2,500 captains, and 5,000 lieutenants and second-
lieutenants (Piesakowski 1990:157). The Katyn Forest massacre destroyed 55 percent 
of the Polish Army’s pre-war Officer corps along with a large portion of the domestic 
security apparatus of the state (Malcher 1993:23). Furthermore, around half of the 
officers were from the reserve forces and drawn from some of the most elite sections 
of Polish society. As a result, Poland lost in addition 300 doctors, 200 lawyers, 300 
engineers, 21 university professors, as well as a host of other professionals (Vance 
2006:222). Along with the destruction of Poland’s military leadership, the annexed 
country also lost the “flower of the Polish intelligentsia,” which individually and as a 
group would have likely posed a stern challenge to the Soviet Union’s continued hold 
on Polish territory (Zawodny 1962:22; Sanford 2005:52). 
What is perhaps most astonishing is how few prisoners survived. The 
executions at the three main special camps resulted in the deaths of 97 percent of all 
Polish officers under Soviet custody at the time. Compared to the violence wrought on 
the Polish civilian and general prisoner population, the Katyn massacre took 
combatant abuse to a completely new level of ruthlessness. Even Japan and Germany, 
not exactly known to be the most humane captors from the Second World War, did not 
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achieve similar levels of carnage when looking at the total number of prisoners falling 
under their control. 
Why was the final order taken to annihilate almost the entire Polish officer 
corps? The text of the March 5, 1940 memorandum from Beria requesting Stalin to 
authorize the executions provides several indications of the territorial motives 
underlying the decision making of the Soviet leadership. In the opening paragraphs, 
Beria justifies the preferred outcome as follows: 
Prisoners-of-war officers and police in the camps are attempting to 
continue their c-r [counter-revolutionary] work and are conducting 
anti-Soviet agitation. Each one of them is just waiting to be released 
in order to be able to enter actively into the battle against Soviet 
power.244  
He goes on to note that NKVD officials had also uncovered a number of insurgent 
organizations in the western portions of Ukraine and Belorussia, which were two of 
the main areas of Poland annexed by the Soviet Union the year prior. In all cases Beria 
charged that these organizations were being led by former Polish officers or members 
of the police.  
After describing the specific number and distribution of prisoners across the 
special camps, he concludes by recommending the prisoners should be dealt with 
“using the special procedure, apply to them the supreme punishment, [execution by] 
shooting” (Cienciala et al. 2007:120). The document also definitively establishes the 
highest echelons of the Soviet leadership both possessed knowledge of the massacre 
that was soon to unfold and played a direct hand in its authorization. Marked on the 
                                                 
244 Quoted from No.794/B Top Secret, Beria Memorandum to Joseph Stalin Proposing the Execution of 
the Polish Officers, Gendarmes, Police, Military Settlers, and Others in the Three Special POW Camps, 
Along with Those Held in the Prisons of the Western Regions of Ukraine and Belorussia, Accepted by 
the Politburo, 5 March 1940, Moscow (Cienciala et al. 2007:118-120). 
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first page of the memorandum were the signatures of Joseph Stalin, Foreign Minister 
Vyacheslav Molotov, as well as several other members of the Politiburo.  
 The memorandum thus reflects a deliberate policy of the Soviet leadership to 
eliminate all sources of current and future resistance within the former Polish territory. 
Alongside the mass deportations and abuses of other soldiers and civilians, “The main 
aim of Soviet policy during 1939-1941 was to destroy Polish political, social and 
cultural influence entirely, and to disperse the Polish population throughout the USSR, 
where it could be controlled effectively” (Sanford 2005:24).  
Beria’s discussion of counter-revolutionary threats, whether real or perceived, 
perhaps could have been a pretext for other motives to kill Polish officers, several of 
which will be examined in greater detail below. Taking into account later 
developments in Poland, however, the Soviet decision was a brutal yet in many ways 
completely reasonable strategy given their desire to hold on to the annexed territories. 
After the German attack on Soviet forces in the summer of 1941, the entire area of 
interwar Poland turned over to the Third Reich for much of the rest of the war. By 
1942, domestic resistance had consolidated into the formation of the Polish Home 
Army, which became the primary indigenous opponent to German rule. At its height 
the Home Army contained around 400,000 members, but its strength is widely 
believed to have been drawn from a core of former Polish military officers.245 These 
officers coordinated all aspects of the Home Army’s fighting force and turned it into 
one of the most formidable resistance movements of the entire war (Stachura 
2004:132-135). Although the Soviet Union never faced the full force of Polish 
                                                 
245 For instance, one of the founders and key commanders of the Home Army, was Stefan Grot-
Rowecki, a former Polish Army officer (Komorowski 1951:140). For a general discussion of the 
composition of the Home Army, see (Walker 2008:58-59). 
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resistance, the Soviet leadership appears to have been justified in expressing concern 
over the threat posed by the officers in their custody. 
Examining other elements of the killings yields additional insight into the 
territorial motives behind Soviet decision making. First, the timing of the massacre is 
interesting given that the Soviet leadership waited more than four months after it had 
captured the vast majority of the Polish officers before commencing the executions. 
Part of the delay appears to have been balancing the future threat posed by the officers 
versus the potential gains from using these prisoners as a bargaining chip in the wider 
European war. Beginning in late November 1939, the Soviet Union found itself in the 
small but hard-fought Winter War against neighboring Finland. There has been some 
thinking that the special camps were liquidated to make way for large numbers of 
Finnish prisoners (Cienciala et al. 2007:139). In this light, the Katyn massacre was 
merely a pragmatic and ultimately ad hoc solution to a housing shortage for the wider 
Soviet prisoner population rather than a systematic plan to consolidate recently won 
territorial prizes. 
 This contention does not stand up well when looking at the overall course of 
the Finnish war. Contrary to Soviet expectations, the Finns put forward a resolute 
defense which translated into the Red Army only capturing 825 prisoners throughout 
the entire war (Hannikainen et al. 1992:85). This number does not represent even one-
quarter of the total prisoner population at the smallest of the three special camps, 
Starobelsk. The Katyn massacre also took place several weeks after the war with 
Finland formally ended on March 12, 1940. Space constraints would no longer seem 
to be an issue, since it was unlikely that more Finnish prisoners would be falling into 
Soviet hands. 
 The Polish prisoners did appear to figure prominently in Russian decision 
making during the Winter War, though not for the reasons initially thought. After the 
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war opened, Russia was accused of the international crime of aggression and ejected 
from the League of Nations in December 1939. In early February of the following 
year, Britain and France put forward a proposal to send an intervention force to help 
their democratic Finnish counterpart (Gilbert 1989:42).246 There was some discussion 
about whether or not the Polish Government-in-Exile in London would contribute 
troops to the mission to thwart the Soviet Union, since it was one of the occupiers of 
the Polish homeland. Several historians have hypothesized that Stalin kept the Polish 
officers in reserve as a source of leverage, should any London Polish military 
contribution to the expeditionary force ever materialize (Cienciala et al. 2007:147).  
In the end the Western powers were unable to provide any significant aid to the 
Finns because of a variety of obstacles. Although the Red Army was suffering far 
greater casualties, Soviet material superiority ground down the Finnish forces and by 
late February Finland had opened armistice negotiations with their adversary. Peace 
with Finland appeared more than likely by the start of March 1940. The possibility of 
Western intervention diminished greatly and with it the usefulness of the Polish 
special prisoners. Far from the threat of war, it appears more likely that the expected 
termination of the conflict with Finland helped to seal the fate of the Polish prisoners 
at Kozelsk, Starobelsk, Ostashkov, and the other NKVD prisons. Alongside the Soviet 
belief during the same period that a war with Germany was unlikely, and consequently 
the need for a Polish ally was small, the contrasting desire to dispose of the Polish 
officers could be given full voice (Cienciala et al. 2007:147).  
When turning to the details of the executions themselves, several aspects point 
to the particular importance Soviet leaders placed on destroying any future Polish 
                                                 
246 Though it should be noted that Britain and France also had ulterior motives in sending an expedition 
to Finland, in particular to use this operation as a pretext to occupy Norway and thereby withhold 
valuable ore deposits from Germany (Calvocoressi et al. 1989:118). 
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resistance. In the sequence in which prisoners were selected, the first batches to be 
sent off to their deaths invariably included the highest-ranking officers, in particular a 
select number of generals, as well as those individuals the NKVD identified as 
possessing a particularly strong aptitude for leadership (Zawodny 1962:105-106). 
With the main leaders gone this made the later executions easier to implement, but 
also ensured the most threatening elements were terminated from the very beginning. 
Although the survival rate was miniscule across all categories within the camps, those 
groups with particularly high-levels of technical expertise were eliminated to the last 
person. For instance, Soviet authorities made certain to round up all officers from the 
Polish Institute of Gas Warfare and every single staff member was executed.247 
In order to obstruct later possible sources of grievances, the Katyn massacre 
was carefully coordinated with targeted deportations of other likely hostile elements. 
In conjunction with the killings of prisoners from the special camps, the NKVD also 
purposefully planned the mass deportation of the prisoners’ families from their homes 
in Soviet-controlled areas of Poland.248 Three days before the March 5, 1940 order 
which sealed the fate of the Polish prisoners, the Politburo issued a directive to the 
NKVD to round up the 25,000 families of the inmates from the special camps.249 The 
families were then shipped to the northern region of Kazakhstan. On April 13, 1940, in 
the midst of the ongoing killings of the Polish prisoners, 66,000 family members were 
swept up and deported to collective farms and other facilities to perform hard labor in 
                                                 
247 Other groups which were targeted in a particularly systematic manner included graduates from the 
Department of Armament of Warsaw Polytechnic and staff from the Policy Technical Institute for 
Armament (Zawodny 1962:132). 
248 It has been argued that one of the reasons the Soviet Union agreed to allow correspondence between 
prisoners and their families was not for humanitarian reasons and to abide by the laws of war, but rather 
to collect further intelligence and in particular the addresses of family members (Sanford 2005:57). 
249 Protocol no.13, 2 March 1940, Top Secret Special folder 114. On Guarding the State Borders in the 
Western Oblasts of the UkSSR and BSSR, Approve the following proposals by Comrades Beria and 
Khrushchev (Cienciala et al. 2007:114-115). 
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the Kazakh interior. Because the families were mainly comprised of women and 
children, the grueling work and harsh conditions killed a large though ultimately 
unknown number (Cienciala et al. 2007:121, 137-138). The aim was not only to 
punish those families of Polish officers, but also to remove any later sources of 
possible resentment against the Soviet Union, which could coalesce into opposition to 
Communist rule over the conquered territory (Sanford 2005:27). The decision to 
liquidate the special camps, therefore, ultimately had much broader ramifications and 
resulted in the deaths of a great deal more innocent people. 
Although much of the discussion up until this point has centered on the officer 
contingents of the special camps, at Ostashkov and many of the smaller prisons in 
Western Ukraine and Belarus the prisoners were high-ranking policemen, border 
guards, and other officials. Disposing of all these groups meant the Soviet Union was 
able to destroy not only the military leadership, but in addition almost the entire 
security and coercive apparatus of the former Polish government (Cienciala et al. 
2007:142). This had the effect of undermining the capability of any aspiring Polish 
state to reconstitute itself, but also eliminated almost every individual in Soviet 
custody with the ability to meaningfully organize and lead a resistance force. In sum, 
the documentary evidence, along with the patterns and timing of the killings 
themselves, suggest the Soviet Union was primarily driven to this highly brutal yet 
targeted strategy of combatant abuse because of its long-term objective to assert 
complete control over recently conquered Polish territory. 
Alongside the mass of prisoners killed in the special camps, a small number 
were not chosen to be executed. Why were a select few spared? The vast majority who 
were executed were deemed to be enemies of the Soviet Union in some form or 
another. The exact criteria for those lucky enough to be saved are not known with 
certainty, though it is generally assumed they fell into one of three categories: 
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professed Communists; those thought to be more susceptible to further indoctrination; 
and those with some aspect of their background that aroused sympathy from their 
NKVD interrogators.250 Once the executions had concluded by the middle of May 
1940, the remaining officers from the three camps were sent to the Pavlishtchev-Bor 
facility before ending up in the Gryazovets prisoner of war camp. Ironically, many 
were initially disappointed, since they assumed their compatriots had already returned 
home while they were being held back for some unknown reason. They would later 
find out that they were saved to become the core of a pro-Communist Polish Army 
that would be under the command of the Soviet Union. In the end, however, the 
indoctrination program was an overall failure, since even amongst those specially 
selected for further education only thirteen ended up being accepted by Soviet 
authorities as avowed communists (Zawodny 1962:148). 
Despite the few who managed to avoid execution, the objective of Stalin 
regarding the prisoners was unmistakably clear – to destroy the Polish officer corps 
and all related elements under Soviet control. Although having immediate 
consequences for the Polish officers, the Katyn massacres are better seen as part of a 
long-term Soviet plan to destroy any meaningful indigenous Polish influence within 
the newly absorbed territories (Sanford 2005:83). Looking even more broadly, the 
massacres had an additional benefit of ensuring that any Polish rump state that might 
have arisen out of the German-controlled area would be as weak as possible 
(Weinberg 1994:107). In one way or another, Soviet territorial ambitions in Poland 
                                                 
250 As an example of the last category, even one general, Jerzy Wolkowicki, managed to survive the 
Katyn massacre. Wolkowicki surmises that the NKVD favored him because of his experience as an 
officer in the Tsarist Russian Navy during the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War when he was the only 
officer who opposed surrendering his ship during the Battle of Tsushima. He believes this single event 
is what made the difference in saving him, while the other generals were executed (Zawodny 1962:143-
145). 
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had dire implications for the general Polish prisoner population, but an especially 
brutal end for Polish officers. 
Alternative Explanations for the Massacre 
 Several alternative explanations have been put forward to explain the Katyn 
massacre. However, the general weight of the evidence indicates that territorial 
motives account most convincingly for the particular patterns of combatant abuse in 
this episode. First, looking at other factors that have been proposed to explain patterns 
of combatant abuse in general, cultural differences certainly appear to figure 
prominently in the Polish case. Russia, whether in its Tsarist or Communist 
incarnations, had developed a longstanding rivalry with its largely Catholic Polish 
neighbor. The cultural clashes between the two countries could presumably explain 
the desire of Soviet Russia to rid itself of its culturally dissimilar foe once and for all 
when given the chance. The cultural argument is consistent with the overall high level 
of abuse the Soviets unleashed on both Polish combatants and civilians at large. 
Cultural factors are less convincing when trying to account for variations in the degree 
to which different groups of essentially culturally similar Poles were targeted. If the 
motive was to destroy members of an opposing culture, why were officers targeted to 
a much greater extent than regular soldiers or civilians?  
The cultural argument also does not account very well for why a later group of 
Polish officers first interned in the Baltic states did not end up being executed. As 
noted earlier, several thousand Polish soldiers had managed to escape the Soviet grasp 
by fleeing to Lithuania and Latvia. Polish prisoners in both countries were later 
arrested after the Soviet Union annexed the Baltic states in June 1940. By the time the 
Polish officers had been interned in camps inside the Soviet Union, the broader 
strategic situation in Europe had drastically changed.  
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Over the course of May and June of that year, Germany achieved surprisingly 
rapid victories over many of the countries in Western Europe, including a crushing 
defeat of France in six weeks. The hopes of the Soviet leadership that the fascist and 
capitalist powers would exhaust each other in a war of attrition appeared to be dashed 
(Mearsheimer 2001:196-197). Although Stalin was ultimately surprised by the timing 
of the eventual German attack, the successes enjoyed by the Third Reich in the 
summer of 1940 greatly heighted the menace posed by the Soviet Union’s accomplice 
in the dismemberment of Poland. With no ready counterweight in the West, Germany 
potentially threatened the very survival of the Soviet Union, much less the Communist 
regime’s ability to hold on to the annexed territories in Eastern Poland. 
One of the ironies of Soviet ambitions in Poland was that from a broader 
strategic point of view the newly gained Polish territories in many ways involved more 
burdens than benefits. The previous Soviet borders possessed a greater extent of 
natural barriers, which had been bolstered during the interwar period by a series of 
more fixed defenses. After the annexation logistics and transportation also became 
more problematic, since Soviet forces now had to deal with two different railway 
gauges across the Russian and Polish areas. Perhaps the biggest problem was that the 
disappearance of Poland removed a useful buffer zone against German forces to the 
West. The Soviets gained Polish territory, but at the expense of placing themselves 
immediately opposite the Wehrmacht and vulnerable to the surprise attack that would 
later come. It was far from an understatement when one Red Army officer expressed 
his skepticism over the merits of Polish annexation and concluded that the operation 
“was not such a good move from the military point of view” (Erickson 1991:22). 
Widespread German victories in Western Europe in the late spring of 1940 
drastically changed the strategic situation of the Soviet Union and correspondingly its 
treatment of Polish prisoners. Just a few months earlier the Katyn prisoners were 
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viewed as entirely expendable, but as the German threat grew the Soviet Union 
preferred to hold on to those Polish officers taken from the Baltic countries should 
they be needed to repel a Wehrmacht offensive (Cienciala et al. 2007:147-148). By 
November 1940, more than six months before the eventual German invasion, Beria 
was discussing with Stalin the possibility of organizing the remaining Polish officers 
and soldiers into military units. Although he still preferred to select particular officers 
who demonstrated pro-Communist attitudes, he concluded that “As a result of the 
work carried out, it has been established that the great majority of POWs can be 
undoubtedly utilized for organizing a Polish military unit.”251 Considering NKVD 
records from the time listed 18,297 Polish prisoners, which included close to 1,000 
officers of various ranks, this stands in enormous contrast to the handful that were 
deemed trustful enough to be spared from the Katyn massacre earlier that same spring. 
If the German armies had indeed become bogged down in Western Europe and in their 
weakened state posed much less of a threat as the Soviets had initially hoped, the 
outcome would have probably been very different. It is more than likely the remaining 
Polish officers would have been sacrificed to Soviet territorial ambitions in a similar 
way to their predecessors. Motives driven by cultural differences do not appear to 
provide a convincing explanation for the very different treatment accorded to different 
groups of Polish prisoners over time. 
Second, perhaps Soviet abuse of the Poles was rooted in a particular historical 
hatred of far greater magnitude than for any other adversary, irrespective of their 
particular cultural attributes. Related to this point is the argument that the Katyn 
massacre was revenge for the Soviet Union’s humiliating defeat during the 1919-1920 
                                                 
251 Quoted from No.47/13b Top Secret TsK VKP (b), Note from Beria to Stalin on the Possible 
Organization of Military Units with Polish and Czech Prisoners of War, 2 November 1940, Moscow 
(Cienciala et al. 2007:276-278). 
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Russo-Polish War (Paul 1991:49). Grievances from the earlier war certainly loomed 
large in the Communist leadership, but if the thirst for revenge was driving Soviet 
actions it is again not clear why the later group of Polish officers taken from the Baltic 
states were not executed. In the eyes of Stalin and the Politburo, these prisoners should 
have been just as guilty as the Katyn victims for the prior war. Furthermore, one of the 
main survivors from the massacre, Colonel Berling, who would later become the 
commander of the Soviet-sponsored Polish People’s Army, had fought Soviet forces 
and distinguished himself during the previous war (Cienciala et al. 2007:142).  
The earlier conflict between the two states was used in one interesting manner 
by later Russian defenders to counter the seeming unique brutality of the Katyn 
massacre. A great number of Russian prisoners died in Polish captivity during the 
1919-1920 war and several Russian officials and historians have attempted to portray 
this event as a sort of “anti-Katyn” to demonstrate that Poland was also guilty of 
similar levels of combatant abuse (Sanford 2005:8). Historical records show this is a 
difficult case to make. Although upwards of 20 percent of Soviet prisoners did not 
survive their time in Poland’s camps, this was more a function of neglect rather than a 
calculated strategy by the Polish government, which was compounded by the already 
sick and weakened condition of many Russian prisoners upon entering captivity (State 
Archives in Poland 2004). Furthermore, Polish prisoners in Russian hands did not fare 
much better during the conflict, which casts doubt on the notion that Katyn was 
revenge for earlier Polish one-sided killings (Davies 1983:3; Ferguson 1999:394). At 
best both sides were guilty of abuse during the earlier conflict, and the Soviet Union 
certainly did not possess a monopoly on prisoner-related sources of grievance. 
Third, perhaps the Soviet Union’s Communist ideology drove them to destroy 
the Polish officer corps rather than anything inherent about the Poles themselves. A 
large body of literature has developed to explain the widespread use of violence by 
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Communist regimes in order to consolidate power and hasten radical changes to 
domestic societies (Dallin and Breslauer 1970:5-6).252 When translated to the 
particular context of the treatment of prisoners during interstate wars, the quantitative 
analysis in Chapter 4 indicates that Communism is a poor predictor of combatant 
abuse. Nevertheless, the targeting of the officer corps, who were more than likely far 
removed from the Polish proletariat, might explain quite well the particular pattern of 
abuse in the Polish case as a way for the Soviet Union to guard against the larger 
menace of “bourgeois contagion” (Zaslavsky 2008:4-5). Writing about a future war 
with a capitalist state, which Poland would have certainly qualified in Soviet eyes at 
the time, one prominent Soviet legal scholar argued ordinary enemy combatants would 
be welcomed as common brothers in arms. The attitude toward captured officers was 
quite different and potentially foreshadows the eventual fate of the Polish contingents:  
The situation would not be at all the same were officers taken 
prisoners, however. Obviously, it could not be expected that officers, 
who in the majority of cases do not belong to the proletariat, would be 
converted to communism by mere theoretical instruction. Hence the 
officers would always be considered by the Soviet authorities as class 
enemies.253 
 Although most of the prisoners at the Kozelsk and Starobelsk camps might 
indeed fall under the bourgeoisie moniker, the vast majority of the inmates at 
Ostashkov were policemen, prison guards, and other individuals who could not 
credibly be accused of being bourgeois. Despite their more working class background, 
they were targeted with the same ferocity as officers from the armed forces. The 
collective punishment of the prisoners from the special camps seems more consistent 
                                                 
252 For a thorough review of the literature on Communist regimes and the use of violence, see 
(Valentino 2004:92-100). Though it should also be noted that Valentino develops a more fine-grained 
typology that distinguishes radical Communist regimes from those that for a variety of reasons are less 
likely to engage is large amounts of violence (Valentino 2004:142-149). 
253 Excerpt from T.A. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law, quoted in (Zawodny 
1962:129). 
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with an attempt to dismantle the coercive apparatus of the Polish state rather than 
target the bourgeois class per se (Cienciala et al. 2007:142). On the other hand, two of 
the survivors from Katyn were princely aristocrats who were certainly more deserving 
than many of the other victims of the label of class enemies (Zawodny 1962:145). In 
contrast to those officers who were spared, Stalin was also known throughout this 
period to liquidate avowedly Polish communists who were thought to be too 
independent-minded (Davies 1982b:452). Soviet decisions on who lived or died 
appeared to have been driven more by considerations of which individuals posed the 
greatest threat to their continued rule over Polish territory rather than by 
straightforward ideological commitments.254 
 Fourth, the final alternative is somewhat related to territorial issues but the 
emphasis focuses more on Soviet concerns to please Germany after their mutual 
dismemberment of Poland and demonstrate they could be a trusted partner (Weinberg 
1994:107). In a similar manner to the Soviet Union, the German government took over 
large portions of Poland, though it also installed an occupying General Government 
(Generalgouvernement) over the remaining territory. Although they never quite 
reached the same degree of targeting killing as at Katyn, the Germans followed a 
similar territorial pattern of committing very high levels of abuse against Polish 
prisoners as well as civilians (Datner 1962:10, 21-22).255 Both countries also engaged 
in a certain degree of cooperation, including prisoner exchanges and a modest amount 
of intelligence sharing. The Katyn massacre appears perfectly in line with 
                                                 
254 Though it should be noted that in some ways the territory and class arguments might be better 
viewed as complementary rather than competing explanations for combatant abuse. The Polish officer 
corps in particular was viewed as an extension of the bourgeoisie, so eliminating the officers had the 
dual benefit of removing a threat to the Soviet Union’s territorial hold on Poland, but its larger 
ideological project of spreading communist principles throughout the region. 
255 In words reminiscent of the feelings expressed by the Soviet leadership, Hitler ordered German 
forces to kill and commit atrocities “without pity or mercy [against] all men, women, and children of 
Polish descent or language. Only in this way can we obtain the living space we need” (Lukas 1986:3). 
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requirements under the second Secret Protocol of the German-Soviet Treaty on 
Friendship, which called for both parties to eliminate possible sources of agitation 
within their respective Polish territories (Cienciala et al. 2007:61-62). The biggest 
problem with this argument is the fact that the NKVD took every step possible to 
conceal the massacre from German authorities. It seems strange that the Soviet Union 
would try to cover up the crime and not report anything to the partner it supposedly 
wanted so eagerly to impress.  
 In sum, an examination of a number of alternative explanations suggests that 
none perform as well as the territorial motive in accounting for a wide range of details 
relating to the Soviet decision to commit the Katyn massacre. An analysis of the Katyn 
case provides a nice complement to the briefer series of comparative case studies in 
the prior sections of the chapter. An examination of Soviet conduct across multiple 
wars showed that the Soviet Union was most likely to resort to higher levels of 
combatant abuse when it was seeking to re-absorb conquered territories. Looking in 
greater detail at the specific case of the Katyn massacre shows that the motives 
underlying combatant abuse during wars of territorial re-absorption are primarily 
preventative in nature. Soviet authorities abused Polish prisoners in an attempt to 
stamp out any future rebellion or threat to their hold on newly conquered Polish lands. 
Polish officers were selected for a particularly brutal punishment because they 
represented the most salient threat out of the entire Polish prisoner populace to Soviet 
territorial interests. The between-case analysis of Soviet conduct across several wars, 
along with the within-case analysis of Soviet abuse in the Polish episode, together 
demonstrated that when territory is at stake the dangers facing prisoners are likely to 
be extremely high. 
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Conclusion 
 The case of the Katyn massacre during the Second World War indicates that 
when a captor state seeks to annex territory from its opponent, the fate awaiting enemy 
prisoners will more likely than not be extremely brutal. The threat posed by Polish 
soldiers to the Soviet Union’s long-term absorption of lands acquired through the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact meant these prisoners would be liquidated to reduce the 
strength of any future resistance movement. Although almost all Polish prisoners were 
treated harshly, the Katyn massacre shows that those groups most threatening to 
Soviet rule, in particular the officer corps, were more likely to be dealt with in the 
most final and definitive manner possible. By killing almost every single Polish officer 
under their control at the time, Soviet authorities were attempting to ensure that those 
with the greatest capability to organize and rise up would not be around to do so. 
 The perpetrators of the Katyn massacre were part of a Communist regime 
known for large-scale brutality at home. In this light it is perhaps not surprising that 
Stalinist Russia chose to deal with Polish prisoners in such a ruthless manner. As 
attractive as this alternative account may seem, through an initial series of comparative 
case studies I attempted to show how there was nothing intrinsic to the Soviet regime 
that would inevitably lead to high levels of combatant abuse. In other conflicts during 
the same period, the Soviet Union was often just as likely to treat prisoners in a 
humane manner, or at least commit more modest levels of abuse overall, as in the 
Winter War against Finland. However, in instances where the Soviet Union held 
strong territorial ambitions, as in the Baltic states, prisoners suffered an equally savage 
fate to the Katyn victims. In sum, the territorial logic seems to offer a more compelling 
explanation for not only the general level of violence meted out by the Soviet Union 
toward their captives, but also for variation the relative levels of abuse suffered by 
different segments of the prisoner population. 
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 Despite the inclusion of several additional cases to put the Katyn massacre in a 
broader perspective, this chapter still focused solely on the actions of the Soviet Union 
during a fairly narrow period of time. One of the limits of this period was in the cases 
of Soviet territorial re-absorption, the targeted country had little opportunity or 
capacity to retaliate. Considering other cases that vary not only on degree of the 
adversary’s retaliation, but also the nature of the war aims, would provide an 
opportunity to further evaluate the relative role of reciprocity and war aims, as well as 
their possible interaction, on the resort to combatant abuse. In the case of the Soviet 
Union, examining the treatment of the national armed forces and other groups during 
the occupation of various Eastern European countries in the post-World War II period 
could provide another valuable source of comparison along these lines. 
 A further comparative element might be gained by examining instances of 
democracies and territorial war aims as a complement to this chapter’s focus on a 
particular autocratic regime. The overall quantitative analysis indeed showed that 
democracies were less likely in general to commit high levels of abuse compared to 
nondemocracies. This does not mean, however, that democracies are inherently less 
likely to commit combatant abuse when seeking territorial annexation. As Chapter 5 
demonstrated, there are limits on the degree to which democracies are in fact 
restrained when treating prisoners. Looking at the overall data on interstate wars from 
1898 to 2003 suggests that when confined to instances where belligerents seek to 
annex territory from their opponent, democracies are just as likely as autocracies to 
engage in the most extreme forms of violence against enemy combatants.256 For 
                                                 
256 The data even suggest that democracies may be slightly more likely than autocracies to commit 
combatant abuse when territory is on the line. However, this result should be considered tentatively 
since there are only a small number of cases of democracies involved in territorial annexation compared 
to the greater disposition of autocracies to seek this objective during war. There are eight total 
observations that meet these criteria, half of which concern Israel during the 1948 Palestine War. 
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instance, during the 1948-1949 Palestine War, the newly formed democratic state of 
Israel proved more than willing to commit many acts of combatant abuse in order to 
wrest control of surrounding lands from their Arab adversaries (Gutman and Rieff 
1999:30; Morris 2008:405). However, democracy may also have an indirect effect on 
territorial issues if it can be established that democracies are less likely to become 
involved in wars of territorial annexation in the first place. Taking into account not 
only different regime types, but also how states form their war aims in the first place, 
points to several interesting avenues to develop a fuller understanding of the 
relationship between territorial ambitions and the treatment of prisoners during war. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
Review of the Main Argument and Findings 
 In this study I began by pointing to the divergent experiences of many soldiers 
once they lay down their arms and surrender to the enemy. While some have been 
treated in a decent and reasonable manner, others have not been so fortunate and 
suffered greatly at the hands of their captors. These divergent fates led to the following 
research question: what explains differences in the treatment of prisoners during war?  
I developed a theoretical framework centered on the nature of the belligerents 
and the bloodshed to explain variation in combatant abuse during interstate wars. I 
expected democratic belligerents to be less likely to abuse enemy combatants either 
because of a commitment to democratic norms of individual rights, or because of 
institutionally-driven incentives which lead to sensitivity to both the costs of 
retaliation and the strategic benefits of humane conduct. In contrast, the severity of the 
fighting on the ground  as well as the pursuit of territorial war aims, in particular those 
of revisionist re-absorption, increased the likelihood states would resort to combatant 
abuse. Operating behind both the nature of the belligerents and the bloodshed was a 
shadow of reciprocity that loomed large in shaping the expectations and conduct of the 
warring parties. 
I tested several hypotheses derived from this theory using a new data set on the 
treatment of combatants during all interstate wars from 1898 to 2003. The quantitative 
results showed strong support for both the constraining role of democracy, and the 
enabling force of reciprocity and the nature of the bloodshed. Alternative explanations, 
such as the role of cultural differences or international law, received much less 
support.  
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I then subjected the two components of my theory to further scrutiny through a 
combination of additional statistical analysis and in-depth comparative case studies. In 
Chapter 5, I argued that democracies do tend to treat prisoners better on average, but 
normative considerations carry little weight compared to institutional incentives. The 
record of the main democratic belligerents during the Second World War further 
demonstrated that these incentives could be extremely fragile and result in a 
corresponding decline in the treatment of prisoners. In Chapter 6, I focused on the 
specific issue of territorial motives and demonstrated that differences in the resort to 
combatant abuse by the Soviet Union can best be accounted for by the aims of Soviet 
leaders with regards to enemy territory. Taken together, the body of evidence using 
multiple methods suggests that key attributes of the belligerents themselves and the 
nature of the bloodshed go a long way to understanding when and at levels combatant 
abuse occurs during warfare. 
Relevance of the Argument for Existing Research on Wartime Politics 
 Neither my argument nor the research design was formed in a vacuum, and I 
benefited greatly from an impressive body of existing research on states in the midst 
of war. Three works in particular are related in a variety of ways to my own research: 
Dan Reiter and Allan Stam’s Democracies at War, Benjamin Valentino’s Final 
Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century, and Alexander Downes’s 
Targeting Civilians in War. In this light, it is worth considering how my research and 
arguments relate to theirs. 
 Reiter and Stam move beyond the large literature on the democratic peace to 
argue that not only are democracies less likely to fight each other, but they are also 
highly likely to win the wars they do end up fighting. They propose the reasons for the 
democratic propensity for victory are that they are more adept at selecting easy wars 
they are especially likely to win, but also that they fight better on the ground 
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irrespective of the war’s difficulty (Reiter and Stam 2002:4-5). My argument is more 
relevant to the latter “warfighting” component of their democracy and victory thesis 
rather than the first “selection effects” component. Reiter and Stam actually briefly 
touch on the association between prisoners and warfighting effectiveness in their 
book. In a similar manner to my argument on the strategic benefits of good prisoner 
conduct, they point out that inducing surrenders can translate into enormous gains on 
the battlefield by depriving the enemy of their fighting force and ultimately shortening 
the war (Reiter and Stam 2002:66).  
Our emphasis on the implications of this relationship between surrender and 
victory in war nevertheless differs somewhat. Reiter and Stam focus on the beliefs of 
individual soldiers regarding the credibility of autocratic versus democratic captors, 
and argue that democracies have an easier time convincing enemy troops they will be 
properly treated if they surrender. As I discussed in previous chapters, this risks a 
certain circularity in reasoning as democracies treat prisoners well because those 
prisoners believe they will be treated well and so on and so forth. Despite these issues, 
my work is ultimately complementary to Reiter and Stam’s as I evaluate the prior 
empirical question of whether or not democracies do in fact treat enemy combatants in 
a better manner than autocratic captors. That democracies are more humane reinforces 
Reiter and Stam’s point that democratic belligerents are better able to reap the rewards 
from encouraging enemy surrenders. 
My research complements Reiter and Stam’s arguments in broader ways as 
well. By generating more systematic evidence that democracies treat prisoners more 
humanely, my findings provide a further mechanism reinforcing their main thesis that 
democracies win the wars they fight. Given that other scholars have challenged Reiter 
and Stam’s arguments on a number of fronts, my research contributes to the larger 
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debate on the logic and empirical validity of the democracy and victory thesis.257 My 
arguments also speaks to the narrower issue of exactly why democracies act 
differently than other regime types. Reiter and Stam’s main arguments regarding the 
“skeleton” and “spirit” of democracy dovetail closely with my institutional and 
normative accounts of democratic behavior (Reiter and Stam 2002:5-7). Although they 
find support for both factors, my argument largely centers on the greater role played 
by institutional incentives compared to normative considerations. While our two 
perspectives might appear to differ, Reiter and Stam employ the institutional approach 
to explain the behavior of democratic states, or their governments more specifically, 
while reserving the cultural variant more to account for the behavior of soldiers on the 
ground (Reiter and Stam 2002:9). Since my research focuses on the conduct of states, 
my arguments regarding the role of domestic institutions in shaping the treatment of 
prisoners by democracies in many ways strengthens the institutional approach offered 
by Reiter and Stam. Of course, it would be interesting in future work to investigate 
more specifically the behavior of soldiers with regards to both the treatment of enemy 
prisoners and the decision to surrender in order to assess the relative role of normative 
factors in comparison to Reiter and Stam’s related arguments in this area. 
My research shares an emphasis with Reiter and Stam on examining the role of 
regime type during war, but their concern is more for the outcomes of wars while 
attention to the actual conduct of belligerents toward defenseless groups on the ground 
is relatively limited.258 My project is thus in many respects much closer to the work of 
Valentino and Downes, where the conduct of states toward victims is of central 
importance. The most obvious difference between my work and their own is that we 
                                                 
257 Some of the most notable criticisms of Reiter and Stam’s work include (Desch 2002; Biddle and 
Long 2004; Downes 2009). 
258 Though they do briefly consider some of these issues related to the treatment of civilians and 
soldiers in several sections of their study (Reiter and Stam 2002:65-69; 152-158).  
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deal with very different sets of victims. Valentino and Downes both deal with various 
aspects of the targeting of civilians, while my work focuses on prisoner issues. Despite 
the different emphasis in subjects, my work shares several similarities to theirs along 
with some contrasts. 
Valentino’s study of the mass killing of civilians posits in a similar manner to 
my work on prisoner treatment that abuses are driven more by instrumental motives 
rather than by emotion or irrational hatreds (Valentino 2004:3-4). Although we may 
differ to a certain extent on the factors expected to lead to civilian or combatant abuse, 
we share an assumption that violations are purposive acts through which actors seek to 
attain certain desired ends. The logic underlying our respective theories of atrocities, 
irrespective of the particular type of victim, is thus fundamentally consistent. 
The main differences between my work and Valentino’s concerns the context 
under which abuses occur and the role of particular factors in making abuse more or 
less likely. On the first issue, Valentino focuses for the most part on mass killings that 
are perpetrated within a country’s own borders, in particular those involving 
Communist, ethnic, or counterguerrilla motives (Valentino 2004:4-6). Valentino 
incorporates an external dimension into the counterguerrilla category, such as the 
Soviet war in Afghanistan, but even here the emphasis is generally on the domestic 
level.259 Valentino’s universe of cases thus differs from my focus on interstate 
warfare. Despite the difference in case selection, Valentino’s theory offers a great deal 
for understanding my own approach. Although he does not deal with wars over 
territory in great empirical detail, his theoretical expectations that territory will 
increase mass killing closely fits with my own reasoning and findings (Valentino 
2004:77-80). Similarly, his discussion of the impact of wars of attrition on mass 
                                                 
259 For instance, Valentino also focuses to a large extent on guerrilla insurgencies during civil wars or 
rebellions, and the mass killing in Guatemala during the 1970s and 1980s in particular. 
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killing mirrors my expectations regarding the relationship between extremely severe 
wars and combatant abuse (Valentino 2004:84-87). 
In other respects we end up finding different results on the causes of our 
respective type of abuse. One of Valentino’s main findings is that Communist regimes 
are especially likely to resort to civilian mass killing, though even here atrocities are 
much more likely when the leadership seeks an especially radical reorganization of 
society (Valentino 2004:73). In contrast, I find in a quantitative analysis of combatant 
abuse that Communist regimes are no more likely to mistreat prisoners than other 
types of autocracies. My non-finding regarding the role of Communism is perhaps 
even more surprising, since the main Communist belligerents in my data set, such as 
the Soviet Union, Cambodia, and North Korea, were also some of the most radical. As 
I showed in greater detail in Chapter 6, the Soviet Union in fact demonstrated 
significant variation in the treatment of prisoners and reserved the most brutal 
punishment of prisoners mainly for those conflicts where territorial aggrandizement 
was at stake. Since Valentino and I deal with different conflict contexts, our arguments 
are not necessarily contradictory. Communist ideology may have indeed played a 
significant role domestically, but stopped “at the water’s edge” where other factors 
played a greater role in the policies of these regimes during interstate wars.260 
In a similar manner, Valentino’s analysis of the role of democracy differs 
somewhat from my own. While I argue that democratic belligerents are much less 
likely to resort to combatant abuse, Valentino is more skeptical regarding the 
restraining effects of democracy on mass killing (Valentino 2004:27-28). Even here, 
however, our arguments are not completely at odds. Valentino acknowledges that 
democracies may indeed be less likely to engage in atrocities, and in later work he and 
                                                 
260 In a similar manner, Gowa argues that partisan politics has played little role historically in 
explaining the resort to the use of force abroad by the United States (Gowa 1998:319). 
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several colleagues find this is indeed the case (Valentino et al. 2004:394). His caution 
appears to be directed more at those believing that democracy has the potential to be a 
panacea guaranteeing humane treatment, which does not help in understanding the 
broader context under which regimes of any type might be more or less likely to resort 
to abuse. In my research I explicitly acknowledge that democracies have sometimes 
employed high levels of violence against violence. My focus on the conditions under 
which democracy is less likely to act as a restraint, along with identifying the nature of 
the bloodshed and the role of reciprocity, goes some way to addressing Valentino’s 
concern of accounting for a broader set of factors explaining the use of violence 
against defenseless victims. My work is thus in many ways complementary to 
Valentino’s by bringing attention to the ways in which states are motivated to harm 
individuals on the ground, whether those victims are civilians or combatants. 
Lastly, my research perhaps speaks most directly to Alexander Downe’s work 
on the targeting of civilians even though he, like Valentino, deals with a different 
category of victims. In a similar manner to Downes, I limit my analysis to the causes 
of abuse in the context of interstate wars. We also find a number of factors that 
influence the resort to violence by states are the same for civilians and prisoners, in 
particular the severity of the fighting and territorial war aims. The biggest difference 
lies in our findings regarding the relationship between democracy and abuse. As I 
briefly discussed in the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4, I find that democracy has a 
restraining effect on combatant abuse, but Downes shows in contrast that democracies 
are actually more likely to target civilians (Downes 2008:64). 
Our results, therefore, appear to be fundamentally at odds with one another. 
However, my examination of the conduct of the democratic belligerents during World 
War II in Chapter 5 suggests some ways in which our two findings might be 
reconciled. I showed during the war that at the same time as the United States and 
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Britain were treating Axis prisoners in a fairly humane fashion they were more than 
willing to target enemy civilians mercilessly. Conduct toward civilians and prisoners 
is, therefore, not always closely correlated. I argued that two of constraining factors 
for democracies in the case of prisoners – fears of reciprocity and attention to strategic 
benefits from good conduct – were either much weaker or absent when looking at 
civilians. Examining some of the mechanisms underlying the aggregate democracy 
finding goes some way to understanding why democracies may act differently 
depending on particular issue under study, but more work on this question is certainly 
warranted.  
Despite our different conclusions, Downes and I share an emphasis on the 
relative importance of institutional as opposed to normative factors in explaining the 
conduct of democracies during war (Downes 2008:22).261 Although we differ in how 
we develop the implications of domestic institutions for the conduct of states, our 
arguments regarding the role of regime type shares a similar underlying logic. In sum, 
my work differs in certain respects from the notable studies by Reiter and Stam, 
Valentino, and Downes, but in many ways my research should ultimately viewed as 
complimentary and contributes to this wider body of work on the behavior of states 
during war. 
Relevance of the Argument for Armed Conflict in the Contemporary Era 
 My work in many ways fits quite closely with existing research on the conduct 
of war and contributes to this larger research agenda. On a more pragmatic note, and 
after so much time and effort spent searching for obscure information relating to 
particular historical episodes and coding hundreds of cases of combatant abuse, 
researchers like me face a daunting question: even if my argument is correct, and this 
                                                 
261 In a similar manner to Valentino, both my work and Downes’s downplays the direct role played by 
cultural differences in accounting for the resort to abuse (Valentino 2004:16-22; Downes 2008:24-26). 
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is always a big if, what relevance does it provide for understanding the contemporary 
state of the world? I take up this concern in light of several of the choices I made in 
limiting the scope of the study along with the continued pertinence of the main 
findings in the current era of armed conflict. 
The Choice of Interstate Wars 
 In the introduction I noted that I decided to confine the study to interstate wars 
given the time intensiveness of coding the main dependent variable of combatant 
abuse. Some of the most notorious conflicts of the past century, such as the world 
wars, have indeed been fought between states. Several post-war commentators have 
suggested, however, that interstate war is increasingly becoming obsolete (e.g. 
Mueller 1990:321).262 If interstate wars are indeed becoming extinct, then my study 
might be expected to provide little insight into the fate of prisoners in contemporary 
and future conflicts. Compared to the numerous conflicts that began during the 
interwar period which culminated in the Second World War, the last decade might 
seem like a fairly quiet time in terms of conflictual relations between states.263  
Even as many commentators have increasingly focused on civil wars and other 
conflicts, wars between states remain an enduring part of the contemporary 
international landscape. The Cold War was only just coming to an end when the 
Persian Gulf War broke out, which involved one of the largest coalitions of states of 
all time. The treatment of Iraqi soldiers and the abuse of prisoners from the UN 
Coalition forces became key issues during and after the war. For instance, U.S. 
soldiers and civilians abused in Iraq have filed lawsuits seeking compensation for their 
                                                 
262 Though Mueller notes that this tendency for wars between states to become unthinkable is generally 
more pronounced in what he terms the “developed world.” 
263 In contrast to the onset of nine interstate wars for the period 1930-1939, the Correlates of War 
(COW) project list only one new interstate war beginning after 1990 (Sarkees et al. 2003:61). As noted 
in Chapter 3, however, COW has not yet incorporated several recent wars, which alter this picture 
somewhat. 
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suffering, which have still yet to be settled (Myers and Glanz 2008:A1). The 
continuing rivalry between India and Pakistan over the disputed Kashmir region, 
which broke out into a small-scale conflict in the Kargil district 1999, shows that a 
major war in one of the most populated areas of the world remains an ever-present 
danger.  
The War on Terror has rightly brought attention to the threat posed by non-
state actors, but it is indicative that the two wars resulting from the 9/11 terror attacks 
have been between states. The 2001 U.S.-led war in Afghanistan is perhaps best seen 
as an interstate war, since the Taliban were the de facto rulers of much of the country. 
This was followed in 2003 by a clear interstate conflict with Iraq that led to the 
toppling of Saddam Hussein. The treatment of prisoners during interstate wars 
consequently will likely remain an important issue for some time to come.  
The Severity of the Fighting 
 The quantitative analysis showed that the severity of the fighting on the ground 
greatly increases the likelihood that states will resort to combatant abuse. Although the 
incidence of warfare might not have changed substantially over the years, the severity 
finding might be less meaningful if the wars that do occur are becoming less bloody. 
A recent study has shown that the probability of a soldier dying during battle has 
actually declined consistently since the beginning of the 20th century (Lacina et al. 
2006:673). As wars appear to become less severe, then one of the main causes of 
combatant abuse might also be less relevant in the current era. On the other hand, 
other research suggests that the relative severity of wars in terms of battle deaths 
shows no clear downward trend over time (Sarkees et al. 2003:65).  
Each view is based on different data sets and operationalizations of battle 
deaths, which means it is difficult to come to a definitive conclusion regarding trends 
in the relative severity of wars. Looking at the large-n data used in this study, I find 
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that wars of attrition, which tend to be particularly severe, are slightly less likely to 
occur over time, but this association is far from clear-cut.264 Even granting that 
interstate wars might have become less and less severe over the years, recent conflicts 
show that attritional warfare will remain a hazard for some time to come. The heavy 
fighting along fortified positions that typified much of the 1998-2000 war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea was in many ways reminiscent of the trench warfare on the 
Western Front during the First World War (Biles 2000). During the war tens of 
thousands of troops died in hopeless frontal assaults, while prisoners from both sides 
were horribly abused (Clodfelter 2002:618; Weeramantry 2005:468). Wars of great 
severity are likely to endure, whether they involve opposing national armies on vast 
battlefields or the drawn-out character of increasingly prominent counter-insurgency 
operations. 
Territorial Annexation 
 Of the three main variables of the nature of the belligerents and bloodshed 
framework, wars involving territorial annexation was the single most important factor 
associated with combatant abuse, but it is also potentially the most obsolete. Many 
scholars argue the value placed on possessing territory has gradually given way to new 
more fluid forms of authority and state sovereignty in the contemporary era (Ruggie 
1993:148-149; Biersteker 2002:163-166). The increasing fragmentation of production 
processes and the growing importance of knowledge-intensive industries may also 
substantially reduce the benefits of territorial conquest (Brooks 1999:655-663).265 
 The available evidence indicates that territory remains a valued and contested 
prize in times of war and peace even as notions of territory may continue to change 
                                                 
264 As a rough test, the correlation between the war of attrition variable and a war’s start year is -0.22. 
265 Brooks also points to other contributing factors, such as the rise of inter-firm alliances across 
countries and the growing ease of obtaining resources through foreign direct investment, which have 
further decreased the incentives to conquer foreign territories (Brooks 1999:663-666). 
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over time (Kahler 2006:2-3). The number of ongoing territorial disputes, where two or 
more states lay claim to the same piece of land, has not declined significantly since the 
early years of the 20th century.266 If anything, the post-Cold War period has witnessed 
an upsurge in disputes compared to prior decades, which has been driven in part by 
many newly independent states gaining seeking to extend their borders. States often 
seek to settle their disputes short of military force, but the presence of conflicting 
claims over territory poses the danger of wars breaking out that would likely be 
extremely grave for any resulting prisoners.267 Although it did not escalate to a full-
blown war, the recent conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008 over the disputed 
areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, shows that territorial aims are likely to remain in 
one form or another for the foreseeable future. 
Democracy 
 The overall pattern of democratic restraint in the treatment of prisoners 
seemingly provides one of the more hopeful implications for the future of warfare. 
Many scholars and policy makers have grabbed hold of the democratic peace thesis to 
espouse the spread of democracy around the world as a way to ensure international 
peace and security (Clinton 1996:22-23).268 The results from this study suggest that 
expanding the realm of democratic states may not only make armed conflict less 
likely, but also mean those wars that do occur will be relatively more humane. 
                                                 
266 Based on Figure 1.1 from (Huth and Allee 2002:28). 
267 Evidence from the data set on combatant abuse suggests that wars of territorial annexation remain, in 
fact, fairly common over time. As a rough test in a similar manner to the war severity variable, the 
correlation between wars of territorial annexation and the starting year of the war is negative but very 
small (r = -0.009).  
268 As one of the foremost proponents of the democratic peace, Russett also asserts that democracy 
promotion is a valuable endeavor. However, he cautions that such a policy should not necessarily turn 
into forcible regime change, since from the point of view of international conflict many authoritarian 
regimes are not inherently aggressive (Russett 1993:135). 
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 Upon closer examination of several cases of democratic belligerents, the 
promise of democracy needs to be tempered somewhat. The commitment of 
democracies to humanitarian principles protecting the rights of prisoners appears tepid 
at best, though there is some ground for optimism.269 Institutional incentives seem to 
perform much better, but the historical record shows the strength of these motives can 
depend greatly on the particular context and can be overcome by competing factors. 
One theme that came out of the case study sections is that it is not democracy per se as 
an abstract concept of regime type that matters, but rather a set of underlying 
mechanisms that tends to be associated with democratic institutions. When these 
mechanisms are weak, then the behavior of belligerents may correspondingly worsen. 
This should especially be the case for democracies facing situations where other 
contributing factors, such as reciprocity, war aims, and the severity of the fighting, 
which make the resort to abuse much more likely. 
Alongside the key set of factors related to my theory of the nature of the 
belligerents and the bloodshed, an additional potentially important contextual factor 
concerns the type of war a belligerent is fighting. Questions concerning the 
implications of different types of conflicts were largely set aside in this study given 
that I limited much of the overall analysis to wars between states. When thinking 
about conflicts beyond the realm of interstate warfare, the prospects for prisoners may 
indeed differ in substantial respects. Examining other conflict types also provides an 
opportunity for considering ways in which the various components making up the 
nature of the belligerents and bloodshed framework apply in other contexts. 
                                                 
269 In supplementary quantitative analysis I find that democracies that ratify international treaties 
relating to the laws of war are more likely to comply with provisions protecting prisoners. Furthermore, 
while international humanitarian norms do not appear to hold much sway across states as a whole, 
democracies appear to have become relatively more sensitive to such norms over time. 
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Making the Theory Travel: The Abuse of Combatants in other Types of Armed 
Conflict 
 Even if conflicts between states continue to arise, how should we evaluate 
combatant abuse in other forms of warfare? In particular, to what degree do the factors 
associated with the nature of the belligerents and bloodshed framework provide insight 
for understanding the treatment of prisoners outside of interstate war? I evaluate the 
relative incentives for combatant abuse across several different types of warfare, both 
past, present, and future. 
Colonial Wars 
 Although pretty much non-existent over the last few decades, colonial wars, 
also sometimes known as “extra-state” wars, were a common occurrence throughout 
much of the 19th and early 20th centuries (Sarkees et al. 2003:61). Colonial wars 
inevitably involved some form of control over a foreign land of people, whether this 
simply meant acquiring land to extract natural resources, or more ambitious plans like 
sending settlers to populate the new holdings. Territory was almost always a stake in 
such conflicts, and if my arguments from this study are indeed correct, then prisoners 
were likely to be brutally treated in most cases. 
 Unlike the purported tendency of democratic states to settle their territorial 
disputes peacefully, the heyday of colonial activity in the late 19th century showed that 
democracies were just as avid colonizers as any other type of regime. Democratic 
belligerents like the United States were often merciless in fighting their wars of 
imperial expansion. On the American continent itself, the United States prosecuted a 
series of wars against various Indian tribes as it expanded its borders ever more 
westward. During these wars prisoners were often horribly treated, while those lucky 
enough to survive often languished on poorly equipped reservations (Vance 2006:355, 
370-371). Later during the U.S. war in the Philippines from 1899-1902, U.S. forces 
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often relied on torture and summary executions as tools to cow the Filipino population 
into submission (Linn 1989:79). British treatment of prisoners during its colonization 
of present-day New Zealand during the Maori Wars of the 19th century was initially 
fairly moderate, but as resistance continued royal forces turned to increasingly brutal 
tactics (Farwell 1977:342-343; Vance 2006:47).  
In contrast to the non-finding for cultural differences from my analysis of 
interstate wars, many of these conflicts shared a common theme where issues of race 
seemed to play a crucial role in guiding the treatment of prisoners. As Vance remarked 
in reference to the Maori Wars, but also in relation to colonial conflicts more broadly: 
A feeling among European armies that imperial wars were not 
governed by the laws or customs of European wars, particularly 
where prisoners were involved, together with a simple tendency to 
retaliate in kind when atrocities occurred, all too often set in motion 
an escalating spiral of abuse against POWs and civilian prisoners” 
(Vance 2006:255). 
 Vance’s comments suggest that different factors may have varying effects 
depending on the particular type of war. The propensity of democracies to engage in 
colonial wars, along with their equally brutal treatment of prisoners, might at first 
seem puzzling from my attention in large parts of this study to the constraining effects 
of democracy. When looking at both the mechanisms underlying democratic conduct 
as well as the role of other contributing factors, the poor behavior of democracies in 
colonial wars is not quite so surprising. 
The frequent atrocities committed by democratic colonizers certainly calls into 
question the supposed force of democratic norms of humane conduct (Reiter and Stam 
2002:151-152). However, even in interstate wars and cases where democracies 
conducted themselves more humanely, I found that domestic norms played little 
constraining role in this regard. On the other hand, the restraints associated with the 
institutional approach probably have much less of an effect in a colonial context. Any 
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strategic benefits from good treatment likely appear slight when compared to the 
potential advantages of using violence to coerce the enemy population to acquiesce to 
the conqueror’s rule. Expectations over reciprocity might also be substantially weaker, 
especially if racial attitudes make democracies or other states presume that the 
combatants to be colonized cannot be trusted.270 The record of colonial warfare thus 
suggests that democratic norms and institutions may provide few protections to those 
soldiers unfortunately enough to be captured. Ultimately, I can only offer some 
preliminary conjectures, since no data set yet exists which looks at combatant abuse 
during colonial wars. The historical record is at least suggestive that combatant abuse 
is likely to be much higher in colonial compared to interstate wars, since territory, 
culture differences, and expectations of reciprocity are likely much more prominent, 
while the constraints of democracy appear to be considerably lower. 
Civil Wars 
 In many ways civil wars might appear to be an even tougher case for the 
prospects of proper prisoner care than interstate conflict. Compared to the extensive 
system of international humanitarian law governing interstate conflicts, the available 
                                                 
270 It should be noted that my line of reasoning here linking expectations of reciprocity to conduct 
during war draws several parallels with Ido Oren’s argument on the relationship between a state’s 
foreign policy goals and the subsequent subjective evaluation of the adversary’s regime type. Oren 
argues that a state is more likely to view an enemy as autocratic irrespective of the latter’s actual 
domestic norms and institutions, while friendly countries will correspondingly be considered more 
democratic (Oren 1995:150-151). The main difference is that my argument posits how certain factors in 
colonial wars may influence expectations regarding the actual conduct of enemy belligerents, but does 
not necessarily imply anything regarding the adversary’s perceived regime type or other national 
institutions, which is the focus of Oren’s approach. Perceptions of the adversary’s regime type are in no 
way central to my overall argument, which centers on the regime type of the potential abuser. One of 
the main implications of Oren’s arguments is that this subjective coding of an adversary’s regime type 
introduces bias in favor of the merits of democracy in major research programs like the democratic 
peace. As I discussed earlier in Chapter 4 even if we accept Oren’s premises, I do not believe this 
overly biases the general findings regarding the constraining effects of democracy on combatant abuse 
during interstate wars. My discussion here of expectations of reciprocity and combatant abuse does not 
laud the benefits of democracy, and if anything points to some of the limits of democracy as a constraint 
on foreign policy. Nevertheless, it may be interesting in future work to consider in a more rigorous 
manner expectations of the adversary and how this shapes not only the choice of states to go to war, but 
also their subsequent conduct. 
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legal proscriptions on combatant abuse during civil wars are relatively sparse. In the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3 is the sole provision dealing with cases 
deemed to be “armed conflict not of an international character.”271 Article 3 does call 
for limiting certain types of violence, but compared to the rest of the convention the 
provisions are not nearly as extensive or precise. It was only in 1977 that a specific 
agreement, the Additional Protocol II, was negotiated which deals specifically with the 
laws of war during civil conflicts. Protocol II was certainly a step forward, but remains 
far from adequate. Its interstate war sibling, the Additional Protocol I, extended 
protections under the Geneva Conventions and included over one hundred separate 
articles detailing various obligations and restraints involving wars between states. In 
comparison, Protocol II contains only one-quarter as many provisions, and several do 
not carry nearly as much force relative to similar provisions under Protocol I. For 
instance, Protocol II does not even accord any special protected status to prisoners of 
war compared to the extensive treatment of prisoner issues in Protocol I.272 While I 
found the actual impact of international law on the behavior of states during war to be 
a promising but limited factor, the lack of clear rules or expectations for the treatment 
of prisoners in civil wars poses an even greater obstacle to proper conduct. 
 One further related problem in civil wars is that unlike interstate wars one side 
is often not an officially recognized actor in the international community. Rebel 
groups usually have no international standing. Because of the frequent lack of 
international legitimacy for rebels, governments may perceive that reciprocity is not 
                                                 
271 For the full text of the article, see http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/375-
590006?OpenDocument. 
272 For instance, specific provisions are made for medical personnel (Articles 9-12) and the civilian 
population (Articles 13-14, 17), but no section dealing specifically with prisoner issues. This does not 
mean that no provisions are relevant for the treatment of prisoners, but these fall under much more 
general proscriptions against various sorts of violations targeting all groups during war (e.g. Articles 4-
7). By contrast, Protocol I devotes an entire section of the agreement to prisoners of war and several 
other articles directly touch upon prisoner issues. 
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likely to hold even if they limit themselves to humane conduct. In the same way as in 
colonial wars, expectations of reciprocity may weaken and correspondingly a further 
incentive for democratic and autocratic incumbent governments alike to limit abuses 
against prisoners from their challengers may disappear. The lack of legitimacy for 
rebel groups also frequently means that humanitarian organizations like the ICRC 
have a difficult time operating in civil war contexts and their attempts to improve the 
lot of enemy combatants in captivity are correspondingly much more difficult in civil 
wars compared to interstate conflicts. 
 Despite these dangers, there exists substantial variation in the treatment of 
combatants during civil wars. In a similar manner to interstate warfare, in some civil 
wars prisoners are indeed horribly abused. The 1936-1939 Spanish Civil War fought 
between Republican and Fascist Nationalist factions was typified by the systematic 
execution and torture of prisoners by both sides (Vance 2006:382). On the other hand, 
during Eritrea’s struggle for independence, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF) provided fairly decent care to surrendering Ethiopian troops (Killion 
1998:347-348). EPLF actions are even more impressive given the fact that Eritrean 
prisoners were often not accorded the same degree of respect when they fell under 
Ethiopian control. 
 The prominence of civil wars in the current era, alongside some interesting 
differences in the treatment of prisoners across wars, suggests the need for a 
systematic examination of the causes of combatant abuse during civil wars in a similar 
manner to my focus on interstate conflicts. Several of the causes of combatant abuse 
presented in this study have likely corollaries when looking at civil wars. The severity 
of the fighting offers perhaps the closest similarity, since the logic of coercion or 
extraction may also hold in conflicts that degenerate into attritional-type warfare. 
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 Territorial aims seem to offer a similar expectation of greater combatant abuse, 
though rather than adding new lands in the case of interstate wars, for civil wars the 
objective would more likely involve one group trying to secede from the existing state. 
The two cases briefly discussed above suggest that the relationship between territory 
and combatant abuse might not be so clear-cut in civil wars. After all, the EPLF was 
seeking to create its own independent state at the expense of Ethiopia, but the former 
chose to treat its prisoners about as well as could be expected. Although it certainly 
contained a territorial element, the Spanish Civil War was rooted more in ideological 
differences between the two sides, but this was more than enough to lead both parties 
to inflict enormous levels of brutality on their prisoners. The war in Spain also 
cautions against the hope that enemies sharing a common cultural heritage should be 
inherently more likely to show empathy with their adversary and correspondingly treat 
their prisoners in a humane manner. Differences between groups can be constructed on 
any one of a host of different fronts, and ideological clashes appear to have the 
potential to be just as deadly for prisoners as animosities based on race or ethnicity. 
 The role of regime type also provides a fairly straightforward parallel 
expectation that democracies should be less likely to commit combatant abuse, at least 
in the case of the incumbent government. However, as noted above each of the main 
mechanisms restraining democracies may not operate to the same extent in the context 
of civil wars. The relationship between democracy and the conduct of rebel groups is a 
little more intriguing, since in the peace and conflict literature democracy is generally 
viewed as an attribute of states rather than non-state actors.  
The role of democracy in my theory of combatant abuse during interstate wars 
should perhaps be viewed more broadly as focusing attention on particular attributes 
of the actors themselves, whether they are states or rebel groups in hiding. Recent 
research has indeed found that particular characteristics of rebel organizations greatly 
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condition the type and level of violence they employ against civilians (Weinstein 
2007:7).273 It remains an open question whether attention to the internal structures of 
rebel groups is also relevant for the study of treating enemy combatants during civil 
wars. 
 Civil wars might also provide certain incentives to actually care for prisoners 
that may ironically be weaker in the case of interstate wars. One motive in particular is 
the potential to lure an adversary over on to one’s own side, which can likely be 
facilitated through decent treatment and persuasion of the righteousness of the captor’s 
cause. On the other hand, large-scale abuse against the prisoner population will likely 
be less successful in gaining new adherents. The growing strength of nationalism over 
the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, which endures in many ways up to the present 
day, in many ways has made it much more difficult to persuade enemy combatants 
from an opposing state to switch sides in the context of an interstate war. Although 
identities are far from fluid in civil wars, opportunities may exist to bring enemy 
combatants over to one’s side. For instance, one of the benefits of the EPLF’s decent 
treatment of captured Ethiopian soldiers, was that the group was able to persuade 
many prisoners to join the rebel ranks and fight against their erstwhile leaders (Killion 
1998:347).  
The ways in which incentives over how to treat enemy combatants may differ 
under various types of conflicts deserves further scrutiny. An eventual theory of 
combatant abuse during civil wars may differ from the one I have put forward in this 
study on interstate conflict. As the brief discussion above suggests, however, such a 
theory would likely share many similarities with my own by focusing on particular 
                                                 
273 Though Weinstein also argues that the initial available endowment of resources similarly conditions 
the type of organization rebels are likely to construct in the first place. 
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types of incentives and factors that are considered to shape the conduct of state and 
non-state actors during the course of the given conflict.274 
The War on Terror 
 Perhaps no issue related to prisoner rights has garnered greater attention in 
recent years than U.S. treatment of terrorist suspects and other insurgents in the War 
on Terror after the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks. The conflict began with the 
almost wholesale rejection of the prevailing laws of war. Presaging the policies to 
follow, just days after the attacks Vice-President Dick Cheney said that in fighting 
terrorist cells: 
We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. 
We’ve got to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A 
lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, 
without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available 
to our intelligence agencies, if we’re going to be successful. That’s 
the world these folks operate in, and so it’s going to be vital for us to 
use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective 
(Meet the Press 2001).  
The implications of the vice-president’s comments were clear that the United States 
would need to set aside certain domestic and international rules when dealing with a 
terrorist adversary. 
These sentiments were later confirmed when the White House publically 
declared that neither combatants from the Taliban nor al Qaeda would be granted 
prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions, though efforts would be made to 
treat them humanely (Vance 2006:6). The conduct toward insurgent detainees suggests 
the promise of humane treatment has not always been met. Human rights groups have 
                                                 
274 The same point can also be made with reference to different types of abuse. Wood provides a similar 
approach incorporating a variety of factors, such as the incentives of the leadership, normative 
constraints, and unit-level attributes, in order to explore the use of sexual violence during war (Wood 
2006:331-333). My approach focuses in several instances on similar factors thus shares many 
similarities with Wood’s framework and points to the potential for a common theory of belligerent 
conduct across various issue areas during war. 
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argued that the United States has engaged in a systematic campaign of employing 
torture to extract intelligence from prisoners on terrorist activities, such as future 
attacks on the United States (Amnesty International 2004:23). This has been 
compounded by the use of rendition to send suspects to third-party countries known to 
use more permissive interrogation techniques for getting prisoners to talk (Forsythe 
2005:133). Irrespective of how they were treated during interrogation, thousands of 
prisoners have also languished for years without charge or trial in an official policy of 
indefinite detention. 
A full account of U.S. conduct in the War on Terror continues to change on an 
almost constant basis as new documents from the Bush administration’s deliberations 
over prisoner policies are publically released.275 The available evidence suggests the 
democratic restraints put forward for interstate wars may have little effect in the case 
of the War on Terror and counter-insurgency operations more generally. Normative 
commitments to individual rights and humane conduct are particularly challenging 
when the very legitimacy of the enemy is called into question. One theme that 
continually emerges in the internal correspondence among U.S. policy makers was a 
common perception that they were facing a completely new sort of threat and enemy 
(Lewis 2005:xiii). Traditional democratic principles appeared to be easily put aside 
when dealing with such a severe threat to the U.S. government and its populace.  
Debates over the legitimacy of the enemy also had implications for the strength 
of institutional restraints. Concerns over reciprocity are ultimately a function not only 
of the actual conduct of the adversary, but also expectations of how the enemy will 
behave. When perceiving a foe as entirely illegitimate, it follows that they will likely 
                                                 
275 Several large compendiums of leaked as well as officially-released government records from the 
early years after the September 11th terrorist attacks have been compiled (Danner 2004; Greenberg and 
Dratel 2005). These have been supplemented by several later releases and new evidence continues to 
come into the public light. 
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be viewed as either unwilling or unable to act in a humane manner. The targeted 
terrorist attacks against U.S. civilians suggested any U.S. soldiers would be treated 
just as brutally. In his justification for the choice to reject the application of the 
Geneva Conventions, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, asserted bluntly that 
any fears of retaliation against U.S. soldiers because of their government’s policies 
were ridiculous because “terrorists will not follow GPW [Geneva Convention] rules in 
any event” (Gonzales 2002:3) Several other officials still pointed to the danger posed 
to U.S. soldiers in the field if the administration rejected the Geneva Conventions. 
Perhaps reflecting his earlier military experience, then Secretary of State Colin Powell 
argued that such an approach would “reverse over a century of U.S. policy and 
practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the protection of the 
law of war for our troops, both in this specific conflict and in general” (Powell 2005 
[2002]:123). Given the U.S. administration’s final decision to set aside the 
Conventions, Powell’s opinion was nevertheless by far the minority view. 
Expectations over the nature and legitimacy of the enemy may also influence 
calculations over the relative strategic costs and benefits of abusing insurgent 
prisoners, such as through such acts as torture or indefinite detention. The amorphous 
nature of terrorist organizations like al Qaeda, along with the reliance on small groups 
for carrying out attacks, puts a much higher premium on obtaining intelligence from 
suspects. Officials like Cheney and others argued that only through the use of harsh 
interrogation methods could the United States extract the necessary information from 
prisoners to capture more terrorists and prevent future attacks against U.S. civilians 
and soldiers (Shane 2009:A14).  
In a similar manner for the issue of indefinite detention, many proponents of 
the policy felt their beliefs were reasonable given the unique threat posed by terrorist 
detainees. Their concerns appear to have been partly justified by a leaked 2009 
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Pentagon report, which argued that one in seven of the detainees released from the 
Guantanamo Bay prison were later found to be engaged in terrorism or other militant 
activities (Bumiller 2009:A1).276 Neither of the institutional mechanisms appeared to 
offer much restraint against the resort to abuse by the United States. Taken together 
with other contributing factors, it is perhaps not surprising that the treatment of 
captured terror suspects has been below that in many interstate wars involving 
democracies. 
Although an examination of conflicts other than interstate wars suggests that 
democracy might not provide much constraint against abuse, one final issue should be 
kept in mind when assessing the overall role of regime type. Just because democracies 
may be more likely to commit combatant abuse in such situations does not mean that 
regime type no longer matters. Taking the case of the war against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, U.S. violations certainly occurred but they pale in comparison to the 
brutality of the Soviet Union during its counter-insurgency war in the same country 
from 1979 to 1989. Soviet forces frequently adopted a take-no-prisoner stance during 
combat operations, and captured fighters from the Afghan mujahideen were often 
sadistically tortured (O'Ballance 1993:161; Arreguin-Toft 2005:183). Wars against 
terrorists and insurgents may certainly make all types of captor states more likely to 
resort to combatant abuse, but it is still yet to be determined whether democracies are 
just as likely to escalate to higher levels of abuse as their nondemocratic counterparts. 
Gaining a more definitive perspective on this question would require a more 
systematic study of combatant abuse across these other types of warfare, which is 
beyond the overall scope of my study. Regime type might still continue to matter even 
                                                 
276 Though as Bumiller notes, there are equal concerns over the methodology of the report and the 
broader implications of the findings for the danger posed by released terror suspects to U.S. national 
security. 
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in these more destructive contexts, though this may provide little comfort to the 
greater number of victims that will likely suffer in any event within such wars. 
Conclusion 
 My study of the causes of combatant abuse suggests that the lives of prisoners 
are often endangered, but that there are still grounds for optimism given many past 
instances of proper prisoner treatment. International norms proscribing the use of 
violence unfortunately appear to provide few protections to combatants in the custody 
of their adversary. The severity of the fighting itself, and in particular the aims 
countries seek to achieve through war, condition in various ways whether prisoners 
will ever be able to return home. Democracy appears to offer greater promise in 
protecting the rights of soldiers in captivity. However, as the overall analysis made 
clear, which is only reinforced by the preceding discussion of other types of war, the 
sources of democratic restraints are often highly contingent. As in many past conflicts, 
the decision of soldiers to surrender is often fraught with danger and will likely remain 
so for some time to come. 
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APPENDIX 
Summary of Interstate Wars Used in the Quantitative Analysis of the Causes of 
Combatant Abuse, 1898-2003 
War Name Start Year End Year
Spanish-American 1898 1898
Boxer Rebellion 1900 1900
Sino-Russian 1900 1900
Russo-Japanese 1904 1905
Third Central American 1906 1906
Fourth Central American 1907 1907
Spanish-Moroccan (Second) 1909 1910
Italo-Turkish 1911 1912
First Balkan 1912 1913
Second Balkan 1913 1913
WWIa (Western Allies-Central Powers) 1914 1918
WWIb (Russia-Central Powers) 1914 1917
WWIc (Romania-Central Powers) 1916 1917
WWId (Serbia-Central Powers) 1914 1918
Russo-Polish 1919 1920
Hungarian-Allies 1919 1919
Greco-Turkish 1919 1922
Franco-Turkish 1919 1921
Lithuanian-Polish 1920 1920
Sino-Soviet 1929 1929
Manchurian 1931 1933
Chaco 1932 1935
Saudi-Yemeni 1934 1934
Italo-Ethiopian 1935 1936
Third Sino-Japanese 1937 1945
Changkufeng 1938 1938
Nomonhan 1939 1939
WWIIa (Poland 1939) 1939 1939
WWIIb (Norway) 1940 1940
WWIIc (France) 1940 1940
Winter War (Russo-Finnish) 1939 1940
WWIId (Germany-Western Allies) 1941 1945
WWIIe (Greece) 1941 1941
WWIIf (German-Yugoslav) 1941 1941  
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Summary of Interstate Wars Used in the Quantitative Analysis of the Causes of 
Combatant Abuse, 1898-2003 (continued) 
War Name Start Year End Year
WWIIg (Eastern Front) 1941 1945
WWIIh (Pacific War) 1941 1945
WWIIi (Soviet-Japanese) 1945 1945
Franco-Thai 1940 1941
First Kashmir 1948 1949
Palestine 1948 1949
Korean War 1950 1953
Russo-Hungarian 1956 1956
Sinai 1956 1956
Assam (Sino-Indian) 1962 1962
Vietnam 1965 1975
Second Kashmir 1965 1965
Six Day 1967 1967
War of Attrition (Israeli-Egyptian) 1969 1970
Football (Soccer) 1969 1969
Bangladesh 1971 1971
Yom Kippur 1973 1973
Turco-Cypriot 1974 1974
Vietnamese-Cambodian 1975 1979
Ethopian-Somalian (Ogaden) 1977 1978
Ugandan-Tanzanian 1978 1979
First Sino-Vietnamese 1979 1979
Iran-Iraq 1980 1988
Falklands 1982 1982
Israel-Syria (Lebanon) 1982 1982
Second Sino-Vietnamese 1987 1987
Chad-Libya 1987 1987
Iraq-Kuwait War 1990 1990
First Gulf War 1991 1991
Nagorno-Karabakh 1992 1994
Ethiopia -Eritrea 1998 2000
Kargil 1999 1999
Kosovo 1999 1999
Afghanistan (Taliban-USA/Northern Alliance) 2001 2001
Second Gulf War 2003 2003  
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